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FOREWORD TO THE FIRST EDITION

Today more than at any previous time it is essential for the preservation of civilization that citizens everywhere be familiar with the outstanding issues that confront the nations. The period since 1914 has been crowded with events of world importance, with complex questions of war guilt, reparation, war debts, disarmament, reconstruction, national minorities, territorial readjustments, economic upheaval, and dictatorships. The mind is easily confused by the magnitude of some of the problems and by the technical aspects of others. Yet, only in the widespread knowledge of the origins and history of these factors can there be any real hope of future international harmony.

It is the aim of this volume to contribute to a clarification of the issues and to provide a readable, organized, and compact exposition of the world developments which, at the time of writing, appeared to be the most promising—or the most portentous.

February 1933 W.C.L.

FOREWORD TO THE SECOND EDITION

This edition contained no special foreword, since it merely included a supplementary chapter summarizing recent developments. It was published in October 1933.

W.C.L.

FOREWORD TO THE THIRD EDITION

The organization adopted in this edition is, in general, the same as that of the original issue. Every chapter, however, has been entirely rewritten

and one new chapter—on Latin America—has been added. The map equipment has, it is hoped, been greatly improved. The spellings of place names vary somewhat from the forms used in the earlier editions because it has seemed advisable, for the sake of uniformity, to employ in every case the orthography of the *Sixth Report of the United States Geographic Board 1890–1932,* 1933. Names of governing bodies are capitalized only when given in exact or full and literally-translated form. For the convenience of the reader, the dates of treaties and of the births and deaths of important individuals have been included in the index. The bibliography has been brought up to date, annotated, and extended so as to include references to each subject from differing viewpoints.

December 1935 W.C.L.

FOREWORD TO THE FOURTH EDITION

The chief innovation of this edition is the inclusion of a Part IV, entitled "The Road to Another War." This part covers the major European and Asiatic developments since 1935 and carries the story of international relations down to the outbreak of the new European war in September 1939. The organization of this part parallels that in the main body of the text and, wherever necessary, cross-references have been provided to tie up all portions of the book. The bibliography has been enlarged, brought up to date, and subdivided for the longer chapters. The index is unusually full. The whole story is related in such a way that the teacher or reader who feels that the account is somewhat lengthy may, by beginning with either Chapter IV or Chapter V, start his study with the year 1918 rather than go back to 1914.

January 1940 W.C.L.

FOREWORD TO THE FIFTH EDITION

Every chapter in this edition has been rewritten, so that not one page has remained without some change, large or small. The changes generally were

made for one or more of three reasons: either because new material had come to light, or because recent events dictated a shift in emphasis, or to conserve space. All material formerly printed in supplements has been rewritten and woven into the body of the text. The volume fortunately reverses an earlier trend by being somewhat shorter than its predecessor. But the lengthy bibliography has been retained and brought up to date. Throughout I have tried—how successfully remains for the reader to judge—to keep the narrative balanced, though it was written in a time, not merely of national, but of world crisis.

June 1943 W.C.L.

FOREWORD TO THE SIXTH EDITION

The chief difference between this edition and its immediate predecessor is the addition of five years' crowded history, covering the period 1943–1948. At the same time some minor changes have been made throughout the text. The particular form of organization adopted for the new part of the book has seemed to be the most teachable one for a confused, turbulent, and exciting period. Let it be repeated from an earlier foreword that the whole story is so organized as to make it feasible to begin the course in 1918 with Chapter IV or 1919 with Chapter V. Thus the reading matter may be shortened by from eighty to one hundred pages.

July 1948 W.C.L.

FOREWORD TO THE SEVENTH EDITION

This seventh edition is, in effect, a new work. The original chapters on the First World War were eliminated, and the story was made to begin with the Paris Peace Conference. This was done partly because a survey showed such omission to be the classroom trend and partly in order to leave more room for a description of events since 1948 (when the sixth edition was published) without unduly enlarging the book. The remaining chapters all were rewritten or at least revised. In some cases the emphases

were shifted as history made certain backgrounds more, or less, important. Organizational changes were made for the sake of better comprehension and in line with the more recent approaches to the study of world affairs.

W.C.L.

June 1954

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PART ONE

THE AFTERMATH OF WAR

CHAPTER 1

The Peace of Paris, 1919–1920

COST OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

The First World War, which lasted 1565 days, was the bloodiest and costliest war that had yet been fought.[1] During the conflict about 65,000,000 men were mobilized and made to participate, for a longer or shorter time, in the economically unproductive activity of organized destruction. Of these men about 13,000,000—one in five—died in action or of wounds. Approximately 22,000,000—one in three—were wounded, and of these, 7,000,000 were permanently disabled. A number of the wounded died within a few years after the war as a consequence of their disabilities.

More than twice as many men were killed in battle during the First World War as in all major wars from 1790 to 1913 together, including the Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War, the Danish War of 1864, the Austro-Prussian War, the American War between the States, the Franco-Prussian War, the Boer War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the Balkan Wars. Two-thirds of the men mobilized and two-thirds of those killed were on the Allied side. The estimated number of civilian deaths owing to the war was even greater than the number of soldier deaths. The noncombatants fell victim to starvation, disease, massacres, epidemics, and raids. In addition, the various national birth rates suffered decline.

[1] The Allied and Associated Powers or "Allies" comprised, in the order of their entry into the war: Serbia, Russia, France, Belgium, Great Britain, Montenegro, Japan, Italy, San Marino, Portugal, Romania, United States, Cuba, Panama, Greece, Siam, Liberia, China, Brazil, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Haiti, and Honduras. The "Central Powers" included Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria.

Equally staggering were the monetary costs of the combat and the destruction of property on land and sea. The average daily cost to all belligerents of the war in the first three years was $123,000,000. In 1918 the average daily cost was $244,000,000, that is, more than $10,000,000 per hour. The total net direct cost of conducting the war thus was $186,000,000,000, the Allies expending $126,000,000,000, and the Central Powers, $60,000,000,000. To this sum must be added property damage on land to the extent of almost $30,000,000,000; damage on sea aggregating $7,000,000,000; production losses of about $45,000,000,000; and war relief and losses to neutrals of more than $2,000,000,000. The total real economic cost amounted to $270,000,000,000.

When to this figure was added the $67,000,000,000 generally estimated as the capitalized value of the human lives lost as a direct consequence of the war, the total reached $337,000,000,000. This sum did not take into account the additional economic loss caused by the crippling and devitalization of soldiers and civilians, the billions of dollars of interest due on the debts contracted by the fighting powers, or the vast sums which continued to be appropriated as pension money. And yet it represented five and a half times as many dollars as the number of seconds which have elapsed since the birth of Christ. Verily, the men who met to consider the terms of peace after the First World War faced a grave responsibility—the responsibility of so settling conditions that the loss in lives and goods should not have been in vain.

THE PEACE CONFERENCE LEADERS

Long before the armistice celebrations of November 1918 subsided, Paris, having been chosen as the site for the conclusion of peace, made ready for this new festival. The French capital prepared to receive some of the most distinguished statesmen, jurists, and scholars of the Allied world, who would coöperate in the drafting of a peace settlement. There were not to be any Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, Turks, or Bulgarians at the conference. These would be called in later—to affix their signatures to completed documents.

In December 1918 President Woodrow Wilson embarked for Europe. Against the advice of judicious friends, he had determined to attend the conference in person. His arrival in Europe was eagerly anticipated, not so much by the statesmen as by the people. A general feeling seemed to prevail that he was the one person who could "rise above the tumult of pas-

sion" that surged through the world. Everywhere the President's reception was commensurate with the glamour attached to his name. In England, Londoners crowded into the streets to get a glimpse of the great Wilson. Frenchmen, it is said, burst into tears in his presence. Not since the days of the ancient empire had Rome witnessed such a triumphal march as that accorded the President of the United States. Even in Germany he was considered a savior. Small wonder that he should have thought himself in control of matters in Paris.

But the glamour was deceptive. Actually Wilson did not have the support of his own countrymen. Though he announced that it was with the "greatest enthusiasm and pleasure" that he accepted the "mandate" of the United States people to draw up a treaty of the type which he contemplated, his own party had been defeated in the congressional elections of 1918. The Republicans captured a majority in both houses, and hence the new Senate—the one which would decide on the acceptance or rejection of the treaty to be drawn up in Paris—was hostile to the Administration. To make matters worse, the President went to Europe without taking along any really influential member of the Republican Party.[2]

With the President went Secretary of State Robert Lansing and Henry White. The latter was a retired Republican career diplomat who spoke French fluently, dressed well, and had been ambassador to France, but who had little influence among Europeans or in the affairs of his party. The remaining two members of the delegation already were in Europe: General Tasker Bliss, a scholar as well as a soldier, and a man whose abilities were not always recognized at the time; and Colonel Edward M. House, who had preceded Wilson to make the necessary preparations. So far as United States politics was concerned, the peace would be Democratic, and some of the Republican senators would vote against it as a mere matter of party loyalty.

Wilson's tactical mistakes were, in some measure, the result of his character and personality. His idealism frequently was above the heads of the people and he found it difficult to make himself understood. Apparently he was willing to sacrifice much, even friendships, for the sake of his ideals. Though his knowledge of European problems and affairs was limited, he sometimes neglected or was unable to give adequate attention to the reports drawn up after months of investigation and research by the technical experts

[2] Wilson further increased his unpopularity at home by ordering Postmaster-General Albert Burleson to assume control over all transatlantic cable lines in order that news to and from Europe might be censored.

whom he had taken to Europe to advise him on matters within their respective fields of knowledge. In diplomacy, Wilson was no match for his foreign colleagues at Paris.

The leading delegate from Great Britain was David Lloyd George, head of the Liberal Party and prime minister since 1916. Feeling that his government ought to receive a vote of confidence from the British people before he went to the conference, "Little Davey" called for elections in December 1918. His party's chief slogans during the ensuing "khaki campaign" were: "Make Germany Pay," "Hang the Kaiser," and "Shilling for Shilling and Ton for Ton." The London *Daily Mail,* owned by Lord Northcliffe and managed by his brother, Lord Rothermere, aided Lloyd George with the cry: "They will cheat you yet—those Huns!" The premier won an overwhelming victory, his coalition securing a majority of more than 250 seats.

Lloyd George was one of the most interesting personalities at the Paris Peace Conference. With his shock of gray hair, his boundless energy and restlessness, his alert mind and lightninglike decisions which often were unmade as quickly as they were made, with his dislike for matters of detail, his humor and wit, his emotionalism and cleverness, his indifference to any mistakes he might make, and his wisdom in relying upon the advice of a staff of expert assistants, the Welsh attorney might have occupied a position of prominence at the gathering even if he had represented a less important country than Great Britain. Lloyd George was rarely at a loss to find the most appealing argument to the "vanity, weakness, or self-interest" of his immediate listener. Consistently and unerringly he was able to find "the weak joints in an adversary's harness."

The British Premier and his contingent were much better informed on the day-to-day growth of the treaty than were the United States or French delegates. The reason for this was no mystery. The treaty terms were drafted by numerous committees, each in charge of a certain section, meeting in different hotels. The British committeemen were required every evening to send a report of the day's proceedings to a central office under Lord Hardinge at the Hotel Majestic, where mimeographed reports of all minutes were made. These were distributed, on the same evening, to all British representatives. This arrangement gave the British committeemen a great advantage over their colleagues.

The French deputation was led by Georges Clemenceau, variously nicknamed "Tiger" and *Père la Victoire.* Clemenceau, it has been said, had one illusion—France; and one disillusion—mankind, including Frenchmen. The "Tiger" was old. He had been a newspaper correspondent in the United States during the War between the States, almost sixty years before the

meeting of the peace conference. He had seen much and experienced much, and he had become skeptical and cynical. Until he himself came into power, Clemenceau had been violently opposed to governmental oppression and censorship and had been instrumental in bringing about the overthrow of almost a score of cabinets at various times in his career. Yet, when he became premier and minister of war, from 1917 to 1920, he devised an efficient "gagging machine" of his own. Clemenceau probably was the best diplomat at the conference, far surpassing his colleagues in knowledge of world affairs and human nature. He was prudent and diplomatic, and paid lip service to the United States ideals and British hopes. Clemenceau never lost sight of the goals which he had set for himself at the conference: to exalt and secure France, and to weaken Germany.

Premier Vittorio Orlando and Sidney Sonnino headed the Italian delegation. Orlando was a learned, eloquent, and artful diplomat, a Sicilian, and an ex-professor of law. However, he had no command of English and hence exerted relatively little influence in the general proceedings. Besides, he irritated Wilson by insisting on the fulfillment of certain secret treaties which had been the price of Italy's participation in the war. Sonnino, though usually considered the dominant delegate, was too stubborn to be a good diplomat. Signori Francesco Nitti and Tommaso Tittoni, who later replaced these men as Italy's representatives, were little more successful in pleading their country's cause.

The less important delegates at Paris also constituted an interesting group. Clemenceau's colleagues, well in the background, were Stephen Pichon, André Tardieu, and Jules Cambon. Since Clemenceau "was by nature and experience not likely to share his power with anyone," his aides rarely attempted to challenge his supremacy. President Poincaré and Marshal Foch, however, though not official delegates to the conference, had considerable influence. Both men had set their hearts upon crushing Germany and they were ready to go even farther in achieving this aim than was Clemenceau. Indeed, Poincaré's opposition to Wilson's ideas so annoyed the latter that he long hesitated to accept a farewell dinner invitation tendered by the French executive. Lloyd George was accompanied by Arthur James Balfour, Andrew Bonar Law, and George N. Barnes, minister of pensions. From Greece came Eleutherios Venizelos, the "Ulysses of the Conference." Poland sent as her chief delegate Roman Dmowski, but when he failed to convince the conference of the justice of his demands, the Poles sent the great pianist, Ignace Jan Paderewski, to see whether he could harmonize the conflicting interests of his countrymen with those of their neighbors. Paderewski soon discovered, to his sorrow, that he was no match for the

international politicians gathered at Paris. The representatives of Japan, led by Kimmochi Saionji and Nobuaki Makino, played a shrewd game at the conference. They had little to say on European questions, not wishing to make enemies, but when the discussions concerned the Far East they were all the more vocal. In general, they voted with the United States and Great Britain.

The long-suffering and persecuted Armenians sent as their chief spokesman Boghos Nubar Pasha, who demanded a stretch of territory extending from the Caspian to the Black and Mediterranean seas. He reënforced his pleas with a thrilling summary of Armenian massacres through the ages. From Belgium came Foreign Minister Paul Hymans; from new-born Czechoslovakia, Premier Karel Kramář and Foreign Minister Eduard Beneš; from Yugoslavia,[3] Premier Nicola Pashich and Dr. Ante Trumbich. Romania was represented by her premier, Jon Bratianu, while from South Africa came Generals Jan C. Smuts and Louis Botha, able statesmen both. The case of the Zionist Jews was placed in the hands of Dr. Chaim Weizmann of London. The Portuguese and Siamese, the Estonians and Livonians, the Lebanese and Georgians, all were represented, and even the far-off Koreans selected two delegates. These last, however, were able to accomplish little, for they arrived as the conference was about to wind up its affairs.

ORGANIZATION AND PROBLEMS OF THE CONFERENCE

The leading belligerent governments, long before the armistice, had appointed experts to collect data on all subjects that might come within the sphere of discussion at the expected peace conference. Since the Allies made no attempt to coördinate their efforts in this direction, and since much of the work was done by subordinates or by people who had no connection with either the war or foreign-affairs departments in their respective countries, some of the labor was wasted. A large portion of it, however, was invaluable, and frequently "ideas appeared at the conference which could be traced back to laborious pens working at a time when the Germans seemed almost invincible."

In the United States, a group of experts was gathered by Colonel House to study the linguistic, economic, and ethnographic factors in Central and Eastern European history. The activities of this group provided the background for the Fourteen Points (see note on pp. 11–12), and furnished Pres-

[3] For the sake of brevity, "Yugoslavia" will be used to designate the nation known officially, from 1918 until 1929, as "the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes."

ident Wilson with a tentative scheme for territorial settlements. Similar preparations were made in other countries, and such national groups as the Poles and Czechs had well-functioning propaganda committees that did considerable work of a like nature. As a result, every delegation that came to Paris brought with it a clutter of statistics and memoranda.

The first plenary session of the peace conference was held on January 18, 1919. Most of the nations of the world were represented, there being seventy delegates and plenipotentiaries, and numerous substitutes. Accompanying each delegation was a large staff of secretaries, advisers, journalists, and representatives of varied interests. Fifty or sixty nationals each came from even the smaller countries, and each nation wanted at least one hotel as its own special headquarters. So large and unwieldy a group could not possibly do business efficiently, and only six plenary sessions were held. For all practical purposes, the conference consisted of the Supreme Peace Council, or Council of Ten, made up of the two chief delegates from the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. While this "Big Ten" assumed the right to decide what should or should not be taken up at the larger conference meetings, the five principal Allied and Associated Powers also insisted on membership on every committee or commission that was appointed. Supported, as Clemenceau pointed out, by twelve-million soldiers, the great powers found little difficulty in convincing the smaller ones of their paramount interests.

It soon was felt that even a body of ten was too large for expedition and secrecy, and in March 1919 it was announced that henceforth the brunt of the work would be borne by the Council of Four, consisting of the chiefs from the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy. The "Big Four" held 145 sessions. Japan voiced no objection to this arrangement, since the Japanese delegates rarely had attended meetings anyway. In April, Orlando left Paris in a huff because Wilson addressed an appeal to the Italian people over his head, and thereafter the "Big Three" conducted their meetings in strictest secrecy. Clemenceau's knowledge of English made it possible to dispense with the services of even the official interpreter.

The routine and investigation work of the conference was accomplished in the 1600 meetings held by the 58 commissions and committees that were appointed. The Commission on the League of Nations, the Commission on Reparation for Damages, and the Commission on Territorial Problems were among the more important of these bodies. Because the final treaty was basically a summation of the work of the many committees, its terms probably were more severe than they might otherwise have been. Each committee went ahead with its assignment, frequently oblivious of what the

other committees were doing. In the end, paradoxical as it may seem, the whole appeared greater than the sum of its parts. But by that time it was late and the delegates were impatient to go home.

The number of knotty problems that faced the conference was legion. Not only did the Paris assemblage have to draw up peace terms which would satisfy at least the more important of the Allied countries, and agree on a covenant for a league of nations that would be acceptable to forty or fifty not particularly friendly nations, but it had to feed the starving millions in Central and Eastern Europe,[4] control the restless victorious armies, satisfy hysterical public opinions at home, and make peace among the dozen nations that fought their own little wars after the First World War came to an end. In the days immediately following the war, Europe resembled a seething cauldron. Poles and Ukrainians, Romanians and Hungarians, Greeks and Turks, Serbs and Montenegrins, Czechs and Germans, Russians and Armenians, Italians and Yugoslavs, all were engaged in combat. The great powers themselves were so much at odds over policies and viewpoints that the Versailles Treaty in its final form might never have been signed had Germany possessed a second Bismarck or a Charles de Talleyrand to look after her interests. In retrospect it seems miraculous that any treaty was drawn up in the pandemonium that was Europe in 1919.

The question of publicity was among the first to require solution. Wilson's advocacy of "open covenants of peace, openly arrived at" seemed to imply that there should be no secrecy. Actually, most of the important meetings were held behind closed doors. Precisely what went on during the meetings of the Big Three may never be known, since few minutes were kept. Newspapermen were admitted to the plenary sessions and general meetings and were given releases for their papers, but the doors of the other council chambers were opened only occasionally, and then usually for photographers. All reports from France to the United States and from the United States to France were censored, lest Americans hear of the dissensions in Europe or Europeans discover the weakening support accorded Wilson by his countrymen. The secrecy was often justifiable. The war hysteria, far from dying out with the signing of the armistice, seemed to become greater as the conference dragged on, and the acrimonious haggling following each leakage of proposed territorial or other adjustments increased the tension. In the plenary sessions, to which newspapermen had access, the

[4] Herbert Hoover served as director-general of Allied relief in Paris. Incidentally, the Allied blockade of Germany was rigidly enforced until March 14, 1919, when the Brussels Agreement was reached permitting Germany to buy foodstuffs from the outside world. This post-armistice enforcement was bitterly resented by the Germans.

bedlam of languages made it difficult to get accurate news. Everything that was said had to be interpreted for someone, and not infrequently the interpreter varied the style, increased the bombast, or added to the errors of the speaker. Paul Mantoux, the ablest of the interpreters, saved the dignity of many a speaker by translating freely but sensibly.

Perhaps the greatest difficulty confronting the delegates was that of reconciling the dispositions agreed upon in the wartime "Secret Treaties" with the idealistic principles laid down by Wilson in his Fourteen Points and accepted by Germany, in modified form, as the basis for the peace discussions.[5] In defending the final Versailles Treaty before a group of

[5] Between 1915 and 1917 the leading Allied states concluded several secret agreements whereby they virtually apportioned the Ottoman Empire among themselves and whereby Italy was promised territory previously held by Austria-Hungary, Albania, and Turkey as well as some land in Africa.

The best-known of several Allied statements of war aims came from President Wilson on January 8, 1918. In an address to Congress, the President summarized his program for a "peace without victory" in "Fourteen Points" as follows:

1. "Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at," and the abolition of secret diplomacy.
2. "Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war" except by international action.
3. "The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers [tariffs] and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions. . . ."
4. "Adequate guarantees . . . that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety."
5. "A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims" with proper consideration of the "interests of the populations concerned."
6. "The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest coöperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy. . . ."
7. The evacuation and restoration of Belgium.
8. The evacuation and restoration of France and the return of Alsace-Lorraine.
9. "A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality."
10. The "freest opportunity of autonomous development" for the peoples of Austria-Hungary.
11. Evacuation and restoration of Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro; free access to the sea for Serbia; determination by friendly counsel of "the relations of the several Balkan states to one another"; and international guarantees of the economic and territorial integrity of the Balkan states.
12. Autonomous development for the non-Turkish possessions of the sultan and internationalization of the Dardanelles.
13. Resurrection of an independent Poland with access to the sea.
14. Formation of "a general association of nations . . . under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small alike."

Several times throughout 1918 Wilson reiterated these views in an effort to convince the people in the Allied and enemy countries that the Fourteen Points really were the aims for which the war was being continued. Thousands of copies of the

United States Senators in the autumn of 1919, Wilson stated that he had known nothing about the Secret Treaties when he made his speech embodying the Fourteen Points (January 1918) and that he first saw the documents when he arrived in Europe for the conference. It was hard to reconcile this statement with available evidence.

During his mission to America in April 1917, British Foreign Secretary Balfour discussed at least the London Treaty with both Colonel House and President Wilson, and in January 1918 he wrote directly to the President about "his thoughts on the Italian territorial claims under the Treaty of London concluded in 1915." In March 1918 he stated in the House of Commons that Wilson was being kept fully informed by the Allies, and in May he told the same body: "I have no secrets from President Wilson. Every thought I have in the way of diplomacy connected with the war is absolutely open to President Wilson." Furthermore, after their successful revolution of November 1917, the Bolsheviks gave out for publication the texts of all Secret Treaties found in the Russian archives. The texts were printed in the *Manchester Guardian* and a few weeks later in the *New York Evening Post,* thus becoming "public property" long before the armistice. As early as July 1917, moreover, Wilson had written House to the effect that United States economic power would be such that the Allies must perforce accept her peace program. Great Britain and France, he wrote, "have not the same views with regard to peace that we have by any means. When the War is over we can force them to our way of thinking."

Here, then, appeared to have been the crux of the matter. Wilson seemed to have thought that he could force the Allies into his way of thinking, and therefore did not trouble to remember the Secret Treaties. They were unimportant to him and hence were easily forgotten. When he was confronted with them again, in 1919, as an obstacle to his scheme of peace, their existence might well have been a shock to him. Consequently it was possible, as Colonel House pointed out nine years later, that, in the confusion and turmoil and under the suspicious cross-examination of inquisitorial senators, Wilson, in denying any foreknowledge of the documents, might have spoken "from conviction," not being able to remember "on the spur of the moment . . . when he first heard of this or that."

At any rate, Wilson's idealism came into sharp conflict with materialism at the conference—and in most cases materialism triumphed. Sometimes

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points were scattered over German trenches and towns by Allied airplanes to shake the power of the Hohenzollern Government. The authorities in Great Britain, France, and Italy, however, never officially accepted all the points, though they did not protest against them during the conflict. Consequently a protracted quarrel between Wilson and the Allied statesmen was made inevitable at the peace conference.

Wilson was firm. Thus, during an impasse over the Saar question, he threatened to go home unless he had his way. Again, he showed such firmness in refusing to give Fiume to Italy that Orlando and Sonnino went home, ill-humored and piqued. These instances, however, were rare and some of them probably hastened rather than arrested the decline of the President's prestige.

Last among the general obstacles to progress at the conference was the temporary return to their respective countries, in February and March 1919, of Wilson and Lloyd George. President Wilson returned to consider the bills that Congress had passed during his absence and to explain to the Senate the tentative draft of the League Covenant. Lloyd George returned to Great Britain to console the increasing number of unemployed with promises of a bright future. During this interim, too, Clemenceau was shot. His attacker was convicted of "murder" and sentenced to death, but at Clemenceau's request the sentence was commuted to a term in prison.[6]

DRAFTING AND SIGNING OF THE VERSAILLES TREATY

The greatest difficulty in the actual drawing up of the treaty terms was experienced in connection with the following points: (1) the wording of a league of nations covenant; (2) the question of French security and the fate of the left bank of the Rhine; (3) the Italian and Polish claims; (4) the disposition of the erstwhile German colonies and the former possessions of the Turkish Empire; and (5) the reparation for damages that was to be exacted from Germany.

A serious difference of opinion arose over the advisability of incorporating the projected covenant in the general peace agreement. Wilson insisted on having it included in the treaty, lest the nations, in their preoccupation with other matters, shelve the covenant indefinitely. He had his way,[7] and the second plenary session, in January 1919, appointed him chairman of a committee to draft the covenant. His leading colleagues on the commission, which represented fourteen states, were Robert Cecil, Léon Bourgeois, Orlando, Makino, and Smuts. In February Wilson presented a completed report to another plenary session of the conference. It met with considerable criticism, and, in all, 26 changes were made before the covenant was finally adopted (April 28). Against the wishes of France, a new article, 21, was

[6] The armistice with Germany, which had been renewed in December 1918 and January 1919, was again extended in February 1919.

[7] Wilson probably was correct in his reasoning, but the fact that the covenant formed an integral part of the peace treaties later proved to be a weakening factor in the life of the League.

added, giving recognition for the first time in a diplomatic document to the Monroe Doctrine: "Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace." The Japanese attempted to have inserted into the covenant an amendment confirming the principle of the equality of nations and the just treatment of their nationals. This was rejected, owing chiefly to the wishes of Great Britain and Australia, lest it lead to a movement for unrestricted Oriental immigration.

Simultaneously with the problem of wording a covenant arose the question of providing France with the security for which she longed. Reminiscences of what had happened along the Rhine frontier during the past century, and the fear that Germany might seek revenge, made the French delegates panicky in their attempts to forestall future invasions. The only means of achieving this security, it seemed to them, was so to cripple Germany—politically, militarily, economically, and commercially—that she never again could threaten France. Poincaré and Foch, in particular, were imbued with this idea, and during the course of the proceedings the marshal said: "Recourse must be had in the first place to all the means provided by Nature, and Nature has placed but one barrier across the line of invasion: the Rhine."

In accordance with this view, Foch and his followers demanded that Germany's western frontier be fixed at the Rhine and that the 10,000 square miles of territory between the Rhine on the east and the Netherlands, Belgium, and France on the west be erected into an autonomous state, more or less under French protection. Actually, in anticipation of a favorable opportunity, France and Russia in 1917 had signed an agreement providing for precisely this type of buffer state. The arrangement, however, had never met with the approval of Great Britain, and at the conference both the British and United States delegations strenuously opposed the creation of another "Alsace-Lorraine."

After prolonged bargaining Clemenceau agreed to a compromise. The area in question was to be occupied by Allied troops for a stated period of years after the signing of the treaty. The northern sector, including the bridgehead at Cologne, was to be occupied for five years; the central zone, with the bridgehead at Coblenz, for ten years; and the southern sector, including the bridgehead at Mainz, for fifteen years. All the time limits, however, were made contingent upon Germany's prompt fulfillment of the other parts of the treaty; otherwise the occupation might continue indefinitely. In addition, a zone extending 50 kilometers (31 miles) east of the Rhine

was to be "demilitarized." In other words, no fortifications might be built and no armed forces assembled in the district. *Die Wacht am Rhein* was to be terminated.

Still further to reassure the French, Woodrow Wilson and Lloyd George promised to sign special treaties which would guarantee that the United States and Great Britain, respectively, would come to the aid of France in case of "invasion" by Germany. Upon Clemenceau's insistence the word "invasion" was changed to "aggression," and the "Tiger" at last was satisfied. On June 28, 1919, therefore, when the Versailles Treaty was signed, two supplementary Guarantee Treaties, one Franco-British and the other Franco-United States, also were signed. These documents specifically guaranteed the eastern boundary of France against German aggression.[8]

Meanwhile another problem, related to that of French security, had arisen: the disposition of the Saar Basin. This Rhenish territory, lying east of Lorraine and belonging, at the time, partly to Prussia and partly to Bavaria, was known to be one of the world's greatest coal-producing sections. With an area of 723 square miles and a population of 660,000 (1919), it was a valuable stretch of territory. In 1913 its coal output was 17,000,000 tons—equal to 40 per cent of the entire French production. In that same year it also produced 2,000,000 tons of steel, as well as large quantities of glass and pottery. The estimated coal reserves of the Saar Basin in 1913 were 17,000,000,000 tons, that is, more than those in all France, and more than a fifth of Germany's prewar reserves. Now, since the Germans had destroyed many coal mines in northern France, it was felt by the Allies that compensation in kind should be paid to the victims. Clemenceau demanded the cession of the basin.

From the viewpoints of history and ethnology, the claims of the French to the region were almost nil. Nearly all the inhabitants were German in stock and sympathy. From the point of view of reparation, France had better claims, particularly since Saar coal appeared essential to the proper development of the Lorraine iron fields. The two regions had formed a solid economic unit before the war. The problem facing the conference, therefore, was how to give France the coal without giving her the land and people. A committee of British, French, and United States experts was delegated to solve the riddle. The arrangement proposed by this group carried out the intentions of the peace conference as nearly as seemed possible, and hence was accepted as a solution. France was given ownership of all the coal mines and mining accessories. The entire district was included in the French customs boundary and French money was to circulate there freely.

[8] For the ultimate fate of the Guarantee Treaties see pp. 75–76.

France was given permission to set up schools for the children of the miners and to prescribe instruction in French. The value of the coal removed was to be credited to Germany's reparation account.

While certain important rights were reserved to France, the territory was to be governed by a commission of the League of Nations. At the end of fifteen years the inhabitants should vote "by communes or districts" as to "the sovereignty under which they desire to be placed." This sovereignty might be an autonomous state under League control, or it might be France, or Germany. All men and women "more than twenty years old at the date of voting," who lived in the Saar at the time of the signing of the treaty, were declared eligible to participate in the plebiscite. After the balloting the League should decide the sovereignty, "taking into account the wishes of the inhabitants as expressed by voting." If the Saar went back to Germany, the latter should repurchase control of the mines from France at a price determined by three experts, a Frenchman, a German, and an appointee of the League.

The single item that took up more of the time of the conference leaders than any other was that arising from the conflict of the Italian demands with those of the newly formed Serbo-Croat-Slovene state. In addition to insisting on the fulfillment of the terms of the Treaty of London—under which she had been promised territory extending from the Brenner Pass in the Tirol to the port of Valona in Albania, plus the Dodecanese Islands and some land in Africa and Asia—Italy now also demanded the port of Fiume and an extra part of the Dalmatian coast, both of which had belonged to Austria-Hungary. That the Tirol contained 250,000 German-speaking Austrians; that the Italian acquisitions in the northeast, including Gorizia, Gradisca, and Istria, contained about 300,000 Southslavs; and that the Dodecanese Islands were almost wholly Greek in population, did not deter Italy from seeking, in addition, to annex more Dalmatian territory in which the Slavs several times outnumbered the Italian residents.

Italy wanted Fiume not only for commercial reasons but to prevent the appearance of a new, strong rival in the Adriatic. One of the reasons for the prewar enmity between Italy and Austria-Hungary had been the struggle for the control of the Adriatic, and now that the Austro-Hungarian peril was removed Italy did not propose to allow another rival to come upon the stage. Rome knew that without Fiume Yugoslavia could not readily achieve maritime greatness.

Orlando and Sonnino advanced several claims to the extra territory which they desired. They maintained that Italy had several times "saved" the Allies during the war and hence deserved special consideration. They

pointed out that Russia's defection had made the conflict last longer than Italy had expected, thus entailing greater sacrifices than she had bargained for. Lastly, strategic and geographic reasons were advanced to establish Italy's claim to Fiume, it being demonstrated that the port was directly *connected* with Italy by sea, but *separated* from Yugoslavia by mountains.

The Slavic delegates were not backward in presenting their view of the case. They showed that of all their country's railways the only good ones led to Fiume. They cited the principle of national self-determination and quoted figures to show that the Slavs far outnumbered the Italians in Dalmatia, while in Fiume itself, if the suburb of Sušak were included, the two nationalities were at least equally represented. The fact that the Italians opposed a plebiscite in the region added to the plausibility of this claim. Finally, it could not be gainsaid that the new kingdom needed a seaport; and the only available good port was Fiume. The Serbs could see no reason, therefore, why Italy should further add to her already large Slavic minority.

After the Council of Four had listened to all arguments, a Dalmatian line was drawn, giving Italy somewhat less than the Treaty of London had promised. Orlando and Sonnino, knowing that its acceptance would result in the overthrow of their government, unhesitatingly rejected this "Wilson" or "American Line." When Wilson thereupon appealed to the Italian people over the heads of the two delegates, the latter angrily quitted Paris. Though they returned after some days, cheered by a vote of confidence in the Chamber of Deputies, their ministry did soon fall. Signori Nitti and Tittoni, who replaced them, were equally unsuccessful in achieving a satisfactory settlement, and so the Fiume-Adriatic controversy raged on after the conference terminated. It later was settled by direct negotiation between Italy and Yugoslavia (see p. 150 and n.).

The Polish question, though perplexing enough, was not so disconcerting as that of Fiume. Since the Allies had promised to restore a united and independent Poland, with access to the sea, it merely remained for the committee in charge to delimit the proper boundaries. Few people took seriously the exaggerated demands advanced by the Polish delegates, but a snag was struck when it was suggested that in order to give Poland her outlet to the sea East Prussia might have to be severed from Germany. A corridor, including the city of Danzig with its German population of 300,000, might have to be created, it was explained, and placed under Polish control. In the case of Danzig, at least, this would be a violation of the principle of self-determination, but it was considered better to sacrifice German nationality than Polish commercial potentialities. Accordingly, there were assigned to Poland large sections of West Prussia and Posen, in which Ger-

mans and Poles were well intermingled because the German governments had fostered colonization in this originally Polish territory.

This arrangement, incidentally, fitted in well with the twofold plan of France to weaken Germany and to create a strong eastern ally to take the place which Russia had occupied in the prewar system of alliances. In the words of Pichon, France wanted a Poland *"grande et forte, très forte."* Owing chiefly to the opposition of Lloyd George, who had no interest in a strong Poland and who feared a German-Polish war, the Marienwerder district east of the Vistula River was not to be given to Poland without a plebiscite. Danzig, moreover, was made a free city, economically subservient to Poland but administered by the League of Nations.

The allocation of Germany's former colonies and of the erstwhile possessions of the crumbling Ottoman Empire was another troublesome issue. Some of the Allied statesmen favored outright partition and annexation, but others objected to this solution as being too obviously imperialistic and contrary to the expressed Allied war aims. Yet, since restoring the possessions to their former owners would be unwise from a business viewpoint as well as supposedly unjust to millions of mistreated natives, some other formula had to be evolved. A way out of the dilemma was suggested in a pamphlet entitled *The League of Nations,* published in December 1918 by General Smuts.

In this brochure Smuts discussed a scheme that had been mentioned by several persons at the conference and which later came to be known as the "mandate system." The plan was to dispose of the territories that were to be taken from Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey by assigning them to the League. This last was then to "delegate its authority" to some other state which it might appoint "as its agent and mandatory," subject to certain supervisory restrictions. Wilson took this design and applied it to Syria, Mesopotamia, and Palestine, and to all German possessions except Kiaochow.[9]

Approximately 1,250,000 square miles of land, with a population of about 19,000,000 and an annual trade of $166,000,000, were given to the League of Nations which, in turn, was to allot them to various mandatory powers. These were to act as stewards for the League in the protection of the relatively backward peoples who as yet were unable to stand alone in the complex world. The actual mandatory distributions followed closely the

[9] France also reincorporated in French Equatorial Africa 100,000 square miles of land ceded to Germany in 1912, while Portugal regained the "Kionga Triangle" (400 square miles) taken by Germany in the nineteenth century from Portuguese East Africa.

terms of the Secret Treaties. All League members were promised equal commercial and trading opportunities in the mandates, and the mandatories were required to report annually to a League of Nations Mandates Commission.[10]

The disposition of the Kiaochow leasehold caused great difficulties because China, one of the Allies, demanded its return to her, while Japan, another Ally, refused to give it up. Wilson favored the Chinese claims, but wavered when Japan threatened to remain outside the League unless her occupation were recognized. Lloyd George and Clemenceau also explained to Wilson that in order to secure the assistance of the Japanese fleet against enemy submarines in 1917 they had promised to let Japan keep Kiaochow. Eventually, therefore, it was agreed to give Germany's former rights in the Shantung Peninsula to Japan. At the same time, however, Tokyo promised to restore the area to China, retaining only certain important economic privileges. The Chinese delegation opposed this decision and refused to sign the Versailles Treaty. Hence China did not become a member of the League until the ratification of the Treaty of St. Germain with Austria. It was some time before Japan kept her promise to give Kiaochow back to China.

One of the last items to be settled, though it had been among the first to be mentioned, was that of reparation. On the presumption that Germany was principally responsible for the war, an Allied pre-Armistice note had stipulated that the Germans would be expected to pay for "all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and to their property by the aggression of Germany, by land, by sea, and from the air." Now, when the commission on reparation of the conference met, the British and French delegates insisted that Germany be held liable for all costs of the war and for pensions as well as for actual damages. The United States representatives denied the justice of this plea and appeal was made to the Council of Four. Here Wilson was able to arrange an agreement that, except in the case of Belgium, the war costs were not to be added to the damages; however, pensions were reckoned as damages rather than as war costs. Ten categories of damages were listed and it remained only to set the figure that Germany must pay.

The United States members of the commission wanted to set a fixed sum, with definite time and methods of payment. They believed that the factor of certainty would be helpful to both sides, since the one would know on how much aid it could rely for rebuilding purposes and the other could make definite plans for paying off its obligations. The remaining commis-

[10] For the distribution of the mandates see pp. 52–53.

sioners, however, refused to give any definite statements of their damage estimates. They thought that any sum, no matter how large, would be unsatisfactory to their constituencies at home and might result in the overthrow of the existing ministries. Furthermore, they wanted Germany to pay to the limit of her capacity and they were afraid of setting too low a sum. It soon became evident, moreover, that even those who favored fixing a sum could not agree on a satisfactory figure, the demands varying from $15,000,000,000 to $200,000,000,000. Eventually the matter was shelved for future settlement, with only a temporary arrangement for immediate payments on account. Accordingly it was stated that Germany should pay by May 1921, in gold or its equivalent, a total of 20,000,000,000 marks (almost $5,000,000,000). A special reparation commission, meanwhile, was to set a fixed total and regulate the method of future payments. Now, with the chief stumbling blocks removed, the treaty was at last given definite form, and the Germans were ordered to call for the document.

Upon receipt of the order to send delegates for the terms, Germany announced its intention to send subordinate officials to bring the document to Berlin for consideration by the authorities. The Allies interpreted this as insulting and warned Germany to send a full-fledged diplomatic delegation at once. The warning was heeded and a German delegation of six, led by Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau, former Imperial German Minister to Denmark and now foreign minister of the republic, arrived at Versailles. The movements of the delegates were restricted. They were guarded by Allied officers, were kept in their hotel behind barbed wire, and were forbidden to communicate with the Allied deputies.

On May 7, 1919, the fourth anniversary of the sinking of the *Lusitania,* the peace terms were formally presented by Clemenceau in the small Trianon Palace near Versailles. As the Allied and American delegations arrived, they were saluted by a guard of honor. This guard was withdrawn when the Germans were called. Then Clemenceau, addressing the representatives of the German Republic as *"Messieurs les délégués de l'Empire allemand,"* said: "You have before you the accredited plenipotentiaries of all the small and great powers united to fight together in the war that has been so cruelly imposed upon them. The time has come when we must settle our accounts. You have asked for peace. We are ready to give you peace."

Brockdorff-Rantzau, possibly because of emotion and oncoming illness, tactlessly replied to Clemenceau without rising. He admitted that his countrymen "were under no illusion as to the extent of their defeat and the degree of their helplessness," but he denied that Germany was solely responsible for the war and announced that Germany, though friendless, still had right

and justice on her side. This attitude was widely interpreted as additional proof of Germany's inability to understand any language other than force.

Clemenceau notified the German delegation that three weeks would be allowed in which to consider the terms, that no oral discussion would be permitted, and that all complaints would have to be submitted in writing. Under this injunction an average of one German note a day reached the Allies and whatever discussion there was took place in the columns of the newspaper press. As was to be expected, the announcement of the terms in Germany resulted in an unrestrained outburst. Radicals, moderates, and reactionaries alike denounced Allied "treachery" and "deceit." Popular sentiment was well expressed by Chancellor Philipp Scheidemann (Social Democrat) when he said: "What hand would not wither that sought to lay itself and us in those chains?" [11] After a brief extension of the time limit, the German delegation submitted a detailed memorandum to the Allies. It contained an elaborate commentary on the treaty, denied that Germany alone was responsible for the contest, and emphasized the impossibility of fulfilling all the terms. The treaty itself covered 230 large printed pages; the German reply occupied 443 pages.

Ten committees were set to work on the German memorandum and the results of their deliberations were incorporated into an Allied reply. Only a few modifications were made, and these chiefly owing to Lloyd George, whose intransigeance was lessening. The main alteration concerned the withholding of Upper Silesia from Poland until a plebiscite should have indicated the wishes of the inhabitants. The Germans were given five days, and then two more, in which to accept the revised treaty. Failure to do so, they were told, would mean invasion.

Although many Germans appeared ready to renew the struggle rather than sign the document, Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg announced that further resistance, on the western front at least, was impossible. That same day the Scheidemann Government, including Brockdorff-Rantzau, resigned. There was no time for sentiment, however, and Gustav Bauer, another Social Democrat, became chancellor. On Sunday, June 22, the German assembly at Weimar voted a conditional acceptance, objecting only to the articles saddling Germany with sole war guilt, accusing her of violating the code of war, and demanding the surrender, for trial before Allied courts, of certain "war criminals." The Allies repeated their demand for uncondi-

[11] Special criticism was aimed at the section of the treaty which demanded that hungry Germany hand over to France and Belgium 140,000 milch cows and 120,000 sheep within three months after the signing of the document. This demand, in Part VIII, Annex IV, of the treaty, was not published in the official summary of the terms as released to the Allied press.

tional acceptance and refused any further extension of the time limit: Seven o'clock in the evening of Monday, June 23, would bring acquiescence or invasion. At a little after five, therefore, Edgar von Haniel, the new German representative, announced Germany's acceptance. His country, he said, was yielding to "overwhelming force, but without on that account abandoning her views in regard to the unheard-of injustice of the conditions of peace."

It still remained for Germany to find someone willing to go to Versailles to sign the treaty. Eventually, Foreign Minister Hermann Müller and Colonial Minister Johannes Bell agreed to act as emissaries. Once again the German delegates, having arrived in Paris, were restricted in their actions and guarded like prisoners. It was decided to have the final ceremony in the Hall of Mirrors, where almost fifty years before the king of Prussia had become German Emperor. As the Germans left Paris for Versailles, mobs showered them with stones and vocal abuse. At three o'clock in the afternoon of June 28, the fifth anniversary of the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the Germans were admitted to the Hall of Mirrors. "Müller was pale and nervous. Bell held himself erect and calm." They signed first, and the Allied delegates followed in the alphabetical order of their countries' names in French. The United States was listed as *Amérique du Nord,* and so Wilson's signature came first.[12]

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

The Treaty of Versailles comprised 440 articles and almost a score of annexes.[13] Alsace and Lorraine were returned to France. Belgium received Eupen, Malmédy, and Moresnet, with a combined population of 70,000. After a plebiscite, Denmark received northern Schleswig, taken from her by Prussia and Austria in 1864, while southern Schleswig voted to remain with Germany. Czechoslovakia was awarded a small section of Upper Silesia. To independent Poland, Germany ceded most of Posen and West Prussia—a territory 260 miles long and ranging up to 80 miles in width, with a population (excluding Danzig) about two-thirds Polish.

In industrial Upper Silesia a plebiscite was ordered held under the

[12] Ratifications between the Allies and Germany were finally exchanged in Paris on January 10, 1920. Four other treaties also were drawn up by the peace conference, with Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Collectively the five treaties were known as the Peace of Paris.

[13] For Part I, the Covenant of the League, see next chapter. The text of the most important articles of the treaties with Germany and Austria may be found in Langsam, W. C. *Documents and Readings in the History of Europe Since 1918,* rev. and enl. ed., 1951, pp. 12–38.

supervision of an Allied commission. The ballot returns showed more than 700,000 votes for Germany and 480,000 for Poland; of the communes, 754 voted for adherence to Germany, while 699 preferred incorporation in Poland. The Poles thereupon claimed all the areas with Polish majorities, while Germany maintained that the entire region was an indivisible economic unit and belonged of right to her. Strife ensued, particularly when France and Great Britain disagreed over a solution, and the matter was referred to the League of Nations Council. The latter partitioned Silesia, leaving Germany more than half of the people and land area, but giving Poland more of the economic resources. Danzig, with a population almost wholly German, was made a free city under League control, but Poland was accorded special diplomatic and economic rights therein. The Memel district, at the northeastern tip of Germany and controlling the mouth of the Niemen River, was ceded to the Allies.[14]

Germany renounced "in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her oversea possessions," these being later apportioned among Great Britain, France, Belgium, Japan, the Union of South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand as mandates of the League. The German control of Kiaochow was renounced in favor of Japan. All Germany's special rights and privileges in China, Siam, Liberia, Morocco, and Egypt were given up. The Allied and Associated Powers reserved "the right to retain and liquidate all property, rights and interest" belonging to private German nationals or companies within territories controlled by these powers, including territories newly ceded to them. Compensation to the owners was to be made by the German Government.[15] All Germany's property and concessions in the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria, and her interests in Austria and Hungary, were forfeited.

Germany agreed to the abrogation of the treaty of 1839, which had guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium, and recognized the severance of Luxembourg from the German customs union. Germany was forbidden to "maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn fifty kilometers to the east of the Rhine." Armed forces could not be assembled, nor ma-

[14] In 1923 a Lithuanian force seized Memel (1100 square miles) from the French garrison which had been holding it. The League Council in 1924 sponsored a convention signed by Lithuania, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan providing for the transfer of Memel to Lithuania as an autonomous territory. The port was to be administered by a harbor board consisting of a Lithuanian, a Pole, and a citizen of Memel. The Lithuanians called the area Klaipėda.

[15] Some of this property, notably in the United States, was later returned to the German owners.

neuvers held, in this area, and existing fortifications were to be dismantled.

"As compensation for the destruction of the coal mines in the north of France and as part payment towards the total reparation due from Germany for the damage resulting from the war," Germany ceded to France the coal mines in the Saar Basin "in full and absolute possession, with exclusive rights of exploitation." The government of the Saar was to be entrusted for fifteen years to a "commission representing the League of Nations." Then there was to be a plebiscite. The fortifications and harbors of the islands of



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Dune and Helgoland were to be destroyed. Germany consented to recognize any treaty arrangements that might be entered into between the Allies and the territories comprising the Russian Empire as of August 1, 1914, and she promised to respect the independence of Austria.

Part V of the treaty contained the military, naval, and aviation clauses.

The German General Staff was abolished. The army was limited to 100,000 men, including a maximum of 4000 officers. The manufacture of armaments, munitions, and war materials was limited and such materials could be stored only "at points to be notified to the Governments" of the Allies. No war materials were to be imported or exported, and poison gases, armored cars, and tanks were neither to be made nor purchased. Compulsory military service was abolished and only voluntary enlistments, of twelve consecutive years for privates and noncommissioned men and of twenty-five



Courtesy, Foreign Policy Association, *Headline Series.*

consecutive years for officers, were permitted. It was forbidden to discharge more than 5 per cent of the total effectives in men or officers in any one year.

The naval provisions permitted Germany to retain only six battleships,

six light cruisers, twelve destroyers, and twelve torpedo boats. No submarines were allowed her and no new warships might be built except for replacement. The naval personnel was limited to 15,000 men, including a maximum of 1500 officers. The periods of enlistment were similar to those for the army. No one in the merchant marine was to receive naval training. All war vessels in excess of the stated quota were either to be dismantled and converted into merchant ships or turned over to the Allies.[16] Germany was forbidden to have any military or naval air forces and all aeronautical war material had to be surrendered.

Allied control commissions were to supervise the execution of the disarmament clauses. The commissions, whose expenses Germany had to bear, were given extensive powers of investigation. By 1927, however, they had all been abolished. Although the armament restrictions were designed to last as long as the treaty itself, many of the clauses soon were modified in practice, with Allied consent. The treaty indicated, moreover, that the restrictions upon Germany's fighting establishments were not merely calculated to render it impossible for her "to resume military aggression," but were the first steps toward a general reduction of armaments throughout the world. It was declared to be one of the first duties of the League to promote disarmament.[17]

"William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor," was publicly arraigned in the treaty "for a supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of treaties." A special Allied tribunal was to be appointed to try him, "thereby assuring him the guarantees essential to the right of defense." However, the Netherlands refused to extradite William. Germany was also required to surrender for trial before Allied courts any designated "persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war." Eventually the Allies permitted the trials to be held in Leipzig, where the court procedure was perfunctory. Only a few of the less important "war criminals" were tried, and they received light sentences.

The legal justification for demanding reparation from Germany was put into the so-called guilt clause of the treaty, Article 231:

> The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to

[16] In June 1919, the crews of the surrendered German warships, which had been ordered to Scapa Flow in the Orkneys, opened the sea cocks and sank 53 vessels. Germany thereupon was ordered to build additional merchantmen for the Allies.

[17] The opening sentence of Part V of the Versailles Treaty read: "In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow."

which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

In Article 232 it was recognized that the resources of Germany were not adequate "to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage" and Germany was required only "to make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their property . . . by land, by sea, and from the air, and in general all damage as defined in Annex I. . . ." This annex listed ten loss-and-damage categories, including military pensions and the allowances paid by the Allied governments to the families of persons mobilized or serving at the fronts. In addition, Germany was to reimburse Belgium with interest at 5 per cent for all the money the latter had borrowed from the Allied governments during the war years.

A reparation commission was to be appointed by the Allies to determine the total amount of reparation and to "draw up a schedule of payments prescribing the time and manner for securing and discharging the entire obligation within a period of thirty years from May 1, 1921." Meanwhile, up to May 1, 1921, Germany was to pay, in gold, ships, securities, or commodities, the equivalent of nearly $5,000,000,000. Out of this advance sum the cost of the army of occupation was first to be met, and the balance applied to reparation. Since full reparation could not be paid in cash, it was stipulated that Germany might pay part in the form of specified commodities. The right of the Allies was recognized "to the replacement, ton for ton and class for class, of all merchant-marine ships and fishing boats lost or damaged owing to the war." Germany therefore was made to surrender all her merchant vessels of 1600 or more tons gross; one-half of her ships, by tonnage, of 1000 to 1600 tons gross; and one-fourth, by tonnage, of her steam trawlers and fishing boats.

The economic resources of Germany were to be devoted "directly to the physical restoration of the invaded areas." The Allies consequently were permitted to file with the Reparation Commission lists showing animals, machinery, equipment, tools, and like articles seized by Germany or destroyed in consequence of military operations, as well as lists of bricks, glass, machinery, heating apparatus, furniture, and like articles which the Allies wished to have produced and manufactured in Germany and delivered to them to permit restoration of the invaded areas. Germany next agreed to make large annual coal deliveries for ten years to France, Italy, and Luxembourg. The Reparation Commission was given an option on the delivery of dyestuffs and chemicals up to 50 per cent "of the total stock of

each and every kind of dyestuff and chemical drug in Germany or under German control."

Special provisions of the treaty required Germany to return the trophies, flags, and works of art taken from France in the war of 1870; to give to the University of Louvain documents and manuscripts equivalent in "number and value" to those destroyed during the war; to "restore to His Majesty the King of the Hedjaz the original Koran of the Caliph Othman, which was removed from Medina by the Turkish authorities and is stated to have been presented to the ex-Emperor William II"; and to "hand over to His Britannic Majesty's Government the skull of the Sultan Mkwawa, which was removed from the Protectorate of German East Africa and taken to Germany." [18]

The Reparation Commission was empowered to recommend action in case of any German default. It was stipulated that "the measures which the Allied and Associated Powers shall have the right to take, in case of voluntary default by Germany, and which Germany agrees not to regard as acts of war, may include economic and financial prohibitions and reprisals and in general such other measures as the respective Governments may determine to be necessary in the circumstances."

The remainder of the treaty disposed of such technical questions as international financial matters disturbed by the war, commercial relations, treaties, debts, property rights, contracts and judgments, industrial property, aerial navigation, the Kiel Canal, ports, waterways, and railways. The products of Allied manufacture were accorded most-favored-nation treatment in Germany.[19] The Elbe, Oder, Niemen, and Danube rivers were "declared international." With the Rhine, they were placed under the control of international commissions in order that free access to the sea might be provided for the landlocked states of Central Europe. In the ports of Hamburg and Stettin, Germany was made to lease free zones to Czechoslovakia for 99 years. Allied goods were to receive "the most favorable treatment" that was extended to internal traffic on German railways. The Kiel Canal and its approaches were made "free and open" on equal terms to the merchant and war vessels of all countries at peace with Germany. An International Labor Organization was created to help bring about an era of "social justice" as the basis of a universal peace (see pp. 46–47).

[18] The skull was not surrendered, Germany pleading ignorance of its whereabouts. A group of officers and students in Berlin prevented the return to France of the flags captured in battle in 1870–1871 by burning them.
[19] The tariff restrictions on Germany lapsed in 1925.

The guarantees for the execution of the treaty were written into Part XIV: "The German territory situated to the west of the Rhine, together with the bridgeheads, will be occupied by Allied and Associated troops for a period of fifteen years from the coming into force of the present Treaty." Depending on the faithfulness with which Germany carried out the terms of the treaty, the occupation was to be successively restricted, so that the bridgehead at Cologne might be evacuated after five years, that at Coblenz after ten years, and that at Mainz after fifteen. On the other hand, the occupation might be prolonged indefinitely, or any evacuated part reoccupied, if Germany misbehaved. Actually, the last of the occupying troops were withdrawn in 1930, after the adoption of the Young Plan for reparation. The United States and British troops in the occupied zone got along fairly well with the German inhabitants, but the French aroused hatred.

The Versailles Treaty, in summary, reduced the European area of Germany by one-eighth and her population by 6,500,000. It deprived her of all colonies and of virtually all investments and holdings abroad. She lost 15.5 per cent of her arable land, 12 per cent of her livestock, and almost 10 per cent of her manufacturing establishments. Her merchant marine was reduced from 5,700,000 tons to fewer than 500,000 tons. Her navy, formerly second only to Great Britain's, was virtually wiped out, and her army remained not much larger than Belgium's. By her European cessions, Germany lost potash, iron, coal, zinc, lead, and food. She surrendered about two-fifths of her coal reserves, nearly two-thirds of her iron ore, about seven-tenths of her zinc, and more than half of her lead. The surrender of the colonies entailed the loss of large rubber, oil, and fiber supplies. The new territorial alignments "broke down the prewar organization of industry and commerce, so that for a long time even the industrial plant which Germany retained was incapable of working at its former level of efficiency." Finally, Germany signed a blank reparation check.

THE LESSER TREATIES

The Council of Four at Paris did not confine its treaty-making activities to the German situation. Before Wilson and Lloyd George left Paris, late in June 1919, the Big Four had sketched a preliminary draft treaty with Austria, had decided on the boundaries of Hungary, and had considered the cases of Bulgaria and Turkey. But the final form of the treaties with Germany's allies was largely the work of a special Council of Five. This consisted of Chairman Clemenceau and one representative each from the

United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy. It functioned until January 1920.[20] All the minor treaties bore considerable resemblance to that of Versailles.

The Austrian peace delegation was presented with a draft peace treaty in June 1919. Protests had to be submitted in writing. An interesting controversy developed when the Austrians insisted that the republic known as "German-Austria" *(Deutschösterreich)*, which came into being on November 12, 1918, and with which the Allies were now dealing, was a newborn state that had never been at war with the Allies—at least no more so than Czechoslovakia or Poland or any other state that was created, in whole or in part, out of the former Austria-Hungary. Hence, it was argued, German-Austria could not be held responsible for the actions of the old Dual Monarchy. The Allies shelved this legal nicety and wrote into the preamble of the final Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye (signed September 10, 1919) that "the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has now ceased to exist, and has been replaced in Austria by a republican government." Moreover, "Austria" was made to accept responsibility for causing loss and damage to the Allies "as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Austria-Hungary and her allies."

Because the new governments of both Germany and Austria favored an *Anschluss* or union, the Treaty of St. Germain forbade the amalgamation of Germany and Austria and imposed upon the latter the obligation to "abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her independence." The Austrians were compelled, in fact, to change the name of their state from German-Austria to "Republic of Austria." The purpose of the Allies was to prevent the strengthening of Germany by the addition of Austrian man power and resources and to protect Czechoslovakia against a German encirclement.

It was no easy task to decide on the territorial redistribution of the former Habsburg domains. Not only did Austria and Hungary have to be dealt with, but all the heirs of the old monarchy—Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, Italy, and Romania—had to be at least partly satisfied. There were no clear-cut ethnic, national, or economic border lines, and a dozen new and old national groups clamored for recognition. It was, indeed, easier to take the land from Austria and Hungary than to divide it among the "victors." In the end, no one was happy.

To Italy, Austria ceded the South Tirol, the Trentino, Trieste, Istria,

[20] The execution of the treaties thereafter was left to the Council, or Conference, of Ambassadors, made up of the ambassadors to Paris from the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan, and of a French representative.

and some islands off Dalmatia. The South Tirol, though inhabited by a quarter-million German-speaking people, was demanded by Italy on the strength of the Secret Treaties and on the ground that, since the Alps were "her natural defenses," she needed the Brenner Pass for military and protective reasons. The section of Czechoslovakia made up from former Austrian territory included Bohemia, Moravia, part of Lower Austria, and nearly all Austrian Silesia, these areas containing about three million *Sudetendeutsche,* named after the Sudetes range. Poland received Austrian Galicia. The industrialized Teschen district, claimed by both Poland and Czechoslovakia, eventually was divided between the two by the Council of Ambassadors. Romania was awarded Bukovina. Bosnia, Hercegovina, and the Dalmatian coast and islands went to Yugoslavia. Altogether, the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy was reduced in area and population by three-fourths.

The remainder of the 381 articles comprising the Treaty of St. Germain were adapted from the Versailles clauses. The articles of the League Covenant and the International Labor Organization were copied from the German treaty. Austria gave up all rights, privileges, and concessions in non-European areas; assented to a blank reparation check; accepted special regulations governing navigation on the Danube and concerning the transfer of railway lines and stocks; acknowledged the right of the Allies to try Austrian "war criminals"; and granted to Czechoslovakia the right to send her own trains over specified Austrian routes toward the Adriatic. Austria herself was guaranteed free access to the Adriatic via the territories formerly comprising the Austrian Empire. The prewar debt of the Dual Monarchy was to be divided proportionally among all former Habsburg domains. Austria surrendered her entire naval force, retaining only three police boats on the Danube. Her army was limited to 30,000 volunteers.

Bulgaria, to forestall punishment, sent a memorandum to the peace conference some time before her peace terms had been decided upon. In the document it was explained (1) that Bulgaria's entry into the war was the fault largely of ex-King Ferdinand, who had abdicated in October 1918; (2) that the kingdom in consequence was not deserving of penalty; and (3) that, for ethnological and historical reasons, Bulgaria had a right to extensions of territory in Macedonia and the Dobruja. The Allies curtly refused to accept these views and reminded Bulgaria that she was a defeated power. Bulgaria had no choice other than to sign the Treaty of Neuilly (November 27, 1919).

For strategic reasons, the treaty gave Yugoslavia four small regions in western Bulgaria. All four cessions contained Bulgarian majorities. Greece

was awarded Western Thrace and an improvement in the Greco-Bulgarian boundary, with the consequent loss to Bulgaria of her Aegean coast line. The Allies, however, promised "to ensure the economic outlets of Bulgaria to the Aegean Sea." Bulgaria's army was limited to 20,000 men and her other armed officials to 13,000. Her navy was abolished, except for "four torpedo boats and six motor boats, all without torpedoes and torpedo apparatus." The economic, political, and international arrangements were similar to those made for Austria. In addition to the immediate surrender of some livestock to Greece, the former Serbia, and Romania, Bulgaria also had to accept reparation obligations. These eventually were fixed at $450,000,000 payable in 37 years from January 1, 1921. Bulgaria's total losses in land and population were relatively small, but combined with her virtually landlocked position they helped to make her one of the weakest of the Balkan powers.

Not until June 4, 1920, was the peace treaty with Hungary signed, in the large Trianon Palace at Versailles. The delay was the fault mainly of the unsettled affairs in Hungary, where the downfall of the Habsburgs resulted in a struggle for control among monarchists, republicans, socialists, and communists. The turmoil was increased by violent anti-Allied outbursts which, occurring while the treaty was being drafted, influenced the Allies only to make one important concession: they allowed the new state to take the name of "Hungary" rather than "Hungarian Republic." But the Magyars were warned that a Habsburg restoration would be "neither recognized nor tolerated."

All the states surrounding Hungary were allotted slices of the old Magyar kingdom. Romania received Transylvania, some of the plain west of Transylvania, and two-thirds of the Banat of Temesvár, including a total of 1,500,000 Magyars. To Yugoslavia went Croatia-Slavonia and the western third of Temesvár, along with 500,000 Magyars. Slovakia became part of the new republic of Czechoslovakia, which also acquired some territory to the south and east of the Carpathian Mountains. Almost 1,000,000 Magyars and 500,000 Ruthenians were thus incorporated into Czechoslovakia. Austria got Burgenland or West Hungary. The other treaty terms were similar to those with Austria. Hungary's army was cut to 35,000 men and her navy reduced to a few patrol boats. She too was made liable for reparation through a "guilt clause."

In 1920 Lloyd George told the House of Commons that the arrangements contemplated by the forthcoming treaty with the sultan would at last release "all non-Turkish populations from Turkish sway." In reality, the treaty contemplated a reversal of the situation by subjecting the Turks

to the sway of Europeans. The principles underlying the treaty with Turkey were largely those embodied in the Secret Treaties, although a few modifications were made necessary by the Bolshevik Revolution, by President Wilson's stand on self-determination, and by the conflicting interests of Italy and Greece.

In the Treaty of Sèvres (August 10, 1920), Turkey acknowledged the loss of all rights in Egypt, the Sudan, Cyprus, Tripolitania, Morocco, and Tunisia. She renounced all rights over Arabia, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Syria. Smyrna and southwestern Asia Minor were to be temporarily administered by Greece, which also received some former Turkish islands in the Aegean and part of Eastern Thrace. Italy was confirmed in the possession of Rhodes and the Dodecanese Islands, though she promised eventually to cede the latter to Greece. The zone of the Straits was demilitarized and internationalized. Constantinople remained under Turkish sovereignty, as did also a small part of the European mainland up to the limits of the town of Chatalja.

Turkey agreed to recognize Armenia as a "free and independent state" with boundaries to be drawn by Wilson. Kurdistan was to receive autonomy, but her boundary might be rectified in favor of Persia (Iran). Nothing was left to Turkey save mountainous Anatolia (Asia Minor) and a corner of Europe. Moreover, on the same day on which the treaty was signed, a tripartite agreement was reached by the British, French, and Italian delegates, whereby spheres of influence in Anatolia were outlined for France and Italy. The French sphere was to the north of Syria; the Italian, south and east of Smyrna.

Though the treaty was signed by the representatives of Mohammed VI, and though the sultan, overawed by Allied ships at Constantinople, was willing to have the document ratified, an energetic group of Turkish Nationalists, led by Mustapha Kemal, determined to prevent its going into effect. The story of their success is told in another chapter.

THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES

The boundary adjustments of the treaties created an acute problem of national minorities. National spirit was fanned by the war and the peace conference, and national jealousies were aroused. Vengeful reprisals were to be expected. In the words of President Wilson, nothing was "more likely to disturb the peace of the world than the treatment which might in certain circumstances be meted out to minorities." To prevent trouble, safeguards for the minorities had to be set up. It appeared essential to guarantee at

least a modicum of racial, religious, social, linguistic, and economic equality for the numerous national minorities.

In the cases of Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, the guarantees were included in the peace treaties. Then, despite considerable opposition on their part, Poland, Romania, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia were required to sign special treaties embodying similar guarantees. Most of the countries concerned objected to the treaties as an infringement of their several sovereignties and as an encouragement to separatist tendencies. But the great powers were insistent and the obligations were assumed. In each instance the supervision over the minorities was left to the League and only with the consent of a majority of the Council might these guarantees be altered or modified. Eventually, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, and Albania entered into parallel agreements with the League.

The treaties followed a somewhat uniform pattern, any differences being the result of particular local problems. They included guarantees of life and liberty to all subjects regardless of race, nationality, or religion; they permitted the private and public practice of any creed or belief not inimical to public morals; and they protected the use of the minority languages, under certain conditions, in business and in the schools.

CRITIQUE OF THE PEACE OF PARIS

Such in brief, were the provisions of the treaties arising from the "war to end wars." They were replete with unstable compromises. They reflected materialism tinged only here and there with idealism.[21] They con-

[21] Wilson's Fourteen Points (see note on pp. 11–12) did not fare well in the final peace settlement. Little attention was paid to Point One, on open covenants. The second point, freedom of the seas, was dropped before the conference met. In disregard of Point Three, trade barriers were not removed. The fourth point, relating to limitation of armaments, was directly applied only to the defeated states. Point Five, concerning the impartial disposal of colonial claims, was used only to deprive Germany and Turkey of subject areas.

Under Point Six, Germany was made to evacuate all former Russian territory; but the Allies themselves sent in troops in an effort to overthrow the new Bolshevik Government. Belgium and France were evacuated in accordance with the seventh and eighth points, and Alsace-Lorraine was restored to France. Point Nine had promised Italy new boundaries along "clearly recognizable lines of nationality;" actually, she got territories inhabited not only by Italians but by several hundred thousand Austrians and Southslavs.

The promise of independence to the subject peoples of Austria-Hungary, under a modified tenth point, was fulfilled; but many Austrians and Magyars were in turn subjected to foreign control. Romania, Montenegro, and Serbia were evacuated in line with Point Eleven. The promise in the twelfth point of home rule to the non-Turkish parts of the Ottoman Empire was generally disregarded. Under the last two points, respectively, Poland was re-created with an outlet to the sea and a League of Nations came into being.

In summary, five points were put into effect, four were carried out in a manner to benefit the Allies but not the defeated states, and five were disregarded.

tained the seeds of future conflict. Yet, in appraising the work of the treaty-makers of 1919 and 1920, the enormous difficulties—material and psychological—under which they labored, must be remembered. Some of their mistakes were obvious at the time they were made, but many stood out more clearly only after the passing of several years. There was much hatred and vengeance, blindness and force, but all these factors were part of the "human nature" and the "civilization" of the day. The four years of blood and mire had not increased reasonableness nor sweetened tempers. Moreover, man has not had a vast experience in peacemaking. For, as someone well said, war appears to be as old as mankind, but peace is a relatively modern invention.

With the benefit of hindsight, and in anticipation of some of the things to be described in the following chapters, it may be interesting at this point to offer a critique of the Peace of Paris:

(1) It probably was unwise to include in the settlement certain promises or principles which in practice could not be carried to their logical conclusion. In this respect, for example, the theoretically admirable principle of self-determination of peoples in practice created about as many new problems as it solved old problems and corrected old injustices. If it was meant that such principle should have limited application only, that limited application probably should have been unequivocally stated and defined. Otherwise, as actually happened after 1919, the promises merely serve as inciting slogans for defeated enemy diehards in their inevitable campaigns for future revenge.

(2) The settlement probably should not have included certain promises or restrictions which the victors imposed on themselves, since there was little likelihood that these promises could or would be honored. Thus, most of the Allies found the postwar world situation such that they continually delayed living up to their own promises of disarmament. Surely, even in 1919, such promises were based on an unwarrantable optimism as to what the future held in store. Again, the chief result of the half-hearted efforts to carry out the promises offered propaganda ammunition to the seekers of revenge and gave rise to ill will and suspicion among the former Allies themselves.

(3) The economic clauses of the settlement bore relatively little relation to the economies of either the defeated enemy or the major victorious powers. Thus, it may have seemed superficially sensible to require Germany to hand over most of her merchant fleet to the Allies in just repayment for the damage done by her submarines. But one apparently unthought-of result of this was a prolonged depression in the British shipbuilding industry and a corresponding boom in the German shipbuilding industry—plus a

later competition between the newer and faster German ships and the old German ships now sailing under the British flag. Or again, one of the strongest drives in Austria for *Anschluss*, or union with Germany, came from the peculiarly difficult economic situation in which the Austrian republic was placed by the Treaty of St. Germain.

(4) It became apparent soon after the conclusion of the peace settlement that "democracy" could not successfully be imposed on peoples merely by threats not to make peace with them or not to recognize them as civilized members of the family of nations unless they quickly adopted "democratic constitutions." It would seem, from past experience, that people, to become democratically inclined, must be allowed gradually to learn the benefits and the mechanics of a democratic system and then permitted to develop that form of democracy which is best adapted to their needs and best fits into the framework of their own historical background and traditions. Germany, as events showed, could not be converted from an autocratic monarchy into a well-functioning democratic republic simply by the desire of the Allies to make it so.

(5) The peace settlement left both Germany and Russia as large, revengeful, and potentially powerful nations surrounded by a cordon of small, weak states, not one of which was a match for its big neighbor or neighbors, and most of which had or thought they had grievances against their new small neighbors. Through this "Balkanization of Central Europe" the Allies made it relatively easy for Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union later on to absorb such areas as Austria, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, and to dominate such other countries as Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania.

(6) Finally, the history of events after the Peace of Paris made it clear that the victorious powers needed to coöperate as much in upholding whatever peace settlement they might agree upon as they coöperated in order to win the war. One of the most important single factors in enabling Germany to precipitate the greatest war in history, only twenty-one years after her serious defeat in 1918, was the circumstance that Great Britain and France, both striving to maintain the peace settlement, pursued this goal by moving along divergent paths. The British, anxious to see Germany recover for trade purposes, advocated one form of treatment for her after 1920 while the French, anxious to keep Germany weak, advocated another. As a result, almost every German-French quarrel after 1920 or 1921 ended by becoming an Anglo-French quarrel, with Germany regularly the gainer—and with a consequent succession of German treaty modifications winked at by one or another of the Allies, to the disgust or apprehension of the others.

Since these mistakes and others were made, the world eventually was reduced to crying, with Jeremiah, "Peace, peace, when there is no peace."

THE NEW WORLD: FUTURE IMPERFECT

And now, before the story of the post-1918 world is taken up, a few of the outstanding changes effected by the First World War and the Paris Peace Settlement may be summarized:

(1) Four imperial governments were swept away, those in Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Turkey.

(2) A wave of republicanism swept over Europe. In 1914 France, Switzerland, Portugal, San Marino, and Andorra were the only republics on the continent. Eighteen years later (1932) there were sixteen continental republics.

(3) Almost simultaneously with the extension of the republican form of government there appeared a distrust of democracy, owing partly to the inability of the new governments to solve the complex postwar problems. Consequently there arose a number of dictators who proposed, through despotism, to save their people from destruction.

(4) Three great politico-economic experiments were inaugurated: Bolshevism, Facism, and Nazism.

(5) There was a decided change in the relative importance of nations in Europe. With the disruption of Austria-Hungary and the territorial changes in Germany and Russia there appeared a number of new states, such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, which began to play an important role in international affairs. Before the war six great powers determined international relations in Europe. The temporary eclipse of Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary and the emergence of a number of states of the second rank increased the number of actors on the international stage and complicated the solution of international problems. The surrounding of Germany by many small states eventually played into the hands of the aggressive Nazis.

(6) The great emphasis on nationality during the war and the diffusion of the idea of national self-determination made political and economic international relations after the war more difficult than ever. Diplomatic intrigues, economic rivalries, jealous quarrels, and new oppressions fanned the flames of old hatreds and overwhelmed Europe with another dangerous hysteria.

(7) The spreading of the principles of nationality and self-determination stimulated unrest in nearly all the overseas possessions of the Allied Powers, in Egypt, India, Korea, East Africa, and elsewhere.

(8) Despite the hopes of many that there would be no more war, the peace treaties created new wounds in the process of healing old ones. The suspicion and fear which for so long had overclouded diplomacy were not dispelled. New military alliances were formed, Europe was divided anew into hostile camps, the number of men permanently under arms exceeded the number in 1913, and the world's military and naval budgets continued to make increasingly heavy demands on the purses of harassed taxpayers.

(9) Instrumentalities for international coöperation and for the peaceful settlement of international disputes were provided by the establishment of the League of Nations and the World Court, but these were not always given effective support.

(10) In many countries democratic reforms were introduced, particularly in the direction of suffrage extension. Partly because of a new spirit and partly because of the services they had rendered during the war, women were widely enfranchised.

(11) Labor assumed a new importance in the world order. This was owing, apparently, to the transient shortage of skilled labor, to a realization that the man on the fighting line would have been helpless without the support of the man at the factory, and to a radical propaganda which throve during the periods of economic distress that followed the war. In Eastern Europe, the hitherto downtrodden agrarians gained temporary control of a number of governments.

(12) There was a general, if temporary, religious revival. It was inevitable that many of the young men who were so constantly surrounded by death should seek refuge in religion and comfort in the belief in another and perhaps better world. Mysticism and spiritualism also enjoyed popularity in the early postwar years.

(13) Education suffered greatly during the war and in the lean years following it, but there was a general feeling that in the proper education of the young lay the best guarantee against a repetition of the catastrophe. Wherever money was available, increased attention was paid to the training of children and of adults.

(14) Youth movements became popular, especially in China, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union. The younger men and women of the world were made serious- and political-minded by the diplomatic and economic crises which grew out of the war and they eagerly anticipated a wholesale regeneration of their respective peoples. Generally the training to which they were subjected was, in the first instance, military.

(15) The war taught the nations lessons in coöperation and "teamwork," and all the value of these was not lost upon the return of peace.

Often, in attempts to solve outstanding international economic and social problems, use was made of the wartime experience in coöperation. World conferences became frequent, if not always successful, occurrences.

(16) The United States, occupying a position as debtor nation in 1914, emerged from the war as the world's greatest creditor. Her new importance was the cause of much ill will and jealousy.

(17) Through their participation in the war, their membership in the League of Nations, and their increasing importance as markets, the Latin-American states came to have a new and more prominent standing in world affairs.

(18) The war served as a stimulus to scientific and commercial advances as well as to the development of more efficient machines of destruction. Advances were made in the field of medicine, there was progress in the art of shipbuilding, and great strides were made in aviation. New industries were stimulated, particularly where wartime conditions deprived a country of products which formerly had been available only through import.

(19) Temporary impetus was given to a movement for general disarmament, but progress in this direction was halting.

(20) A complete and world-wide economic rehabilitation was necessitated, for the war dislocated the economic machinery of all participants and even of the neutrals. In direct consequence of the war and its aftermath, a depression made its appearance toward the end of 1929 which, becoming universal, boosted the world unemployment figure to 30,000,000, bankrupted nations, and gave rise to unprecedented world unrest. By 1939 final proof was given that the preceding score of years had in reality been only a twenty years' armistice.

CHAPTER 2

The League of Nations

ORIGIN, MEMBERSHIP, AND ORGANIZATION

The pertinence of the observation regarding the absence of anything new under the sun is strikingly illustrated in the history of plans for an association of the nations. Collected in book form, the texts of the most important schemes for international arbitration and organization from ancient times to the twentieth century cover about 1000 pages. Most of the costly wars in history have produced new plans to preserve peace and settle international disputes by arbitration rather than armed conflict. The outbreak of the First World War for a time made people lose faith in the value of peace work. Before long, however, the catastrophic nature of the struggle imbued idealists with new strength to agitate for the establishment of an instrument which would replace armed conflict as a means of settling international difficulties. By the time of America's entry into the war it was generally understood that the forthcoming peace conference would have to give the matter its earnest consideration.[1]

In the previous chapter there was told the story of the drafting of the Covenant at Paris. Not only was this document made an integral part of each peace treaty, but the League of Nations which it created was given supervision over the fulfillment of many treaty clauses. The League, indeed, was entrusted with the task of "liquidating the war and implementing the peace"—an assignment which was made the more difficult by the refusal

[1] The idea of a society of nations was also discussed during the war days by some German thinkers, notably Matthias Erzberger.

of the United States to become a member. Moreover, many people, particularly those in the defeated countries, were from the beginning prejudiced against the League *because* it was tied so closely to the peace settlement.

No better explanation of the purpose of the League can be given than by quoting the preamble to the Covenant:

> The High Contracting Parties,
> In order to promote international coöperation and to achieve international peace and security
> by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war,
> by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations,
> by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments,
> and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another,
> Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.

The original members of the League were the signatories named in an annex to the Covenant and such of a group of invited states as acceded without reservation to the document within two months of its coming into force. By a two-thirds vote of the Assembly, membership might be extended to any self-governing state, dominion, or colony provided it could give effective guarantees of its desire to observe its international obligations and its willingness to accept such armaments regulations as might be prescribed by the League.

Any member state which had fulfilled its obligations under the Covenant might withdraw from the League after two years' notice. By the close of 1932, only Brazil and Costa Rica had done so, but after 1933 many states forwarded the required two years' notice of their intended withdrawal. In 1934 Ecuador became the sixtieth member, but by the time of the outbreak of the Second World War only 46 states had neither resigned nor served notice of intention to withdraw; in 1946, the last year of the League's existence, there were 43 members. The Covenant might be amended by the unanimous vote of the Council and a majority vote of the Assembly. The League budget, including the costs of the World Court and the International Labor Organization, never exceeded $10,000,000 in any one year. The expenses were allocated among the members according to a scale. The British Empire, exclusive of the dominion League members, was required to pay most.

The League functioned through an Assembly, a Council, and a Secretariat. The Assembly consisted of representatives of all the members, each state being entitled to a maximum of three delegates, but only one vote.

These representatives and all officials of the League enjoyed diplomatic immunity. Sessions were held annually at Geneva. Special sessions might be held in times of emergency. The first Assembly was called by President Wilson and convened on November 15, 1920. The twentieth ordinary session adjourned on December 14, 1939. The next and last Assembly met from April 6 to 18, 1946.[2] By unanimous vote of the 34 members represented, the League was officially abolished as of April 19, 1946, with its powers, functions, and properties in Geneva transferred to the United Nations.

The Assembly might consider "any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world." From the start, "the Assembly established itself as a platform from which the representatives of the Governments associated in the League could annually give expression to their general views, their grievances, their criticisms, and their aspirations." Specifically, the tasks of the body were to select the nonpermanent members of the Council, control the budget, admit new members, elect with the Council the judges of the World Court, and advise the reconsideration of treaties that might have become inapplicable.

The Council, composed of one delegate from each state entitled to representation, corresponded to the executive branch in a national government. Originally, the Covenant provided for five permanent and four nonpermanent Council seats, the former to go to the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. Because of the refusal of the United States to join the League, there were until 1922 only eight members in the Council. In that year the Assembly increased the nonpermanent seats to six, thus giving the smaller states a majority. The terms of the nonpermanent members (increased to nine in 1926, ten in 1933, and eleven in 1936) were fixed at three years and staggered so that each year several states retired. For the periods of their membership, Germany and the Soviet Union had permanent Council seats.[3]

After 1929 the Council normally held three meetings a year, but there were frequent special meetings. The presidency of the body was rotated in successive sessions among the delegates in the alphabetical order of the names of the member states in French. Except in matters of procedure, decisions of the Council had to be unanimous. Whenever a subject was under discussion concerning a nonmember of the Council, that state was

[2] Between 1920 and 1939 there also were five special sessions, making 26 in all.
[3] The final Council, elected in 1939, was made up of France and Great Britain as permanent members plus Belgium, Bolivia, China, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Finland, Greece, Iran, Peru (withdrew in 1941), South Africa, and Yugoslavia.

entitled to temporary representation thereon. Like the Assembly, the Council might consider any question affecting world peace or threatening the harmony of international relations. Since this body was smaller than the Assembly and could be more quickly gathered, it was called upon to handle most of the emergency situations. The first Council meeting was summoned by President Wilson for January 16, 1920, at Paris. The last or one hundred and seventh meeting closed on December 14, 1939.

The specific duties assigned to the Council by the Covenant included the formulation of plans for the reduction of armaments, the study of the annual reports submitted by the mandatories, and the devising of means for protecting the territorial integrity of member states against external aggression. It was to inquire into any international disputes which might be submitted to it and it might refer these disputes to the Assembly. Finally, the Council was supposed to recommend to the member states what effectives each should contribute in the event that "the covenants of the League" required protection.

The third agency of the League was the Secretariat, or "civil service," established at Geneva. It consisted of a secretary-general (who also acted in that capacity at Council and Assembly meetings) and a staff selected by him with the approval of the Council. The first secretary-general, Sir James Eric Drummond, was named in the annex to the Covenant. With Allied approval he began to assemble his assistants and establish temporary quarters in London immediately after the adoption of the text of the Covenant—two months before the signing of the Versailles Treaty. Drummond soon proved himself an officer of remarkable ability, combining tactfulness, hard work, fairness, and efficiency. Future secretaries-general were to be appointed by the Council with the approval of the Assembly. In 1933 Drummond relinquished his post and was succeeded by his former deputy, Joseph Avenol of France. The latter resigned in 1940 and was succeeded by Seán Lester of Ireland as acting secretary-general. The final Assembly in 1946 formally nominated him as third and last secretary-general.

The secretary-general came to be assisted by a staff of almost seven hundred employees drawn from more than fifty nations. Staff members were employed and paid by the League; theoretically at least, they did not represent the interests of their respective countries. The Secretariat was divided into eleven sections which were concerned with such matters as mandates, disarmament, health, minorities, and economic and financial questions. The secretary-general was responsible for the registration and publication of all treaties entered into among the League members or

voluntarily submitted to him by nonmembers. About 5000 documents were so registered and published in their original language, as well as in French and English.

To lighten the work of these three main bodies the League created several auxiliary organs known as "technical organizations" and "advisory committees." In the former group were the Economic and Financial Organization, the Organization on Communications and Transit, and the Health Organization. Among the advisory committees were those on mandates, traffic in opium, and intellectual coöperation. There were also such temporary groups as the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference. A number of international bureaus which originated independently of the League, such as the International Hydrographic Bureau at Monaco, likewise were placed under the auspices of the association. Most of these organizations were later taken over by the United Nations.

THE PERMANENT COURT AND THE I.L.O.

Two other major agencies technically formed part of the machinery of the League: the Permanent Court of International Justice, or World Court, and the International Labor Organization. According to Article 14 of the League Covenant:

> The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly.

In execution of this mandate the Council at its second session appointed a committee of jurists to draw up a statute for such a court. The committee in less than six weeks agreed unanimously upon a detailed draft constitution for the proposed tribunal. The Council, after making a few amendments, passed it on to the first Assembly. The latter added more amendments and in December 1920 unanimously adopted it as the statute of the court.

The Council then prepared a protocol of ratification and submitted the document to the League members. The court was to come into existence as soon as a majority of the League members should have ratified the protocol. By September 1921 the necessary minimum of ratifications was secured and the Council and Assembly concurrently but separately elected

the first group of judges.[4] The Hague was picked as the seat of the court. Its expenses, about $500,000 annually, were financed through the League budget.

The World Court was originally composed of eleven judges chosen for nine-year terms by the Council and Assembly. In order to emphasize the permanent character of the tribunal, a committee of jurists appointed by the Council recommended that the number of judges be increased to fifteen and that the court remain in session throughout the year. By rotation among the judges the burden on the individual jurists would remain within reasonable limits. A protocol embodying these recommendations became effective in 1931. The presidents were elected by the judges themselves for three-year terms.

The jurisdiction of the court was of two kinds, voluntary and compulsory. When two or more states having a dispute referred it to the court for settlement, the tribunal's voluntary jurisdiction was being invoked. A certain number of states, however, signed an "Optional Clause" which was attached to the protocol of the court. This clause bound its ratifiers to accept the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court "as compulsory, *ipso facto* and without special convention" in all legal disputes concerning the interpretation of a treaty, any question of international law, a breach of an international obligation, or the nature and extent of reparation to be made for any such breach. For signatories of this clause the jurisdiction of the court was compulsory. At one time or another about fifty states were bound by its terms. Reference of disputes to the court also was made compulsory by the terms of many of the bilateral treaties of conciliation and arbitration that were signed after the First World War.

The procedure of the court was like that of any regular tribunal. Only states might bring suit before the court and judgments might be given in default when a country failed to answer a plaintiff's summons for trial. The court also was empowered to give advisory opinions to the Council and Assembly. The Council, especially, availed itself of this opportunity to get advice on legal points. The opinions were not binding but were generally accepted as valid.

The Permanent Court did not entirely replace the old Hague Tribunal which was set up in 1899. The latter was a panel of 132 jurists from which a court might be selected to arbitrate any dispute between signatories of the Hague Convention. The World Court did not arbitrate quarrels; it inter-

[4] Altogether there were 51 ratifications. Four Americans served on the court: John Bassett Moore, Charles Evans Hughes, Frank B. Kellogg, and Manley O. Hudson.

preted international law and decided on treaty violations. By the time the judges dispersed after the invasion of the Netherlands in 1940, 31 decisions and 27 advisory opinions had been handed down. In 1946 the Permanent Court was transformed into the International Court of Justice of the United Nations.

The International Labor Organization, although autonomous, also was an organ of the League. It was brought into being in the interests of labor through Part XIII of the Versailles Treaty. Since the League was pledged "to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women, and children" in all countries, the Council and Assembly agreed to supply the I.L.O. with funds and make membership in it automatic with League membership. Germany, however, was represented in the labor association before her entry into the League, and Brazil remained a member of the I.L.O. after her withdrawal from the League. In August 1934, the United States became a member of the body, without assuming "any obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations."

The structure of the I.L.O., which had its seat at Geneva, was similar to that of the League itself. There were a General Conference, a Governing Body, and an International Labor Office. The General Conference consisted of four delegates from each member state, one chosen by labor, one by the employers, and two by the government. The General Conference, in which voting was by head, had no legislative powers; but it could focus world attention upon certain evils and point the way to an improvement in labor conditions. It might pass either recommendations or draft conventions. The former usually consisted of broad principles to guide the various states in their own labor legislation. The conventions were detailed legal proposals which, it was hoped, might be adopted by the states members. Each state was bound to submit the proposals to its legislative authority for consideration.

The Governing Body came to be made up of thirty-two persons, eight representing the workers, eight the employers, and sixteen the governments. In order that the states of greatest industrial importance might have a permanent voice in the activities of the I.L.O., it was provided in 1922 that eight delegates among the government representatives in the Governing Body be chosen by Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, India, Italy, and Japan. After the United States and the Soviet Union joined the I.L.O., they replaced Belgium and Canada in the list of permanently represented states. The chief function of the Governing Body was the election and control of a director of the International Labor Office.

This office had its headquarters in Geneva. Its functions were to

collect information on all phases of industrial life and labor, prepare the agenda for the annual General Conference meetings, and maintain contact with the various volunteer labor societies throughout the world. It published an *Official Bulletin,* an *International Labour Review,* and numerous studies, documents, and reports.

The exigencies of the Second World War led to the setting up of an I.L.O. working center in Montreal from 1940 to 1948; thereafter Geneva once again became its seat. Meanwhile, with the end of the League of Nations, the I.L.O. became one of the "specialized agencies" affiliated with the United Nations. By 1953 about 100 conventions had been proposed by the I.L.O. Dealing with such matters as the length of working hours, unemployment, workmen's compensation, medical examinations, night work, sanitary conditions, the right of combination among agricultural workers, factory inspection, paid vacations, and the like, they had received more than 1200 ratifications. Thus was marked the fair progress "of a uniform movement for social reform throughout the world."

THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Each member of the League entered into 34 specific engagements under the Covenant. Nineteen of these dealt with the preservation of peace. To begin, the members undertook "to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League" (Article 10). In case of such aggression, it became the duty of the Council to "advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled." To have force, any decision to which the Council might come in this regard had to be unanimous. Hence no power with representation in that body could be made to go to war against its will in order to meet its responsibilities under the tenth article.

Further, "any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not," was declared to be a matter of concern to the whole League, and each member had the "friendly right" to bring to the attention of the "Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends." All parties to the Covenant agreed to submit to arbitration or judicial settlement any disputes suited to such forms of settlement, or else to lay their difficulties before the Council. As an added inducement to this course of action, the members promised not to go to war against any state which accepted the arbitral award, judicial decision, or Council report (pro-

vided the latter was unanimous). If the Council failed to reach a report, the members reserved the privilege "to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice." In no case was resort to be had to war until three months after the award or report was made.

Whenever the Council was asked to settle a quarrel, it might refer the dispute to the Assembly. Here a decision, to be conclusive, had to be concurred in by the representatives of all states having seats in the Council and by a majority of the remaining members of the League. If the Council found that a dispute arose "out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction" of one of the contending parties, then no recommendation of settlement might be made.

The Covenant provided penalties for the infraction of its pledges. Whenever a nation resorted to armed hostilities in violation of its agreements, "it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against" the entire League. The culprit was to be subjected to immediate "severance of all trade or financial relations" both with the members of the League and with nonaffiliated countries. This economic weapon might be applied to the private affairs of the nationals of the guilty state as well as to its government. In order to minimize the loss which might result to the boycotting states from such procedure, the League members promised to support one another in the financial and economic measures which might be taken against a covenant-breaking power. If the economic sanction proved of no avail, the Council might *recommend* to the governments concerned "what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League" (Article 16).

In twenty years the League was called upon to examine about forty political disputes, most of them legacies of the First World War. As a rule the cases were handled by the Council. Some of the earlier quarrels, such as that of 1923 between Italy and Greece over the murder of several Italians on Greek soil, were serious threats to world peace. Others, such as that of 1921–1922 between Finland and Soviet Russia over the treatment of the inhabitants in eastern Karelia, were of lesser importance. A number, including the Polish-Lithuanian controversy over Vilnius and the Hungaro-Romanian "optants" difficulty, the League was unable to settle. Article 19 of the Covenant, whereunder the Assembly might "advise the reconsideration . . . of treaties which have become inapplicable," was never implemented, though it obviously was formulated to make possible a peaceable revision of the Peace of Paris.

On the whole, the League was able to assert its political mission more strongly where small nations were involved. The larger nations were more likely to regard League investigations as infringing their sovereign rights. They were also better able to bring pressure to bear in their favor. From 1931 on, indeed, the great powers showed repeatedly that they were not prepared to uphold the ideal of collective resistance to aggression. The Covenant was violated with increasing frequency, and the League members simply refused to meet the challenge of the violations. Thus the powers failed the League, not the League peace.[5]

ADMINISTRATION OF TERRITORY: THE SAAR

The Versailles Treaty placed upon the League responsibility for the government of the Saar Basin and the free city of Danzig. Regarding the basin, the treaty stipulated that a governing commission be appointed, to consist of a Frenchman, a native of the territory, and three citizens of countries other than France or Germany. The Council at its second session named such a commission, and in February 1920 the latter entered upon its duties. France was represented on the commission by Chairman Victor Rault, ex-prefect of Lyon and a staunch patriot. The member for the Saar was Alfred von Boch, an able local official; the remaining commissioners were a Belgian, a Dane who had been living in Paris for twenty years, and a Canadian. Boch was so irritated by the pro-French attitude of his colleagues that he soon resigned. His successor was more willing to coöperate with the French chairman.

In its first proclamation to the inhabitants, the commission stressed its determination "to carry out strictly the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, and to enforce respect on the part of all for these clauses, both in letter and in spirit." The people were warned as follows: "Being firmly resolved to impose respect for its authority, [the commission] will fearlessly suppress all attempts, from whatever source, to disturb or mislead the population. It will tolerate neither open violence, intrigue, nor passive resistance. The treaty of peace does not leave it without the necessary authority, and the powers conferred will permit the commission to devote itself to its task without being troubled with useless and criminal opposition."

Among the privileges that the peace treaty conceded to France in the district were the right to substitute French for German money in connection with the working of the mines that had been turned over to her, the

[5] A number of disputes which were referred to the League for settlement are considered in connection with the histories of the countries concerned.

option of establishing schools for the French mine employees' children in which the instruction should be in the French language, and the permission to incorporate the basin entirely within the French customs regime. The natives were given certain protective guarantees. They had the right to lodge complaints against the administration with the League Council. None of the laws in force at the time of the armistice might be modified by the commission without the consent of elected representatives of the inhabitants. The maintenance of order was to be entrusted to a local gendarmerie.

Many Saarlanders were not only annoyed by France's exercise of her legal powers, but had a number of specific grievances against the commission. The election of representatives, for example, was deferred until March 1922; and, after their election, the people's deputies were not consulted by the commission on some of its most important measures. Special privileges were extended to German children who could be induced to attend the French schools. Whenever the natives drew up a complaint, it had to be transmitted to the League Council through the commission, which minimized the objections. Despite the treaty stipulation regarding the formation of a local gendarmerie to maintain order, a French army was stationed in the area.

In 1923, when the German miners went on strike out of sympathy for their fellow-workmen in the Ruhr district which had been placed under occupation by French troops, the commission inaugurated repressive measures. Picketing was forbidden, it was made a penal offense to speak against the League, and the press was muzzled. Since the commission was responsible only to the League and not to the inhabitants, and since Rault was present at every Council session at which the Saar was discussed, the people ordinarily had little chance to secure an impartial hearing. On this occasion, however, the protests were so serious that London requested the League to investigate.

In the resultant investigation of 1923, the Council took care to prevent the appearance of an inquiry. The commission was invited to attend a Council session on the Saar and the commissioners were politely questioned by the Council delegates. During the proceedings Rault admitted that the commission had a branch office in Paris, that the French troops received both their pay and their orders from France, and that, as the representative of France on the governing body, he felt in duty bound to further the interests of his country.

The Council expressed no criticism of Rault and merely suggested that the army be replaced by a local force of gendarmes. Despite this whitewashing, the prestige of the commission as an impartial group of interna-

tional officials was undermined and gradually its membership was revised. In 1926 Rault resigned, being succeeded as chairman by George W. Stephens of Canada, who in turn was replaced by the Britishers, Sir Ernest Wilton (1927) and Geoffrey G. Knox (1932). These changes reduced the antagonism not only of the natives, but of the Germans in the Reich, for the latter sympathized with their vexed countrymen.

In 1927 the question once more arose of the French troops in the Saar, for the League recommendation of 1923 had resulted in only a partial withdrawal of the force. Since Germany now was a member of the League, there took place some vigorous discussions of the matter. In the end it was agreed that the troops should be recalled and replaced by an emergency Railway Defense Force of 800 men, recruited from the British, French, and Belgian armies of occupation in the Rhineland. Thus was the "Saar garrison" eliminated and a check placed on the number of men France might in future send to the region.

According to the peace treaty the permanent status of the Saar was to be decided in 1935 by a plebiscite of all inhabitants over twenty who were "resident in the territory" at the time the land was severed from Germany. For this purpose a records commissioner was ordered in 1922 to collect the necessary voting statistics and deposit them with the League. In 1934 the Council appointed a neutral committee to work out the details for the plebiscite. The committee's suggestions were adopted and the plebiscite date was set for January 13, 1935. The preparations for the plebiscite were to be supervised by a commission whose members were drawn from Sweden, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, and which was to be assisted by a technical expert from the United States. Voting disputes were to be arbitrated by a special plebiscite tribunal.

Both France and Germany agreed not to exert official pressure to influence the voting and promised to prevent reprisals against persons because of their attitude during the plebiscite. Nazi Germany also promised, if the Saar were returned to her, not to hinder any individuals who might wish to leave the basin, and not to apply any "Aryan legislation" for at least a year. Yet, as the date for the balloting neared, friction developed in the Saar. The trouble arose out of the excesses of Nazi sympathizers and the fears of German refugees who had fled to the Saar when Hitler came to power. Accordingly a League army of three thousand British, Italian, Swedish, and Netherlands soldiers was assembled in the Saar to help maintain order before and during the plebiscite.

It was also necessary, before the plebiscite, to settle a question regarding the Saar coal mines. If the voting favored Germany, the treaty provided

that the Reich was to repurchase the mines from France at a price to be determined by three experts. Now, however, direct negotiations were carried on between Berlin and Paris, in consultation with the chairman of the League's plebiscite commission. It was agreed that, if the plebiscite favored Germany, the latter would pay France 900,000,000 francs in settlement of all Saar claims.

As the day of balloting approached, many Saarlanders who had lived in the valley when the treaty was signed, but who had since emigrated to Germany or France or even to North or South America, returned to cast their votes. The Nazis in Germany were confident of overwhelming victory, while their opponents hoped that the Catholic, liberal, and left-wing votes might carry the decision for the *status quo*. There was little belief anywhere that a majority would favor incorporation into the Third Republic.

In a tense atmosphere, but without serious outbreaks, the plebiscite was held according to schedule. Approximately 98 per cent of those who had registered went to the polls. More than 525,000 votes were cast, and of these about 90 per cent were in favor of returning the Saar to Germany. Only 46,500 wanted continuation of League rule and 2100 asked for annexation to France. A few days after the plebiscite the Council awarded the basin to Germany and on March 1, 1935, the formal transfer took place. Thus was ended one of the most difficult tasks imposed on the League of Nations by the Peace of Paris.[6]

THE PROTECTION OF MANDATES AND MINORITIES

Under Article 22 of the Covenant, the League was made responsible for the well-being and development of the peoples inhabiting the late German overseas possessions (except Kiaochow) and the former lands of the Ottoman Empire in the Arabian Peninsula. Certain of the more advanced nations were to be delegated by the League as mandatory powers to exercise on its behalf a tutelage over these so-called backward areas. The mandatory powers would be obliged to render annual reports of their administration to the Council, and there was to be constituted a Permanent Mandates Commission to examine the reports and advise the Council on mandate matters.

The mandates were divided into three categories according to their political development, geographical situation, and economic conditions. The Class A mandates, which included the communities formerly attached to the Turkish Empire, were regarded as having "reached a stage of develop-

[6] For the League and Danzig, see pp. 302–303.

ment where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone." The Class B mandates included the former German possessions in Central Africa. These were held to need definite governmental supervision, and their prospects for self-government were remote. In Class C were placed German South West Africa and the Pacific islands which had once belonged to Germany. These, "owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centers of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances," were thought to be "best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory," subject to certain safeguards in the interests of the indigenous population.

Since the Covenant made no mention of the mandatory powers nor of the manner in which the areas were to be distributed, these details had to be settled by special agreement. The C and B mandates were assigned in 1919 by the Big Four of the peace conference. In the C group, German South West Africa went to the Union of South Africa; German Samoa, to New Zealand; the island of Nauru, to the British Empire; [7] all other German islands south of the equator, to Australia, and those north of the equator, to Japan. The Class B mandates were distributed so that Great Britain got one-sixth of the Cameroons, one-third of Togoland, and most of German East Africa (Tanganyika); France secured five-sixths of the Cameroons and two-thirds of Togoland; and Belgium received the northwestern corner of German East Africa, Ruanda-Urundi. A conference at San Remo in 1920 allotted the Class A mandates in such fashion that Iraq, Palestine, and Trans-Jordan went to Great Britain, and Syria and Lebanon to France. All apportionments were later approved by the League Council.[8]

Late in 1920 there was created the Permanent Mandates Commission, whose function was to scan the mandatories' reports and present recommendations to the Council. Eventually the commission came to consist of

[7] Nauru was administered for the British Empire by the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. Its area is 8.4 square miles; it is rich in phosphates.

[8] In Iraq the hostility to British control was so great that the mandatory relationship did not go into effect. Instead, the proposed mandate was replaced by alliance treaties of 1922, 1926, and 1930 which, embodying the supervisory principles of the mandate system, converted Iraq into a British protectorate under its own king, Feisal I. In October 1932 Iraq was admitted to the League as a sovereign state. Under another treaty with Great Britain, however, the Arabian kingdom accorded London special financial and military rights. King Feisal I died in 1933 and was succeeded by his son, Ghazi. The latter was killed in an automobile accident in 1939 and was succeeded by his three-year-old son, Feisal II.

eleven members, selected for indefinite terms on the basis of their personal qualifications. The powers of the commission were purely advisory, but it kept the Council informed as to whether or not the various mandates were being administered in the interests of the natives and in accordance with the principles of the Covenant. Unfortunately for its effectiveness, the commission could not hear petitioners nor visit the mandated territories.

The actual administration of some of the mandates is discussed in other chapters. Be it said at this point, however, that the mandate system proved of considerable value in focusing public opinion on the "sacred trust" of proper colonial administration and in substituting the idea of a trusteeship of backward peoples for the prewar concept of imperialist exploitation. The theory of League mandates opened the way to a somewhat more responsible "spirit of world politics." After the Second World War, the League mandate system was absorbed into the United Nations trusteeship system.

In addition to the peoples in the mandated areas, there were placed under League guardianship about 30,000,000 members of national minorities in Central and Eastern Europe. This protection was provided through special minorities treaties signed at, or soon after, the Paris Peace Conference (see pp. 33–34). Most of the minorities agreements provided that infractions of the accepted obligations towards minorities might be called to the attention of the Council by any member of that body. The responsibilities of the League in respect of the minorities were heavy, especially since they might so easily take on a political guise. The Council had to shield the minorities against mistreatment and yet had to be careful not to infringe the sovereign rights or hurt the national pride of the majorities. This phase of the League's activities was frequently subjected to hostile criticism.

In an attempt to remedy some of the evils the Council in 1929 revised its procedure of dealing with minority disputes. A Minorities Committee was established, to consist of the president of the Council and two delegates chosen by him. To this organ was assigned the duty of deciding whether or not questions regarding minority rights should be laid before the Council. All communications between the committee and the governments concerned were to be carried on through the Minorities Section of the Secretariat, the latter also being responsible for the collection of pertinent data and information on the entire subject of minorities. It became the practice of the Council not to impose its decisions in minority disputes, but to indicate the path of conciliation and compromise.

The Fourteenth Assembly in 1933 expressed the feeling that the states

not bound by minorities treaties ought to show "at least as high a standard of justice" in the treatment of their minorities as was required of other states by the treaties. On the other hand, at the next Assembly in 1934, Poland declared that, until a new general system of protecting minorities should be developed, she would refuse to coöperate. Nationalists sometimes attacked the minorities treaties as tending to perpetuate undesirable internal differences.

THE WORTH OF THE LEAGUE

The Covenant imposed upon the League of Nations a multitude of tasks in addition to those mentioned. Financial assistance was rendered by the League to needy states in Central Europe and the Balkans. It played a prominent role in the seach for national security and in the (unsuccessful) movement for a reduction of armaments. Highly important, if less spectacular, work was accomplished through its agencies in such fields as preventive medicine; epidemiology; the codification of international law; the suppression of the traffic in women, children, and opium; and the struggle against slavery and forced labor. Much was done under its auspices to promote international intellectual coöperation, to facilitate international transit and communications, and to coördinate the activities of various health and scientific organizations throughout the world. Much of this, also, was passed on for further development to the United Nations.

Perhaps the greatest general contribution of the League was its influence in spreading the idea of international coöperation. More than any other agency, the League helped to make people aware of the existence of world conditions and world problems, and to dispel ideas concerning purely national and isolated difficulties. It appeared to be a decided advance merely to have a periodic assemblage of representatives from all over the world at one conference table, so that these delegates might come to know their respective worths and outlooks. The concept of an association of nations was old; the actuality of the League of Nations was new. And the League failed in the end to preserve peace because it could be only what the nations made of it—nothing less and nothing more.

Finally, "in its purposes and principles, its institutions and its methods, the United Nations bears at every point the mark of the experience of the League. In judgments upon the records of the League and all that it did, this truth must be always borne in mind. Whatever the fortunes of the United Nations may be, the fact that, at the close of the Second World War, its establishment was desired and approved by the whole community of

civilized peoples, must stand to future generations as a vindication of the men who planned the League, of the thousands who worked for it, of the many millions who placed in it their hopes of a peaceful and prosperous world." [9]

[9] Walter, F. P. *A History of The League of Nations,* 2 v., 1952, II, p. 812. Reprinted by permission of the Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER 3

Reparation, Debts, Depression

FOUR GRIM YEARS, 1919–1923

In the Peace of Paris, the Allies demanded that the Central Powers, because of their presumed responsibility for the war, make complete financial restitution for the property damage done to Allied civilians and assume the burden of the pension and separation allowances added to the Allied budgets in consequence of the conflict. War responsibility and reparation thus were expressly linked together.

To evaluate the amount of the damages and formulate a method of payment were tasks assigned by the peace treaty to a Reparation Commission. This was to consist of one representative each from the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and the remaining Allied powers. Since the United States did not ratify the treaty, no American member was appointed. A Belgian was selected to represent the lesser states. The commissioners had until May 1921 to hear and pass on Allied claims for damages and to set a total reparation figure. Meanwhile Germany was to pay on account about $5,000,000,000.

While the commission deliberated, the Allied statesmen held conferences to decide on a scale of distribution of the reparation receipts. At a Spa Conference in 1920 distribution percentages were agreed upon, France being allotted 52 per cent of the total receipts, the British Empire 22 per cent, Italy 10 per cent, Belgium 8 per cent, and all other claimants the remaining 8 per cent.

Meanwhile, early in 1921, Germany announced that she had completed

payment, in the form of coal, rolling stock, and so forth, of the amount demanded on account, and that further payments would be withheld until a final reparation total was established. The Reparation Commission declared the German claim false and based upon the fixing of an unduly high price level for the goods delivered. According to the commissioners, German payments were still 60 per cent short of the goal. A fruitless exchange of notes ensued, after which the commission declared Germany in voluntary default on her obligations. Thereupon the Allied zone of occupation was extended across the east bank of the Rhine to include several large industrial centers. The occupied area was surrounded with a customs wall against German products, and special taxes were levied on German imports into Allied countries.

Seven weeks later (April 1921) the Reparation Commission announced that the total German indemnity should be about $32,000,000,000 (plus interest). This was three times as high as the figure recommended by the economic experts at the peace conference. According to a "London Schedule" which was drawn up later, Germany was to pay this sum through fixed annuities of $500,000,000, plus variable annuities corresponding to a tax of 26 per cent on her exports. Following threats of an Allied occupation of the Ruhr district, the schedule was accepted by the government of Chancellor Joseph Wirth.

In order to make the annual outpayment of hundreds of millions of dollars, Germany needed a favorable trade balance. Instead, for some time after the war, she had an unfavorable balance. Huge quantities of raw materials had to be purchased from abroad to replenish the stocks that had been used up or lost during the conflict. Since these imports could not be paid for in full by an immediate reëxport of manufactures, they made necessary the export of a large percentage of the none-too-plentiful gold. The resulting shortage of capital was made still more acute by the activities of some Germans who invested their surplus funds in foreign securities lest the government place on their shoulders the chief burden of taxes for reparation purposes. German credit fell so low that foreign loans were unobtainable and high prices had to be paid for foreign exchange. Every time the government bought foreign currency to make reparation payments the value of the mark experienced a further decline.

Despite these difficulties, Germany, in the opinion of some, might have been able to fulfill her obligations had she really been anxious to do so. There was evident in Germany a lack of will to pay—attributable in part to the circumstance that the stipulated annuities did not even cover the interest charges on the total reparation debt. In other words, the indebted-

ness would increase every year no matter how faithfully the payments were made. And the Allies in no way tried to improve Germany's international credit standing or help her trade. Even so, the first instalment of $250,000,000 was met, though at the price of another decline in the value of the mark and a further acceleration in the printing of paper money. A moratorium therefore was asked until the end of 1924.

This suit precipitated a double quarrel: one between Germany and the Allies, and another between Great Britain and France. The British, bearing in mind that Germany had been one of their best customers in prewar days, had gradually come to realize that economic ruination of the republic could only lead to increased British economic distress. Hence Lloyd George, anxious to reopen the German market to British goods at the earliest possible moment, was ready to grant the moratorium. The French, on the other hand, were indignant. They felt badly enough not to have been awarded full damages in the first place, and now, in addition, they were being asked to wait two years without receiving a sou. They estimated that in the past two years France had expended $5700 a minute on reconstruction and pensions, whereas Germany had been contributing only $381 per minute. Consequently Poincaré would agree to the moratorium only on condition that Germany transfer to French control the mines and dyestuff factories in the Rhineland. Inasmuch as Llyod George was of no mind to allow a further disruption of German economic life, the remaining months of 1922 were spent in an exchange of notes among London, Paris, and Berlin. Finally Poincaré determined to apply the "big stick," for he was convinced that Germany could pay, if only she would.

Under the Versailles Treaty the Allies might undertake reprisals whenever Germany voluntarily defaulted on her obligations. Poincaré consequently looked for defaults. He soon found them: Germany had defaulted on the delivery of telegraph poles. Later he also discovered shortages in coal and cattle deliveries. The Reparation Commission was notified and the culprit was called to account. The republic maintained that the default was involuntary, resulting from the necessity of drawing up new contracts with the timber companies because of the declining currency. Over the protests of the British member who, it is said, called the procedure the greatest timber scandal since the Wooden Horse of Troy, the commission declared Germany in default. In January 1923 French, Belgian, and Italian troops occupied the Ruhr district as far east as Dortmund. The British regarded the occupation as illegal and refused to participate in the venture.

The Ruhr was the heart of German industry, producing 80 per cent of

the country's coal, iron, and steel, and being responsible for 70 per cent of its commercial railway traffic. By the occupation, therefore, the French in effect crushed the German economic body while demanding a continuation of reparation payments. The embittered Germans could not fight, but they inaugurated a passive resistance in which representatives of all classes of the population participated. The situation led a prominent German to remark: "Two men have united the German people—Bismarck in 1871 and Poincaré in 1923."

Despite harsh treatment by the occupying troops, the inhabitants of the Ruhr refused to carry out orders given by the invaders. The telephone, telegraph, and railway services came to a standstill. The mines and factories were deserted. Newspapers refused to publish French and Belgian decrees. Local officials disregarded foreign commands. Jail terms were accepted with patience. Promises of reward from the aliens for services were spurned. Most of the German mayors in the district eventually were imprisoned.

The Berlin Government now stopped all reparation payments, forbade the Ruhr inhabitants to have dealings with the intruders, and subsidized the striking miners and workmen with food, clothing, and freshly printed paper money. As a consequence, the French were compelled to utilize their troops to work the mines and run the trains—with little success. The men found it difficult to operate the German machines and numerous accidents occurred. During the occupation, indeed, France secured only one-fourth as much Ruhr coal as she had received during equal time-periods prior to 1923. In anger the invaders declared a state of siege, prohibited the export of Ruhr products to Germany, and seized private as well as public funds and property. Blood was shed. The mark, meanwhile, continued to decline, being quoted in August 1923 at 5,000,000 to the dollar.

In the winter of 1923–1924 the French and Belgians tried to set up a separatist state in the Rhineland, called "Revolver Republic" by the loyal inhabitants. Discontented laborers and radicals, released convicts, and rowdies from all over Germany were imported into the Rhineland and encouraged to proclaim the region independent. Here again strenuous opposition was encountered from the British, to say nothing of the angry natives, and the French withdrew their support from the movement in February 1924. Those separatists who did not escape quickly under French protection were roughly handled by the patriots.

In unoccupied Germany conditions during 1923 became almost equally bad. Bankruptcy loomed and the government was forced to choose between complete surrender and total disintegration. In September 1923

Berlin announced the immediate and unconditional cessation of passive resistance. Poincaré apparently had triumphed, but the price of victory was high. Friendship with Great Britain was strained to the breaking point; neutral opinion was alienated by what were considered France's bullying tactics; and the total suspension of German reparation payments, plus foreign distrust of French methods, caused an alarming drop in the value of the franc. It was therefore deemed advisable to resume negotiations, and a proposal was adopted for the appointment of an international committee of experts to study the whole problem of German reparation. The commissioners were to be economic experts rather than politicians, and the report was to be based on fact, not sentiment.

THE DAWES AND YOUNG PLANS, 1924–1931

The selection of experts to deal with reparation was entrusted to the Reparation Commission. That body appointed a committee, consisting of two representatives each from the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium, to study and report on ways and means for balancing the German budget and stabilizing the mark. The committee began work in January 1924. Under the chairmanship of the United States financier, General Charles G. Dawes, it submitted a comprehensive plan to the commission in April.

The committeemen who drew up this Dawes or Experts' Plan approached their task as "business men anxious to obtain effective results." They viewed the reparation question in the light of recovery of debt rather than imposition of penalties, and they believed that "since, as a result of the war, the creditors of Germany are paying taxes . . . to the limit of their capacity, so also must Germany pay taxes . . . to the limit of her capacity." Though charged merely with the task of discovering means to balance Germany's budget and stabilize her currency, the experts had to stipulate the amount of reparation money that was to be included in her annual budgetary calculations.

The Experts' Plan made the following recommendations: (1) the Ruhr should be evacuated; (2) there should be established, as a depository for reparation payments, a central bank of issue *(Reichsbank)* having a monopoly for the issue of paper money, and supervised by a mixed board of Germans and foreigners under the chairmanship of one of the latter; (3) reparation payments should start at $240,000,000 for the first year and gradually rise over four years to a "standard" annuity of $600,000,000; (4) this standard might in future be raised or lowered in accord with the

fluctuations of an "index of prosperity" to be calculated upon the base period 1927–1929; (5) an immediate foreign loan of $200,000,000 should be concluded; (6) the sources for the reparation money should be a transport tax, railway bonds, industrial debentures, and pledged budgetary revenues from alcohol, tobacco, beer, sugar, and customs; (7) to watch over the execution of the plan in Germany there should be appointed a foreign Agent General for Reparation Payments.

The Reparation Commission accepted the report as a basis for solving the reparation problem. Germany endorsed the plan and then Great Britain, Italy, and Belgium all quickly registered their acquiescence. France alone held out until, as a result of the May 1924 elections, Poincaré was toppled from power and the more conciliatory Edouard Herriot became premier. On September 1, 1924, the plan became effective. Evacuation of the Ruhr began at once.

Under the supervision of Agent General Seymour Parker Gilbert, a United States financier in his early thirties, the plan gave promise of working well. German business picked up, reparation payments were made promptly, and a general confidence in Germany's future was restored. There seemed little doubt that Germany eventually would be able to meet with relative ease even the large "standard" annuities. For the first time since the signing of the Versailles Treaty, the diplomatic tension in Europe was lessened.

Nevertheless, the Dawes Plan had some weaknesses. Because it had not been empowered to do so, the Dawes Committee had not fixed a total reparation bill. Technically, therefore, the total of $32,000,000,000 set by the Reparation Commission in May 1921 was still in force. Yet it was obvious (1) that so high a sum could not be the definitive total and (2) that Germany would not long continue making huge annual payments with no knowledge as to how many years the process would have to go on. Moreover, the elaborate system of international economic control for which the plan provided was distasteful to both sides. An additional German grievance, linked to the subject of reparation, was the continued Rhineland occupation which, presumably, would last until 1935.

In 1928 the air was rife with talk about the desirability of more satisfactory reparation and Rhineland settlements. Eventually the chief powers concerned agreed that a new committee of experts should be appointed to work out a "complete and final settlement of the reparation problem." In due time a group of leading bankers was chosen to wrestle with one of the world's most difficult problems.

The new committee, known as "the Young Committee" after its United

States chairman, Owen D. Young, held its first meeting in Paris in February 1929. After more than seventeen weeks of hard work, the committee's report was handed to the governments concerned and to the Reparation Commission. The Young Plan contemplated a new indemnity bill of $8,032,500,000, to be paid over a period of 58½ years.[1] Significantly, the number of annuities coincided exactly with the number of inter-Allied war-debt payments still outstanding. In devising its schedule for these annuity payments the Young Committee had borne in mind three important principles: (1) the desirability of dividing the payments into an unconditional and a postponable part; (2) the need for a continuance of deliveries in kind for a few more years; and (3) the advisability of formulating a procedure to be followed when economic stress made it necessary to postpone the conditional payments.

The average annuities to all creditors for the first 37 payment years were set at $511,000,000; the remaining 22 annuities were to average $390,000,000 and were to correspond to the simultaneous "outpayments" of the creditor powers.[2] Thus the plan a second time linked reparation and war debts, for the reference to outpayments concerned the remaining instalments due on the inter-Allied debts. The unconditional or unpostponable part of each annuity was set at $162,000,000, of which three-fourths was assigned to France. In order to provide for a transitional period and avoid a sudden shock to German economy, it was advocated that some deliveries in kind be continued for a period of ten years. The Reparation Commission was to be abolished. It was the belief of the committee "that the basis of security for the payment of annuities is the solemn undertaking of the German Government, to which no further guarantee can add anything whatsoever." To protect German currency against disorganization because of difficulty in meeting the conditional obligations, the plan provided that "the German Government by giving at least ninety days' previous notice shall have the right to suspend for a moratorium period of two years from its due date all or part of the annuity described as postponable."

It remained to remove the shadow of politics from the reparation problem and to provide for some intermediary agency to handle the technical details arising between the original payment of the annuities by Germany in marks and the final receipt of these payments in their own currency by the individual creditor powers. To achieve these ends the

[1] The actual payments, including interest at 5½ per cent, to be turned over to the Allies from 1929 to 1988, were to total $26,350,000,000.

[2] France was to get more than half of each annuity, while the British Empire was to receive about one-fifth. The United States was to get $16,500,000 per year to cover the cost of the army of occupation.

committee recommended the establishment of a Bank for International Settlements.

In connection with the annuity payments this bank was to act as trustee for the creditor countries. It was to perform "the entire work of external administration of this plan, . . . act as the agency for the receipt and distribution of funds, and . . . supervise and assist in the commercialization and mobilization of certain portions of the annuities." The bank was also "to provide additional facilities for the international movement of funds, and to afford a ready instrument for promoting international financial relations." Thus it was to be a bank for the national banks, with a capital stock of $100,000,000, one-fourth of which was to be paid up immediately. It was hoped that the sound use of credit through the B.I.S. would help "contribute to the stability of international finance and the growth of world trade."

The advantages of the Young Plan over that of 1924 were set forth by the Young Committee itself:

> The proposed plan continues and completes the work begun by the Dawes Plan, which the position alike of Germany and of the other countries made it impossible to do more than indicate in outline in 1924. By the final reduction and fixation of the German debt, by the establishment of a progressive scale of annuities, and by the facilities which the new bank offers for lessening disturbance in the payment of annuities, it sets the seal on the inclusion of the German debt in the list of international settlements.

The Young Plan was fairly well received in diplomatic circles, and delegates were selected to meet at The Hague to draft a protocol for putting the new arrangement into effect. After much wrangling, the conference signed a final act in January 1930.[3] It provided for the going into force of the Young Plan as soon as (1) it was ratified by any four of the following creditors: France, Great Britain, Belgium, Italy, Japan; (2) the laws necessary for its operation were promulgated in Germany; and (3) the Bank for International Settlements was established. The act also provided for the evacuation of the Rhineland by Allied troops "not later than the end of June 1930."[4] Finally, because the French were frightened by a renewal of nationalistic outbursts in Germany, the idea of sanctions was revived by a clause which restored to the Allied states "full liberty of action" whenever the World Court should declare Germany in wilful default.

Ratification of the final act occurred in the spring of 1930. Only in

[3] The conference increased Britain's share of the annuities by about 10 per cent.
[4] The Rhineland occupation thus was ended five years before the minimum time limit set by the Versailles Treaty.

Germany did the government encounter much trouble in securing popular approval for the plan. There Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, maintaining that the payments could not be met, resigned as head of the Reichsbank in protest, and Dr. Alfred Hugenberg, a former Krupp director and now leader of the Nationalist Party, forced the holding of a plebiscite on the question. Since the vote was favorable to the authorities, the plan went into effect. Once more the nations were relieved, feeling that a "complete and final settlement" had at last been reached. Yet, within less than two years, the Young annuities had to be suspended.[5]

DEPRESSION AND DEFAULTS, 1931–1932

In the German parliamentary elections of September 1930 the bitterest opponents of the Young Plan won astonishingly many votes. Foreign investors thereupon became uneasy and a heavy withdrawal of money from Germany resulted. Within a few weeks $200,000,000 was recalled and, although a loan from a New York syndicate temporarly stabilized conditions, it was clearly apparent that "German finances were . . . easily capable of being upset."

Conditions elsewhere in Europe were little better. The structure of western political economy seemed to be breaking under the strain of postwar readjustments. The entire world soon came into the grip of a prolonged depression. As to the causes of this depression, there was considerable speculation and argument. Some authorities traced the economic difficulties to a supposedly inadequate world gold supply. The resulting decline in commodity prices, they believed, had a disastrous effect on international trade. Others regarded an oversupply of silver and the consequent decline in the purchasing power of such silver-standard regions as China and India as the root of the trouble.

It was also pointed out that the continuing technological advances (1) so multiplied the output of industrial and agricultural products that a huge, undistributed surplus was piled up and (2) so decreased the amount of needed man power that the world's unemployment figure was swelled

[5] New reparation arrangements were also concluded in 1930 with Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Austria was relieved of all further reparation payments, but from 1944 until 1966 was to pay Italy an annual sum of $200,000 for certain administrative and relief costs incurred at the end of the war. Hungary's contributions until 1943 were to be poured into a general fund to reimburse Hungarian nationals whose lands in Romania had been expropriated. From 1944 until 1966 Hungarian reparation was to total $2,750,000 per year. Bulgaria was required to pay 5,000,000 gold francs in 1930, plus 415,000,000 gold francs in 36 annual instalments. Turkey had been excused from all reparation payments by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923).

to an unprecedented total and the purchasing power of the working groups suffered a steady diminution. Emphasis also was placed upon the circumstances that the years since the war had witnessed the general levying of high tariffs, the imposition of import quotas, the passage of restrictive immigration laws, the development of highly organized "buy-home-products" movements, and the invention of ingenious forms of economic discrimination and retaliation. The general shrinkage of foreign trade, it was explained, made the situation especially trying for those states which had to make reparation payments or meet war-debt instalments, for these states obviously needed favorable balances of trade with which to cover their obligations.

Relief proposals were legion, but the only really important development in 1930 was a scheme for the creation of an economic federation of Europe, discussed before the League Assembly by Aristide Briand, the French Foreign Minister. Unfortunately, it appeared to some that the motive behind this idea was less to revive the economic life of the continent than to consolidate the hegemony of France and uphold the peace treaties. Hence the Austrian Foreign Minister, Dr. Johann Schober, advised the Assembly that the situation was too acute for long-drawn-out negotiations for a Pan-Europa, but that a beginning in the direction of federation should be made by the prompt conclusion of regional agreements. The suggestion was favorably received, and throughout 1931 a series of economic and grain conferences was held in European capitals. Economic rivalry and national jealousy, however, prevented the reaching of any major understanding other than an Austro-German agreement to conclude a customs union.

In March 1931 Germany and Austria made public the text of this agreement to conclude a treaty which, while maintaining the independence of the signatories, would "mark the beginning of a new order of European economic conditions on lines of regional agreements." Customs duties between Germany and Austria were to be entirely abolished. Goods from other countries were to be subject to identical duties in the two republics. Wherever possible, the signatories were to negotiate similar though separate trade treaties with third powers. The respective customs administrations were to be independent of one another, but all receipts were "to be apportioned between the two countries according to a quota." The parties were ready "to enter into negotiation for a similar agreement with any other country expressing such desire."

The announcement of the contemplated customs union was well received in Great Britain, where financial circles favored any move to

safeguard international credit, but it caused excited outbursts in France and among France's allies. Seeing in the proposed customs pact a veiled Anschluss or Austro-German union, France sought to prevent its consummation by diplomatic and financial pressure. Thus she suddenly adopted an uncompromising stand in the current Anglo-Franco-Italian naval parleys which until then had been progressing fairly satisfactorily, and made the granting of a much-needed loan to Austria contingent upon the latter's renunciation of the customs protocol.

Austria needed this money to save from collapse the *Kredit Anstalt,* a bank which had numerous foreign branches, controlled three-fourths of Austrian banking, and dominated two-thirds of Austria's industry through share-holdings and credit advances. Despite the emergency, Austria rejected the politically weighted French terms and appealed to Great Britain. The Bank of England advanced the money as a short-term loan renewable at seven-day intervals. This was widely regarded as a diplomatic defeat for France and the authorities at Paris were angry with the British. But the most serious international outcome of the Austrian affair was the precipitation of another financial crisis in Germany, for "although the commitments of the German banks in Austria were an insignificant part of their total assets, the (difficulties) of the *Kredit Anstalt* shook confidence in the solvency of Central Europe." Panic had indeed been latent in Germany's adverse trade balance, in the vulnerability of her financial structure, and in her growing budgetary deficit.[6]

Hampered by reactionaries and communists at home and by French diplomacy abroad, the German Government had energetically striven to avert economic ruin. Between July 1930 and July 1931 Chancellor Heinrich Brüning, backed by President von Hindenburg, issued dozens of emergency decrees increasing taxes, lowering salaries and pensions and unemployment benefits, and effecting other economies, chiefly at the expense of education and social welfare. Well-to-do Germans, fearing national bankruptcy, hastily invested in foreign securities, while panicky Americans, Netherlanders, and Swiss withdrew their credits at a rapid rate. In the first three weeks of June 1931 the Reichsbank lost 41 per cent of its gold holdings.

At this point President Hoover, in the interest of the "economic recovery of the world," proposed a one-year world moratorium, involving postponement "of all payments on intergovernmental debts, reparations

[6] Germany's unfavorable trade balance for 1924–1931 was $1,600,000,000. The accumulated budgetary deficit from 1925 to 1930 was $320,000,000. Unemployment figures in 1931 reached 6,000,000. In July 1931 the short-term credits of the republic totaled $3,000,000,000. In September 1931 Germany and Austria dropped their proposed customs pact.

and relief debts, both principal and interest . . . not including obligations of governments held by private parties." He was careful to make it plain that he did "not approve in any remote sense of the cancelation of the debts to" the United States. The scheme was agreeable to every country except France, which objected that the Hoover proposal bore no relation to the Young Plan. Consequently time was spent in harmonizing the Hoover scheme with the Young Plan, and, although the moratorium was allowed to go into effect on July 1, 1931, the final arrangements were not concluded until five days later.

The main points of the moratorium were as follows: (1) all intergovernmental debt payments, including conditional reparation dues, were to be postponed for a year; (2) the unconditional reparation payments were to be continued by Germany, but the B.I.S. was to reinvest the entire sum in German railways bonds, the railway immediately returning the funds to the government; (3) the postponed dues were to be paid in ten equal instalments commencing in 1933; (4) assistance was to be given the smaller European states, whose finances might be seriously disturbed by the discontinuance of reparation receipts, by loans from the larger central banks acting through the B.I.S.; (5) assurances were to be given that Germany would use the money freed by the moratorium "for exclusively economic purposes," not for military preparations.

When the plan went into effect optimism in the United States ran high. But as far as Germany was concerned, the moratorium negotiations were little more than a general advertisement of her financial exhaustion and of the continued bitterness of Franco-German diplomatic relations. The heavy German gold losses continued, and in July the great *Darmstädter und Nationalbank* failed. Thereupon all German banks were forced by governmental decree temporarily to close their doors. To deal with the new crisis, "conversations" were held in Paris and London. The whip hand at these gatherings was held by France, who alone in Europe had large funds available but who was angered by the continued attempts of Germany, Austria, Great Britain, and the United States to reach vital settlements without her assistance. The French had few German investments, but they regarded their reparation dues as a first claim on Germany, the payment of which was far more important to them than the security of the speculative investments of the citizens of other countries.

A committee of the B.I.S. recommended that the existing short-term credit be continued and recommended additional long-term credits. The committee added, however, that "financial remedies alone will be powerless to restore the world's economic prosperity until there is a radical change"

in the policy of obstruction whereby the nations had permitted "the development of an international financial system which involves the annual payment of large sums by debtor to creditor countries, while at the same time putting obstacles in the way of the free movement of goods." Until international commerce should be freed from artificial obstructions, therefore, it was impossible "to suggest definite plans for securing to Germany long-term credits."

The first recommendation of the committee was adopted and a "Standstill Agreement" reached whereby all short-term credits to Germany were extended for six months. At the end of that time the standstill was prolonged for another year, while Chancellor Brüning announced that Germany also would have to stop the Young Plan annuities.[7] It was no longer a question of the *will* to pay, he indicated, Germany *could* not pay. In the meantime British finance had also crashed (see p. 111) and this new crisis shook still more the confidence of the world in its financial structure. As a last hope, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Japan agreed to hold another reparation conference in June 1932.

The representatives of these countries met at Lausanne and after three weeks reached an agreement which set aside the German reparation debt and substituted therefor an obligation upon Germany to contribute $714,600,000 for the general purpose of European reconstruction. To meet this debt the Berlin Government was to deliver to the B.I S. 5 per cent bonds for the entire amount. The bonds were to be held by the bank as trustee for three years, after which they might be negotiated and placed in the open market. Germany might at any time redeem at par bonds not yet issued, and after fifteen years all bonds which the bank had been unable to negotiate were to be canceled.

It was not philanthropy that induced the creditor delegates to forego more than 90 per cent of the Young reparation figure. They were motivated primarily by a desire to make possible the revival of world trade and to remove the fateful cloud of insecurity that hovered over the nations. The return of prosperity, they felt, was dependent upon commerce and security, and these should be restored through the virtual abolition of reparation.

When the agreement was made public, it was hailed as the beginning of a new epoch in postwar history. But there was another side to the story. It soon was revealed that the delegates of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium had come to a separate "gentlemen's agreement" which provided that the Lausanne convention would have final effect only after

[7] The Standstill Agreement was then extended from year to year, with Germany gradually reducing the short-term debt.

ratification—and such ratification would not follow "until a satisfactory settlement had been reached between them and their own creditors." In case no such settlement could be arranged, the legal position "will revert to that which existed before the Hoover Moratorium."

Now, the chief creditor of the signatories of the "gentlemen's agreement" was the United States, which had consistently maintained that there was no official relation between reparation and war debts. Hence the news of the "gentlemen's agreement" was received in Washington with vigorous assertions that cancelation of the war debts was unthinkable even if reparation obligations were abolished. Many persons resented what they regarded as an attempt by Europe to pass on responsibility for the world dilemma to the United States. The Lausanne Agreement therefore was dropped and the world depression continued, while the nationalists in Germany intensified their attacks against the "weak" government which could force no large concessions from the former Allies.

The total amount of reparation paid by Germany up to the time that the Lausanne Conference met was, according to Allied estimates, about $5,500,000,000.[8] Technically the Young Plan schedule remained in effect after the Lausanne Agreement fell through, but no further reparation payments were forthcoming. The larger portion of these had been raised through foreign loans; hence when, owing chiefly to the spreading depression, further foreign credits became unobtainable, Germany seemed to regard her reparation obligation as ended. Thereupon the other debtor governments also began to default. Finland alone continued to meet her obligations to the United States.

THE INTER-ALLIED WAR DEBTS

The debts which the former Allies were so eager to link with reparation arose out of the exigencies of the war. Prior to the entry of the United States into the conflict, France, Russia, Italy, and lesser Allied powers had borrowed several billion dollars from Great Britain. Eighteen days after the United States joined the belligerents, Congress authorized the lending of $3,000,000,000 to the Allies at 5 per cent interest. Other loans followed during the remainder of the war and in the postarmistice months. Altogether, the advances to twenty nations totaled $10,338,000,000. Of this sum $7,077,000,000 was loaned before the armistice and $3,261,000,000, or about 31 per cent, after November 11, 1918. During the peace conference in 1919 the British announced their willingness to

[8] The German estimates were considerably higher.

cancel the war debts owed them by the other Allies if the United States adopted a similar stand. President Wilson rejected this proposal and the succeeding administrations, Democratic and Republican alike, chose the course of collection.[9]

Early in 1922 Congress created a World War Foreign Debt Commission to arrange funding agreements with the debtors, most of whom had not yet paid any interest on the loans. Between 1923 and 1930 accords were reached with all parties concerned for a funded total, including back interest, of $11,565,000,000. The agreements provided for the full repayment of the advances over 62 years. The interest charges varied according to the commission's estimate of the debtors' capacity to pay. The average for all debts was 2.135 per cent. The total amount of principal and interest to be paid to the United States was $22,188,000,000. As long as Germany, aided by borrowing, met her reparation instalments, the Allies remitted their obligations to the United States. All payments, however, were suspended by the Hoover Moratorium of 1931–1932. After the expiration of the moratorium, the failure of the Lausanne Conference, and the appearance of the depression, there occurred an increasing number of defaults. Meanwhile United States public opinion had become divided on the subject of collection.

Among the arguments advanced by the advocates of collection were these: (1) collection was essential to uphold the sanctity of contracts as a fundamental principle of business ethics; (2) cancelation was unfair to United States taxpayers because the war bonds had to be retired whether or not Europe paid; (3) payment was necessary to restore confidence in Europe's good faith, since some countries were not taxing themselves as heavily as they might and others were spending huge sums on armaments.

Those who favored cancelation or drastic reduction maintained that: (1) since the United States entered the war late, lost few men, and spent relatively little money, she might consider the debt money her contribution to the cause; (2) the United States became wealthy as a result of her wartime activities and should be content with her new business contacts and markets; (3) United States manufacturers would suffer if the country were flooded with foreign commodities, without the sale of which Europe

[9] In the "Balfour Note" of August 1922, Great Britain explained that she still was "prepared, if such a policy formed part of a satisfactory international settlement, to remit all the debts due to Great Britain by [her] allies in respect of loans, or by Germany in respect of reparation." Since, however, the United States saw the matter in a different light, Great Britain was "regretfully constrained" to request repayment of the loans. The reaction of the other debtors to this principle was, in general, that they could repay Great Britain and the United States only as much as they themselves received from Germany.

could not pay the debts; (4) insistence upon collection was causing ill will against the United States, whereas cancelation would increase international harmony.

A third body of opinion favored some form of conditional cancelation. The debts, it was said, might be canceled on condition that the respective beneficiaries guaranteed to use the money thus saved for educational or economic, but not military, purposes. Again, the Allied debts and German reparation might be reciprocally canceled; or, finally, the dismantling of existing armaments might be made a condition of cancelation. The government, however, refused cancelation and in 1934 adopted a law forbidding defaulting nations to float loans in the United States.

1933–1939: WORLD ECONOMIC CONFERENCE AND AFTER

The final act of the Lausanne Conference asked the League of Nations to convoke a world conference on monetary and economic questions. The League Council called such a gathering in London in 1933. The coöperation of the United States was secured by a promise to omit from the agenda the subjects of reparation, war debts, and tariffs. A preparatory commission drafted the agenda for the conference. "Before setting forth the problems which require solution," ran the introduction to its report, "we wish to call attention to the gravity of the situation with which the world is confronted." The following summary of the economic plight of the nations at the end of 1932 was then presented:

> Unemployment has recently been estimated by the International Labour Office as involving at least thirty million workers. Even this huge total, which does not include the workers' families or other dependents, is probably an underestimate. . . .
>
> Wholesale commodity prices—expressed in gold—have declined since October 1929 by roughly a third; raw material prices on the average by 50 to 60 per cent. In the middle of December [1932], at Winnipeg, the price of wheat fell to the lowest level recorded in any primary market for wheat during the past four centuries. . . .
>
> World stocks of agricultural products and of other raw materials continue to accumulate. The index of world stocks for 1932 was double that for 1925. Huge accumulations thus overhang some of the principal markets. . . .
>
> Industrial production has been drastically curtailed, particularly in those trades producing capital equipment. The depths which have been reached in some instances are illustrated by the position of the United States steel industry, which, at the close of 1932, was operating at only 10 per cent of capacity.
>
> The international flow of goods, hindered by currency disorders and restricted by a multiplicity of new governmental interventions, has been reduced

to incredibly low levels. The total value of world trade in the third quarter of 1932 was only about one-third of that in the corresponding period of 1929. . . . Moreover, the quantum of goods in foreign trade appears to have fallen by at least 25 per cent; by far the largest fall on record.

As a result of price-declines and the fall in the volume of production and trade, national incomes in many countries have fallen, it is estimated, by more than 40 per cent. The revenues of Governments, as a consequence, have suffered sharp reductions, while expenditures have shown no corresponding decline. The inevitable result has been a series of budget deficits which, in some cases, have reached unprecedented proportions. . . . Almost half the countries of the world are off the gold standard, and, in some forty countries, exchange restrictions have been imposed.

Currency disorganisation, price-declines, curtailment of trade have thrown into sharp relief the vast and difficult problems of indebtedness with which many, if not most, countries are confronted. As matters now stand, there are countries the total value of whose export trade has fallen below the sums required for external debt service alone.

The conference proper, representing 67 nations, met in June and July 1933. The questions of world monetary policy and removal of international trade restrictions soon loomed as the chief stumbling blocks of the gathering. France, Italy, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, and other gold-standard states formed a "gold bloc" which insisted that all talk about reduction of tariffs and removal of trade barriers must *follow* a general stabilization of world currencies. The United States, having gone off the gold standard some weeks before, announced that she would refuse to coöperate in any move for stabilization until a sufficient rise in prices had been achieved at home. In other words, President Roosevelt placed improvement in the domestic situation above international coöperation on a basis which would interfere with his recovery plans. Great Britain seemed to have no fixed policy, but sided now with one view and then the other.

The concrete achievements of the conference may be easily summarized: (1) a short international tariff truce distinguished for its many loopholes; (2) a four-year agreement among the eight leading silver-producing and silver-holding countries not to dump their stores on the world market, in the hope that this might raise the price of the metal; (3) a resolution declaring for closer coöperation among the various national banks and between these institutions and the B.I.S. at Basel; and (4) a resolution advocating direct negotiation between international debtors and creditors. The general view was that the conference had failed.

In the months following the adjournment of the monetary conference, economic conditions throughout the world experienced a slight improvement. But this revival, except in Japan and Australia, was almost entirely

domestic in character. International trade remained stagnant. The gains, moreover, seemed to be most pronounced in those states which adopted emergency measures of an intensely economic-nationalist nature. And such gains promised little for the permanent revival of world trade.

The means employed between 1933 and 1939 to bring about and maintain "recovery" nearly all tended in the direction of *autarky*, the latest descriptive term for economic self-sufficiency. They included further currency devaluations, regulations governing the production of raw materials, public-works programs, currency-exchange restrictions, the development of new industries to supply goods otherwise kept out by tariff schedules and import quotas, and the like. Almost nothing was done to break down the international trade barriers, stabilize exchange, solve the intergovernmental debt problems, or restore economic good feeling and friendship among the nations.[10] With Nazi Germany leading the way, the nations of the world continued to place political obstacles in the way of international trade. In the end, this intensification of economic nationalism, with its resultant controlled national economies, helped bring on the Second World War. More and more people came to believe "that the difficulties of international economic relations could be alleviated only by recourse to force." [11]

[10] An exception to the general trend was the effort of Secretary of State Cordell Hull to arrange reciprocal tariff agreements with other countries.

[11] The price indices, in gold dollars, of world trade were as follows: (1929 = 100)

1913	73.5	1931	67.7
1924	109.4	1935	42.4
1929	100.0	1938	45.5

CHAPTER 4

The Search for Security

THE REVIVAL OF ALLIANCES, 1920–1927

Long before the last echoes of the war had died, France embarked upon a search for security against another German invasion. Twice within memory had the pounding of German military boots been heard on French soil, and Frenchmen were fearful of still another incursion. As long as Germany remained economically and militarily strong and as long as her population increased at a faster rate than that of France, it seemed necessary to Frenchmen to seek iron-clad guarantees of protection and help. The leader in this hunt for security was Raymond Poincaré who, born in Lorraine, nourished from early youth a hatred of Germany. The foreign policies of other French premiers, however—of the conservative Tardieu, of the optimistic Briand, and of the liberal Herriot—were all motivated by the same fear. Differ as they might on domestic policies, the statesmen of France invariably sought one goal in international affairs: security.

The first practical step in search of security was the signing, in June 1919, of identical treaties between France and Great Britain, and France and the United States. These Guarantee Treaties provided that Great Britain and the United States, respectively, should "come immediately to [France's] assistance in the event of any unprovoked movement of aggression against her being made by Germany." Whatever comfort France might have got from these agreements was short lived. The United States Senate would have nothing to do with Wilson's treaty and thereupon the one with Great Britain, already ratified, automatically became void; its acceptance

had been made "contingent upon the United States Government undertaking the same obligation."

France, looking upon this development as little short of betrayal, turned to the smaller states that also had cause to fear any change in the political *status quo*. First (1920) came a military alliance with Belgium. This provided that each signatory should come to the support of the other in case of attack by Germany. The League was notified of the existence of the military accord but the terms were kept secret. As the price for this alliance France agreed to the inclusion of Luxembourg in a customs union with Belgium, although the Luxembourgers had earlier voted for economic affiliation with France.

Next, France sought a substitute to take the place occupied in the prewar alliance scheme by Russia. The logical candidate was Poland, for the latter stood in as much fear of Germany as did France. The natural attachment between the two republics was increased when France, in 1920, lent Poland men, money, and munitions with which to fight the Bolsheviks, whom the French feared only less than they did the Germans. A Franco-Polish treaty therefore was signed in 1921. It bound the two governments to consult on all matters of mutual interest, to act in concert for the maintenance of treaties to which they were or might become parties, and to lend one another military aid in the event of any unprovoked attack. In later years this treaty was supplemented by half a dozen conventions.

The pivot of two alliances, France also determined once more to approach Great Britain. Late in 1921, accordingly, Paris advanced plans for a political alliance. The ensuing negotiations were not happy. The British would promise immediate assistance only in case of a direct German invasion of France. But France was more apprehensive lest Germany attack Poland, and in that event the Third Republic was bound to aid her ally. It was against such a contingency that Paris sought assurance of British military support. Meanwhile other differences had arisen between France and Great Britain. At the Washington Conference for the Limitation of Armaments in 1921–1922 (see p. 85), an Anglo-United States proposal to abolish submarines was laid aside largely because of opposition by France. The breach between the two former allies was widened still more by their opposing views on the reparation question. In the summer of 1922, therefore, alliance negotiations lapsed.

Worried by the complications arising from the Ruhr occupation, France set out to find additional friends. In 1924 a Franco-Czechoslovak pact was concluded whereby the signatories agreed to settle by pacific means any disputes that might arise between them; promised to consult with one

another if Germany and Austria tried to unite, or if Germany or Hungary attempted a monarchist restoration; and undertook to "concert upon" common measures in dealing with matters relating to their security or the peace treaties. Two years later (1926), France concluded a security agreement with Romania. The two powers agreed to act together in forestalling attempts to change the political status of Europe, and to consult with one another regarding prospective action if either were attacked without provocation. In 1927 France signed a similar treaty with Yugoslavia.

Meanwhile the eastern allies of France had formed a partnership among themselves. In 1920 and 1921 a Little Entente was organized by Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania to keep intact the Treaty of Trianon, prevent a restoration of the Habsburgs, and oppose a solid front to any Hungarian irredentist outbreak. In 1921, moreover, Romania signed a treaty of alliance with Poland. During 1922 cordial relations were established beween the remaining members of the Little Entente and Poland. Finally, to make possible economic as well as diplomatic coöperation, the foreign ministers of the entente states decided to hold periodic conferences to which Poland might be invited.[1] The new French hegemony thus created in the name of security was founded upon an armed camp of the type that had proved so futile and so dangerous in 1914. It was one of the moving factors behind the conclusion of two other treaty systems, centering, respectively, in the Soviet Union and Fascist Italy.

It happened that in April 1922 the representatives of 34 nations, including Germany and Russia, met at Genoa to devise means for improving the European economic situation. Discussions on loans and credits were well advanced when news reached the gathering that Walther Rathenau and George Chicherin, chiefs, respectively, of the German and Russian foreign offices, had signed a treaty at the Italian watering place of Rapallo.

It was understandable that these two powers should have been drawn together. Neither had as yet been restored to membership in good standing among the nations of Europe. Both were fearful of an unfriendly Allied or French-controlled coalition. And both were anxious to establish new trade contacts. To Germans, the pact seemed to clear the way to an alliance with Russia and to make possible defiance of the Allies and their treaty demands. To the Russian leaders it meant the restoration of diplomatic relations with a great power, the opportunity to secure credits, and lessened fear of the Franco-Polish alliance. By the terms of the treaty, the Soviet

[1] The ties that bound these satellites to France were not alone those of treaty obligations, but of finance. Over a period of years French bankers lent the four states hundreds of millions of dollars, chiefly credits for munition purchases in France.

Government was accorded recognition by Germany, and all prewar debts and claims were mutually canceled. If Russia ever paid her other creditors, however, Germany was to receive equal consideration. The news of the treaty angered the Allied delegates and the conference broke up without settling any major issue.

Soon after the conclusion of the Rapallo Treaty, the Bolsheviks began to fear the formation of a European bloc against Russia. Hence Moscow determined to negotiate nonaggression pacts with neighboring countries. The first such achievement was the signing in 1925 of a treaty of friendship and neutrality with Turkey. The Turkish Republic shared the Soviet Union's distrust of the western states, particularly of the League, because the latter had just awarded some disputed territory to Iraq and because of a quarrel over the expulsion of the Greek Patriarch from Constantinople. In the treaty each signatory agreed not to attack the other and to remain neutral if the other were attacked by a third power or group of powers.

Four months later (April 1926) a similar covenant was signed at Berlin with Germany. The Reich was indignant over bickerings attending the vote on its admission to the League in that year and consequently looked with favor on closer relations with Moscow. The Berlin Treaty provided for mutual neutrality in case of attack without provocation. Each signatory agreed not to participate in any financial or economic boycott directed against the other. Before the end of 1926 the Bolsheviks had concluded like agreements with Afghanistan and Lithuania, and in 1927 a nonaggression treaty was negotiated with Persia (Iran).

It was not to be expected that Italy would remain isolated while the other continental states were engaged in so lively a search for security. Italy, in fact, had great ambitions and bitter enemies, and Italy therefore needed friends. The postwar period saw the development of a struggle between Italy and France for control of the western Mediterranean. The result was an armament race, and military preparations were made on both sides of the Franco-Italian border. Several times naval parleys among the powers broke down because Rome insisted on parity with France, while Paris contended that mathematical parity was not allowable. Besides, France had land in Europe and North Africa which, according to some Italians, should be theirs. Italy, finally, placed chief blame upon France for her inability in 1919 to get more colonies.

Steps to protect Italy against French diplomatic maneuvers were undertaken shortly after Benito Mussolini's advent to power. Treaties of friendship and neutrality were signed in 1924 with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. In 1926 similar agreements were reached with Romania and Spain.

A political treaty of 1926 with Albania was strengthened in the following year by a defensive alliance. An Italo-Hungarian treaty was negotiated in 1927.

Thus, in 1927, nine years after the armistice, Europe was again divided into armed camps. In place of the two big prewar alliances (Triple Alliance and Triple Entente), each with a host of satellites, there were now three major groups. But, as in the previous case, a number of the countries simultaneously had ties with two opposing alliance nuclei, and, as before, finance played a part in determining the line-up. The outlook was hardly one to inspire confidence in the hearts of any European people. France, in particular, was virtually bound by her various treaties to defend the frontiers of five protegés, not one of which was a first-class power and each of which had numerous enemies. On the other hand, the organization of the new alliances was paralleled by several efforts to guarantee security through more conciliatory means. Most of these attempts originated within the framework of the League.

THE ERA OF PACTS, 1923–1933

According to Article 8 of the Covenant, the members of the League recognized "that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations." The task of formulating specific plans for the reduction of armaments was entrusted to the Council. Even before the League started functioning, a beginning was made in compulsory disarmament by the arms clauses of the peace treaties with the defeated powers. Moreover, in a note to Germany in June 1919, the Allies plainly stated that German disarmament was to be regarded as one of the "first steps" toward a general reduction of armaments throughout the world.

Early in 1921 the Council appointed a commission to draw up proposals for the reduction of armaments. The commission formulated a draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance which was unanimously adopted by the Fourth Assembly in 1923. The document provided security by a pledge of the signatories to aid any one of their number who was the victim of attack. Regarding armaments, it was stipulated that the Council should devise a scale of reductions to "a point compatible with national security." When the draft treaty was circulated among the powers, it failed to secure a single acceptance. Most of the states protested against the absence of an adequate definition of "aggression" and complained of the vagueness of the disarma-

ment provision. In the meantime the governments of Great Britain and France had come under the leadership, respectively, of James Ramsay MacDonald and Edouard Herriot. Both premiers sought to devise some formula whereby "arbitration, security, and disarmament" might become the foundation stones of future international relationships. In 1924 they introduced a resolution at the Fifth Assembly of the League, reopening the entire question of security and disarmament. As a result of this move the Assembly unanimously approved a Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.

The Geneva Protocol, as it came to be known, stigmatized aggressive war as an international crime. To prevent such wars, it stipulated that the nations adhering to its terms must agree (1) not to go to war against other signatories who abided by their international obligations; (2) to refer all justiciable disputes to the World Court and all political quarrels to the League Council or to special arbitration committees; (3) not to mobilize armed forces while a dispute was being arbitrated; (4) to regard as "aggressor" any nation which refused to submit a difference to peaceful settlement or which rejected an arbitral decision and resorted to war; (5) to recognize the power of the League Council to declare an economic boycott against such an aggressor state; (6) that the costs of any war be "borne by the aggressor state up to the limit of its capacity," but that such indemnity include no cessions of territory; and (7) to participate in an international conference for the reduction of armaments. No part of the protocol was to go into effect until the efforts of this conference should have resulted in at least partial disarmament.

Although some of the smaller states displayed eagerness to ratify the Geneva Protocol, the great powers found objections to it and the document never came into force. This rejection of the first important attempt to define the aggressor in future conflicts was at least followed by the acceptance of another scheme which aimed at identifying any future aggressor in one of the worst of Europe's many sore spots: the Rhineland.

In the hope of allaying the mutual suspicions with which the French and Germans regarded each other's every action, Berlin had several times (1922–1923) suggested to Paris the negotiation of frontier guarantees, antiwar pledges, and arbitration projects. Each time France had been cold to the proposals. Undismayed by these setbacks and by the fate of the Geneva Protocol, Germany, through Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann, in 1925 once more broached the subject to France. This time Briand in France and Austen Chamberlain in Great Britain lent willing ears to the plan, but before definite negotiations could be inaugurated the French in-

sisted that Italy, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Poland be invited to attend the parleys.

In October 1925, delegates from the seven states met at Locarno in Switzerland. For the first time since the war all powers met on equal footing and the proceedings were carried on informally. So different were the atti-



After Landman, J., *Outline History of the World Since 1914,* 1934.
Courtesy, Barnes and Noble, Inc.

tudes of the delegates on this occasion from the usual diplomatic poses that the phrase "spirit of Locarno" was coined to describe the changed atmosphere. In this spirit seven treaties were initialed, namely; a Treaty

of Mutual Guarantee among Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Belgium; four arbitration treaties between Germany as the party of the first, and Belgium, France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia severally as parties of the second; and two treaties of guarantee between France and Poland, and France and Czechoslovakia.

In the major pact the powers "collectively and severally" guaranteed "the maintenance of the territorial *status quo* resulting from the frontiers between Germany and Belgium and Germany and France" as fixed by the Versailles Treaty, and the demilitarization of the Rhineland as stipulated in the same treaty. Germany, France, and Belgium agreed that they would "in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each other" except (1) in "legitimate defense"; (2) in case of a "flagrant breach" of the demilitarization formula; or (3) in fulfilment of League sanctions. The same states undertook to settle by peaceful means "all questions of every kind which may arise between them." All signatories bound themselves to aid the power against which a violation of the treaty was perpetrated. Where violation was doubtful, the League Council was to decide. The treaty was to go into effect immediately upon Germany's entry into the League.

The four arbitration treaties provided that all disputes between Germany and the cosignatories, "which it may not be possible to settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be submitted for decision either to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court of International Justice." This provision was not to apply to "disputes arising out of events prior to the present convention," and hence was not binding for problems which, like that of the Polish Corridor, arose out of the peace settlement. The treaties between France and her two allies provided that if the respective signatories were made to suffer from a failure to observe the undertakings of Locarno, they would "lend each other immediate aid and assistance, if such a failure is accompanied by an unprovoked recourse to arms."

The Locarno achievements were widely hailed as precursors of a new era in world history. But neither the pacts nor the spirit of Locarno were actual guarantees of peace. True, the Rhine frontier apparently was safeguarded. Germany supposedly gave up all claims to Alsace-Lorraine and France all hopes of a Rhineland protectorate. Yet the problem of Germany's eastern frontiers remained unsolved, and there was no guarantee that it would be settled peaceably. The spirit of friendliness, moreover, was only sporadically evident in international affairs after 1925. Nonetheless, in 1927 it did lead Foreign Minister Briand to dispatch a note to Washington suggesting a Franco-American engagement "mutually outlawing war."

After several months of correspondence, Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg proposed that France and the United States join in an effort to induce a number of the powers to sign a general antiwar pact. It was not difficult to interest the members of the League in such a scheme, for by signing the Covenant they had automatically promised to have recourse to war only as a means of last resort. Eventually, in August 1928, delegates from fifteen nations subscribed to an antiwar agreement in Paris. The document came to be known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact or Pact of Paris.

The signers declared "in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another." They agreed "that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means." According to the preamble "any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty." If a signatory should break its pledge, therefore, the other parties would recover their freedom of action with respect to the trespasser. Copies of the document were sent by Secretary Kellogg to 48 other countries. Within four years 62 acceptances were recorded.

The efficacy of this "outlawry of war" was lessened by qualifications placed upon the text by a number of signatories. In effect, war was outlawed except (1) when resorted to in self-defense; (2) in the execution of obligations assumed under previous treaties; or (3) in fulfilment of responsibilities under the League Covenant or Locarno agreements. Fundamentally, only wars of aggression were outlawed, and even in such cases there was no provision for enforcement. The pact was founded on the hope that public opinion might be strong enough, even in time of emergency, to restrain any particular nation from violating what were simply moral obligations. But such incidents as the Sino-Japanese controversy of 1931 and after seemed to indicate that a warless future could be guaranteed only if the Pact of Paris were provided with "teeth" so that its violation would be regarded as something more serious than the perpetration of an unmoral act. As it happened, one of the chief effects of the Paris Pact was the appearance of the so-called undeclared war.

The suspicion and antagonism that characterized European relations during the early depression years, and especially after Adolf Hitler became chancellor of Germany, led to the formulation of two additional peace agreements: the Pact of Rome and the London Agreements. To dispel new war clouds, Mussolini suggested that the leading western powers act

to guarantee peace at least for a certain stated period. The result of his enterprise was the signing (1933) of a ten-year pact at Rome by Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. The signatories agreed to consult on all important international political and economic questions, to work for the success of disarmament proceedings, and to acknowledge once more the principle of treaty revision as stated in Article 19 of the League Covenant (see p. 48).

The Soviet Union, far from regarding the pact as a guarantee of peace, looked upon it as another alliance against Bolshevism and proposed a general nonaggression treaty to her neighbors. The idea took hold and, at the Soviet Embassy in London, the representatives of Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Persia, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, Turkey, and Yugoslavia signed three London Agreements (1933). The signatories confirmed the inviolability of each other's territories, expressed the conviction that the Kellogg Pact, to which they were parties, forbade all aggression, and defined an aggressor as any signatory who declared war on another, invaded foreign lands without formal declaration of war, established a blockade, or supported on its soil armed bands organized to raid another state.

DISARMAMENT AND REARMAMENT

The delegates who were gathered at Geneva in 1925 for the Sixth Assembly of the League faced a grave responsibility. Five Assemblies had already met, and yet the problem of disarmament was hardly nearer solution than in 1920. Hence the time had come to take some definite action that would be acceptable to the governments of the world. In this spirit the Assembly requested the Council "to make a preparatory study with a view to a Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments in order that, as soon as satisfactory conditions [of security] have been assured . . . the said Conference may be convened and a general reduction and limitation of armaments may be realized."

The Council thereupon appointed a Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, to meet at Geneva in 1926. The British and French governments prepared draft conventions to serve as starting points for the talks of the Preparatory Commission. The drafts conflicted on nearly every vital issue, and there was little harmony in the conversations that were based upon them. The technical aspects of the disarmament problem were constantly pushed into the background by fear, jealousy, pride,

and economics. In general, the United States, Germany, and Great Britain were on one side in the voting, and France and her allies on the other.

Three problems were especially thorny. Although it was agreed that limitation of land armaments necessarily involved limitation of effectives, there was a difference of opinion on how to estimate effectives. France and other conscriptionist countries objected to the inclusion of trained reserves in the category of effectives, while the states with volunteer armies maintained that a man who had just completed several years of service with the colors was as well prepared to fight as one who still drilled with his regiment. In the matter of naval limitation, Great Britain and the United States believed that there should be a total-tonnage restriction for each nation, plus a limit on the tonnage of each class of ship. France and Italy, while subscribing to the idea of a limited total tonnage, thought each country should be free to build within its allotment whatever vessels it saw fit. On the question of international supervision, France and her *cortège habituel* wanted to set up an elaborate system of international control, whereas the other states contended that the main reliance for the enforcement of any disarmament program must be placed on the good faith of the parties concerned.

The commission, unable to reach one final agreement, drew up (1927) a draft convention which embodied the points that had secured general assent and the alternative texts of all articles on which there had been dissension. This convention did not come up for a second reading until 1929. In the meantime many things had happened in the spheres of security and disarmament.

To understand the story of the further disarmament proceedings, it is necessary to refer back to the early postwar years. Inasmuch as the peace conference had ignored the question of the freedom of the seas, influential groups in the United States agitated soon after the war for the building of a navy that would be able to enforce United States rights in any future war. For a time it appeared as if the prewar Anglo-German naval rivalry would be replaced by an equally dangerous Anglo-United States competition. By virtue of an Anglo-Japanese alliance, moreover, Japan might well be found on the side of Great Britain. To forestall any such catastrophe, President Warren G. Harding invited a group of powers to attend a conference at Washington in the winter of 1921–1922 to consider naval limitation as well as the entire question of Pacific and Far Eastern relations.

Seven treaties were signed by the conference. One of these, effective from 1923, limited the total tonnage of aircraft carriers and restricted

the number of capital ships to be allowed each signatory.[2] A ten-year "naval holiday" was declared during which no new capital ships were to be built, and no capital ship might be replaced until it was twenty years old. The eventual total capital-ship replacement tonnages were fixed at 525,000 for the United States; 525,000 for Great Britain; 315,000 for Japan; and 175,000 each for France and Italy. These figures established the ratio of 5:5:3:1.67:1.67. In order to achieve the Washington limit, most of the powers had to scrap ships that were already built or under construction.

Five years after the signing of this treaty, President Calvin Coolidge invited the signatories to a conference to consider the limitation of cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. He reminded the powers that the Washington Conference had imposed tonnage restrictions on capital ships and aircraft carriers, and suggested that the time had come to deal similarly with the remaining classes of war vessels. Only Great Britain and Japan accepted the invitation. France and Italy declared that such a conference would merely increase the difficulties of the Preparatory Commission. Hence it was a three-power conference that opened in 1927 at Geneva.

The United States proposed a total-tonnage restriction in each of the ship categories under discussion. Japan sided with this view. Great Britain insisted that mathematical parity with the United States was not equivalent to practical parity, and maintained that the need to protect 80,000 miles of trade and communication lines made it imperative that there be no restriction on her right to build small (7500-ton) cruisers. After two months the conference broke up, with nothing accomplished except a renewal of the suspicion between the United States and Great Britain that had temporarily subsided after the signing of the Washington treaties. Before long the suspicion in the United States changed to anger.

The *New York American* in September 1928 uncovered a secret military-naval compromise which earlier in the year had been reached by London and Paris. By its terms France promised to support Great Britain's stand on naval limitation at future disarmament meetings, and Great Britain withdrew her objection to the exclusion of trained reserves from the category of military effectives. The publication of this arrangement aroused popular protests in both Great Britain and the United States. Although the two European powers protested that they had been motivated

[2] A capital ship was defined as one with a greater displacement than 10,000 tons and guns of larger than eight-inch caliber. The signatories were the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy.

solely by a desire to speed disarmament, the people in the United States were skeptical of London's sincerity.

But during 1929, while the Preparatory Commission was reading for a second time the draft convention of 1927 and effecting compromises on several disputed points, there occurred a *rapprochement* between the United States and Great Britain. The ratification of the Kellogg Pact restored a measure of good feeling, and both President Hoover and Premier MacDonald expressed renewed hopes for a further reduction of naval armaments. The outcome of resulting conversations was the calling for January 1930 of a London Naval Conference of the five great naval powers.

Almost exactly three months after the opening of the conference, the five powers signed a London Naval Treaty. Because of their contest for control of the western Mediterranean, France and Italy withheld their signatures from the really vital part of the pact. The Italian delegation expressed a willingness to accept any naval figure, however low, provided it was not exceeded by that of any other continental power. The French argued that mathematical parity with Italy meant in fact inferiority in the Mediterranean since France had coast lines on three seas. Hence Paris and Rome could reach no agreement.

In so far as the other three states were concerned, the treaty, to remain in force until the end of 1936, solved the problem of relative cruiser strengths by compromise. The three powers were given equal submarine tonnage, no new capital ships were to be laid down until 1936, and the aircraft-carrier figures remained the same as in the Washington Treaty. Perhaps the most-discussed section of the treaty was the so-called safeguarding or escalator clause. This permitted any signatory to increase its tonnage in any category if, in its opinion, its national security was endangered by new construction on the part of any nonsignatory. The only requirement in such case was prompt notification to the other treaty signers. The latter thereupon would become free to make proportionate increases in their own navies.

While the London Naval Conference was in progress, the Preparatory Commission had adjourned in the hope that the naval deadlock might be broken. The failure of France and Italy to sign the whole treaty, however, emphasized the need for reaching results. Discussions were resumed and late in 1930 a final draft convention for a general disarmament conference was adopted. After almost five years of effort disagreements persisted over virtually every important article. The League Council now selected Geneva as the site of the world's first disarmament conference, to open in February

1932. When the Geneva Disarmament Conference opened, there were present representatives from about sixty states.

The draft convention that was placed before the conference was a general document which indicated the methods of limitation that might be adopted, but which left to the conference the application of these methods and the decisions at to ratios and figures. It was a "skeleton lacking flesh and blood" and it offered blanks and dashes in place of figures. Among the specific recommendations were budgetary limitation of armaments; limitation of military service; limitation of military, naval, and air effectives; acceptance of the form of naval restriction laid down in the London Naval Treaty; and the appointment of a permanent disarmament commission.

Perhaps even more ominous for the success of the conference than the flood of reservations to every one of these points was the clash of French demands for security and German demands for equality. The French representatives steadfastly refused to vote for any reduction of armaments unless adequate security were first guaranteed, preferably by the placing of a powerful military, naval, and air force under the control of the League of Nations. This means of achieving security, though endorsed by the allies of France, satisfied none of the other larger states. Deadlock therefore ensued.

The conference, unable to agree on any vital matter, adjourned in July 1932. One of the most dangerous results of its failure was the reaction in Italy, the Soviet Union, and Germany. In the former two countries the authorities became more disdainful than ever of the impotence of the League. In Germany a fear of widespread military preparations and alliance formations, a resentment over the intransigeance of France, and a desire for the restoration of the fatherland to equality with the other great powers, played directly into the hands of the restless nationalists. Through Defense Minister General Kurt von Schleicher these nationalists now officially demanded that the world either disarm down to the level set for Germany in the Versailles Treaty or recognize the equality of the Germans and let them arm to the degree of their neighbors.

Alarmed at the prospect that Germany might unilaterally abrogate the disarmament provisions of the Versailles Treaty, the powers declared in December 1932 that "one of the principles that should guide the Conference on Disarmament should be the grant to Germany and to the other disarmed powers of equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations. . . ." In February 1933 the conference resumed the work it had begun just one year previously. In the meantime (January 30,

1933) Adolf Hitler, leader of the National Socialist Party, had become German Chancellor.

The new German Government displayed no mood for temporizing, and once more Franco-German differences threatened to disrupt the proceedings. Whereas Germany was determined to rearm without further delay, France and her allies, alarmed by the nationalistic utterances of the Hitlerites, were unwilling to permit such rearming for some time to come. Meanwhile the armament expenditures of every large state continued to mount.[3] And into this atmosphere there burst the news, on October 14, 1933, that Germany was withdrawing from the disarmament conference. Simultaneously Germany served notice of her intended withdrawal from the League. A few months later, in 1934, the delegates to the disarmament conference dispersed, never to meet again. Thereafter most of the powers voted increasingly high appropriations for military measures.[4]

FROM REVISIONIST BLOC TO AXIS

Toward the end of the first postwar decade it became apparent that the three-cornered security system built up by France, the Soviet Union, and Italy was destined to undergo changes. As Germany regained strength and as the other defeated powers acquired more stability, there was a growing demand for broad revision of the peace settlement. Italy, moreover, because of her grievances against France and her general ambitions, gradually drew closer to her former enemies and began openly to side with them on matters pertaining to the peace treaties. By 1928 the Fascist kingdom began to emerge as the leader of a "revisionist bloc" whose most insistent member, Hungary, clamored for the return of the many Magyars assigned to the neighboring states by the Treaty of Trianon.

In 1928 Italy concluded treaties of friendship and neutrality with Turkey and Greece, and in 1930 one with Austria. Owing largely to Italian influence, Turkey and Greece negotiated a nonaggression pact in 1933. Italian friendship with Bulgaria was sealed in 1930 by the marriage of

[3] It was at this point that the Pact of Rome and the London Agreements were signed; see pp. 83–84.

[4] World armament expenditures, at similar price levels, rose as follows:

1913	$3,000,000,000
1928	3,500,000,000
1930	4,000,000,000
1935	5,000,000,000
1938	10,000,000,000

The world's expenditure for armaments in 1938 represented a sum large enough to run the League of Nations, the Permanent Court, and the International Labor Organization for twelve centuries (in terms of their budgets for that year).

Princess Giovanna of Italy to King Boris. In 1933 Italy and the Soviet Union signed a pact of nonaggression. Thereafter Italy encouraged a resumption of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Hungary, a condition which was completed in 1934.

In 1933 the rise to power of Adolf Hitler, who patterned some of his policies after those of Mussolini, seemed to foreshadow an Italo-German entente. The prospect for a time worried France, but Italy showed little sympathy for Germany's desire to absorb Austria. For strategic and economic reasons Mussolini preferred to see Austria independent and closely tied to Italy. March 1934 saw the premiers of Italy, Austria, and Hungary sign the Rome Protocols. The signatories agreed to pursue "a corresponding policy" and to conclude bilateral trade agreements to widen Austria's and Hungary's markets for manufactures and grain, respectively.

The new German nationalism, as voiced by the Hitlerites, and the continued activity of the revisionist bloc, also affected the interrelations of the Little Entente, France, and the Soviet Union. Already, in 1929, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania had renewed the whole set of treaties that comprised the entente. Now, in 1933, a "pact of organization" was signed which contemplated the transformation of the entente into a "higher international unity," directed by a permanent council composed of the respective foreign ministers and coöperating closely in economic, financial, and political affairs.

Further to protect themselves, the members of the Little Entente in 1933 signed the London Agreements with the Soviet Union and then also drew closer to Poland. The latter step was especially important inasmuch as all these smaller countries seemed to have wearied of being regarded as French satellites. On several occasions, notably at the disarmament conference, Poland and even the entente upheld views that were not entirely in harmony with those of France. As if to emphasize her new sentiments, Poland in January 1934 signed a ten-year nonaggression pact with Nazi Germany. Soon thereafter Poland also renewed a nonaggression treaty that had earlier been signed with the Soviet Union.

The Third Republic, too, figured in a changed diplomatic line-up. As early as 1931, France, for years the leading foe of the Soviet Union, had begun to shift her position. She had long wanted access to the Russian oil resources. The Soviet Union placed huge orders abroad and France saw no reason why these should nearly all fall to Germany, Great Britain, and Italy. In Germany the nationalists were becoming strong enough to frighten both the French and the Bolsheviks: they threatened to repudiate the Versailles Treaty, vehemently denounced communism, and sometimes

referred to Russia as a suitable field for eastward expansion. Hence Soviet-German relations cooled, and France in 1932 signed a neutrality treaty with the Soviet Union. Then, in 1935, France and the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression pact. They promised each other immediate aid in case of "unprovoked aggression." Meanwhile, in the summer of 1934, Great Britain had voted a huge program of aerial construction and Stanley Baldwin had announced that Britain's frontiers lay on the Rhine.

Turkey took the lead in promoting a movement for Balkan coöperation. During 1933 the foreign ministers of Turkey and Greece visited the Balkan capitals to sound out opinion on a program of collaboration based on the principles of "the Balkans for the Balkan peoples" and the maintenance of the territorial *status quo*. This latter point was objectionable to Bulgaria who wanted revision of her Greek and Yugoslav borders, and to Albania who, as an Italian protectorate (see p. 179), upheld Bulgaria in her revisionist demands. Hence the Balkan Pact which was signed at Athens in 1934 bore the signatures of only Turkey, Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia. The four states expressed their decision to assure "the maintenance of the territorial order at present established in the Balkans" and promised not to take any political action with respect to any Balkan nonsignatory "without previous mutual discussion." This agreement was welcomed by France but criticized by Italy. Without the adherence of Bulgaria and Albania, moreover, it failed to stabilize Balkan affairs.

Later in 1934 representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan discussed the question of renewing the naval-limitation treaties. Japan demanded parity with the United States and Great Britain. The old 5:5:3 ratio, according to the Japanese, suggested a "moral superiority" on the part of the United States and Great Britain and was humiliating to Japan. When the Western naval powers refused equality to Japan, Tokyo gave the required two years' notice of the termination of the naval agreements. By 1935 the matter was further complicated by Germany's determination to build a sizable fleet.

This time the German naval ambitions appeared to worry France more than Great Britain. London, indeed, signed an agreement with Berlin in 1935 whereby the Nazis, regardless of Versailles restrictions, might acquire a naval tonnage equal to 35 per cent of that of the British Commonwealth. Meanwhile France and Italy, troubled by the Nazi foreign policy, had effected a reconciliation through the signing of another pact at Rome (Laval-Mussolini Pact, 1935). Some French territory and railway rights in Africa were ceded to Italy, certain privileges enjoyed by Italian citizens in French-controlled Tunisia were continued, and provision was made for

ALLIANCES AND PACTS, 1920 TO MID-1939

The dates indicate the year of signing of the treaties. Supplementary agreements are listed only if exceptionally important.









Franco-Italian consultation in the event of a threat to Austrian independence.[5]

And then came the autumn of 1935 and with it the Italian invasion of Ethiopia and the imposition of limited League sanctions against the Fascist aggressor. More and more did Rome now veer away from the states that at last—four years after a Japanese invasion of Manchuria—had come to act in the name of "collective security." More and more, therefore, did Rome now veer towards the states (Germany and Japan) that were bent upon upsetting the territorial *status quo* by threat and force.

Deriding collective security, which had not been tried in the case of Manchuria and only partially applied in the case of Ethiopia, Mussolini in November 1936 said: "A virile people . . . refuses to confide its destiny to the uncertain hands of third parties." Continuing, he declared that Germany, "although surrounded and solicited, did not adhere to sanctions." Berlin, moreover, early recognized the conquest of Ethiopia. Consequently the Germans and Italians could not but be sympathetic to one another's aims. This new friendship, thundered Il Duce, was bolstered by common opposition to Bolshevism and was in reality "an axis around which all European states animated by the desire for peace might collaborate." Thus for the first time was the word "axis" used with a special political connotation. And thus also did Mussolini cede first place among the revisionists to the stronger Reich. Fascist Italy became content to follow where once she had led.

Soon after Mussolini made this speech, Germany and Japan drew together through the signing of an Anti-Comintern Pact (November 1936). The signatories agreed "to keep each other informed concerning the activities of the Third International, to consult upon the necessary defense measures, and to execute these measures in close coöperation with each other." One year later Italy adhered to this agreement and the "Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis" was an established fact. Referring to the ideological and practical differences of outlook of the axis and nonaxis states, Mussolini announced: "The struggle between two worlds can permit no compromise. Either we or they!" Thus was the challenge of battle hurled at the British Commonwealth, France, the Soviet Union, China, and the United States.

[5] See pp. 173–174 for additional terms.

PART TWO

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
1919–1939

CHAPTER 5

Great Britain and Ireland

THIRTEEN UNLUCKY YEARS, 1918–1931

When Great Britain entered the First World War, the Liberals, led by Herbert H. Asquith and supported by the Irish Nationalists and the Laborites, controlled the government. The ministry soon became unpopular. There were clamors against the press censorship, the sluggishness of the munitions service, the activities of profiteers, the enlistment system, and the defeat at Gallipoli. In 1915, therefore, Asquith reorganized the cabinet. A new government was formed, supported by a coalition of Liberals, Conservatives, and Laborites. David Lloyd George was made head of the ministry of munitions.

The revised cabinet proved too phlegmatic for the dynamic Lloyd George and within a year and a half he assumed Asquith's place as premier. Governmental proceedings rapidly assumed a new vigor. The Parliament was extended for the duration of the war. An attempt was made to solve the long-standing Irish question. Conditions in India were investigated with a view to introducing political reform. The electoral system was revised and women over thirty were enfranchised. Under the sponsorship of H. A. L. Fisher an act was passed which made elementary education compulsory for children and limited child labor.

At the end of the war, Lloyd George, feeling that the electorate ought to express its sentiments once more, called for elections in December 1918. In these "khaki elections" Lloyd George appealed for support of the war-time coalition on its record. He undertook, if endorsed, to advocate the

trial of William II and the exaction of a big indemnity from Germany. A pledge was given to prevent the dumping of foreign goods and to protect the "essential industries." Finally, Lloyd George promised to care for the veterans, settle the Irish Question, and reform the House of Lords.

On this platform the coalition, which during the campaign was deserted by the Laborites, captured two-thirds of the seats in the House of Commons. The Labor Party, with about sixty seats, became the official Opposition. The membership of the coalition was 70 per cent Conservative and hence, although the prime minister was a Liberal, the Conservatives predominated in the cabinet. Lloyd George at once went to Paris, but after the signing of the peace treaties his attention was absorbed by Great Britain's critical economic situation.

During the early postwar years British industry climbed to a peak of prosperity. The world, "bent on replenishing its depleted stocks, thought only of buying." Prices and wages rose, the number of people employed increased, and there was a tendency to shorten the work week. By the middle of 1920 there were three times as many registered companies in Great Britain as there had been in 1918. Unhappily, as 1920 drew to a close, conditions underwent a precipitate change. Numerous strikes broke out and unemployment increased so rapidly that a new Unemployment Insurance Act was passed to supersede that of 1911. July 1921 saw 2,000,000 persons idle in a population of 42,000,000.

The reasons for this decline were many. The war had impoverished several of Great Britain's customers, including Germany, Russia, and the Danubian states. Then, while the British strove to reëstablish the pound sterling at its prewar value, most of the continental governments resorted to inflation. In the world market this meant that the price of British goods was high, for British manufacturing costs exceeded those in countries where inflation resulted in relatively cheap labor. The fact that Great Britain's factories remained intact during the conflict was not an unmixed blessing, for now, although the country still had its machinery, much of this was antiquated and inefficient. Competition with the more modern methods and implements in use in the United States and Germany became increasingly difficult.

During the war, the British had suffered a loss of markets, especially to the United States and Japan. The former acquired much of Great Britain's trade in Latin America; Japan secured much of it in China and India. Between 1914 and 1919 many British women had entered the labor field, taking jobs that formerly had been held by men. Not all the women relinquished their positions when the demobilized soldiers returned to look

for work. The tariff barriers erected by the new and strongly nationalistic continental states curtailed Great Britain's export trade. Since both the population and the productive capacity of Great Britain were greater in 1922 than in 1913, the reduction in the volume of export trade caused grave concern.[1]

In addition, there must be considered Great Britain's war losses, which were greater than those of the rest of the British Empire combined. About 750,000 of her men had been killed and twice that number wounded. Her total debt burden at the end of the war was ten times that of 1914. About 2200 vessels, with a combined displacement of 8,000,000 tons, had been destroyed. This last might have acted as a stimulus to shipbuilding, but the forced surrender by Germany of most of her ships checked any such development. By 1921 almost one-third of the men in the British shipbuilding industry were out of work. The unemployment problem was aggravated because the Britishers, unlike the French, could not fall back upon agriculture in time of industrial depression. Great Britain was primarily a manufacturing and exporting country. Only 7 per cent of her population lived on the soil and 60 per cent of her food supply had to be imported. Hence the only solution for the crisis lay in a revival of trade and industry.

The government that first had to cope with this situation was the coalition under Lloyd George. In the beginning resort was had to temporary expedients. One was the allotment of a "dole" to involuntarily unemployed men and women for a maximum of fifteen weeks per year. This involved an annual outlay of millions of pounds and was of transitory value. It was not a cure for chronic unemployment. Secondly, the government encouraged the emigration of jobless workmen to other parts of the empire, especially Canada. Inasmuch as the laborers generally were not eager to migrate and the dominions set up severe qualifications for entrance, the scheme offered little relief.

In 1921 two specific attempts were made to get at the root of the trouble by reviving industry. First, Great Britain signed a trade agreement with Russia, based upon a mutual pledge that neither country would spread propaganda against the other. Then there was passed a Safeguarding of Industries Act. This, deviating from traditional free-trade policy, levied a duty of 33⅓ per cent to protect certain "unstable key industries" which were considered "essential for war." The same act placed a tax on imports from countries with a depreciated currency.

Meanwhile the Conservatives had begun to weary of the dominance of Lloyd George. They disliked a treaty that had been signed with Ireland

[1] The volume of British exports in 1922 was 68.9 per cent of the 1913 volume.

and they favored closer coöperation with France. They complained about the troubles Great Britain was having in the Near and Middle East, and they charged the government with extravagance. In October 1922, therefore, the Conservatives withdrew from the coalition. Thereupon Lloyd George resigned and the Conservative leader, Andrew Bonar Law, formed a ministry. Since the Conservatives controlled only a plurality of seats, new elections were set for November.

The Conservatives entered the campaign with a platform promising "tranquillity and stability." The Liberals were disunited. Lloyd George, at the head of a group called the National Liberal Party, pointed once more to his war record, promised economy, and upheld the virtues of strong government. Asquith, still bitter over the Welshman's wartime tactics, had organized an Independent Liberal Party favoring free trade and economy. The Laborites promised widespread social change by parliamentary means, favored the nationalization of certain industries with compensation to owners, upheld the existing monarchical form of government, advocated imperial development along lines of local autonomy, and opposed class warfare.

The contest ended in a triumph for the Conservatives, who secured well over half of the seats. The Labor Party, which in 1900 had captured only 2 seats, was now returned with 142. The Liberals formed a poor third. Bonar Law retained the premiership, but illness soon forced him to resign and he was succeeded by the less experienced Stanley Baldwin. The new prime minister was an ex-businessman who had occupied several financial offices between 1917 and 1923, and had arranged the funding of the British war debt to the United States.

Baldwin, who was said to be fond of repeating: "I am not a clever man," faced an unemployment situation which by this time had grown to be a "chronic malady." In his perplexity he was converted to the view that protection and imperial preference (preferential tariff rates among the several parts of the empire) were the only cures for the industrial depression. Since, however, Bonar Law had pledged the party not to change the tariff without a mandate from the people, Baldwin felt bound to dissolve Parliament and set new elections for December 1923. Thus a safe majority was placed in danger on the tariff issue.

This unexpected occasion stimulated the Liberals into renewed action. Asquith and Lloyd George became reconciled, at least outwardly, and vigorously campaigned for the continuance of free trade. If they could not oust the Conservatives from power, the Liberals hoped at least to recapture some of the seats previously lost to the Laborites. The Conservatives pointed

out that tariff barriers against Great Britain were everywhere being erected, and that the kingdom was becoming a dumping ground for foreign manufactures. They considered the empire self-sufficient and maintained that an intra-imperial system of preferential rates would free its members from dependence upon foreign trade. Though they desired to place high rates upon manufactured articles, they promised not to tax raw materials, wheat, or meat, and to reduce the rates on sugar. The Laborites favored free trade, the nationalization of mines and railways, subsidizing housing and power developments, a capital levy on all fortunes exceeding £5000, and revision of the Versailles Treaty.

Although they polled nearly as many votes as in the previous election and still comprised the largest party in the House of Commons, the Conservatives now failed to command the necessary majority to control that body. The Laborites, on the other hand, increased their representation by more than a third, and the Liberals also registered a gain. When Parliament met, in January 1924, the Liberals joined the Laborites in voting a lack of confidence in the Baldwin Government. The Lloyd George and Asquith group preferred to risk a coalition with the untried Laborites rather than encourage a continuance of Conservative rule. Hence J. Ramsay MacDonald, leader of the Labor Party, became prime minister and foreign secretary in Great Britain's first Labor Government.

MacDonald was born in 1866, the son of a laborer, in the Scottish fishing village of Lossiemouth. He acquired most of his education by attending evening classes and by avid reading. He chose the career of journalism and made frequent trips to various parts of the empire. At thirty, he married a girl who brought him valuable social contacts and considerable wealth. Meanwhile he had been active in bringing about a political fusion of the British intellectual socialists with the trade-unionists, and he helped found the British Labor Party.[2] An effective orator, he became secretary of the party and its leader from 1911 to 1914. In 1914 he resigned his headship rather than endorse the party's support of the war. As an avowed pacifist he was publicly denounced and defeated for Parliament in the "khaki elections" of 1918. Four years later he regained his seat in the House of Commons.

Among the premier's able assistants in the first Labor Cabinet were Philip Snowden and Arthur Henderson. Snowden, who became chancellor of the exchequer, was a former clerk, an ardent pacifist and freetrader, a

[2] The British Labor Party grew out of the efforts of a Labor Representation Committee which, meeting for the first time in 1900, strove to secure political representation for the workers. The name Labor Party was adopted in 1906.

financial genius, and a stubborn parliamentarian. Henderson, appointed home secretary, was a former ironworker who had become prominent as an aide to Lloyd George during the war. He was basically a "trade-union man."

The first Labor Government worked under serious difficulties. Despite MacDonald's insistence that the "labor movement had never had the least inclination to try short cuts to the millennium," there were rumors that radical legislation would become the order of the day. Some investors became panicky and some United States financiers withdrew their money from London. But aside from its avowed rejection of class warfare, the MacDonald Government had a practical reason for refraining from revolutionary methods: it depended for its tenure of office on the support of the Liberals. This of necessity tempered its program.

The domestic accomplishments of the Labor Government were not striking. The unemployment situation became worse rather than better during the nine months of Labor rule, and unemployment relief had to be further extended. The Wheatley Bill was passed, providing for the construction, with governmental aid, of thousands of inexpensive houses. Some of the war duties were repealed and those on tea, coffee, and sugar were lowered.

More spectacular were the exploits in the foreign field. The government played a prominent role in the acceptance of the Dawes Plan. MacDonald urged the admission of Germany into the League. He supported the Geneva Protocol of 1924, which aimed at ensuring peace by defining the term "aggressor nation." The government voted to build several new cruisers, but, as a gesture of disarmament, stopped the building of a naval base at Singapore. Relations with France, now led by Herriot, were improved. The Soviet Union was recognized and British goods were promised a better reception in the Russian market.

The Labor Government soon came under popular suspicion as being amenable to pressure from the Bolsheviks. The Soviet trade treaty was attacked, and much excitement ensued when the government dropped the prosecution of an editor of the communistic *Workers' Weekly* who was accused of inciting British soldiers to mutiny. Opposing a parliamentary motion to appoint a committee of inquiry on this action, MacDonald was defeated through the defection of the Liberals. He dissolved Parliament and ordered new elections.

During the campaign (October 1924) the cause of the Labor Party was injured by the publication of the so-called Zinoviev or Red Letter. This missive was said to have been written by a Bolshevik leader to

British Communists, urging them to prepare for revolution. Later it appeared that the letter was probably a forgery, but at the time it hurt the Laborites. Many voters seemed to feel uncomfortable in the thought that the Labor Ministry might condone unbridled freedom for communist propaganda. The workers, moreover, grumbled because the Labor Government had done little to improve the economic situation. That the distress was world-wide did not enter into their calculations.

The Conservatives won more than 400 seats in the election, while the Laborites and Liberals together had fewer than 200. The Conservative Party secured this great majority of seats though it polled only a minority of the popular vote. This seeming paradox was traceable to the three-cornered elections and the absence of proportional representation. MacDonald resigned the premiership, Stanley Baldwin took the reins once more, and Austen Chamberlain became foreign secretary.

Soon after his reëntry into office, Baldwin, in the name of "safeguarding employment," outlined a procedure whereby industries might obtain the aid of "safeguarding" duties. Any industry desiring such protection was to lay its case before a trade committee which should study the situation and report to Parliament. If the case for protection was upheld by the committee, Parliament was to authorize appropriate duties.[3] This and other attempts to alleviate distress notwithstanding, the Conservative Government soon was faced by a serious labor crisis.

Among the hardest hit of British enterprises was the coal industry. Before the war Great Britain used millions of tons of coal annually in her own industries and sold additional millions abroad. But after 1920 the importance of coal as a fuel declined. The rising popularity of oil as a fuel, the development of Diesel ship engines, and the increasing use of hydro-electric power, all caused a drop in the demand for coal. Moreover, under the Versailles Treaty, Germany annually supplied large quantities of coal to France, Italy, and other regions which formerly had depended on British coal. Russia, because of domestic difficulties, bought 13,000,000 tons less coal in 1925 than in an average prewar year. Simultaneously the general decline in British business lessened the domestic demand for coal.

As it happened, the miners and owners in 1924 had signed a wage agreement that was to run until the summer of 1925. Before the contract term expired, conditions became so bad that many mines shut down. By June 1925 one-fourth of the insured men in the coal industry were without work. When the miners nevertheless refused to accept a proposal to lengthen

[3] Though this procedure was favorable to applicants for protection, only nine industries satisfied the necessary conditions and got a duty within the next four years.

the working day from seven to eight hours and to take lower wages, the owners threatened to discontinue the system of wage agreements and to introduce a new time and wage scale. The workers disregarded this threat and were encouraged in their stand when the railwaymen agreed not to transport coal in the event of a lockout. The Baldwin Government, in order to prevent the closing of all mines, undertook temporarily to subsidize the industry so that the existing wage agreement might be continued pending investigation by a parliamentary commission. The total cost of this subsidy, which lasted for nine months, was $100,000,000.

The coal commission reported in March 1926 that the coal industry would have to be radically reorganized if it were to be kept alive. The report urged government ownership of the mines, with private management under lease from the authorities. It was recommended to close some of the mines because they were too deep to be worked profitably, and to amalgamate others. A continuance of the subsidy was declared preposterous and a decrease in wages was considered inevitable. This report satisfied neither party and, while the government tried to arrange further conferences, the operators gave notice that the wage agreement would be considered terminated on May 1, 1926. The workmen threatened to strike, and the General Council of the Trades Union Congress announced its intention to call a general strike unless the wishes of the miners were met by May 3. The owners remained adamantine and the general strike began as scheduled. The following industries were affected: transport, printing, heavy chemicals, iron and steel, metals, and all building except hospitals and houses. Orders were issued against strikes in the electric, gas, sanitary, health, and food services, and against violence.

The strike actually involved less than half of the trade-union membership and less than one-sixth of the working population, but it frightened the government into declaring a state of emergency.[4] Thousands of volunteers tried to keep the trains, buses, and industries going, and special constables were commissioned to protect the volunteers. Troops and warships were stationed at strategic points. But there was little violence. Rather, a gay humor was discernible, possibly because of the novelty of the situation. Emergency bus- and tram-drivers vied with one another in displays of wit, and placards bearing inscriptions such as "Don't stop me! I can't start again!" were much in evidence.

After nine days the general strike came to an end. The Trades Union Congress called it off on the promise that further negotiations would be

[4] About 2,500,000 union members struck. The total union membership was 6,000,000, and the total working population 16,000,000.

pushed by the government. Baldwin asked that there be no vindictiveness and that the men be taken back by their old employers. This caused new difficulties, for some employers found it hard to discharge their volunteer substitutes, and the industrial disorganization following the strike temporarily decreased the amount of work to be done.

The coal strike continued for six more months, until November. For a time, coal had to be imported from the United States and Germany to keep the factories and railways running. Meanwhile the plight of the miners became desperate. Their resources dwindled and winter was coming on. Gradually the cold and hungry men drifted back to work on the owners' terms. The net result was the lengthening of working hours, the lowering of wages, and the disregarding of the coal commission's recommendations. Blame for the waning of popular sympathy with the strikers fell in part on the unwise tactics of "Emperor" Arthur J. Cook, secretary of the Miners' Federation and leader of the strike.[5]

Politically, the strike weakened both the Labor and the Liberal parties. In the former, extremists pointed to the failure of the coal strike as proving the need for more direct action. MacDonald, however, succeeded in holding the party together. The Liberal Party was split once more when Asquith and Lloyd George disagreed on the question of supporting the strikers. The Conservatives were more solidly united than before and determined to rid Great Britain by law of the possibility of a future general strike. In 1927 they put through Parliament the Trades Unions and Trades Disputes Act which made general strikes illegal, forbade picketing, and protected union members who refused to join illegal strikes. The act also struck at the Labor Party by changing the old law that had permitted unions to collect assessments for political purposes from their members unless the latter formally protested. Now the political levy was forbidden unless the member gave his written consent in advance.

The Conservatives sought another advantage from the strike situation. They proposed to strengthen the House of Lords. By the Parliament Act of 1911, money bills became law within thirty days after their passage by the House of Commons regardless of the attitude of the House of Lords, and the speaker of the lower house was empowered to determine whether a measure was a money bill. In ordinary legislation the Lords were left with a suspensive veto. The Conservatives never had approved these arrangements and now felt that the "socialist peril" warranted a strengthening of the upper chamber. Then, even though public opinion might tem-

[5] His reaction to new working conditions proposed by the operators in April 1926 had been: "Not a penny off the pay, not a second on the day."

porarily place a Labor Government in the saddle, the destinies of Great Britain would be safeguarded. In 1927 Baldwin introduced a plan to reorganize the House of Lords and increase its legislative power. But the scheme was so violently opposed in debate by the younger Conservatives, as well as by the Laborites and Liberals, that it never was formulated into a bill.

Among the laws passed by the Baldwin Government were new provisions for widows', orphans', and old-age pensions, and the further extension of female suffrage. The electoral act of 1918 had limited the franchise to women over thirty, lest the women, who outnumbered the men, predominate in politics. This act, which simultaneously removed the few remaining property qualifications for male voters, was in line with a general European postwar tendency towards democracy. Not unnaturally, the women in Great Britain were dissatisfied with the age restriction and considered the arrangement a slur on their maturity. A decade of active campaigning was crowned with success in 1928 when Parliament extended the vote to all women over twenty-one. With the addition of this "flapper vote," Great Britain's electorate numbered 12,500,000 men and 14,500,000 women.

During the Conservative regime there occurred a religious controversy. For many years the leaders of the established Anglican Church had been engaged in revising the old Book of Common Prayer. In 1927 an altered edition, in harmony with a wave of Anglo-Catholicism, was presented to Parliament for approval. The House of Lords accepted the revised form but the House of Commons rejected it. A few modifications were made, but the lower house registered another adverse vote in 1928. The rejections came only after earnest debates within and without Parliament, and the popular interest in the matter for a time made the book a "best seller."

It was chiefly the fear of a restoration of "popery" that led to the final declination of the book. The Anglican bishops were grieved to find that their work failed of acceptance largely because of the votes cast by non-Anglican members of the legislature, and so a stimulus was given to a movement for disestablishment. Such procedure would deprive the Anglican Church of prestige and revenue, but it would permit independence of action and perhaps instil more vigor into clerical activities.

In foreign policy the Conservatives did not play a heroic role. War-debt agreements with Italy and France were reached and the Locarno Pact was concluded. An equivocal part was acted during the negotiations for Germany's entrance into the League, and friendship with the United States was strained over naval disarmament. Most difficult were the dealings with

the Soviet Union. Chamberlain unearthed a series of Soviet anti-British plots reaching from Great Britain to China, and in 1927 diplomatic relations with Moscow were severed. The foreign secretary was no more than lukewarm towards the Kellogg Pact.

The chronic industrial depression proved to be as much a thorn to the Conservatives as it had been to Labor. Higher tariff rates, the establishment of some new industries (such as the manufacture of airplanes) in southern England, the active support given by the government to foreign commercial advertising and propaganda, and the popularity of Great Britain with United States tourists, all failed to revive industrial strength. On the other hand, irrational organization, antiquated methods, and emotional antipathy towards necessary amalgamation and coöperation persisted; only a few individuals pointed to developments in the United States and Germany as examples of the benefits to be derived from "rationalization" and concentration.

To make matters worse, report had it that there was no future for British industry and that capital would bring in a greater return if invested abroad rather than at home. Hence it was often difficult to raise sufficient funds for even urgently needed equipment. British exports in 1927, reduced to the price level of 1914, totaled only 79 per cent of those in 1913. From 1913 to 1927 British exports fell 21 per cent, although the world's total export trade rose in the same period by 18 per cent. In January 1927 Great Britain had 1,500,000 unemployed.

Unemployment and industrial troubles loomed large in the regular parliamentary elections of May 1929. Baldwin, Lloyd George, and MacDonald took pains to appeal to the five million "flappers" who would exercise a powerful influence in this, their first, opportunity to cast ballots. The Conservatives adopted as their slogan "Safety First!" and pointed with pride to their firm stand during the general strike. They advocated permitting industry to "save itself" without governmental interference, but urged higher tariff protection and great imperial preference. They emphasized increasing coöperation between employers and workmen and prophesied that this, combined with more vigorous rationalization, would soon restore prosperity. They opposed recognition of the Soviet Union without special guarantees as to propaganda and debts, stressed imperial defense, and objected to any additional peace commitments beyond the League Covenant, the Locarno Agreements, and the Paris Pact.

The Lloyd George Liberals recommended a stupendous public-works program, reaffirmed their reverence for free trade, and advocated closer coöperation with the League and Germany. They favored friendship with

the United States and the Soviet Union. The Laborites were particularly successful in their use of slogans and posters, many of which were especially designed to attract the younger voters. They advocated nationalization of the leading industries, an extensive public-works program, longer compulsory education, and the development of natural resources—particularly hydroelectric power. Promise was made of shorter working hours, higher direct taxes, additional social legislation, and the repeal of the Trades Unions Act of 1927. In foreign affairs the Laborites held about the same views as the Liberals, but stressed a determination to prevent future war.

More than 22,000,000 of the eligible 27,000,000 electors went to the polls. Labor captured 288 seats, the Conservatives 260, and the Liberals 59. Though the Conservatives actually secured 250,000 more popular votes than the Laborites, it seemed that the people had repudiated the Baldwin Government. In June 1929, therefore, MacDonald became prime minister for the second time. Again, however, he depended on the Liberals to remain in office. The poor showing of the Liberals, incidentally, gave rise to a growing feeling that the mission of the party had been fulfilled, or at least that the days of Lloyd George's leadership were numbered. The cabinet appointments were much the same as those in 1924. Snowden again headed the exchequer and Arthur Henderson, "Uncle Arthur," became foreign secretary. For the first time in history a woman was appointed to a British cabinet: Margaret Bondfield, minister of labor.

The control of the Laborites became precarious when their Liberal supporters split into a left and a right wing. The former, led by Lloyd George, though not always in agreement with Labor's policies, still preferred Labor to any Conservative Government. The right wing, led by Sir John Simon, was ready to vote against the government at any time. The Labor Party itself suffered half a dozen defections when Sir Oswald Mosley and some friends became convinced that MacDonald was not striving sufficiently hard to remedy unemployment.[6]

The energies of the Labor Government soon were concentrated on foreign policy. Attempts were made to allay native disaffections in India, Arabia, and Egypt. Diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were restored and the promise of a wide Russian market secured. The Young Plan was accepted. MacDonald visited President Hoover in the United States and so prepared the way for the London Naval Conference of 1930.

[6] In 1932 Sir Oswald founded the British Union of Fascists whose slogan became: "Fascism is practical patriotism." This black-shirted group advocated a greater development of the home market, the establishment of a national council of industry, and a general "social and moral rejuvenation." After 1934 the British Fascists several times clashed with the police. See also p. 114.

At the Imperial Conference of 1930 MacDonald refused the Canadian Premier's request for a preferential-tariff arrangement under which foreign wheat would have been taxed, because this would have increased the price of bread in Great Britain. Throughout 1931 Henderson was conspicuous in the movement for world disarmament. The Optional Clause of the World Court Protocol was signed, and thus Great Britain was pledged to submit to judicial settlement any international dispute involving the interpretation of a treaty or a question of international law.

In the domestic field the Laborites again did nothing spectacular. An attempt to modify the Trades Unions Act of 1927 was abandoned after the government suffered a defeat in committee on one clause of its proposed bill. Agriculture was aided a little, the coal situation was slightly improved by the Coal Mines Act of 1930 which required a certain amount of collaboration in the marketing of the product, and reforms were effected in the auto-vehicle transport system. Snowden's budgets were fairly satisfactory to most groups, though his higher income and land taxes aroused some hostility. On the question of the land taxes, the right and left wings of the Liberal Party drifted still farther apart. Several important steps were taken in military matters. The government withdrew its grants for military training in the public schools, restored the civil and political rights of the conscientious objectors in the First World War, and abolished the death penalty for desertion or cowardice in the army.

The most important campaign pledge of the Laborites remained largely unfulfilled—that of unemployment relief. There was no dearth of attempts to restore trade, but they were of little avail. The Prince of Wales made good-will tours, notably to Latin America, in the hope that he might be an effective social sales-manager. When he returned he delivered some frank addresses in which he urged British businessmen to wake up to modern methods and to go out and look for trade rather than remain at home and wait for customers at the door. Negotiations were undertaken to get the continental states to reduce their tariffs in the interest of a general trade revival, but there was only failure to record, and the total value of imports and exports fell by more than a third from 1929 to 1931. Public works were inaugurated. The dole continued to eat away hundreds of millions of dollars per year. By the end of September 1931 the unemployed numbered 2,800,000. The people probably realized by this time that the situation was world-wide and not peculiar to Great Britain, but the Labor Government had promised more than it could perform. Labor lost a number of seats in by-elections.

In the summer of 1931 the government noticed with alarm that the

country's gold reserve was shrinking rapidly. The general effects of the depression, the decreasing tax receipts, the increasing dole appropriations, the falling confidence in Great Britain's financial stability and the consequent heavy foreign withdrawals, all combined to make the situation acute. Besides, there was a tense diplomatic situation on the continent, where Great Britain was trying to help Germany and Austria in their financial difficulties. A committee of financial experts suggested slashes in government salaries, pensions, and unemployment benefits, and recommended slight tax increases. The premier and the chancellor of the exchequer favored these views, but a majority of the cabinet refused to endorse the proposals, saying they provided economy at the expense of the working people. In August 1931, therefore, MacDonald tendered the king the resignation of the entire ministry. One day later he reassumed control with a new "National Ministry" composed of members drawn from all three parties.

Soon after this startling development became public, the Labor Party expelled MacDonald, Snowden, and a few other leaders.[7] Arthur Henderson was elected to succeed MacDonald in the leadership of the party, and the latter officially went into opposition.[8] These events were perhaps not so abrupt as they seemed. While the rank and file of the party had been leaning more and more towards the left, MacDonald and his close associates had become middle-class liberals. Though still concerned with the welfare of the people, they appeared to be content with the social *status quo* of the land. It seemed to them that they were placing loyalty to national welfare above loyalty to party policies.

THE NATIONAL COALITION, 1931–1939

In September 1931 the National Cabinet pushed through Parliament a finance bill which embodied most of the proposals that had been suggested some weeks earlier. The government held that the law exacted equal sacrifices from all citizens, but the Labor Party insisted that most of the savings were made at the expense of the working people. When the act was published, Great Britain witnessed some astonishing events. Thousands of schoolteachers, postmen, and other government employees held protest meetings against the salary reductions. There were dozens of mass meetings

[7] In 1931 Snowden entered the House of Lords as Viscount Snowden of Ickornshaw.
[8] After the election of October 1931 George Lansbury became parliamentary leader of the Labor Party. He resigned in October 1935 when the party endorsed the use of sanctions against Italy in the Ethiopian dispute, and was succeeded by Major Clement Richard Attlee. Henderson died in the same month.

of the unemployed, and riots had to be put down in London, Liverpool, Glasgow, and other large cities. Most serious was a naval mutiny at Invergordon.

Such incidents shook foreign confidence in the stability of Great Britain. The kingdom's credit fell rapidly and at one time the foreign withdrawals from the Bank of England amounted to several million pounds daily. The result was so great a depletion of the gold reserve that Parliament in September 1931 repealed that law of the realm which had required the government to issue and sell gold at par. In other words, Great Britain "went off the gold standard." Almost immediately the value of the pound fell from $4.86 to $3.49. The chief consolations of this move were the belief that the cost of production would be lowered, thus giving British goods a sales advantage in the world market, and a diminution in the real value of the internal debt.

To enable the people to express their views on the policies of the National Government, Parliament was dissolved and elections were held in October 1931. The candidates who supported the National Government ran as Conservatives, National Laborites, and National Liberals. The opposition candidates retained their names of Laborites and Liberals. The program of the Nationals was of necessity vague. They asked for a vote of confidence, advocated tariff protection, and requested a blank check to do what they considered best for the country. The Laborites had their customary platform, but lacking their old leaders they seemed to find it difficult to make their points clear to the voters. MacDonald and Snowden, indeed, joined the Conservatives in prophesying disaster if the Labor Party were victorious.

The result of the election astonished even the most experienced political sages. The government won a *majority* over its opponents of nearly 500 seats. The Conservatives alone had a majority of about 325 over all other groups and became the backbone of the next National Government. MacDonald, reëlected as a National Laborite, formed another cabinet. It included four National Laborites, five National Liberals, and eleven Conservatives. Neville Chamberlain, a Conservative proponent of high tariffs, became chancellor of the exchequer. The Liberal Sir John Simon became foreign secretary. No really outstanding Conservative obtained a ministerial post.

Though MacDonald retained the premiership for almost four years longer, his control was by leave of the Conservatives. In order to extend the life of the National Government and to maintain "national unity in the presence of the grave problems" that confronted "the whole world," the

extraordinary step was taken of permitting individual members of the cabinet to express in Parliament "by speech and vote" views contrary to those held by the majority of the cabinet. Thus was broken a constitutional principle of 148 years' standing. In 1935 MacDonald resigned because of illness. Thereupon the Conservative leader, Stanley Baldwin, reconstructed the National cabinet with himself as prime minister, Sir Samuel Hoare as foreign secretary, Neville Chamberlain as chancellor of the exchequer, and the youthful Anthony Eden as "Minister for League of Nations Affairs," a post specially created for him.

Before the year was out, Baldwin decided to appeal to the country for support of his stand in the Italo-Ethiopian dispute which was then raging (see p. 173). Although some losses were sustained, the Baldwin Government was returned with a majority of about 250 seats. The Conservatives again formed the core of the coalition, having a sizable majority over all other groups combined. There was little change in the cabinet except that Eden soon succeeded Hoare as foreign secretary.

In January 1936 King George V died and was succeeded by his oldest son as King Edward VIII. The latter, the generally popular Prince of Wales of the war and postwar periods, soon became involved in a dispute with Prime Minister Baldwin. The difference grew out of the king's desire to marry morganatically a woman of American birth, Mrs. Wallis Warfield Simpson, who was about to procure a second divorce. The government resisted the king's wishes (a resistance stiffened because of the ruler's apparent readiness to participate in government affairs) and on December 10, 1936, Edward abdicated. He left immediately for the continent as Duke of Windsor and some months later married the woman of his choice in France. The dominion governments supported the British Ministry and the constitutional crisis passed with relatively little outward disturbance. The Duke of York now became king as George VI and was crowned in May 1937. He and his queen seemed quickly to win the affection of their people and were wildly acclaimed on visits in 1938 and 1939 to France, Canada, and the United States.

Meanwhile, after the coronation, Baldwin had retired from politics.[9] He was succeeded as premier by his chancellor of the exchequer, Neville Chamberlain. Aside from the perennial question of a budget, and that of rapid rearmament—itself a repercussion of the foreign situation—there was

[9] In 1938–1939, as Earl Baldwin of Bewdley, he interested himself in the plight of refugees from Nazi-dominated Central Europe. MacDonald, who retired from an honorary position in the cabinet at the same time as Baldwin, declined a peerage. He died in 1937 while en route to South America.

little in the way of domestic administration to which the new premier could devote his energies. The Mediterranean activities of Italy, the exigencies of the Spanish Civil War, the territorial and military progress of Germany, the important relations with France—these demanded all Chamberlain's attention, particularly after the resignation in 1938 of Foreign Secretary Eden, who disagreed with his chief on further concessions to the totalitarian states. In explanation of his position, the premier told the lower house of his desire to find out "whether there was any common ground on which we might build up a general scheme of appeasement in Europe." This policy of appeasement he then steadfastly pursued until the very outbreak of the Second World War in 1939.

From 1931 through 1938 the several National Governments tried to revive prosperity. There was no definite program, but a series of measures was adopted with the aid of which Great Britain might once more "muddle through." Heavy dole payments continued, and a tariff was imposed on all imports save raw cotton, wool, meat, fish, and wheat. A "corn law" was passed which virtually guaranteed a minimum of $1.00 a bushel for a specified quantity of domestic wheat. Gradually the tariff schedule was further raised, and a tariff commission was empowered to increase any duty by as much as 100 per cent for countries that discriminated against British goods. Soon after this legislation, several new industries sprang up in southern England and more raw materials were imported.

In order to decrease government expenditures, the British war loan was converted and the interest rate reduced, but the interest on Great Britain's total national debt remained at more than $1,000,000,000 a year. The people were urged to help the government by paying income taxes in advance of the date required and to sell to the authorities their private gold possessions. Large quantities of gold were imported from India. To retain the foreign-trade advantages that presumably accompanied currency inflation, the government set up an Exchange Equalization Fund. The exact operations of this fund were secret, but its purpose was so to "control" the inflationary process and "manage" the currency that a fairly stable relationship might be established between sterling and gold.

At an Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa (1932) Great Britain and the dominions sought to improve the economic situation within the empire by an exchange of trade concessions. A dozen bilateral trade treaties were signed, but they fell far short of accomplishing what had optimistically been hoped for from the conference. The sessions were characterized by a greater willingness to demand sacrifices than to make them, and gave evidence of the existence of serious intra-imperial economic rivalries. But

some concessions were granted, especially by the mother country, and the empire trade gave signs of improving. Soon after the close of the Ottawa Conference, Great Britain also began to negotiate bilateral trade agreements with foreign countries, the first such pact being with Argentina.

Many observers felt that permanent recovery could come for Great Britain, with its economic structure "geared to the world market," only through the return of a prosperous foreign trade. Yet business evidently was aided by a variety of immediate factors. These included a more vigorous trade with the dominions, the need to make replacements after years of "patching up," the coronation, an acceleration of house construction and shipbuilding, and the enormous demands of the rearmament program. Though wages remained low and taxes high, and though strikes continued, the number of unemployed declined from a peak of 3,100,000 in mid-1932 to 1,200,000 in mid-1939. British foreign trade for 1937 was the highest for any year since 1930. In 1938, moreover, there came to an end a six-year-old tariff and trade war with Ireland and there was signed with the United States a trade pact of the type which Secretary Hull had been negotiating over a period of years with a score of nations. The British granted concessions chiefly to United States agricultural products, while Washington modified its tariff schedules on British textiles, metals, and books.

The least hopeful economic problem concerned certain "depressed" or "special" areas in northern Scotland and southern Wales. Some remedial measures were applied, but it was not possible to arouse enthusiasm among industrialists for the establishment of new plants in the affected areas. High local taxes for relief purposes and the fear of labor trouble were often cited as reasons for this hesitancy. Under the new rearmament program some factories actually were set up where the unemployment was greatest. But the continued seriousness of the problem, plus a desire to tie the dominions more closely to the mother country for defense, led to the appointment of an Oversea Settlement Board to find means for encouraging migration within the empire. The board's report (1938) contained concrete recommendations for the "planned coöperation" of all agencies concerned, but little was done to put them into practice. A table in the report, incidentally, showed that for each year from 1931 through 1937 there had been a balance of empire migration *inward* to the United Kingdom.

There were some interesting additional items of internal legislation in these years. In 1937 there became effective a Public Order Act which, aimed especially at Mosley's black-shirted British Union of Fascists, forbade the wearing of political uniforms and the formation of semimilitary

organizations.[10] The same year saw the enactment of a new divorce law which recognized desertion, cruelty, and insanity as legal causes. And a Coal Act of 1938 provided for the transference of the coal-mine ownership of the kingdom to the state by mid-1942. Hoping to revive one of the country's most depressed industries, the government planned to buy the coal-mining royalties of more than 4000 owners. A coal commission, made up of persons unconnected with either Parliament or the mining industry, was appointed to assess the specific amounts to be paid each owner—among whom one of the greatest was the Church of England. The war of 1939 delayed the process of valuation and the carrying out of the task (see also p. 619).

IRELAND

In 1914 Parliament passed an Irish Home Rule Bill. This action, it was hoped, would end Irish agitation for autonomy, dating from 1801 when Ireland became an integral part of the United Kingdom. If the provisions of the law had gone into force, Ireland might have been rent by civil war. The six "Ulster" counties in the northeast, being industrialized and largely Protestant, were resolved not to submit to the control of an Irish parliament the majority of whose members would be elected by the Catholic farmers in the 26 southern counties. The people in the south were equally determined that one parliament should rule the entire island. Upon the passage of the bill both sides organized for armed conflict, but the outbreak of the First World War caused the British Government to suspend the operation of home rule. John Redmond, leader of the Irish Nationalists in the south, assured London that his followers would remain loyal during the war. The fealty of the Ulsterites was a foregone conclusion.

The British authorities now pursued ill-advised tactics in Ireland. The Ulsterites were permitted to form a military division of their own for overseas service, but the Irish Nationalists were denied a similar request, and south-Irish recruits were asked to enter English regiments. Beyond this, petty annoyances were multiplied until many people in the southern counties became indignant. In 1916 the discontent crystallized in an Easter Rebellion. This uprising was the work of some radicals who had left the Irish Nationalist Party, which still officially supported the British, and formed an Irish Republican Brotherhood. Most of the "Brothers" also were affili-

[10] During the Second World War Mosley was for a time placed in confinement. In 1946 he entered the publishing business.

ated with a society known as *Sinn Fein* ("We Ourselves"), which had originally been organized for industrial betterment and to develop Irish national sentiment. In 1914 the association had entered politics and during the war it became identified with a republican movement. The republicans, accordingly, were known as Sinn Feiners.

On Easter Monday, 1916, the Sinn Feiners seized some public buildings in Dublin and issued a proclamation in the name of the "Provisional Government of the Irish Republic." Germany had promised to aid the rebels by "land, sea, and air," but the tightness of the British blockade made such help impracticable. The British put down the rebellion within a week, shot a number of the leaders, and placed Ireland under martial law. Several thousand people were arrested and many were deported to Great Britain. These measures further swelled the ranks of Sinn Fein sympathizers.

In 1917 Lloyd George attempted without success to solve the Irish Question by a conference with representative leaders. The disorder increased, and a crisis was reached in 1918 when Parliament applied a conscription act to Ireland. The opposition to this measure was so strong that the authorities offered to suspend its provisions on condition that a sufficiently large number of Irishmen volunteered for service. The volume of enlistments, however, was small and the outlook for the future ominous. The signing of the armistice occurred in time to prevent disaster.

The British parliamentary elections of December 1918 assumed the form, in southern Ireland, of a contest between the Nationalists and the Sinn Feiners. The former stood for home rule, the latter for independence. In Ulster the Unionist group, which preferred close ties with England, was supreme. Of the 105 seats to which Ireland was entitled in Parliament, the Unionists got 26, the Nationalists 6, and the Sinn Feiners 73. After election, the Sinn Fein deputies refused to attend the Parliament at Westminster, preferring to consider their election as a mandate to set up a separate Irish parliament. This they did, at Dublin, in January 1919. The deputies took the name of Irish Republican Party and called their parliament *Dáil Eireann*. At the first meeting of this body 29 men were present. The remaining 44 were in prison, on their way to prison, or in hiding. Nothing daunted, the Dáil selected three delegates to attend the Paris Peace Conference and plead the cause of Irish self-determination. The assemblage, however, refused to recognize these emissaries. At a subsequent meeting the Dáil appointed a ministry and elected Eamon de Valera president.

De Valera was born in New York in 1882 of a Spanish father and an Irish mother. During his infancy he was taken to Ireland. He grew up to be

a professor of mathematics. A fervent orator and patriot, he had been one of the leaders of the Easter Rebellion. Though he was captured and sentenced to death, his sentence had been commuted to life imprisonment. In 1917 he benefited by a general amnesty but in 1918 was again imprisoned. This time he escaped to the United States, there receiving financial assistance for his plans. After the war he returned to Ireland and soon headed the republican camp.

The defiance of the Dáil led to a state of war between the "Irish Republic" and Great Britain. The British military and police forces fought pitched battles with the Irish Republican Army led by the young and able Michael Collins. Cruelties were perpetrated on both sides and late in 1920 Cork was burned. Especially hateful to the Irish were the "Auxiliaries" sent over from Great Britain to aid the police. These soon were nicknamed "Black-and-Tans," because their uniform consisted of a khaki outfit with black bands on hat and arm.

To end the strife, Lloyd George secured the passage of another Home Rule Act in December 1920. This law conceded more local autonomy to Ireland than had the earlier one, but it set up separate parliaments for northern and southern Ireland. The Ulsterites proceeded to implement the law.[11] The other Irishmen balked. They no longer were satisfied with home rule and they objected to a division of the island. When London ordered elections held in the spring of 1921, the Sinn Feiners captured 124 of the 128 seats allotted to the "Parliament of Southern Ireland." At the opening session of this assembly, the four members from Trinity College, Dublin, were the only delegates present. The body adjourned, never to meet again.

Still hopeful, Lloyd George invited de Valera to London to discuss an amicable settlement. A conference was arranged, but the British proposals were unacceptable to the Irish. Later a second conference was held to find means whereby "the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as the British Empire could best be reconciled with Irish national aspirations." This time the Irish delegation was headed by Arthur Griffith, founder of Sinn Fein. On December 6, 1921, the plenipotentiaries signed a treaty which, in effect, was the birth certificate of a new Irish Free State.

The treaty provided that "Ireland shall have the same constitutional status in the community of nations known as the British Empire, as the

[11] In June 1921, King George V formally opened the Parliament of Northern Ireland. It consisted of a House of Commons, elected by popular vote, and a Senate, composed of the mayors of Belfast and Londonderry and 24 members elected by the lower house. Ministerial responsibility was provided, and the king was represented by a governor. Northern Ireland also elected 13 (from 1950, 12) delegates to the Parliament at Westminster.

Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa, with a Parliament having powers to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of Ireland and an Executive responsible to that Parliament, and shall be styled and known as the Irish Free State." Officials of the Irish Free State were to take an oath of allegiance to the king. The Crown was to be represented by a governor-general. The coasts of Ireland were to be protected by the British fleet, and Great Britain was to retain authority over some Irish ports as naval bases. The Irish Free State was to have its own military forces and eventually was to share in the coast defense. It was to assume a portion of the British national debt. Northern Ireland might join the Irish Free State or continue the relationship established with Great Britain in 1920. Ulster chose the latter course, so that a boundary line remained to be adjusted.

When news of the treaty reached Ireland, there was a break in Sinn Fein ranks. De Valera denounced the document and resigned from the presidency when the Dáil accepted it by a close vote. Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins led the movement for the organization of the Irish Free State, and a committee was appointed to draft a constitution. De Valera and his followers thereupon withdrew from the Dáil, boasting: "We made it impossible for the British Government to rule Ireland, and we can also make it impossible for an Irish Government working under British authority to rule Ireland." When, in June 1922, elections for a provisional parliament were held, the chief issue was the acceptance or rejection of the treaty. The republicans interfered with the elections by tearing up railway tracks, intimidating voters, and assassinating speakers. Nevertheless, the friends of the treaty were overwhelmingly victorious in the balloting.

Republican "Irregulars" for some time continued their lawless activities with apparent immunity because many members of the provisional government were loath to deal harshly with the men who had been their comrades in the struggle against Great Britain. But in August 1922 the republicans killed Michael Collins from ambush. A few days earlier Arthur Griffith had died from overwork and worry. William Cosgrave and Kevin O'Higgins thereupon came to the head of the parliamentary forces and determined to suppress the disorder. The provisional parliament supported this stand and elected Cosgrave president. A struggle followed, fiercer than that with the British. Thousands were imprisoned and scores were assassinated or executed. Eventually the Free Staters triumphed, and in the spring of 1923 de Valera ordered his followers to lay down their arms.

From 1923 to 1927 de Valera and his followers abstained from violence.

Organized as the *Fianna Fáil,* or Republican Party, they put up candidates for election to parliament, but when elected these delegates excluded themselves from office by refusing to take the oath of allegiance to the king as required by the constitution. For a time this was useful to Cosgrave, for it meant that there was no large opposition group in the legislature. In 1927, however, Kevin O'Higgins, Cosgrave's assistant, was assassinated. As minister of justice, O'Higgins had been active in repressing the Irregulars and he was generally regarded as the "strong man" of Ireland. Though de Valera and his aides denied complicity in the murder, the government determined to curtail the objectionable activities of the Fianna Fáil. A public-safety act empowered the authorities to deal vigorously with lawlessness, and the electoral law was amended so that any parliamentary candidate had to agree in advance to take the oath of allegiance if elected.

By this time popular opinion in southern Ireland was decidedly averse to the methods of de Valera. Moreover, a number of Irish-Americans who had been assisting de Valera financially were alienated by his tactics. De Valera therefore announced his intention to head a constitutional opposition in the parliament, and the political atmosphere became calmer. In the elections of 1927 de Valera's party, having forsworn violence, became the second largest party in the parliament, with only four seats fewer than Cosgrave's Free State Party, *Cumann na nGaedheal.*

The provisional parliament which in 1922 elected Cosgrave president also adopted a constitution. This was republican in character and was accepted by the British Parliament without change. On December 6, 1922, King George V proclaimed the Irish Free State *(Saorstát Eireann).* Immediately thereafter the last British troops were withdrawn from the newest dominion.

Theoretically the executive power in the Irish Free State rested with the governor-general; actually it was vested in a responsible Executive Council. A bicameral legislature called *Oireachtas* was set up. The upper house *(Seanad Eireann)* was given no power to amend money bills and in general was accorded only a suspensive veto. The lower house or *Dáil Eireann* was to be elected for four years by all citizens over twenty-one. It was empowered to elect the president of the Executive Council, the chief administrative officer in the land. Religious freedom was guaranteed.

A thorny political question grew out of Article 12 of the treaty of 1921. This article stipulated that, if Northern Ireland preferred not to join the Irish Free State, a commission of three should be appointed to determine the boundary between the two regions. Such a commission visited the border areas in 1925 and heard evidence for several months.

The Irish Free State wanted to add the counties of Tyrone and Fermanagh, but the Ulstermen were determined to keep the six northeastern counties. Eventually the Irish Free State delegate on the commission resigned on the ground that the other two were moved more by political considerations than by the wishes of the inhabitants.

Before an overt action took place, an Irish Free State delegation was sent to London to negotiate directly with the British Government. A compromise was reached whereby the boundary was to remain as fixed by the Home Rule Act of 1920—a complete victory for Ulster—but the Irish Free State was relieved of its share of the public debt of the United Kingdom as of 1921. This arrangement was accepted by the Dáil late in 1925. Then the two parts of Ireland agreed "mutually to aid one another in a spirit of neighborly comradeship."

It was to be expected that there would be a nationalistic reaction in the Irish Free State after the achievement of dominion status. The new country adopted its own flag and sent diplomatic representatives abroad. In 1923 it was admitted to the League of Nations. There was a strong movement to make Gaelic the language of the people and many family and place names were Gaelicized. Thus William Cosgrave became Liam McCosgair, and the city of Queenstown became Cóbh. Irish coins and postage stamps were adopted, and the mailboxes were painted green in place of the former royal red. In the spring of 1929 Gaelic was made compulsory for lawyers as it had previously been made for civil servants. The Irish delegate to the League Assembly delivered his speeches in Gaelic. The Irish Free State adopted a severe censorship system.

During the Cosgrave regime (1922–1932) economies were effected by the consolidation of departments and the establishment of an efficient poor-relief method. The police and postal systems were reorganized and the standing army was reduced. Land-purchase provisions were enacted and various forms of agriculture received subsidies. By 1929 the hydroelectric potentialities of the River Shannon had been developed. A modernized system of education was inaugurated.[12]

Despite the general administrative success of President Cosgrave, there were signs, by 1930, that the days of his control were numbered. The economic depression and the vogue of economic nationalism strongly affected Erin, and the antagonists of the government made the most of the economic difficulties. Many farmers were alienated by the strict enforcement of the

[12] Large sums of foreign money were got by the legalization of sweepstakes for the benefit of Irish hospitals and charitable institutions. This device was opposed by both Cosgrave and de Valera, but it was popular with the citizenry.

laws against the exportation of low-grade agricultural products and the use of inferior bulls for breeding. Users of electric current were disappointed because the poor distribution facilities forced the state to exceed its promised rates for power from the Shannon plants. The refusal of the government to adopt a high tariff angered the manufacturers. The reduction of salaries (1931–1932) in the army, the police force, and the civil service brought additional unpopularity. When the discontent took the form of renewed disorders and secret military activities by the Irish Republican Army, a new and more stringent public-safety measure was enacted (1931) —thus further arousing the ire of the malcontents. Finally, when Cosgrave declared that the Irish Free State could enjoy greater security within the British Commonwealth than outside it, he lost the chief appeal which attached to the traditional Irish hero, namely, that of being in opposition to the British. By contrast, de Valera now seemed much more heroic.

The chief issue in the election of 1932 was the platform announced by Fianna Fáil. This program, the keynote of which was political and economic self-sufficiency, included the following points: (1) abolition of the oath of "faithfulness" to the king that was required of all deputies by the treaty of 1921; (2) retention by the Irish treasury of certain land-purchase instalments (£5,000,000 annually) that were due British bondholders under financial agreements of the 1920's; (3) suspension of the public-safety act of 1931; and (4) erection of a tariff wall. The voting was close. De Valera, with the aid of some Laborites, controlled the new Dáil by a narrow margin and was elected president of the Executive Council.

President de Valera quickly became aware that it was easier to promise far-reaching changes than to inaugurate them. A majority of the senators still were pro-Cosgrave, and the upper house had the right to hold up for eighteen months bills passed by the Dáil. The oath requirement was based on a clause in a bilateral treaty that had been registered with the League Secretariat. The annuity payments, though guaranteed by the British Government, were private debts. Retention of the money, therefore, though it would lighten the task of budget-making, would simultaneously violate financial conventions and moral obligations. A high tariff might be raised, but, since Ireland depended for her prosperity on exports, it was dangerous to invite retaliation. The suspension of the public-safety law was the only election pledge that could be and was carried out quickly.

London refused to countenance either the unilateral abrogation of the oath clause in the treaty or the repudiation of the annuities. The British emphasized the illegality of the Irish contentions, and in sheer self-defense

hesitated to tolerate the establishment of an Irish state that might at some time be used by a foreign power as a military or naval base. The threat of a high tariff caused the Britishers little worry since they could easily retaliate. Whereas Great Britain purchased nine-tenths of the exports of the Irish Free State, only one-twelfth of all British exports went to Ireland.

Throughout the spring and early summer of 1932 de Valera and J. H. Thomas, British Secretary for the Dominions, conferred, but with little success. Thomas warned that recourse would be had to a tariff war if the annuities were not paid. Many Irish farmers and small-business men were frightened at such a prospect, but de Valera remained firm. In fact, he added to his demands another: the unification of Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State. Meanwhile the Senate delayed an attempt of the Dáil to remove the oath of allegiance from the constitution, and the Irish Finance Minister announced pay cuts and tax increases. Eventually, de Valera decided to withhold from Great Britain some annuity money, and expressed a willingness to have the Anglo-Irish dispute settled by arbitration. Thomas accepted the idea of arbitration, but refused de Valera's condition that some of the arbitrators be chosen from without the empire. The other dominions appeared to side with Great Britain in the quarrel.[13]

In July 1932 the long-expected tariff war was launched. Hoping to gain some compensatory economic advantages, the Irish Free State participated in the current Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa, but little benefit accrued to her from the agreements there reached since Great Britain granted her no concessions. Attempts were then made to negotiate trade treaties with Germany and other countries, but again with little result. Meanwhile the British Parliament had empowered its government to place a duty up to 100 per cent on Irish products coming into Great Britain, in order that funds might be collected with which to meet the defaulted annuities. The Irish, moreover, heavily taxed British imports, and Anglo-Irish trade rapidly fell to a fraction of its former worth.[14]

When, after these months of diplomatic failure and economic difficulty, de Valera sensed a growing opposition in the Dáil, he dissolved that body and ordered new elections (January 1933). His party was returned with a majority of one. Since the suspension of the public-safety act, moreover,

[13] No British or dominion flags were displayed at the Roman Catholic Eucharistic Congress held at Dublin in 1932, and the governor-general was not invited to attend the official reception held on the occasion. Irish Free State ministers later boycotted private affairs to which the representative of the king was invited.

[14] The costly customs war was continued until 1938. See p. 124.

the Irish Republican Army had recommenced its drills and hinted that it was ready to back the government by force if necessary. In pursuance of the campaign to sever all connections with Great Britain, the Dáil in 1933 once more passed the bill to abolish the oath of allegiance, and this time it became law. Then followed legislation removing the need for the governor-general's assent to legalize acts. The Senate, moreover, agreed to a bill, previously adopted by the lower house, abolishing the right of appeal from Irish courts to the British Privy Council.

Opposition to the president's policies was not wanting. Many of the midland-county farmers and cattle-raisers, who were hurt by the tariff war, had to be forced to continue making the annuity payments which now went into the Irish treasury instead of to Great Britain. The better to defend their interests, the farmers organized a Center Party under the leadership of Frank MacDermot. The unrestrained activities of the Irish Republican Army led a group of young men to form a blue-shirted counter-organization which, under the leadership of General Eoin O'Duffy, came to be known as the National Guard.

In 1933 MacDermot's Center Party, the National Guard, and the followers of Cosgrave combined to form the United Ireland Party *(Fine Gael)* under the presidency of O'Duffy. The program of the new party included reconciliation with Ulster for a united Ireland and the ending of the tariff and annuity controversies with Great Britain. In 1934 a Blue Shirt conference in Dublin pledged itself not to pay the annual land taxes until the Anglo-Irish trade war was terminated. This open defiance of the government by one wing of the United Ireland Party caused some dissension within the latter's ranks, whereupon O'Duffy resigned his leadership. Thereafter the party, under the leadership of Cosgrave, was content to oppose de Valera by constitutional means.

In 1935 and 1936 de Valera's position continued to be strong. The circumstance that the bigger farmers and the well-to-do businessmen opposed him made him the more popular with the masses, especially in the west of Ireland. His attempts to break up some of the larger estates, his plan to make the country self-sufficient by decreasing the emphasis on cattle raising and encouraging the sowing of grain, his negotiation of foreign-trade agreements, the fixing of prices by government boards, and the belief among many of the Irish that Great Britain and not de Valera was responsible for their economic difficulties, all won popular favor for the mathematician-president.

The increasing trend away from Great Britain was reflected in a new

Irish constitution which was enacted by vote of the people and inaugurated in December 1937.[15] The document declared the "national territory [consisting] of the whole of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas" to be "a sovereign, independent, democratic state" henceforth to be known by its old Gaelic name of *Éire,* or, in English, Ireland. "Pending the reintegration of the national territory," that is, pending the union of northern and southern Ireland, only the Free State area was to be affected by the constitution. This last, which bore a strong Catholic impress, made no mention of king or commonwealth. In the six northern counties there was some excitement over this "paper annexation," but the British remained calm, feeling that there was no practical change in the commonwealth relationship.

The new constitution provided for a directly elected president with a seven-year term and eligibility for reëlection. He was made dependent on the advice of a ministry, itself responsible to the lower house. A bicameral legislature was set up with a popularly chosen Dáil Eireann, and a Seanad Eireann selected on a vocational and indirect basis. In 1938 Dr. Douglas Hyde, a Protestant professor of literature who had never taken part in politics, was chosen first president under the new constitution. Since he was an unopposed candidate, there was no actual popular election. De Valera was designated premier.

De Valera's policies continued to aim at economic self-sufficiency and hence were dubbed, by some of the businessmen, "Dev's hair-shirt dream." The trade war with Great Britain, moreover, continued to have a disastrous effect on the Irish economic system. At last, in January 1938, British and Irish delegates met in London to negotiate a truce. The result of their deliberations was the signing of a political, a financial, and a trade agreement.

In the political agreement, Great Britain transferred to Ireland its admiralty property and rights at certain Irish coast towns—property and rights that had been reserved to her by the treaty of 1921. The financial arrangement provided for an Irish payment of a lump sum in "final settlement" of all financial claims, that is, in settlement of the annuities that were due the British bondholders. Ireland also agreed to pay $1,250,000 per year until 1987 for damage done to property during the civil war in the early postwar years. Both countries undertook to abolish all special duties that had been imposed since the outbreak of the trade war in 1932. The trade agreement provided for new and liberal customs arrangements. All the agreements were ratified (May 1938) and, perhaps in order to capitalize

[15] In an election held on the same day as the plebiscite on the constitution, de Valera lost his majority in the Dáil. His followers numbered exactly half the membership. But he was supported by the Laborites and was reëlected chief minister.

on the approval called forth by the agreements, de Valera requested a dissolution of the lower house and new elections. The balloting gave his party a majority in the new Dáil. Now Premier de Valera could carry on his work without fear of parliamentary opposition.

To establish "social justice," de Valera, leaning heavily for justification on the encyclicals of Leo XIII and Pius XI, encouraged plans for a redistribution of natural resources among the classes, fostered labor legislation, strove to decentralize industry while encouraging manufactures, and tried to bring more efficiency into agriculture. The opposition to such policies, to the enforced introduction of the Gaelic tongue to the exclusion of English, and to the continued separation of northern and southern Ireland, led to much violence. De Valera therefore declared the Irish Republican Army illegal, but in 1939 the I.R.A. renewed its activity, being charged with 130 bomb outrages throughout the United Kingdom in the first 8 months of that year. The British Government replied with an act which gave the police unprecedentedly wide powers to deal with terrorist suspects. These, despite their British status, might now be treated as undesirable aliens. De Valera himself denounced the terrorist campaign and ordered the Irish police to assist in checking the illegal activities of the I.R.A. But when the Second World War broke out, Ireland alone of the commonwealth countries remained neutral.

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE COMMONWEALTH

The war and post-1919 periods witnessed some remarkable changes in the relationships within the British Empire. Beginning in 1907, and interrupted only by the war, numerous imperial conferences were held, attended by the premiers of Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, Newfoundland,[16] and, for a time, the Irish Free State. At these gatherings the delegates discussed problems that confronted the empire as a whole and that affected the relations of the members one to another. The method of the conferees was to seek agreement on general principles, embody the agreements in draft resolutions, and then work for the acceptance of the resolutions by the home governments.

The exigencies of the First World War, the dependence of Great Britain on the help of the dominions, the independent signature by the latter of the peace treaties, and the circumstance that the dominions became members

[16] In 1934, because of economic distress, Newfoundland temporarily surrendered its dominion status and accepted rule by a royal commission. In a 1948 referendum, Newfoundland voted to become (with Labrador) a province of Canada in 1949.

of the League of Nations, served greatly to alter the relations between the mother country and the colonies. Long before all the legal niceties involved in the new status of the dominions were worked out, the dominions proceeded with a number of actions that were usually regarded as falling within the category of sovereign powers.

Canada, for example, in 1923 signed with the United States a Halibut Fisheries Treaty which bore the signatures of only the United States and Canadian representatives. This precedent was followed in a number of later treaties between Canada and the United States and Canada and European countries. Some of the dominions appointed their own diplomatic ministers abroad. Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa administered mandates in their own names. In 1930 the Australians successfully contended that their choice for the governor-generalship, in this case a native, should be accepted. In 1931 the Irish Free State assumed a Great Seal of its own.

In principle, most of these actions had been affirmed by the Imperial Conference of 1926. In the Balfour Report this conference had declared: "They [Great Britain and the dominions] are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." It remained to enact this principle into imperial law, and in 1929 a committee representing Great Britain and the dominions was appointed to find a method of bringing the old legal restrictions and the new practice into harmony. The report of the committee was accepted by the Imperial Conference of 1930, and steps were taken in each dominion and Great Britain to give it the force of law. This was finally accomplished in December 1931 with the passage by the British Parliament of the Statute of Westminster.

The statute recognized the equal status of the dominions with the mother country and thus virtually accorded them independence. In future no law passed by a dominion parliament could be declared void "on the ground that it is repugnant to the law of England" or to the provisions of any existing or future act of the Parliament of Great Britain. The dominion parliaments were recognized as having full power to pass laws applying to dominion citizens living abroad or traveling on the high seas. No law of the Parliament of Great Britain was to be applicable to any dominion unless the latter specifically consented to the extension of such law to its domains. No longer might the king on advice of his ministers "disallow" an act of a dominion parliament, and henceforth no alteration in the laws concerning

succession to the throne or the royal titles might be made without the assent of the parliaments of the dominions as well as that of Great Britain.

Thus there was created a "British Commonwealth of Independent Nations," a group of separate political entities avowing allegiance to one and the same symbol of unity: the Crown. The king, a feeling of commonwealth citizenship, and perhaps a certain pride in descent from common stock, remained as the dominant ties between Great Britain and the dominions. But the latter, as long as they did not entirely break away from Britain, enjoyed the protection of a powerful navy which was paid for chiefly by the people of Great Britain.

The freedom accorded the dominions led some observers to believe that the British Empire was doomed. An answer to this view was well given by Sir Cecil Hurst in the words: "The British Empire will endure so long as it serves a useful purpose, so long as its constituent elements find it better to belong to it than to stand alone."

CHAPTER 6

France

POLITICS IN THE THIRD FRENCH REPUBLIC

The political structure of the Third Republic was somewhat different from that of other parliamentary states. There were a few parties, particularly radical parties, that had definite organizations and party funds and held periodic conventions. In addition, there were numerous political groups which, though they had none of these characteristics, were listed under special names and were entitled to representation on parliamentary committees, provided they had a certain minimum number of adherents.

In view of this situation, it was difficult for any one group to command a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Hence the government functioned through a system of coalitions or *blocs*. Frequently the make-up of a bloc was based upon a few major issues and, when new issues arose, group realignments followed. Consequently the average life of cabinets in France was short. By July 1940, when it came to an end, the Third Republic had had 110 ministries. Some degree of stability in governmental policies was nevertheless maintained by the presence of permanent undersecretaries and because the ministerial changes often involved merely a shuffling of portfolios.

During the war and until November 1919 France was governed by a bloc called "Sacred Union." After the elections of 1919 the union split into two other coalitions, the *Bloc National* and the *Cartel des Gauches*.[1] The

[1] The conservative groups in the legislature, as in most continental parliaments, were seated to the right of the Speaker, the moderates in front of him, and the radicals to his left. Hence the designations "Right," "Center," and "Left" indicated the general political stand of any group or party.

Bloc was made up of conservatives and moderates led by Clemenceau, Poincaré, Alexandre Millerand, and Briand. It hoped to reduce Germany to economic bondage and make France secure, was opposed to socialism, and favored friendly relations with the papacy. The Cartel was led by Edouard Herriot. It was anticlerical, favored high income taxes and state social control, proposed to reduce the power of the Senate, and, while fully as anxious as the Bloc to give France security, advocated friendship with Germany and Russia. Independent of these coalitions were the socialists and communists on the left and the royalists, led by Léon Daudet, on the right.

The powers of the French President were limited and, except in treaty making, he exercised far less control than the Chief Executive of the United States. Yet, if he happened to possess a dominating personality, the president might exert considerable influence on the course of politics. Poincaré, for example, was certainly more than a figurehead during his incumbency from 1913 to 1920.

When Poincaré's term expired, the National Assembly elected Paul Deschanel in his place. Clemenceau was a candidate in this election, but his popularity suffered in a nationalistic dissatisfaction over the presumed moderation of the Versailles Treaty. Indeed, he soon heard himself called not *Père la Victoire,* but *Perd la Victoire!* In September 1920 Deschanel retired because of illness and was succeeded by Millerand. The new president tried to take a part in legislative as well as executive affairs. In 1922, for example, he virtually forced a Briand Government out of office, and in 1924 he took the unusual step of having a presidential petition read before the Chamber of Deputies. During the parliamentary elections of 1924 he openly supported the Bloc National, one of whose founders he had been. When the Left came into power in 1924, therefore, Millerand was forced to resign.

The next president was Gaston Doumergue—bachelor, lawyer, ex-magistrate, former president of the Senate, and a Protestant. Though himself a member of the Left, he was equally cordial to all parties and his charm and honesty won for him the confidence of most Frenchmen. In 1931, at the close of his seven-year term, the sexagenarian Doumergue left the presidency to marry and retire to private life. Little could he realize, at the time, that he would be called upon within three years to accept the premiership in a grave national crisis.

In 1931 the National Assembly, dominated by the Right, chose Paul Doumer, president of the Senate, to succeed Doumergue as chief executive. Like so many other French officials, Doumer had begun his career as a

radical. Maturity, however, and a settled income tended to make him conservative in later life. He was well known in financial circles, had been a colonial governor, and had twice been minister of finance in Briand cabinets. To the sorrow of his countrymen, Doumer was assassinated in 1932 by a Russian émigré, who in some mystic way hoped by the deed to help free Russia from Bolshevik control. Once more the Senate and the Chamber met together to select a president. This time the choice fell on Albert Lebrun, who earlier had succeeded Doumer as head of the upper house. The new president, whose parliamentary experience dated from 1900, had political sympathies similar to those of Poincaré. Reëlected in 1939, it was his lot to be in office when France collapsed in 1940.

In international affairs the attitudes of all postwar ministries in France were determined by a desire to make the republic secure against foreign aggression. French foreign policy, therefore, was an "integrated foreign policy of colonial empire, to guarantee tropical supplies and supplement a stationary domestic man power; of European alliances to hold the *status quo* and ensure that if war came it would be fought on several fronts; and of support of the League to stay the crumbling of the Versailles Treaty, to provide that the alteration of existing public law be orderly and gradual, and to afford a forum in which world opinion might be won for the French case." [2] In carrying out this policy, some leaders, such as Poincaré and Tardieu, were unyielding; others, notably Briand and Herriot, were conciliatory. Nevertheless, since the same end always was kept in view, there was a marked degree of unity in French foreign policies. On domestic issues, however, and especially in economic and clerical matters, the various cabinets held divergent opinions.

FRANCE'S "ASPIRIN ERA," 1919–1939

When the war came to a close, France was in domestic chaos. The northern tenth of the country had been reduced to wasteland. Farms, mines, houses, factories, wells, public buildings, railway lines, roads, and private possessions had been laid in ruins. In their stead were barbed-wire entanglements, shell holes, débris, trenches, ammunition dumps, and flooded mines. Almost 300,000 private houses and 6000 public buildings had been destroyed; 435,000 houses and 11,000 public structures were damaged; wrecked factories totaled 20,000; 2,000,000 persons had been forced to leave their homes. Little wonder, therefore, that the army was restless, urban laborers were clamoring for bread, and the middle class

[2] Hill, H. *The Spirit of Modern France,* 1934, p. 22.

was afraid of the spread of communism. So great was the apprehension among peasants and middle-class burghers of violence and disorder that the Bloc National was victorious in the elections of 1919 and moderate government thus was ensured at least until 1924.

Financial difficulties soon plagued the Bloc. Expecting Germany to pay the total cost of reconstruction, the government, without raising the tax rate, spent billions on restoration. The total expenditure assessed against a reconstruction budget was estimated at $7,000,000,000, most of this money being raised through loans and the printing of paper money. Month after month went by, however, and the expected sums from Germany were not forthcoming. Indeed, late in 1921, as we have seen, Germany asked for a moratorium. The French conservatives, led by Poincaré and Tardieu, now agitated for the downfall of Premier Briand, who had come to the head of the government early in 1921. They succeeded in their endeavors (1922) and Poincaré assumed the premiership.

Raymond Poincaré was born in 1860 in Lorraine. He was an able lawyer and financier, was energetic, and had a logical mind. Short and stocky, with a high voice and a cold manner, he won the respect of the French people through sheer ability and honesty. He gained a cabinet position for the first time in 1893, was many times premier, and from 1913 to 1920 was president. Alternately showered with praise and abuse, he steadfastly pursued the goal of a powerful and secure France. "Nicknames were fastened upon him—Poincaré la Guerre, Poincaré la Ruhr—but without any parade he kept on his logical course."

The new premier floated foreign loans, introduced financial reforms, and raised the taxes, yet the inflated franc continued to decline and the budget remained unbalanced. Many of the *rentiers* who had been living on incomes from bond investments and who now found themselves facing starvation because of their shrinking real wealth lost all confidence in the government. Poincaré's tactics in the Ruhr, moreover, and his favorable attitude towards the papacy were also unpopular. The Left consequently hoped to overthrow him at the next election and promised the voters greater reliance on direct taxation, closer coöperation with the League, and a more conciliatory foreign policy. In the balloting of 1924 the Left won control of the Chamber of Deputies and ex-Professor Herriot of Lyon, leader of the Radical Socialists, became premier. Despite their name, the Radical Socialists were liberals and not Marxists. They professed a firm faith in the republic and promised prosperity and security at home and abroad.

Herriot was the idol of Lyon, having been mayor of that city for a

score of years. Even while prime minister he spent two nights a week on trains, commuting between Paris and Lyon so that he might attend to both his national and municipal duties. Sincere and honest, he was inexperienced in national politics and for a time injured his reputation by his complete informality. In foreign affairs, the Herriot Ministry accepted the Dawes Plan, established more cordial relations with Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and Germany, and helped draft the Geneva Protocol. It was less fortunate in its domestic policies. Hence, when the Senate in 1925 refused to countenance further inflation, the ministry resigned.

Some troublous months followed in which Paul Painlevé organized two ministries, Briand three, and Herriot another one. The franc continued to drop in value and by July 1926 was worth one-tenth of its prewar quotation or 2 cents. Government bonds sold below par and old loans matured faster than new ones could be floated. At this crisis group lines in the Chamber were effaced and a National Union Ministry was formed, headed by Poincaré and including six ex-premiers. The veteran prime minister now remained in office for three years, until July 1929. In these years he earned the title of "Savior of the Franc."

Poincaré informed the legislature that financial salvation could be obtained only through increased taxation and stringent economy. Since the deputies had at last come to be in a reasonably receptive mood, new taxes were voted. The French people had to submit to one of the highest tax rates in the Western world, the imposts absorbing more than 20 per cent of the national income. The problems presented by the huge debt were solved by a special commission which paid off the short-term notes, consolidated and refunded other issues, and in some cases reduced the interest rate from 6 per cent to 3 per cent. Surplus courts, prisons, and treasury offices were closed and the number of army officers was reduced.

In 1926 the budget was balanced—for the first time in thirteen years. The franc consequently rose in value and by December 1926 was worth 4 cents. It was stabilized at this level in 1928. This action constituted a virtual repudiation of approximately four-fifths of the internal debt, for it reduced the value of prewar and war bonds to about 20 per cent of their original par rating. In the elections of 1928 the policies of Poincaré were upheld by vote of the people. Unfortunately for his successors, however, the power in the lower house was almost equally divided between Right and Left. Both groups supported him, but when illness forced his retirement a year later (July 1929) they fell to quarreling.

Following Poincaré's resignation several short-lived ministries struggled with the financial and diplomatic problems. First came a government under

Briand, but it fell on the questions of finance, the adoption of the Young Plan, and the evacuation of the Rhineland. Briand was succeeded by Tardieu, a journalist who had come into prominence as an assistant of Clemenceau and a follower of Poincaré. Since Briand entered this new cabinet as foreign minister, it appeared that the Tardieu Government might combine Poincaré's domestic firmness with a conciliatory foreign program. But the delicate balance in the parliament made matters difficult and Tardieu soon had to form another cabinet. Since this was recruited largely from the Right, the Left voted adversely on whatever measures came up for action.

Despite the handicap of an uncertain tenure, much was done by the Tardieu ministries. One achievement was the passage, after years of discussion, of an insurance law which went into effect in 1930. The act provided for the compulsory insurance against sickness, invalidism, old age, and death of all (about 9,000,000) men and women between 16 and 60 engaged in industry, commerce, agriculture, and domestic service, and earning less than a stipulated minimum. This minimum ranged from $600 to $1000, depending on the personal status and place of residence of the worker. The insurance system was to be maintained by contributions from employers and workmen (in each case equal to 3 per cent of the individual's wages) and by supplementary state contributions.

Under Tardieu, in addition, taxes were reduced, military service was cut from three years to one, and the size of the army was diminished. The war budget, however, was considerably expanded so that new fortifications might be built and maneuvers held on the Italian and German frontiers. Through the influence of Foreign Minister Briand the Young Plan was ratified, the evacuation of the Rhineland was completed, and a French scheme for a Pan-European federation was announced.

Now, in the German elections of September 1930 the nationalistic parties received an unexpectedly heavy vote. This caused a severe reaction in France because the German nationalists were the most determined opponents of the Versailles Treaty and the Young Plan. Many Frenchmen became panicky over what they called Briand's weak foreign policy. Poincaré emerged once more to complain that, though it was pleasant to listen to "international hymns to the divinity of peace," France also needed "other things" to give her a "feeling of security." Hence, in December 1930 Tardieu's Government fell, the specific occasion being a bank scandal which appeared to involve several cabinet officers.

Senator Théodore Steeg thereupon organized a government which lasted six weeks. Because it included Briand it failed to obtain the full support

of the Right; it was opposed by the socialists on financial and military matters. The situation was made still more complex for the premier by the world depression which, beginning in 1929, had gradually come to make itself felt even in France—where the balance between industry and agriculture had hitherto staved off the hardships attendant upon decreasing trade and increasing unemployment.

Another senator, Pierre Laval, next formed a cabinet (January 1931). An effective orator and clever politician, Laval, although only forty-seven years old, had already held the portfolios of public works, justice, and labor. His chief support came from the Right, and he entrusted both Briand and Tardieu with ministerial posts. He remained premier for more than a year, but during this period he had to reconstitute his cabinet three times.

In domestic affairs the Laval cabinets faced a number of vexatious problems. Unemployment figures rose steadily and the volume of exports continued to decline. When serious financial losses threatened some of the most important business enterprises in the land, the government fought strenuously to win over the parliament to its view that the state was obligated to rescue such ventures from bankruptcy. In accord with this policy a credit was extended to the French Line and funds were advanced to the Bank of France so that it might withstand the losses incurred through the depreciation of its sterling holdings when Great Britain went off the gold standard. Important matters of international concern also arose to tax the patience of Laval. It was during his incumbency that France interposed against the projected Austro-German Customs Accord of 1931 and that she accepted, in modified form, President Hoover's plan for a moratorium on governmental-debt payments. A delegation was sent to participate in the Geneva Disarmament Conference. In January 1932 Briand's place in the foreign office was taken by the premier himself, because of the former's illness.[3] Soon thereafter Laval fell, over an electoral bill designed to aid the Right in the forthcoming elections. Tardieu now became premier for the third time.

The elections of May 1932 betrayed a decided Leftward swing of popular sympathies. The Radical Socialists, still led by Herriot, became the largest group in the Chamber of Deputies. The liberals and radicals had pointed out during the campaign that the rule of the Right had bequeathed the country an empty treasury, a high unemployment figure, heavy military expenditures, and financial losses through state loans to bankrupt private firms and unstable foreign governments. Moreover, the voters apparently

[3] Briand died in March 1932.

had not been in sympathy with Laval's and Tardieu's departures from the conciliatory principles of Briand's foreign policy.

After the election Tardieu was succeeded by Herriot. As had been his lot in 1924 and for two days in 1926, Herriot once more came to power at a time of economic distress. The value of French exports in the month of the elections had been lower than in any month since the war. The decline in the price of wheat made the farmers irritable. The number of civil employees on the national payroll had increased enormously since 1914, and yet the government dared not dismiss any of its servants. Unemployment figures were rising and income-tax receipts fell rapidly. In external affairs, the cabinet had to consider the Lausanne Reparation Conference and the Geneva disarmament parleys. To meet the most urgent of these developments, the Herriot Government pushed through parliament a budget which reduced expenditures and increased taxes. Government bonds to the value of 85,000,000,000 francs were converted and the interest rate was lowered. Tax evaders, of whom there appeared to be many, were prosecuted, and a public-works program was undertaken.

It appeared in the autumn of 1932 that Premier Herriot might continue for some time to hold the confidence of parliament. Yet he soon found it necessary to resign. The issue upon which the ministry fell was the war-debt question. Herriot urged that France meet the instalment of about $19,000,000 due the United States in December. But the deputies held that France had renounced enough in the Lausanne Reparation Agreement and that it was up to the United States to make the next sacrifice. The government's motion to make the payment was defeated and the cabinet resigned (December 1932).

In the next thirteen months France had five ministries. Each premier struggled to balance the budget while avoiding inflation. The tariff was raised, civil service salaries and pensions were cut, and there was some price-fixing. In December 1933 there came to light a municipal-pawnshop scandal in Bayonne, involving a notorious swindler named Alexandre Stavisky, who had come to be director of the pawnshop. It soon appeared that government officials were implicated in the scandal, which cost French investors millions of francs. Excited mobs in the larger cities demanded immediate action to find and punish the guilty. When the rumor spread that attempts were being made to cover up the crime, France was on the verge of revolution.

Other scandals, too, had caused the French people to become restive. There had been a railway accident at Lagny (1933), in which 200 persons had lost their lives. Popular opinion blamed the disaster on the negligence of

the railway company and its failure to comply with the official safety regulations. Once again the investigation lagged, and it appeared that the fixing of responsibility might be evaded. Many persons, moreover, had become weary of the factiousness of the Chamber. It was felt that the deputies, blind to the urgent needs of the country, haggled and bargained and upset ministries, instead of adopting constructive measures to cure the national ills. Consequently there had been a growing demand that the executive authority be strengthened and that the lower house be deprived of some of its powers.[4]

In January 1934 there was violence before the Palais Bourbon, where the deputies met. The participants were royalists, socialists, communists, civil employees protesting against pay cuts, a group of "Young Patriots," and a Fascist war-veterans' association called *Croix de Feu*. On February 6 Premier Daladier attempted to protect the deputies from intimidation by placing troops around the Palais Bourbon. There was little excitement during the day, but at night the crowds became violent, property was destroyed, and conflict ensued between the populace and the guards. On the following day the fighting spread to other cities. President Lebrun now called upon former President Doumergue to leave his retirement and form a government that would place patriotism above politics and save the country from civil war.

Doumergue organized a cabinet of leaders from all groups save the royalists, socialists, and communists. Among the members were Herriot, Laval, Tardieu, and Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain of Verdun fame. There was a general belief that this ministry would restore order, strengthen the executive, and ensure security. Hence there was a lull in the demonstrations. The chastened deputies awaited the government's proposals.

A budget was adopted and the government was empowered to reduce expenses and change tariffs by decree. Commissions were appointed to investigate the various scandals and disasters. The number of civil servants was reduced and the salaries of the remainder were cut. Despite these accomplishments the Doumergue Government faced criticism. In the parliament, the socialists, led by Léon Blum, voted against most of the cabinet's measures. Outside parliament, the Croix de Feu, led by Colonel François de la Rocque, threatened "action" if reforms in government were not soon forthcoming. Resentment was caused by the state's failure to fix responsibility for the Lagny incident, by the whitewashing of the fighting on February 6, and by failure to solve various riddles connected with the

4 "Automobiles were . . . seen in Paris carrying on their windshields the inscription, *'Je ne suis pas député.'* "

Stavisky swindle which continued to bring in its train suicides and possibly murders.

In September 1934 the premier outlined his plans for constitutional reform. He proposed to give the cabinet exclusive right to initiate money bills, advocated a curb on the organization of civil servants, and wanted power delegated to the prime minister to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies without the consent of the Senate. This last suggestion was upheld on the ground that the deputies would be slower to upset ministries if there could be held over their heads the threat of a new election. To the Leftist groups in parliament these suggestions smacked of dictatorship. The cabinet, they said, must remain under the control of parliament, not parliament under the cabinet.

The heated discussions aroused by Doumergue's plans, the increasingly bad economic situation, the fears of socialists and communists that reactionaries were planning to seize the government, the recurrence of political riots, the apprehension over the approaching plebiscite in the Saar, and then the assassination at Marseille of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and Foreign Minister J. Louis Barthou (see p. 278), all made the position of the ministry insecure. Another crisis was precipitated when Doumergue, withholding the proposed new budget from the Chamber of Deputies, requested that body to vote certain provisional credits. Thereupon several members of the cabinet resigned and the Doumergue Ministry fell.

Another coalition cabinet was formed (November 1934), this time by Pierre-Etienne Flandin. Its political complexion was less Rightist than had been that of its predecessor. Laval was appointed to carry on the foreign policies of the deceased Barthou. Flandin was more interested in tackling economic problems than in immediate political reform. But when in the spring of 1935 he appealed to the deputies for power to do whatever he thought necessary to fight the depression, the answer was a vote of no confidence.

Pierre Laval then became premier in June 1935. Given extraordinary powers to take measures "in defense of the franc," he reduced governmental salaries and pensions, lowered the returns on national securities, raised the tax on incomes and on munitions manufacturing, inaugurated new public works, lowered certain rents and the prices of some commodities, and studied ways of stimulating foreign trade.[5] These acts re-

[5] The terms of military service for the period 1935–1938 were lengthened to compensate for the smaller number of available conscripts born during the First World War.

lieved the financial strain but aroused opposition. There was an increasingly restless activity on the part of several antiparliamentary leagues, chief among which was the Croix de Feu, claiming a membership of 1,000,000. Laval dissolved several of the smaller leagues but was unable to retain his control. In January 1936 he was succeeded by Albert Sarraut (Radical Socialist), who formed a stopgap ministry which lasted through the elections of April–May 1936.[6]

The parties of the Left (Radical Socialists, Socialists, and Communists) combined in the election as the Popular Front. They denounced fascism, urged the nationalization of munitions manufacture, and promised to "break the power of the two hundred families who control the economic life of the nation." They undertook to stimulate production, were friendly to Great Britain and the League, and upheld a strong military program. The voters gave 381 seats (62 per cent of the total) to the Popular Front and the remaining 237 seats to the candidates of the Right and Center. The Socialist Party formed the largest single group in the chamber. Its leader, Léon Blum, a well-to-do Parisian Jew of legal and literary renown who had first entered parliament in 1919, organized a government in June 1936.[7] The Communist Party, led by Maurice Thorez, refused representation in the cabinet but agreed to support Blum. For the first time in French history, three women were taken into the cabinet as undersecretaries.

During its year of office the Popular Front Government encountered many political storms. The first was an immediate epidemic of "sit-down strikes" in which 1,000,000 workers "occupied" their places of employment (standing with folded arms and later sitting and lying down) in automobile, aircraft, textile, and munition factories, newspaper plants, department stores, and so forth. Transport, lighting, and food services were, in general, unaffected, so that the public was not seriously inconvenienced. The real reasons for this demonstration were not clear; perhaps the proletariat wanted to make sure that the government would fulfill its election promises to labor. Certainly the authorities were impressed by the evidences of discipline in the strikes.

Blum called representatives of the employers and the workers to a conference and effected a temporary settlement. Although both sides

[6] Two ballots, on successive Sundays, were generally required in the parliamentary elections. On the first ballot a candidate, to be successful, had to win a majority of the votes cast in his constituency. A plurality sufficed on the second ballot.

[7] Blum emerged as a popular figure when a group of royalists in February 1936 pulled him out of an automobile and severely beat him. President Lebrun had thereupon decreed the dissolution of the two leading royalist societies, the *Camelots du Roi* and the *Action Française*.

violated this Matignon Agreement, the government soon enacted its provisions into law. The new legislation provided generally for a forty-hour week without pay reduction, collective bargaining, the closed shop, paid vacations, wage increases, and compulsory arbitration in labor disputes. These things brought some satisfaction to the workers but further alienated many worried businessmen.

By the end of 1936 the Popular Front had fulfilled its campaign program. The Laval pay cuts were restored and the pittance to soldiers was increased. The coal industry was reorganized and a wheat office was created to control the price of breadstuffs. Credit was provided for farm-mortgagors and small-business men, and the public-works program was expanded. The franc was devalued by 30 per cent, probably because the new social legislation increased the cost of production by about 35 per cent. The press (often corrupt) was required to publish its sources of revenue, and the government was empowered to expropriate arms factories at prices to be fixed by arbitration. Finally, the Bank of France was reorganized so that the government secured more control while the so-called Regency Council, composed of the two hundred largest stockholders, was deprived of its power.

In defense and foreign affairs, the Polish and Yugoslav alliances were renewed, the armed forces were strengthened, and the lead of the British was followed in the Spanish situation. The sympathies of the voters who had elected the Popular Front were evidently with the Spanish "Loyalists." They could see no reason why France should imitate the British and not permit the legal sale of arms to the legally constituted Madrid Government. It therefore required all Blum's oratorical skill to convince his supporters of the advisability of following Great Britain's example—particularly in a Europe so full of powerful dictatorships.

With the opening of 1937, it was apparent that the Popular Front Government, having achieved the aims which held it together, must simply "coast along," hoping that no great issue would arise to disturb its equilibrium. In the spring unemployment figures were down to 380,000, and a large internal loan was successfully floated. Labor was temporarily satisfied, and the conservative elements became less restive upon the promise of a legislative "pause." Blum now also refused the demand of Léon Jouhaux, leader of several million trade-unionists (in the *Confédération Générale du Travail,* or C. G. T.), for a 10,000,000,000-franc public-works loan. The much heralded and oft postponed opening of the Paris Exposition occurred in 1937, and the exhibits attracted large crowds of natives and foreigners during the summer. The relative domestic quiet of

the first half of 1937 was seriously disturbed only by a fight in the Parisian suburb of Clichy between some followers of de la Rocque and some local radicals.[8] The police intervened roughly against the Leftists, and Blum had to rely once more on his oratory to calm his more radical supporters.

In the end, the financial situation proved to be the nemesis of Blum as it had been that of so many of his predecessors. The interest on the public debt consumed more than one-third of the government's income when Blum took office, and during his incumbency the situation had not improved. In June 1937 Blum requested broad powers to deal with the financial crisis. The Chamber agreed, but the Senate twice refused its assent. The premier therefore resigned and was succeeded by Camille Chautemps, a Radical Socialist.

The Chautemps Government further devalued the franc, declared a moratorium on gold payments, temporarily closed the stock exchange, and announced the prolongation of the social-legislation "pause." The parliament thereupon voted to give Chautemps the extraordinary financial powers which it had denied to Blum. The cabinet approved heavier taxes, larger import duties, higher telephone, telegraph, and postal rates, steeper tobacco prices, and an increase in rail rates to cut the annual railway deficit that had to be made up by the state.[9] Public-works expenditures were curtailed, and the franc was allowed to drop to the level which it sought for itself. In the fall of 1937 the authorities frustrated a plot of an armed secret society, *Les Cagoulards* ("The Hooded Ones"), to reëstablish a monarchy. The forty-hour-week law was modified, with greater consideration for seasonal industries. At the close of the year a strike of public-utility employees in Paris was ended after one day, owing chiefly to the government's threat to call the strikers to the colors and order them, as soldiers, to carry on their jobs.

When 1938 opened, France appeared to enjoy relative domestic calm. Chautemps now placed all activities of the war, marine, and air ministries under the supervision of a political leader, called "Minister of National Defense," and a military leader, called "Chief of Staff of National Defense," the first such chief being General Marie Gustave Gamelin. Then Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos emphasized the need to coöperate with the League

[8] The Blum Government had dissolved the Croix de Feu in June 1936, but Colonel de la Rocque then organized the *Parti Social Français,* which claimed a membership of 2,000,000 about the time of the Clichy incident.

[9] Beginning January 1, 1938, all French railroads—whatever their previous status—were brought under the control of the *Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français,* over which the government exercised supervision. It was thus hoped to increase the efficiency of the service and reduce the operating deficits.

and Great Britain, hold fast to the alliances with the Soviet Union and the smaller states of Central and Balkan Europe, and induce Italy to agree to nonintervention in Spain. Though these policies were endorsed by the deputies, the Chautemps Ministry fell in March 1938 when the socialists and communists refused the premier's request for renewed emergency financial powers.

Since the overthrow was caused by the Left, President Lebrun asked Léon Blum to try to form another government. This he did, forming another Popular Front Ministry—without communist participants. The second Blum Cabinet lasted less than a month. The premier resigned when the Senate refused to follow the example of the lower house in voting him emergency financial powers similar to those which Chautemps had demanded one month earlier. Thus, again and again, the French Parliament, unable itself to cope with the country's financial difficulties, refused special powers to the premiers: the Chamber denying them to the Rightists, the Senate, to Leftists. And meanwhile Germany had absorbed Austria, and General Francisco Franco, with German and Italian aid, was extending Fascist influence along the southern borders of France.

Blum was succeeded (April 1938) by Daladier, who had risen above the popular ill will aroused during his premiership in 1934 when the Stavisky and other "affairs" had threatened to bring on revolution. It had not been lost on Daladier that during the debate preceding Blum's fall, the upper house had indicated its readiness to give emergency financial powers to *a* premier, but not to *Blum*. It had also become clear, by this time, that the Senate was veering away from the principle of collective security and becoming reconciled to the idea of bilateral agreements with Hitler and Mussolini, in line with Chamberlain's policy of appeasement. Hence Daladier appointed a cabinet composed of Radical Socialists. There was not a socialist or communist in this "anti-Red" ministry, as it came to be called, and foreign affairs were entrusted to Georges Bonnet, who was lukewarm towards the Soviet alliance. Now the parliament granted its government plenary powers and adjourned.

Thereupon appeared a lively succession of governmental decrees. All taxes were immediately increased. New credits were assigned to measures for national security, and a defense loan was quickly oversubscribed by the public. A minimum was set to which the franc would be allowed to fall, and almost at once there was an appreciable return of capital to France. Easier credit facilities were made available to business and a sizable public-works program was outlined. Over the objection of the General Confederation of Labor, the forty-hour work week was modified and the army

was enlarged. In the face of an approaching foreign crisis; these measures appeared to win popular approval.

In September 1938 the whole national life was caught in the web of events that accompanied the German demand for an immediate solution of the Sudetenland problem. This story of disaster which befell one of France's earliest postwar allies, Czechoslovakia, is dealt with in later pages. Be it said here, however, that the French people, in response to the orders of the government, faced the prospect of war and the actual preparations for an armed conflict with a fatalistic resignation that must have astonished as much as it delighted the authorities. When the crisis had passed, the Chamber overwhelmingly endorsed the conduct of the cabinet, though this represented a virtual repudiation of France's whole postwar diplomacy.

This vote of confidence heralded the breakup of the Popular Front, for the communists alone had voted against Daladier's conduct of diplomatic affairs. The split was widened when, in response to the premier's demand for further plenary powers, the request was granted through the votes of the Right, the Center, and the Radical Socialists. The socialists abstained and the communists voted "no." In November 1938 the Radical Socialist Party specifically dissociated itself from the Popular Front, and the latter ceased to be a moving factor in French politics.

The Radical Socialists' decision to quit the Popular Front reflected the influence of Paul Reynaud who, in a reshuffling of the cabinet, had secured the portfolio of finance. His influence was further evident in a set of decrees issued in November 1938 and based on a report submitted to the president of the republic by Messrs. Daladier and Reynaud. The decrees, affecting labor, finance, and the national economic life in general, were acceptable to the conservatives but were denounced by the trade-unionists and the union of war veterans. The latter objected to the reduction in pension payments. The former feared the doom of the forty-hour-week system. Employers were permitted, for increased production, to extend the work week by a maximum of ten hours and to set overtime pay only slightly higher than that for regular work. On the other hand, the government levied a special tax on the profits made by employers through this overtime labor.

There now broke out a series of strikes during which the police engaged in violent clashes with the workmen. Jouhaux and his assistants in the C. G. T. called for a one-day general strike, whereupon the government mobilized the workers and ordered them, as soldiers, to carry on with

their jobs. This maneuver proved successful, and many men refused to obey the strike call. Although both sides claimed victory, the strike was not "general" and the government did fine or imprison a number of persons who had quit work despite the mobilization order.

Meanwhile a fresh international complication had arisen. In November 1938 a demand was voiced in the Italian Chamber of Deputies for the acquisition of French-controlled Tunisia, Corsica, Savoy, and Nice. Despite their advocacy of appeasement, Daladier and Bonnet seemed as firmly determined as any Frenchman to resist Italy's demands for French areas. The premier took the occasion to make a triumphal tour of France's Mediterranean and North African possessions, being everywhere greeted with demonstrations of loyalty.

Although he endorsed the Chamberlain policy of appeasing the totalitarian regimes, Daladier became convinced, after the absorption of Bohemia and Moravia by Nazi Germany in March 1939, of the need to build up the military strength of France. Almost immediately thereafter Daladier asked parliament to pass a five-line bill granting his cabinet full power for eight months. The legislature quickly complied with his request, and the government proceeded to convert France into a "workshop of national defense."

Decree followed decree, and the premier came to be looked upon as a new "strong man" on the European political stage. The hours of labor were generally increased to fifty per week and might be further raised if, in the opinion of the government, the national welfare so demanded. The press was placed under strict control. The army was further enlarged, and General Gamelin was made commander-in-chief with unusually wide powers. The index of production went up, the national debt increased, prices rose, and unemployment virtually disappeared. The conservative Albert Lebrun, with Daladier's backing, was reëlected president. The life of the parliament was extended to 1942, and thus the regular election which should have taken place in 1940 was eliminated. The French people in general seemed content to have the government take so firm a hold of affairs and put a stop to time-wasting debate. Even Blum endorsed Daladier's position, in principle if not on every point. When war came, in September 1939, France had the outward appearance of a well-functioning economic and military machine.[10]

[10] In September 1939 Daladier dissolved the Communist Party in France after some of its leaders objected to French military action against the recently formed Nazi-Soviet "front."

FRANCE AND THE PAPACY

Interesting among the developments in postwar France was the partial reconciliation of the government with the Catholic Church. In 1901 and 1905 the French Government, controlled by anticlericals, had curtailed the number and activities of the religious orders; had closed monasteries, convents, and some of the church schools; and had nationalized the church property. One of the effects of this policy had been a decrease in the number of French missionaries who, going abroad, might have carried overseas French culture along with Roman Catholicism. Besides, trouble had been caused at home, for some of the faithful Catholics joined the monarchists in agitating against the Third Republic. Indeed, a monarchist-Catholic organization, *L'Action Française,* had been formed to advocate the restoration of monarchy and the reëstablishment of a state-supported Catholic Church.

After the war, in order to advance French interests abroad and end quarrels at home, the French authorities gave evidence of a willingness to resume cordial relations with the papacy. The Vatican proved equally amenable to negotiations, for a *rapprochement* obviously would strengthen the position of the church not only in France but wherever French culture was being implanted. Moreover, *L'Action Française* now had come under the domination of a philosophical skeptic and an advocate of violence in political life, Charles Maurras, many of whose works were placed on the Catholic Index of Forbidden Books. The church did not care to continue an alliance with Maurras.

The steps in the process of reconciliation were gradual. In 1919 Clemenceau nominated an Alsation bishop. In the following year the French Government sent a representative to take part in the ceremonies attending the canonization of Joan of Arc. In 1921, after a lapse of seventeen years, diplomatic relations between France and the Vatican were restored, and soon thereafter France permitted a number of religious orders to return. In 1927 the publications of *L'Action Française* were placed on the Index, and some time later the archbishop of Paris issued an edict virtually excommunicating Catholics who remained affiliated with that monarchist group. The complete restoration by the state of the clerical property previously nationalized also received consideration, especially from the Right groups, but the anticlericals forestalled this final concession. In the critical days of 1939–1940, the church question helped to weaken French resistance to the Nazi invasion.

THE PROBLEM OF ALSACE-LORRAINE

When, after the conclusion of the armistice of 1918, French troops crossed the Vosges Mountains into Alsace-Lorraine, they were greeted with banners, triumphal arches, and kisses. Most of the people appeared happy that the "lost provinces" were freed from German control and reunited with a victorious France.[11] Trouble, however, soon followed. The newly recovered provinces and their motherland quickly found themselves at issue over questions of language, religion, political rights, and economic opportunities.

When France regained the provinces, about one-fourth of the natives habitually spoke French; the remaining three-fourths used German dialects. This situation had existed for centuries: under the rulers of the *ancien régime,* under Napoleon and his successors, and under the German emperors from 1871 to 1918. Yet, after the war, the French, feeling that only French-speaking people could be genuine patriots of the republic, tried to force their language on the provincials by barring German from all schools. The opposition to this attempt at Gallicizing the inhabitants was so great that a compromise had to be reached. Eventually it was agreed that children would have to learn French exclusively only during the first two school years. Thereafter they might receive three hours a week of German instruction, and German might be used in the periods devoted to religious teaching.

Meanwhile the provinces had been flooded with railroad and civic functionaries who spoke only French. This led to a Lorraine railway walkout in 1919, the strikers demanding the removal of all railway officials and foremen who could not speak German. Said one of the strike leaders: "It wasn't worth while to get rid of the Germans if the French come and take all the good jobs." The strikers won their point.

A further quarrel arose out of religious differences. Alsace-Lorraine was inhabited by a staunch Catholic population, and under German rule the region had been permitted to continue the relationship with the papacy that had been established under the Napoleonic Concordat of 1801. The local government had paid the salaries of the clergy, and religious instruction had been given in the schools. The Bloc National acquiesced in this arrangement until 1924, but when the anticlericals came into power

[11] Between 1871 and 1914 several hundred thousand people migrated from Alsace-Lorraine to France, while many Germans came to settle in Alsace-Lorraine. There were further large movements of population in 1918–1919 and 1940.

Premier Herriot decided that since France had scrapped the concordat, Alsace-Lorraine should be required to do likewise. He therefore proposed to disestablish the church and prohibit religious instruction in the classrooms. The Catholic school children thereupon went on strike until another compromise was reached. All children, regardless of faith, were to attend the same "interconfessional" schools for academic instruction, while religious classes were to be held in separate Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish schools. The Catholic Church was not wholly content with this solution and complained that some of the religious education was being delegated to anticlerical teachers. Nevertheless the settlement was adhered to and it appeared to work in a fairly satisfactory manner.

Under German rule the natives had enjoyed local autonomy. They had had a separate parliament since 1911, and Strasbourg had been governed by its own municipal council. This situation was respected for a time by the French, but in 1925 the local parliament and the municipal council were deprived of their powers and the whole administration was centralized in Paris. Thus was created another grievance, for the Alsatians and Lorrainers were unaccustomed to, and much annoyed by, the centralized French system. Even more painful to the natives was the abolition of the designations Alsace and Lorraine and the redivision of the provinces into the three new departments of the Upper Rhine, the Lower Rhine, and the Moselle.

Finally, there were economic grievances. From the material standpoint many of the natives had been better off under German control than they were under the postwar French regime. The coal, iron, textile, and potash industries all had prospered more before 1918 than thereafter. Although this situation gradually changed with the passing of years, the natural trade outlets and business connections of the provinces still were with Germany, and Lorraine iron ore could best be worked with coal from Westphalia. The development of renewed trade relationships between Germany and the transferred region was impeded by the constant bickering between France and Germany.

Annoyed by such a combination of political, economic, religious, and social grievances, the natives often found it difficult to be loyal to France. In 1926 a *Heimatbund* or Home League was formed which, particularly strong in Alsace, demanded local autonomy and priority for German in the schools. In 1927 the French suppressed three German newspapers in Alsace on the ground that they were advocating reunion with Germany. The year 1928 saw fifteen Alsatians tried for conspiracy. An Alsatian butcher tried to assassinate the French state's attorney who prosecuted

the alleged conspirators. As a result of this incident some French parliamentary deputies left the chamber when a member from Alsace, some time later, rose to speak.

The situation became so critical that Poincaré in 1929 delivered a ten-hour speech on Alsace-Lorraine. He reviewed the history of the conflict between France and the provinces and intimated that the autonomist movement was receiving moral and financial support from "east of the Rhine." He admitted that France had made errors but promised better conditions in future. Upon the conclusion of his speech, the Chamber of Deputies overwhelmingly voted its faith in the patriotic attachment of Alsace and Lorraine to France. Despite this official vote of confidence in their fidelity, many Alsace-Lorrainers continued to feel unhappy. While they were at first glad to be reunited with France, they soon became as restive as they had been under the German regime.

LES AFFAIRES SONT LES AFFAIRES

France emerged from the First World War tired, but capable of a quick return to power. Enjoying a balance of industry and agriculture, and with half of her population engaged in farming, France was virtually self-sufficient in food supply. Moreover, there was a relatively even distribution of wealth in the land because the national inheritance laws provided for an equal division of the father's estate among the children. The resulting large number of petty proprietorships furnished a strong undercurrent of popular stability.

French industry made great strides after the war. The United States and British wartime port installations were a permanent asset, as were the river, canal, and railway improvements. The French learned much from United States experts and greatly bettered their methods and machines. Keen foreign competition eventually led even the individualistic French manufacturers to realize the value of combinations, especially in the chemical, textile, and metallurgical trades. Numerous technical schools were established, with a consequent extension of technical and mechanical skill.

The French Government was noted for its intelligent business regulation. The state exercised considerable supervision over big business, and the commercial code required corporations to divert specified portions of their earnings to reserves. The bankruptcy laws "were so severe that they made the bankrupt business man an actual outcast." At times of labor shortage foreign workers, usually from Poland, Italy, Spain, and Belgium, were invited—but nearly always under contracts that required them to

return home when there was no more work for them. In this way unemployment was kept to a minimum. Because of official restrictions and the temperament of the people, there occurred no such overexpansion of industry as in postwar Germany. The French preferred, on the whole, to build their large industries "brick by brick out of earnings" rather than on credit.

The great depression affected France later than most other countries and found her in an enviable economic position. The unemployment figures, though large for France, were small when compared with those in other lands. The Bank of France had a gold reserve second only to that of the United States Federal Reserve System. The sources of this wealth were the hoardings of the people; the income from reparation payments, the tourist traffic, and shipping services; and the export of manufactures, chiefly luxuries. A sizable proportion of the wealth was manipulated to serve political as well as economic ends—to bind to France certain needy allies and to force political concessions from impoverished enemies. Most of the French investments abroad were short-term loans which could be recalled on demand and hence could be used as diplomatic levers.

No discussion of France could be complete without a word on the character of its people. To generalize about the French is difficult. George Meredith once spoke of them as "the most mixed of any European nation." Nevertheless, a few remarks may be risked. The Frenchman, particularly the French peasant and the shopkeeper, was thrifty, prudent, realistic, and individualistic. Economic self-sufficiency was his supreme desideratum. His dream was to have a little property and a little income from investments —not much, perhaps, but enough for comfort. To gain this end he would work unceasingly and deny himself pleasures and even necessities. He was suspicious, jealous, and "astonishingly void of sentiments when his interests were at stake." And "when at last he considered himself independent, with enough for his own wants, he ignored with beaming self-satisfaction everything that did not appertain to his own community, almost to his own person." The Frenchman's character was a fundamental reason for the power of his country—and for its weakness. It remained for the exigencies of the Second World War to lay bare this weakness.

CHAPTER 7

Fascist Italy

VICTORY—AND UNHAPPINESS

Italy was the only major power among the victors to experience a complete change in system of government soon after the First World War. This change, hastened by Italian disappointments at the peace conference, had its inception in the war years. There was considerable disagreement among Italians in 1914 as to what course Italy should pursue in the struggle. The government issued a declaration of neutrality. The socialists, with nearly eighty deputies in parliament, endorsed this stand since they regarded the war as a capitalist enterprise. But there were many who, for material or emotional reasons, favored intervention. These groups eventually brought about Italy's entry into the war in return for the offer of certain territories.

The Italians found the war more exacting than they had anticipated. About 700,000 soldiers were killed and 1,000,000 wounded. The net direct cost of the war to Italy was more than $12,000,000,000, while property damage amounted to an additional $3,000,000,000. Moreover, a disastrous rout at Caporetto in 1917 made the final victory of 1918 all the more emotionally exciting. In the circumstances, Victor Emmanuel's subjects were sorely disappointed not to achieve their desires in Dalmatia, Albania, the Near East, and Africa.

Reference has been made to the problems encountered by the peace conference in dealing with Fiume on the east coast of the Adriatic. In order to encourage the Southslavs to break away from Austria in 1918, Italy had made some general concessions to their ambitions in the Adriatic.

But when it appeared, after the war, that one of the Slavic ambitions was the acquisition of Fiume, the Italians were enraged. Fiume came to have an emotional importance out of all proportion to its economic or strategic value. Histrionic effects were added when the poet, Gabriele d'Annunzio, led a band of black-shirted veterans to Fiume in a chartered boat and took the city by force—over the objections of the peace conference and the inhabitants. Giovanni Giolitti, who had become premier in 1920, deprecated such artificial nationalist stimulations and negotiated with Yugoslavia the Treaty of Rapallo (1920), whereby the independence of the free state of Fiume was recognized "in perpetuity." Soon thereafter Italian troops drove d'Annunzio's legionaries from their stronghold.[1]

During the war, Austrians, Serbs, and Italians had fought on Albanian soil. Italian troops continued to occupy the land for several months after the armistice. During this occupation the Italian delegates to the peace conference attempted to acquire Albania as an Italian mandate. By way of alternative, they were ready to partition Albania among Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia. The Albanians, however, desired independence. Encouraged by Wilson's friendly attitude, they resorted to guerrilla warfare to drive out the foreigners. By the summer of 1920 Giolitti, preoccupied with domestic problems, withdrew the Italian troops from all Albania save the island of Saseno. Italian nationalists bewailed this additional "inglorious page" in their country's history.

In the Near East, much of the territorial bait that had been held out to Italy either went to Greece or was retained by Turkey. The Italians received only some minor commercial concessions. In Africa, where Great Britain, France, and Belgium acquired the former German colonies, Italy got only small extensions to Libya and Somaliland. Despite the acquisition in Europe of 8900 square miles of land and 1,600,000 people, therefore, the Italians accused their allies of "faithlessness." They were angry that "Italian achievements were being discounted and Italian imperialism denounced."

The nationalists flung uncomplimentary epithets at most of the diplomats at Paris. Then they turned against their own ministries, accusing them of weakly consenting to the "mistreatment" of Italy. They blamed their older statesmen for the debacle whereby "the war had been won and the peace lost." Fiery young patriots referred to the "old men" as "parasites

[1] Neither the Italians nor the Slavs were satisfied with the arrangement. Eventually, by the Treaty of Rome (1924), Italy received the city of Fiume, while Yugoslavia received Port Baros and a fifty-year lease of part of the Fiume harbor.

on the better blood of the nation" and vowed that they would re-create Italy in such fashion that the world would be "forced to sit up and take notice."

Meanwhile the government faced a disheartening domestic situation. Millions of men had to be demobilized. It was impossible to find employment for all returned veterans because industry was demoralized, jobs had been filled by those who had remained at home, foreign markets were temporarily lost or closed, and tourist traffic was almost at a standstill. Even the "safety valve" of emigration was shut, owing to lack of funds at home and the restrictive legislation of foreign countries. The price of food rose quickly, and there was the usual popular hatred of the war profiteers. Budgetary deficits and inflation added to the general woes. To climax the particular troubles of the former soldiers, military tribunals were set up to try as traitors those who had led the retreat at Caporetto.

In the elections of 1919 the socialists captured 156 parliamentary seats. These deputies consistently voted against government measures, thereby creating a parliamentary stalemate. The popular manifestations of discontent soon took the form of strikes and riots. These were idly watched by the impotent authorities who feared to call upon the army lest the soldiers fraternize with the people. Socialism spread rapidly, owing in part to fantastic rumors regarding the marvelous changes wrought by proletarian rule in Russia and in part to the government's inaction. Shouts of "Down with the King!" and "Long live Lenin!" were frequently heard.

"Direct-action" schemes won increasing favor, and many communes were seized by socialists. Peasant tenants refused to pay rent, large estates were broken up, former service men appropriated plots of ground, and numerous outrages, often economically unwise, were perpetrated. In some cities, when the employers announced their inability to continue in business unless wages were lowered and hours lengthened, the workmen themselves took over the factories. In 1919 and 1920 a total of 35,000,000 workdays was lost, and there was talk of the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat. Even the formation in 1919, by the Sicilian priest, Dom Luigi Sturzo, of a moderate Catholic People's Party failed to stem the "Red tide."

But the period of factory and land "occupation" did not last. The workers found it difficult to carry on without raw materials, without sufficient food, and without managerial experience. The peasants were illiterate and fundamentally conservative. The socialists split into factions. The novelty of doing things as the Russians were supposed to be doing them wore off. A feeling arose that a proletarian state might be no more able to

cope with Italy's problems than was the existing weak regime. If neither the parliamentary system nor a possible proletarian state could help Italy, then, wondered many, who should be entrusted with the government?

It so happened that the strife of the war and postwar years had created bonds of sympathy among several important groups. Many landlords and property-holders were much affected by the incidents of the reign of radicalism. They were determined that Italy should have a government strong enough to protect private property. Many university people and professionals were disgusted with the whole trend of events since 1914. They wanted to see a general governmental house-cleaning and the emergence of a strong and patriotic administration. The nationalists and ex-soldiers were angered by the thought that the net result of their participation in the war might be an anarchic Italy. They, too, wanted to see new men at the helm. At this critical moment Benito Mussolini came forward to seize control.

MUSSOLINI: FROM PRIVATE TO PREMIER

Benito Mussolini was born in Romagna in 1883. His father was a blacksmith, with socialistic leanings. His mother was a schoolteacher. Upon his mother's advice, Mussolini eventually became a teacher. Dissatisfied with his lot and by nature rebellious, he soon quit his position and went to Switzerland. There he eventually obtained work on a socialist newspaper, but his activities in organizing labor and fomenting strikes led the Swiss Government to demand his departure. Returning to Italy for a time, Mussolini took up journalism, and then went to Austria. Once more his radical activities made it necessary for him to leave.

He came back to Italy, where he was kept under surveillance as a revolutionary. In 1911 he was arrested for agitating against the departure of troops for Tripolitania. In 1912, after some able speechmaking at a socialist congress, he became editor of *Avanti,* the official paper of the Italian Socialist Party. When the war broke out he favored Italian neutrality, but nationalism, and perhaps bribery, soon triumphed over socialism and he began to urge intervention. For this he was made to resign from *Avanti* and was expelled from the party. Thereupon he founded an interventionist paper in Milan, *Il Popolo d'Italia.*

When his class was called to the colors in 1915, Mussolini entered the army as a private. He served on the Isonzo front and rose to be corporal. In 1917 he was wounded by the explosion of a trench mortar. Upon his recovery he was exempted from further military service so that he might

return to the editorship of *Il Popolo d'Italia* and use its columns to combat the growing spirit of defeatism. Mussolini now displayed a dominating, magnetic personality. Though his voice was hard, he was an effective orator, adept in the use of short, crisp sentences. He had flashing black eyes, possessed determination and imagination, and made the most of a supposed resemblance to Napoleon. He worked hard and paid much attention to matters of detail.

In 1919 Mussolini called a meeting of ex-servicemen and others who were interested in solving Italy's problems and defending her war record against the calumnies of a lot of "penitent Magdalenes." The meeting was attended by a colorful group of agitators, many of whom earlier had been affiliated with societies known as *fasci d'azione*. These fasci had been organized as early as October 1914 by young "men of action" eager to have Italy join the Allies in the war. Within a few months more than 100 fasci had been founded, and vigorous methods of propaganda had been employed to win the country to the interventionist viewpoint. Mussolini had led the Milan fascio, and his *Il Popolo d'Italia* had become the Fascist literary organ. Now, under Mussolini's guidance, these former interventionists reorganized themselves into *fasci di combattimento*.

The gathering adopted a program which demanded proportional representation, an eight-hour day, a heavy capital levy and inheritance tax, confiscation of some church properties, abolition of the Senate, the calling of a national assembly to decide upon a new form of government, nationalization of the munitions plants, the creation of economic councils with legislative power, management of certain industries (such as railroads) by the workers, and annexation of Fiume and Dalmatia. The program was calculated to appeal especially to the returned soldiers, the "proletariat of the trenches." Said Mussolini: "It is we who have the right to succeed this government, for it was we who pushed the country into the war and led it to victory."

Despite the confidence of its leader, the cause of fascism progressed slowly. In the elections of 1919 the two Fascist candidates for office in Milan, one of them Mussolini himself, polled fewer than 5000 votes. During the period of the communist factory occupation, the Fascist movement was dormant. With the end of the occupation, however, it took on a new life. Recruits came from property-holders, younger sons of businessmen, unemployed ex-soldiers, unoccupied ex-officers, and discontented professionals and students. The wealthier sympathizers made monetary contributions. Filled with hatred for socialists and communists, the Fascists embarked upon a campaign of terrorization known as "squadrism." Castor

oil, clubs, and guns were used to convert or dispatch the radicals. Scores of "battles" were fought between the rivals from the summer of 1920 to that of 1921. The government watched the civil war with resignation, because it was too weak to intervene or because it hoped to see communism destroyed.

Eventually the Fascists emerged triumphant. The Reds were divided among themselves, while the Fascists had come under the domination of Mussolini's Milan group. The Fascists also conducted a vigorous propaganda campaign, using pamphlets, papers, books, and speeches in an attempt to convince patriots that they alone had saved the country from the horrors of Russian bolshevism and that they alone could restore to Italy security, prosperity, and international respect. In 1921 the Fascists, now with 35 deputies in parliament, constituted themselves the National Fascist Party. By this time their program was much less radical than in 1919. During the fight against socialism the Fascists had given up their faith in the proletariat.

Following the lead of other patriotic organizations, the Fascists donned distinctive uniforms and adopted a ritual. Apparently because many of d'Annunzio's black-shirted followers had joined the Fascists, the latter adopted the black shirt. They patterned their ceremonial after old Roman customs and chose the Roman salute. The *fasces* or bundle of rods enclosing a battle-ax, symbolizing strength and power, became the emblem of fascism. A Turin student song, *Giovinezza* ("Youth"), popularized during the war, became the Fascist anthem.

Meanwhile the government was so unstable that there was talk of forming a coalition ministry and of inviting Mussolini to accept a portfolio. But Mussolini refused, saying, according to report: "Fascism will not come into the government by the service entrance." Then, during the spring and summer of 1922, he several times hinted that the Fascists might overthrow parliament and substitute a strong nationalistic regime. In September 1922 he first raised the cry: "On to Rome!"; but he hastened to reaffirm his faith in the monarchical form of government, professing merely a desire to see the monarchy strengthened.

Not long thereafter Mussolini presented the Chamber of Deputies with a set of demands. He warned parliament that failure to comply might lead to the use of force. The demands were for a dissolution of the lower house, electoral changes, new elections, financial reform, a strong foreign policy, and five cabinet posts for Fascists. Although the recently organized Fascist Militia was gradually taking over control of the larger cities in the north, the deputies seemingly regarded the ultimatum as a joke. At a National

Fascist Congress held at Naples in October 1922, Mussolini invoked force. Following a threatening speech he entrained for Milan, while thousands of armed Fascist militiamen began to concentrate on Rome.

Although it appears that the army could have been counted upon to meet this danger, King Victor Emmanuel III refused to sanction martial law. Instead, when the weak Premier Luigi Facta resigned, the king telephoned Mussolini, asking him to form a cabinet. Mussolini at once left Milan for Rome, and on October 30 a new cabinet took office. Only four of the fifteen portfolios were placed in Fascist hands, but no socialists were appointed. The moderate composition of the government was owing to Mussolini's desire to follow a policy of compromise until he could be certain that popular opinion would support him in more venturesome steps.

MAKING ITALY FASCIST

The parliamentary opponents of fascism hesitated to express an immediate lack of confidence in Mussolini. They hoped that his inexperience would lead him into some tactical blunder that might serve as an excuse for his ousting. But Mussolini was wary. He secured a grant of virtually dictatorial powers until the end of 1923. Then he assured himself of the loyalty of the administrative branch of the government by the appointment of Fascist prefects to govern the provinces. Control of the legislature was next assured by the Acerbo Election Law in 1923. In order to get parliament's consent to this law, Mussolini reminded the legislators that "the revolution has its rights" and that he was ready to use force.

The law stipulated that whichever party obtained the largest number of votes in a national election was entitled to two-thirds of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The remaining seats were to be divided among the other parties in proportion to votes registered. Under this scheme the party that polled a plurality was sure of absolute control of the house, and there could be no single strong opposition group. In the first elections held under the new system (April 1924), the Fascists gained a majority of the votes. The Fascists therefore were given two-thirds of the seats in the new Chamber.

The chief opposition group was the Socialist Party, led by a young deputy named Giacomo Matteotti. In an anonymously published book and in speeches he enumerated Fascist outrages and threatened to expose as bribetakers certain members of Mussolini's new cabinet. Before he had a chance to present his evidence, Matteotti disappeared. His body was found in a wood some weeks later. This murder (June 1924) aroused a

storm of indignation, especially since it was only the most notorious of a number of excesses.

Since it appeared that Matteotti's charges had been well founded, Mussolini decided to bluff his way through the crisis and assumed full responsibility for the actions of his followers. As a sign of protest, most of the non-Fascist deputies withdrew from parliament, vowing not to return to their seats so long as fascism remained in power. Actually the secessionists made it easy for Mussolini by leaving him in absolute control of parliament; in 1926 he deprived them of their seats. Meanwhile Mussolini had dismissed from office nearly everyone who had been connected with the Matteotti incident. In addition, he had pledged law and order, appointed a commission for constitutional reform, and reorganized the militia. But not until almost two years later were the murder suspects brought to trial. They were defended by the secretary-general of the Fascist Party, Roberto Farinacci. Some of the accused were acquitted, and the others given short jail terms.[2] Thereafter Mussolini took a stand against the "squadrists" who still terrorized country districts. In 1927 he ordered the police to crush their illegal tactics.

Having weathered the crisis of 1924, Mussolini proceeded to make himself supreme in Italy. In 1925 and 1926 municipalities, towns, and cities were deprived of their local political rights and placed under the control of appointed *podestàs*. Rome was placed under a governor, and Naples and Milan were made subject to commissioners selected by the national government. Parliament was deprived of the right to initiate legislation. The premier became solely responsible to the king, and was empowered to issue decrees with the force of law. The press was censored, and opposition papers were bought up or suppressed. Nothing could be printed without the approval of the proper Fascist authority. Mussolini became commander of all armed forces, and new members of the Fascist Party had to swear "to follow without question the orders of Il Duce." Secret societies, including the Masons, were abolished. Membership in the Socialist Party at first was made punishable with deportation, and then, in 1926, all opposition parties were abolished. The Fascist Party remained as the only legal political organization.

The membership of the Fascist Party in 1939 was about 2,000,000. At the apex of the hierarchical party organization was the Fascist Grand Council, headed by Mussolini as Il Duce, "the Leader." The council included most of the high party and government officials. By virtue of his

[2] In 1947 three surviving murderers of Matteotti were retried and sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment.

power to add to its membership at any time, Mussolini dominated the council, thus carrying out his maxim: "A hierarchy must culminate in a pin point." By law, the Grand Council of the Fascist Party was recognized as the "supreme organ, coördinating all the activities of the regime." Its chief functions were to draft new legislation, name the successors of both king and premier, and deliberate on international treaties involving changes in Italian territory. The members of the council occupied ministerial posts, and at one time Mussolini himself held eight portfolios simultaneously.

The party base consisted of about 10,000 local fasci which in each province were federated and controlled by provincial councils. The provincial secretaries appointed the secretaries of the local fasci. The organization exemplified well the theory of government stated in the constitution of the party: "The ordinances and hierarchies without which there can be no discipline of energies nor education of the people must be illuminated and guided from on top where there is a comprehensive view of powers, duties, functions, and merits."

Since the Fascist Grand Council, for all practical purposes, became the government of Italy, the roles of the Senate and Chamber rapidly diminished in importance. Until the end of 1934 the consent of both houses was still needed for legislation, but Mussolini adopted the practice of taking action and then having it legalized by the "disciplined" parliament. Occasionally resistance was encountered in the Senate, whose membership consisted of the princes of the royal house and a group of men appointed for life by the king. But Mussolini might at any time request the king to make enough new appointments to outvote an opposition. As a consequence, the Senate in 1939 had about 500 members, of whom all but a few were Fascists. The Chamber, as we shall see, voted itself out of existence in 1938. While these changes went on, Italy was "purified." Anti-Fascist lawyers were disbarred, prominent opponents of the regime were imprisoned or exiled, the property of Italian emigrants who said anything adverse to fascism in foreign countries was confiscated, and the universities were staffed with Fascist professors.

A new penal code was completed in 1931. The death penalty, which had been abolished in 1888, was restored for those who attacked "the life or liberty of King, Queen, Crown Prince, or Prime Minister." Parents were forbidden to name their children after "socialists or other rebellious people." Divorce was restricted, the holding of masked balls prohibited, swearing made punishable with arrest, cabarets made to close at midnight, and the advocacy of birth control made a criminal offense. Emigration was cur-

tailed. A secret police force was organized and made directly responsible to Mussolini.

Believing that the country's future lay with its young people, Mussolini decreed that Italian youth be trained and disciplined. For this purpose there were organized several uniformed societies which gave their members, numbering 5,000,000 in 1939, military training and a thorough grounding in Fascist aims and achievements. A decree of 1934 subjected all males between the ages of 8 and 33 to a definite schedule of military training, which thus became "an integral part of the national education." There was less emphasis upon the organization of women into Fascist groups, for Mussolini believed that women should remain attached to the household and, at most, engage in social-welfare work.

A strong foothold had been gained among Italian workers before 1914 by a doctrine known as "syndicalism," which advocated government by economic groups. During the war many of the syndicalists, led by Edmondo Rossoni, became imbued with nationalism and fought loyally to down the enemy. In 1919 these nationalistic syndicalists united with the nationalistic Fascists in the struggle against communism. After the victorious outcome of this conflict, Rossoni began organizing Fascist syndicates as a counter-balance to the socialist trade-union movement. He also hoped to reform the governmental system so that representation would be based upon organized economic interests rather than upon geographic-political units. The Fascist syndicalists accepted "the capitalist class as socially productive," preferred "class collaboration" to class warfare, and were ready to accord producers' organizations a place in the governmental machine. By 1925 the Italian Industrial Employers' Federation recognized the Fascist syndicates as labor's sole spokesmen. In 1926 the federated Fascist syndicates had a membership of 2,400,000. Mussolini therefore determined to control them.

By a law of 1926, thirteen confederated Fascist syndicates, six of employers, six of employees, and one of intellectuals, were given legal status.[3] The syndicates acquired the sole right to formulate collective contracts and were empowered to tax all persons engaged in their industry regardless of whether or not the taxpayer was a member of the association. The syndicates were forbidden to affiliate with any international organization and became subject to the direct control of a ministry of corporations. (Mussolini was the first minister of corporations.) The same law prohibited strikes

[3] One each for the employers and employees in industry, agriculture, commerce, maritime and aerial transportation, land transportation and inland navigation, and banking, and one of intellectuals, including professionals and artists.

and lockouts, and established sixteen labor courts from which there could be no appeal. Only persons politically acceptable to the Fascist authorities might become members of syndicates, but their decisions were binding upon all workmen and employers in the industry. Members were entitled to preference in employment over nonmembers.

In 1930 Mussolini inaugurated a National Council of Corporations composed of representatives from the thirteen syndicates, from the government, and from such extrasyndical but coöperating institution as *Dopolavoro*.[4] The council was ordered to supervise the official employment bureaus, promote production, and settle intersyndical disputes. For better administration, the council was divided into seven sections, corresponding to the seven main syndicate divisions. In 1931 the seven sections of the council were transformed into "corporations" with tasks identical to those hitherto fulfilled by the sections. Thus the employers and employees in each of the seven chief branches of production were brought together into an organization which was at the same time an administrative agency of the state, controlled by the minister of corporations. The latter nominated and removed the corporation presidents.

It had been hoped that the establishment of national syndicates under governmental supervision would lead to an improvement in conditions of labor. Progress, however, was slow. Rossoni therefore prevailed upon Mussolini in 1927 to promulgate a "Charter of Labor." "The Italian nation," declared the document, "is an organism having aims, life, and means of action superior to those of the single or grouped individuals who compose it." The charter dealt mainly with guarantees to the workers. Night work must receive higher pay than day work. Sunday was made a legal holiday, and an annual paid vacation for every workman was stipulated. Workers dismissed through no fault of their own must receive a discharge compensation. Labor contracts could not be broken because of military service, brief illnesses, or any change in the ownership of an enterprise. "Education and instruction, especially vocational instruction," were made "one of the principal duties of the syndicates." The state promised, and later enacted, a broad social-insurance program.

In 1928 a law was passed which made Italy the first Western state to have a national legislature representing economic divisions. The membership of the Chamber of Deputies was set at 400. These deputies were to be

[4] Dopolavoro ("After Work") was established in 1925 as an association to provide workers and their families with physical and cultural recreational facilities. The society promoted hygiene, education, and art, and its membership card entitled holders to reductions in fares and admission fees to theaters, museums, and exhibitions. In 1939 the society had 3,160,000 members.

elected by the entire kingdom, acting as a single electoral constituency. Candidates to the number of 800 were to be nominated by the executive councils of the 13 syndicates. Each syndicate was given the right to nominate a definite number of candidates, and in each field of production the employers and employees were to select the same number of nominees. Thus the agricultural employers' and the agricultural employees' confederations were each to nominate 96 men. Two hundred additional candidates were to be nominated by a group of cultural and charitable institutions. From the list of 1000 candidates the Fascist Grand Council would select 400.

The council might add names or even reject the entire list and substitute a new one. When the council had decided upon a satisfactory "four hundred," the approved list was to be made public. On election day the voters would receive a ballot containing the single question: "Do you approve of the list of deputies designated by the Fascist Grand Council?" The answer had to be either "yes" or "no" for the entire list. No individual names might be rejected. If the majority of votes cast were "yes," the 400 were to take their seats. If the majority were ever "no," new elections under a complicated system were ordained.

Universal suffrage was abolished by this electoral law. The franchise was restricted to those who paid a syndicate rate, paid a certain minimum of direct taxes, received pensions or salaries from the state or public institutions, or belonged to the clergy of a recognized cult. Women were excluded from the national franchise, while men, to vote, had to be twenty-one, or eighteen if they were married and had children. The male electorate thus was reduced by approximately 3,000,000. The employers, though less numerous than the workers, received equal representation with the latter. The procedure was undemocratic, but the Fascists were proud of this very fact. They considered democracy to have been "a good method of government for the nineteenth century" but inadequate for the twentieth.

Early in 1929 the executive councils of the syndicates and other institutions met to nominate their candidates for the first elections under the new law. Mussolini's name came first on nearly every list. The Fascist Grand Council then scanned the list of 1000 and selected 400 men of suitable qualifications and "reliable Fascist faith." The list was published, and the voters were permtited to accept or reject the entire list. Approximately 90 per cent of the qualified voters went to the polls, and the official list was endorsed by a proportion of 62 to 1. The second election under the law was held in 1934. This time the government's list of "deputies-designate" was accepted by an even greater majority.

In 1934 the Italian Government created 22 new corporations, each of which represented the state, capital, and labor. They fell into the three main divisions of agriculture, industry, and services. Each corporation included all the interests concerned with its particular branch of national economy—"from the farmer who grew the raw material or the miner who dug it . . . to the salesman who placed the finished product in the hands of the public." Three functions were assigned to the corporations: to advise the government, to settle labor disputes, and to regulate production, distribution, and prices. Under this system, said Mussolini, private initiative was transferred from the individual to the corporate sphere.

After several years of study, the Fascist Grand Council in 1938 decreed the organization of a new legislative body to take the place of the Chamber of Deputies. Called "the Chamber of Fasces and Corporations," this house was to be composed of about 700 "national councillors" representing the state, the Fascist Party, and the 22 corporations; all members were to be appointed by the "Head of the Government" (Mussolini). This arrangement was promptly accepted by the "Suicide Chamber," elected in 1934; it dutifully voted itself out of existence. The first meeting of the Chamber of Fasces and Corporations was opened by the king in March 1939. Thus were national elections abolished in Italy.

FASCIST DOMESTIC POLICIES

Financial conditions improved during the first eight years (1922–1930) of the Fascist regime. The budget was balanced by 1926, after which the treasury generally held a surplus until the great depression. The smaller foreign war debts soon were paid off, and the debts to the United States and Great Britain were funded. In 1927 the lira, five to the dollar before the war, was stabilized at nineteen to the dollar. After 1930, however, the government found it necessary to reduce salaries, decrease the number of official positions, restrict foreign-exchange transactions, and float large loans. The number of unemployed fluctuated between 400,000 and 1,300,000, and every available method was mobilized to combat the crisis. In some localities the stress was lessened by the forcing down of rents and food prices. Large producers were required to regulate output, sales, and prices, and restrictions were placed on the lowering of wages.

Beginning in 1932 the outlines of a planned economy became evident. A board was established, without whose consent no new factories could be opened and no old ones expanded. An institute was founded to advance long-term loans to deserving enterprises. New public works were launched,

and steps were taken to shorten hours of work, extend the system of labor rotation or shifts, abolish overtime work, and fix wages and prices. Efforts were made to reduce the country's dependence upon foreign imports of wheat, cotton, and tobacco by producing more of these staples at home or in the African colonies. This would not only be an aid to self-sufficiency but would help lower the foreign-trade deficit. Most spectacular was the "Battle of Wheat."

To increase wheat production, national wheat-raising contests were inaugurated, the prizes being contributed by the government. The authorities also encouraged the formation of agricultural coöperatives. An agricultural-credit bank was established, and educational facilities were provided to teach modern methods to the peasants. Traveling "movies," which showed how farm output might be increased, were sent to rural districts. Simultaneously there was a campaign to reduce the importance of spaghetti and macaroni as factors in Italian diet, since the large-scale manufacture of these products required huge quantities of wheat. Late in 1933 the further importation of wheat was restricted through heavy customs duties. By this time, however, the slogan had been changed to "Battle of Agriculture," and energies were concentrated upon increasing the yield of rice, oats, and corn.

Energetic measures were taken to increase Italy's share of world shipping and the tourist traffic. Steamship companies received subsidies, and efforts were made to develop lines to Balkan ports, the Soviet Union, Turkey, Egypt, and India. In 1931 the three leading shipping firms were merged. For a time Italian shipyards were busy building war vessels for the Soviet Union, Turkey, Greece, and several South American states.

The radio industry was encouraged and high-tariff acts were passed. A law of 1930 doubled the duties on automobiles, thereby causing worry to United States automobile manufacturers and giving the Italian Fiat Automobile Company a virtual monopoly of the Italian market. Henry Ford, however, established a branch factory at Milan. Trade pacts were signed with many countries, including the Soviet Union. In 1929 Italy led Europe in completed hydroelectric-power developments and in the rayon and silk industries. These last, however, were greatly affected by the depression. A survey of natural resources led to the discovery of new mineral wealth. Reclamation projects, especially in the Campagna and Pontine Marshes, were set under way, and much money and effort were expended upon reforestation schemes. The railway service was improved. Air lines were subsidized and efforts made to spread "air-mindedness" among the

people. Despite these material advances, Italy remained dependent upon foreign capital and foreign coal, iron, oil, and phosphates.

These deficiencies became especially apparent during Italy's venture in Ethiopia in 1935–1936. Although the limited League sanctions against Italy (see p. 176) failed to prevent her successful completion of the war, they did place a severe strain upon her economic structure. The League "siege," as Mussolini called it, marked "the beginning of a new phase in Italian history," one during which the government tried to secure "in the shortest possible time, the maximum degree of economic independence."

Renewed energy was therefore put into the development of substitute products and the fullest exploitation of such resources as Italy did possess in some quantity. To relieve the shortage in foreign exchange, the government required its subjects to surrender all their foreign holdings in return for Italian treasury bills. Restrictions were placed on the amount of money that Italian tourists might spend abroad, foreign tourists were offered transportation and accommodation concessions, and the lira was devalued. Patriotic citizens gave up wedding rings for iron bands, but the gold coverage for bank notes continued to fall and financial deficits were hidden in "extraordinary" budgets. In 1935 all foreign trade became "a function of the state," and steps were taken to deprive the war industries of their "private character." A law of 1936 converted private commercial banks into state institutions. In 1937 shipbuilding became a government enterprise. In the same year there was a 10 per cent levy on the capital of stock companies. The rapid rise in prices and a drop in the standard of living led to decreed wage increases and a two-year prohibition on increased bread prices, rents, and transportation costs.

Among the leading obstacles facing the Fascists was the illiteracy of the people. In 1911 almost 40 per cent of the Italians were illiterate, the proportion being much higher in the south than in the north. The Fascists attacked the problem by voting increasingly large educational budgets and by enforcing more strictly the laws for compulsory school attendance up to the age of fourteen. In order that the children might be reared "in a healthful spirit of Fascism," all textbooks were reëxamined and those not meeting Fascist standards were tabooed. Gradually a series of new Fascist texts was written. Since the schools provided one of the best fields for propaganda, every teacher had to swear to uphold the existing government and refrain from anti-Fascist activity. Several attempts were made to stimulate a new Fascist art in Italy, since Mussolini once said: "Without art there is no civilization." Progress in this direction was not striking.

Two new cultural factors in Italian life under fascism were national discipline and anti-Semitism. Mussolini provided the theme for the first with his slogan: "Believe! Obey! Fight!" And the philosopher Giovanni Gentile wrote: "Fascism means to take life seriously. Life is toil, effort, sacrifice, hard work; a life in which we know very well that there is neither matter nor time for amusement. . . . Even in our sleep we must give account of the talents entrusted to us." Then, in 1938, a group of Italian university professors published a report, apparently phrased largely by Mussolini, that outlined the "scientific bases" for an "Aryan" racial policy. The report contained ten propositions which became the platform for an Italian anti-Semitic campaign, although Italy had only 70,000 Jews.

The propositions held that "a pure Italian race now exists" whose racial conception must be "essentially Italian and Aryan Nordic in trend." Jews, it was declared, do not belong to the Italian race; henceforth the "physical and psychological characteristics of Italians must not be altered in any way." Decrees followed in rapid order, barring Jews from Italian schools, ordering all Jews (even citizens) who had entered Italy since the First World War to leave within six months, expelling Jews from the Fascist Party, prohibiting new trade licenses to Jewish businessmen, forbidding marriages between Italian "Aryans" and Jews or between Italian officials and *any* foreigners, and making it necessary for any Italian to get official permission before marrying even an "Aryan" foreigner. Pope Pius XI vigorously opposed this "racism," but his protests had little effect on the Rome Government.

ALTO-ADIGE, THE FORMER SOUTH TIROL

For strategic reasons the Paris Peace Conference assigned to Italy not only that part (Trentino) of the South Tirol which was inhabited by Italians, but the portion which was inhabited by a quarter-million German-speaking Austrians. At the time of transfer, one of Italy's delegates to the conference made a speech in the Italian Chamber of Deputies in which he assured the new subjects that "their language and cultural institutions would be respected." When the Fascists came into power, this promise was disregarded. Said Mussolini: "We shall make them Italians."

The process of Italianization was vigorous. The area was placed under a prefect appointed from Rome. Italian was made the official language of the courts and of all public services including railways, banks, and water, gas, and electric works. Only Italian-speaking citizens might serve on juries, and all decrees were published in Italian exclusively, even at a time when

there still were many natives who neither read nor understood Italian. Most of the former officials were replaced by non-German-speaking Italians. All inscriptions, signs, placards, catalogues, timetables, menus, and so forth had to be in Italian. Wherever villages, towns, rivers, mountains, or valleys had German names, these were Italianized. All maps, guidebooks, picture postcards, and advertisements were required to bear the new Italian designations. The old German names might not even appear in parentheses after the new ones.

The name "Tirol" was abolished, and the area was renamed Alto-Adige. The use of the words "Tirol" or "Tirolese" was made subject to severe penalties. All German newspapers were suppressed, except for one that was edited as a Fascist propaganda sheet. The local alpine clubs were abolished, and their property was handed over to the single *Club Alpino Italiano.* The statues of such Tirolese idols as Walther von der Vogelweide and Andreas Hofer were torn down. German schools were closed. Early in 1928 German was forbidden even during the periods in religious instruction, but later in the year this prohibition was rescinded. The singing of songs in German and the giving of private instruction in German were forbidden. Although any Italian citizen throughout the remainder of the kingdom might learn German, the inhabitants of the German-speaking South Tirol were deprived of this right.

Most objectionable to the Tirolese was a decree of 1926 which ordered the "re-Italianization" of all family names that, in the opinion of the authorities, "had been translated into other languages or defaced by a foreign orthography or the addition of foreign terminations." Likewise, "names of topical origin, derived from places whose names have been translated into other languages, or disguised by a foreign orthography, will resume their Italian forms." All citizens must watch the *Official Gazette* to see what their names were henceforth to be. Adherence to German forms of officially Italianized names was made punishable by heavy fines.

Such measures led to repeated protests from Austria and Germany. Mussolini eventually became aroused over these "interferences" and in 1928 declared: "The next time I shall make acts do the speaking. . . . A self-respecting state does not tolerate such interference." He scoffed at the suggestion that the matter be referred to the League of Nations for settlement. Austria was worried by the tenor of Mussolini's speech and in 1930 signed a treaty of conciliation and arbitration. Thereafter Austria refrained from officially championing the cause of the Tirolese. Germany, moreover, even after Hitler came to power, offered little in the way of concrete help to the "racial comrades" under Italian control. Instead, Hitler and Musso-

lini reached an agreement in 1939 whereby the Tirolese were given the choice of migrating to the Reich or remaining and becoming loyal Italians. Thousands thereupon left the land of their ancestors and settled in one or another of the regions which the Nazis were rapidly depopulating in pursuit of their wartime economic and social policies.

RELATIONS WITH THE PAPACY

In 1870 Napoleon III of France ordered the withdrawal from Rome, the pope's sole remaining temporal domain, of the French troops that had been stationed there to protect the Holy See against Italian territorial encroachments. When the French were gone, an Italian army marched on the Eternal City. Pius IX made a show of resistance, but soon ordered the gates thrown open to the attackers. Thus Rome became the capital of Italy, and thus was created the "Roman Question" which for fifty-nine years disturbed Italian national life.

The pope considered himself a victim of unjust force and denounced the government. In order to appease His Holiness, the Italian Parliament passed the Law of Papal Guarantees (1871). This act guaranteed to the papacy perpetual possession of St. Peter's, the Vatican and Lateran palaces, and the Villa Castel Gandolfo. The pope was granted sovereign rights within these possessions, was recognized as personally inviolable and as having the right to send and receive ambassadors, was accorded free use of the Italian railway, telegraph, and postal systems, and was promised an annual pension of $645,000.

Pope Pius IX ignored this statute. He would not recognize any unilateral arrangement devised by the Italian Government for, if the *modus vivendi* between church and state were merely a law, passed by a parliament, it might at any time be abrogated by a succeeding parliament. Moreover, if the status of the pope could be fixed by Italian law, he would become an Italian subject and would be deprived of the prestige accruing from his traditional position as the nonnational head of an international religion. The pope therefore retired to the Vatican, called himself "the prisoner of a usurping power," refused to recognize the Savoy dynasty, and directed Italian Catholics to abstain from participation in the political life of the kingdom. The successors of Pius IX contined this policy, with the result that Italians who aspired to be both loyal Catholics and patriotic citizens were confronted with a serious "conflict of conscience." The controversy deprived the monarchy of the services of many able Catholics and simultaneously curtailed the influence of Catholicism in the shaping of governmental policies.

As time went on, the crisis became somewhat less acute. Intelligent Italians "did their duty by the state, and still called themselves Catholics." The state tried in a number of ways to show that it regarded the popes not as Italian subjects but as foreign sovereigns. Pius X, in 1905, authorized Catholics to participate in parliamentary elections. Yet the "Roman Question" remained, in the words of Mussolini, "a thorn in the flesh of the nation."

When the Fascists came into control, they realized that so serious a conflict between church and state materially weakened the power of the nation. Religion, they felt, must be made to serve Fascism, not to combat it. And Catholicism, because of its personally disciplining aspects, had special appeal for the Fascists. The government therefore made some conciliatory moves. The crucifix was restored to classrooms. Religious instruction was made compulsory in the elementary schools. Chaplains were assigned to the army, and the salaries of clergymen were raised. At the same time Pope Pius XI, realizing that no help could be expected from other countries, was equally prepared to end the quarrel. By 1926 "unofficial" negotiations were under way. They came to a successful conclusion on February 11, 1929. Three documents in all, collectively known as the Lateran Accord, were signed. They comprised a political treaty, a concordat, and a financial agreement.

The political treaty dealt with the international status of the papacy. In it the pope regarded the "Roman Question" as definitively settled and recognized the kingdom of Italy under the house of Savoy. Italy, in turn, through the establishment of Vatican City under the "complete ownership, exclusive and absolute power, and sovereign jurisdiction" of the Holy See, assured to the latter "absolute and visible independence" and "undisputed sovereignty in the field of international relations." There was to be "no other authority" in Vatican City than that of the Holy See. The person of the Supreme Pontiff was declared "sacred and inviolable," and his power was recognized to send and receive diplomatic representatives. "Italy guarantees always and in every case to allow free correspondence from all nations, including belligerents, to the Holy See." The papacy declared its purpose to "remain extraneous to all temporal disputes among nations . . . unless the contending parties make a concordant appeal to its mission of peace." The territory of Vatican City was to be considered neutral and inviolable.[5]

The concordat defined the future relations between the papacy and Italy. Roman Catholicism was established as "the sole religion of the state." The selection of archbishops and bishops was to rest with the Holy

[5] The area of Vatican City is 108.7 acres; its population in 1954 was 1000.

See, but before a candidate could be nominated his name must be communicated to the Italian Government "in order to be sure that the latter has no objection from a political standpoint against the nomination." Bishops, before taking office, were required to swear loyalty to the state, the king, and the government. The state agreed to pay the clerical salaries. The Catholic Church might freely exercise spiritual power and jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters, and the state granted "to ecclesiastics protection on the part of its authorities" whenever it should be necessary in the carrying out of their ministry. In other words, the state would assist in the enforcing, among Catholics, of the canon law. The state also agreed to revise those chapters of its civil law that conflicted with canon law in matters of faith and morals. This had reference chiefly to marriage and education.

Marriage was recognized by the state as a sacrament and, provided certain formalities were observed, a religious ceremony was to be sufficient. A civil ceremony was alike optional for Catholics and non-Catholics. Divorce among Catholics was left to the church. Religious instruction, formerly required only in elementary schools, was made compulsory in secondary schools as well. It was to be taught by state-paid instructors who were priests or other clerics "approved by ecclesiastical authority." The church was not to interfere with the curricula or school administration. The Catholic Action and other religious societies were recognized by the state on condition that they refrained from political activity and confined their efforts to "the teaching and practice of Catholic principles." The Holy See renewed "its prohibitions to all the ecclesiastics and religious to enroll or take any part in any political party."

In the financial agreement Italy consented to pay immediately upon ratification of the accord the sum of $39,375,000, and, in addition, $52,500,000 in 5 per cent bonds. These moneys were accepted by the papacy "as a final settlement of its financial relations with Italy resulting from the events of 1870." Thus was terminated a conflict that had lasted for two generations. Henceforth, according to Mussolini, "the citizen is a Catholic and the Catholic is a citizen." Or, as the pope remarked, "God has been restored to Italy and Italy has been restored to God." His Holiness soon emerged from the Vatican to bless the Italians, the royal family, and the world.

Some differences of opinion regarding the respective spheres of influence of church and state caused renewed difficulty in 1931. In May of that year, Pius XI issued an encyclical on labor. Proclaimed on the fortieth anniversary of the issuance by Pope Leo XIII of his encyclical on labor, *Rerum novarum*, it was called *Quadragesimo anno*. The encyclical

deplored the circumstance that "the whole economic life has become hard, cruel, and relentless in a ghastly measure." The pope urged a "just" wage, advocated the attainment of some property by the workmen, and recommended that wage earners be made "sharers in some sort in the ownership or the management or profits" of capitalistic enterprise. Communism was declared "detestable" and socialism and Catholicism were called incompatible. Pius lamented the "dreadful scourge" of unemployment and blamed it, in part, on the "extreme freedom of competition."

Lest this plaint against unrestricted competition be considered an endorsement of the Fascist system, the pope added: "It is to be feared that the new syndical and corporative institution possesses excessive bureaucratic and political character, and that, notwithstanding [certain general advantages], it risks serving particular political aims rather than contributing to the initiation of a better social order." Such ideas were displeasing to the Fascists. They maintained that the pope had no right to pass judgment on economic and social matters. Pius, on the other hand, held that the church could not surrender its right to exert influence over the economic and social welfare of the family. An open break between church and state threatened, for besides this difference of opinion there existed conflicting views regarding the education of Italian children and the activities of the Catholic societies. Before long, Fascist students started destroying church property, trampling the pope's portrait, and attacking priests. On the ground that they were engaging in political activity, Mussolini dissolved all Catholic societies not directly connected with the Fascist Party.

Pius denied that the Catholic Action was dabbling in politics and accused the government of violating the Lateran Accord. He denounced Fascist claims regarding the education of youth, called "illicit" the Fascist oath which "even little boys and girls are obliged to take, about executing orders without discussion," and deplored the setting up of a "true and real pagan worship of the state." He also complained that Italian children were being diverted from attendance at church service in favor of participation in military and athletic events. The Fascists replied by reminding the pope that as sovereign of a foreign state he had no right to interfere in a purely domestic situation. Mussolini announced that "the child as soon as he is old enough to learn belongs to the state alone. No sharing is possible."

For a time it appeared as though the agreement of 1929 would be torn up, but eventually a compromise was effected. Enrico Rosa, a Jesuit and a militant anti-Fascist, was removed from the editorship of the leading Catholic review in Italy, while Major Giovanni Giuriati, the man who first accused the Catholic Action of spreading anti-Fascist propaganda, resigned

the secretary-generalship of the Fascist Party. In addition, the pope placed control of the reopened Catholic Action clubs in the hands of the bishop of each diocese rather than in those of laymen, as had formerly been the case. The Fascists agreed that in future their military and athletic programs would be so arranged as not to interfere with Sunday church services for the children. Differences, however, continued to flare up from time to time. The government was firm in its contention that, though Italy was Catholic, she was, above all, Fascist.

NATIONALISM, POPULATION, IMPERIALISM

The Fascists sounded warlike as well as nationalistic. They strove to revive the prestige of ancient Rome and glorified war as a symbol of national virility. One of the leading publicists, Mario Carli, wrote: "The warlike spirit is the fundamental character of Italians; it is not a Fascist invention nor a post-bellum attitude. Find me a single moment of history in which we have not fought—for whom or for what little matters." Mussolini himself, in an article on Fascism in the *Enciclopedia Italiana,* declared: "Only war carries human energies to the highest level and puts the seal of nobility upon peoples who have the courage to undertake it." A nation which thus glorified combat, and that was desirous of expanding territorially as the old Roman Empire had expanded, required a large population.

The population of Italy in 1927 was estimated at fewer than 41,000,000. In a speech of that year before parliament, Mussolini said: "If Italy wants to count for something, she must appear on the threshold of the second half of the century with a population of no fewer than 60,000,000 inhabitants. If we fall off, gentlemen, we cannot make an empire, we shall become a colony." In 1928 he wrote: "In disciplined, enriched, cultivated Italy there is room for 10,000,000 more men. Sixty million Italians would make their weight felt in the history of the world."

Acting on the theory that "without quantity there can be no quality," the Fascist Government prohibited the giving of contraceptive information, further restricted emigration, and placed a tax upon bachelors. On the other side, encouragement was given to early marriage and large families. The legal age for marriage was fixed at sixteen for boys and fourteen for girls, and newlyweds were offered trips to Rome on the state railways at a fare reduction of 80 per cent. In 1933 a fete was prepared in Rome for 93 Italian mothers who together had borne 1288 children. But by 1939 the estimated population had risen to only 44,000,000.

The combination of extreme nationalism and an increasing population pressure in a country with limited resources became a disturbing factor in international politics. With an area of only 120,000 square miles and a population density of 375 to the square mile, every addition to Italy's population increased the margin of economic insufficiency. The kingdom's African colonies offered few attractions to immigrants, and even so large a reclaimed area as the Pontine Marshes between Rome and Naples accommodated only 60,000 persons. Despite the variety of methods employed by the government to increase the country's food-supplying potentialities, the problem of feeding Italy became intensified. The only solution, in Fascist opinion, lay in territorial expansion: "Italian nationals must work in Italian territories for the wealth and power of Italy." Fascism, according to Mussolini, regarded expansionism "as a manifestation of vitality." Such a spirit made the conduct of foreign affairs a dangerous matter.

ITALIAN FOREIGN AND AFRICAN RELATIONS

In external relations the Fascist Government strove to make amends for the "weaknesses" displayed by the pre-Fascist ministries. Mussolini adopted a bellicose front and inspired Italy with confidence in her position as a world power. Simultaneously emphasis was placed upon the need for ever greater armaments. The land, water, and air services of Italy were all placed under the direct control of Mussolini in 1933. To explain to the people the necessity for further military preparedness and to exercise stricter control over the newspapers, a press and propaganda bureau was created and placed (1934) under the supervision of Mussolini's son-in-law, Nobile Galeazzo Ciano.

The most threatening of Italy's foreign relations in the early postwar years were with France. Mussolini did not like to see thousands of Italians flocking to France in search of employment. He was the more vexed that France encouraged the immigrants to become naturalized. France also was hospitable to émigrés who had left Italy through dislike for, or fear of, Fascism. Some Italians, moreover, maintained that Tunisia, Corsica, Savoy, and Nice, all in the possession of France, belonged of right to Italy. The Fascists placed chief blame on the French for the disregard of Italy's "legitimate" claims at the peace conference and her failure to acquire any mandated territory. The two countries competed for control of the western Mediterranean and for superiority in naval armament. On occasion, Franco-Italian relations became impaired because of quarrels between Italy and France's allies, especially Yugoslavia. Extensive military preparations were

made on both sides of the Franco-Italian border but no "incident" occurred to precipitate armed strife.[6]

Meanwhile, soon after his rise to power, Mussolini had remarked: "On the west there are national states which have taken definite form and to which we can send nothing except our labor—though even our export of that may be prohibited or restricted any day." Hence efforts were made to consolidate Italian power in Eastern Europe. In 1923 Rome was confirmed in the possession of the Dodecanese Islands. Fiume was acquired in 1924. Treaties of friendship, neutrality, and commerce were signed with a number of the Central- and Eastern-European states.

In 1925 Italy signed the Nettuno Convention with Yugoslavia whereby the citizens of the latter gained some commercial rights in Italy, Italians were permitted to hold land in certain parts of Yugoslavia, and Italian firms in Yugoslavia were allowed to import Italian labor. There was so much opposition in Yugoslavia to this potential Italian "encroachment" that ratification of the treaty did not occur until 1928. Part of this opposition was owing to the development of a Southslavic irredentist movement whose goal was the acquisition of a large part of Dalmatia from Italy. The agitation was accompanied by violence, and relations between the two powers continued under high tension. The Italo-Yugoslav quarrel, which in essence was a struggle for the control of the Adriatic, was further intensified by the establishment of an Italian protectorate over Albania (see p. 179).

After 1928 Italy attempted to consolidate her postwar orientation of friendships. While drawing away from France, Poland, and the Little Entente, she became increasingly friendly towards Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. On the ninth anniversary of the March on Rome (1931), Mussolini advocated revision of the peace treaties in the interests of both the former Central Powers and Italy. In 1932 Foreign Minister Dino Grandi proclaimed the urgency of a territorial redistribution in North Africa. Already in the spring of 1928 Great Britain, France, and Spain had invited Italy to share in the international government of the free city of Tangier on the west coast of Morocco. Then, in 1934, through the influence of Great Britain, the boundary between Egypt and Cyrenaica (in northeastern Libya) was readjusted in favor of Italy. Soon thereafter King Victor Emmanuel III reviewed the troops and inspected the military defenses of Italian Somaliland and other Italian African possessions.

Meanwhile, beginning in the summer of 1934, rumors were current

[6] France was not the only country with territory coveted by Italy. Mussolini once referred to British Malta as part of "Unredeemed Italy," and some Fascists clamored for the "restoration" of the Italian-speaking Swiss canton of Ticino.

that Rome was displeased with the efforts of the emperor of Ethiopia to modernize and enlarge his army. Emperor Haile Selassie was equally worried over the strengthening of the defenses of Italian Somaliland and Eritrea, both of which bordered on Ethiopia. Late in 1934 several "incidents" occurred, involving clashes of armed patrols at Ualual (Walwal) and other points along the incompletely demarcated boundary. Ethiopia appealed to the League for arbitration, while Italy dispatched troops to Africa.



ETHIOPIA 1935

From Townsend, M., *European Colonial Expansion since 1871*, 1941.
Courtesy, J. B. Lippincott Co.

Before the League had time to study the Italo-Ethiopian dispute, France and Italy signed a pact at Rome in January 1935. Because of the recent political changes in Germany and the rising danger to Austrian independence, Mussolini, for a brief period, sought a *rapprochement* with Paris. France, afraid of Nazi Germany, welcomed the opportunity to improve relations with her neighbor to the southeast. The result of these changed outlooks was the Laval-Mussolini Pact, wherein the countries settled some outstanding colonial differences and agreed to consult if Austrian

independence were threatened. France ceded to Italy almost 45,000 square miles of territory adjoining Libya and a small piece of French Somaliland touching Eritrea. The Italians thus acquired an extra portion of the Sahara and an outlet on the Gulf of Aden. In addition, Italy was allotted a share in the French railway connecting Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, with Jibuti in French Somaliland. Special citizenship rights and school privileges were extended to the Italian residents of Tunisia. According to Mussolini, moreover, Laval secretly gave him a free hand to proceed as he wished in Ethiopia.

The Rome Government advanced many reasons to explain this particular colonial interest. The charge of unfair treatment in the matter of African colonies at the peace conference of 1919 was once more repeated. Italy's need for more room and more food for her growing population was again proclaimed. The constantly recurring "incidents" along the edge of their own and Ethiopia's possessions had at last "exhausted the patience" of the Fascists. The Ethiopian victory over Italian troops at Adowa in 1896 had to be avenged. The Italian nation's "civilizing mission" in the world was reiterated, and the "backwardness" of Ethiopia was graphically depicted. Furthermore, Italy expected to find in Ethiopia the natural resources which she so urgently needed.[7] Because of her newly cemented friendship with France and the weakened condition of the League owing to the recent withdrawals of Japan and Germany, the time appeared opportune to Italy for an imperialistic venture.

Early in 1935 Ethiopia pleaded for arbitration of the Ualual incident that was being used by Mussolini as justification for projected military measures in Ethiopia. Haile Selassie promised to abide by the award of an arbitration commission to be appointed under the terms of an Italo-Ethiopian treaty of 1928. Italy, after several months, agreed to this, but then further time was consumed in wrangling over the make-up and power of the proposed commission. Eventually the League Council ruled that the commission must fix responsibility for the clash of patrols without regard to the question of whether Ualual was in Ethiopian or Italian territory. The arbiters announced their unanimous decision in September that

[7] Ethiopia in 1934 had an area of 350,000 square miles, a population of 7,000,000, and a negligible foreign trade. There was reason to believe that the mineral and agricultural potentialities of the country were substantial, but reliable estimates did not exist. The well-educated Emperor Haile Selassie ("Power of the Trinity") made a serious attempt to unify the country, assert the power of the central government, and abolish slavery, but his task was rendered exceptionally difficult by the racial and religious differences among his subjects, the tradition of separatism and the ambitions of local chieftains, the prevailing ignorance and superstition, and the absence of proper communication facilities.

neither side was to blame since each believed itself to be fighting on its own soil.

In the meantime, at the Council's suggestion, representatives of Great Britain, France, and Italy met (August) to seek a settlement of the whole Ethiopian problem. These three states, all with African possessions bordering on Ethiopia, were parties to more than a score of treaties, signed between 1888 and 1928, that alternately delimited the boundary of, upheld the political integrity of, and divided into spheres of influence the empire consolidated during the reign of Emperor Menelik II (1889–1913).

Now Great Britain and France agreed, subject to the consent of Haile Selassie, to give Italy extensive economic rights in Ethiopia. Mussolini, however, rejected this overture and announced his intention to annex the lowlands in eastern Ethiopia. The Rome Government had made such extensive war preparations and had so stirred up sentiment at home that it probably dared not forego the opportunity to create a "Fascist empire" through the "glory of Italian arms." The League therefore took up the matter once more and appointed a neutral committee of conciliation. Italy refused to curtail her mobilization activities while the committee deliberated, and the League was cold to a request of Haile Selassie to dispatch neutral observers to the border regions.

The strongest anti-Italian stand at Geneva now was taken by Great Britain. The British feared that the successful conclusion of Italy's Ethiopian venture would endanger British predominance along the Red Sea and in northeastern Africa and encourage the Fascists to contemplate further territorial expansion. France, on the other hand, was only mildly interested in the immediate Ethiopian controversy and was eager to preserve the friendship of both Great Britain and Italy in the event of trouble with Germany. The French probably would have preferred to uphold the prestige of the League and support the British (as the stronger potential ally)—if only London had been ready to make a specific commitment of aid in case of a threat to French security on the continent. This Foreign Secretary Hoare was not ready to pledge, and so Premier Laval continued to search for a formula of conciliation that would satisfy both London and Rome.[8]

When the League's conciliation committee reported a plan for the international development of Ethiopia with a recognition of Italy's "special interests" therein, Haile Selassie accepted the scheme in principle but

[8] In December 1935 Hoare and Laval agreed on a plan whereby Italy was to keep most of the extensive territory she had conquered by that date, while Ethiopia was to get "in exchange" a narrow corridor to the Red Sea through Eritrea. Laval published the plan before it was approved by the Chamberlain Cabinet, which then, in the face of public condemnation, repudiated it.

Mussolini rejected it. Thereupon the Council unanimously decided, in the absence of the Italian delegate, to prepare a report in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article 15 of the Covenant.[9] While the Council was at work, Italian troops advanced into Ethiopia from the north, east, and south (October 3, 1935). The pretext for beginning the invasion at this time was the Ethiopian withdrawal of its soldiers from the border. This "strategic move," according to Italy, "necessitated" an immediate advance in order to protect Eritrea and Italian Somaliland against further aggression! On October 7 the Council, except for Italy who was a party to the dispute, adopted a report which declared that "the Italian Government has resorted to war in disregard of its obligations under . . . the Covenant." Thus, for the first time since its establishment, the League designated the aggressor in an armed conflict. The Council's verdict was referred to the Assembly, where the representatives of 51 nations voted to invoke the sanctions of Article 16 against Italy.

Then the Assembly (minus Italy) drafted five proposals. These imposed arms, credit, and raw-material embargoes, prohibited the importation by League members of any goods from Italy, and asked League members to replace imports from Italy by imports from such states as Romania and Yugoslavia which normally enjoyed a profitable Italian market. These proposals were accepted by most of the member states, and it was decided to make the sanctions effective on November 18.[10] Thus was begun the first "great experiment of the coercive powers" of the League. As it happened, the experiment was not complete. Sanctions were not imposed on oil—Italy's greatest foreign need. When Secretary Eden proposed oil sanctions in 1936, French Foreign Minister Flandin insisted that there first be another attempt at appeasement. Then, when Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland, all talk of an oil embargo was dropped.

While these events occurred in Europe, the Italian military advance continued at a moderate rate. The Ethiopians impeded the Italian advance without permitting themselves to be drawn into any large, open engagement. At last, in May 1936, after seven months of warfare, the Italian troops entered Addis Ababa. While Haile Selassie was on his way to Europe on a

9 "If the dispute is not thus settled [through the mediation of the Council], the Council either unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto."

10 Acting under the terms of a recent neutrality resolution, President Roosevelt issued two proclamations announcing that Italy and Ethiopia were in a state of war, placing an embargo on arms shipments to both belligerents, and warning United States citizens against traveling on the ships of either warring country. Persons who traded with or traveled on the vessels of either Italy or Ethiopia did so "at their own risk."

British warship, Italy formally annexed his country. King Victor Emmanuel took the title Emperor of Ethiopia. Recognition of Italy's new empire by the other powers followed slowly, while relations between Rome and Geneva continued to be strained after the lifting of sanctions. It occasioned no astonishment when Italy submitted her resignation from the League in 1937. The League, indeed, gained no prestige in the Ethiopian dispute.

A decree of 1936 united Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Italian Somaliland into Italian East Africa, and in 1937 Mussolini took the post of Minister for Italian Africa. A six-year plan was announced to develop Ethiopia, and it was hoped to derive large quantities of cotton, coffee, meat, hides, wool, timber, and minerals from the new empire. It was still a matter of hopes when the Second World War began.[11]

After the Ethiopian War, Italy drew ever closer to Germany and became further estranged from Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. Germany had not participated in the sanctions against Italy and had been quick to recognize the conquest of Ethiopia. Both the Nazis and the Fascists, moreover, supported General Franco in the Spanish Civil War that began in 1936. And so Italy and Germany finally reached a general understanding which Mussolini first called "an axis." Thereafter, despite some further efforts by Chamberlain to appease Italy in the Mediterranean, the Rome-Berlin axis began to capitalize its nuisance value in international politics.

In 1937 Mussolini expressed a lessened interest in the protection of Austria against Nazi advances, endorsed the German claim for colonies, and subscribed to the German-Japanese pact against communism. In 1938 he made the best of what was an unpleasant surprise and acquiesced in the German absorption of Austria; soon thereafter he supported the Reich in the feverish negotiations over the Sudetenland. In 1939 he justified Germany's absorption of Bohemia, Moravia, and Memelland. And in that year, also, he concluded a formal military alliance with Hitler.

For a time, Italy obviously was the lesser gainer from axis activities. Hence Mussolini in 1938–1939 made two efforts to swell the area of the "Italian Empire." Late in 1938, in the presence of a newly accredited French Ambassador and of Mussolini, a group of parliamentary deputies

[11] The unsuccessful resistance of the Ethiopians against Italy's modern weapons brings to mind some lines from Samuel Johnson's *The History of Rasselas, Prince of Abissinia,* published in 1759. "The artist" replies to a query of Rasselas, saying: "If men were all virtuous, . . . I should, with great alacrity, teach them to fly. But what would be the security of the good, if the bad could, at pleasure, invade them from the sky? Against an army sailing through the clouds, neither walls, nor mountains, nor seas, could afford any security."

raised the cry of "Tunisia!", a cry which was rapidly taken up by the spectators and then by the crowds in the streets. According to French figures the number of Frenchmen and Italians in Tunisia was about equal, but Rome claimed that its nationals considerably outnumbered the French residents. Thus Italy began to plead the cause of an "oppressed nationality" in Tunisia much as the Germans had done in Czechoslovakia. In addition, Fascist voices were raised for Corsica, which France had bought from Genoa in 1768, and for Savoy and Nice, which had been ceded to France by treaty in 1860. Moreover, since the French Parliament had not yet ratified the Laval-Mussolini Pact of 1935, Mussolini renounced it at the close of 1938—but without returning any of the desert lands that Italy already had been allowed to occupy. On Tunisia, however, France remained firm, and so Mussolini next turned his aggressive attention to Albania.

ITALY AND ALBANIA

One of the results of the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 was the emergence of a new state: Albania. A German prince, William of Wied, was chosen ruler. William proved incapable of governing the mountainous state with its unruly inhabitants, and when the First World War broke out he returned to Germany. During the war Albania was officially neutral, but the Austrians, Italians, and Serbs used it as a battleground. At the peace conference the Italians sought an Albanian mandate, but Wilson objected and told the natives to form a government of their own. In 1920 a provisional government was established, which concentrated its efforts upon ousting the foreign soldiers who still occupied the country. At the end of the year Albania became a member of the League of Nations, but its final boundaries were not fixed until 1926. The area of Albania was 11,000 square miles and the estimated population 1,000,000 (perhaps 1,200,000 by 1953).

The provisional government led a precarious existence, but out of the chaos emerged the conspicuous figure of a young Moslem chieftain, Ahmed Zogu. In 1922 Zogu became premier, retaining this position until 1924 when he was ousted by Bishop Fan S. Noli and forced to flee the country. Noli, who had studied at Harvard University and was head of the Albanian Orthodox Church, was unable to achieve order and fell before the end of the year. Zogu returned and Noli fled to Italy. One month later (January 1925), Albania was declared a republic and Zogu was chosen president for seven years by a national assembly.

Zogu attempted to consolidate his power, but found himself obliged to

turn to Italy for financial aid. In 1925 Italian initiative established the Albanian National Bank. Not long thereafter Italy lent the republic money, guaranteed by Albania's customs receipts. Other transactions followed, and Italy soon stood in a fair way to dominate Albania and thus, incidentally, control the Strait of Otranto. Yugoslavia was vehemently opposed to any such scheme that would endanger her freedom of access to the Mediterranean Sea. Precisely such a factor had constituted one of the grievances of the old Serbia against Austria-Hungary.

In 1926–1927 numerous internal improvements were prosecuted in Albania with Italian funds and under the supervision of an Italian development corporation, while Italian officers reorganized the Albanian army. Faced by another rebellion in 1926, Zogu once more turned to Italy for aid. This Mussolini was ready to give—for a price. In November 1926 the two countries signed the Treaty of Tirana. By its terms "Italy and Albania recognized that any disturbance directed against the political, juridical, and territorial *status quo* of Albania was opposed to their reciprocal political interest." To safeguard this interest the parties "undertook to give their mutual support and collaboration." An accompanying letter gave Italy the right to intervene in the external or internal relations of Albania whenever the latter so requested.

Thoroughly alarmed at this turn of events, Yugoslavia took advantage of a frontier incident to make certain military preparations. In 1927, after an employee of the Yugoslav Legation had been arrested at Durazzo for espionage, diplomatic relations with Albania were severed. Italy championed the cause of Albania, and war seemed imminent. Upon the representations of several neutral powers the matter was adjusted without recourse to arms, but Yugoslavia now eagerly turned to France for an alliance. Thereupon Italy and Albania signed a twenty-year military pact.

In 1928 Zogu had himself proclaimed king, as Zog I. In the following year an Italian company secured an oil concession from the king, and in 1930 an arrangement was concluded whereby an Italian bank assumed supervision of Albania's coinage system. Thereafter, however, the Albanians displayed an increasingly anti-Italian feeling. Zog, late in 1932, rejected an Italian proposal for a customs union and in 1933 closed all private schools, most of which were controlled by Italian religious. During 1934 Zog tried, though with little success, to lessen the influence of Italian officers in his army and to check Italian immigration. Apparently as a warning against such tendencies, an Italian fleet appeared in Durazzo harbor without previous notice and without firing the customary salute. Though these omissions were officially explained as an oversight, it was

widely believed that the demonstration had political implications. This belief was strengthened when several new Italo-Albanian commercial agreements were announced. In 1938 Italy remitted a large sum of money owed by Albania, while an Italian company acquired special fishing rights in Albanian waters and received permission to employ armed guards.

At last, on Good Friday of 1939, Italian soldiers landed on the Albanian coast and on the next day entered Tirana. There was little resistance, for the natives were poorly equipped. Zog fled the country with his queen (a lady of Hungarian-American origin) and their two-day-old son, and Albania was joined to Italy in a personal union. Victor Emmanuel III added to his titles of king of Italy and emperor of Ethiopia that of king of Albania. Germany appeared to know in advance of Mussolini's Albanian plan; the other powers accepted the *fait accompli*.

The new Italian possession received from the king a constitutional statute. Italy took over Albania's diplomatic services, and the Albanian soldiers were absorbed into an Italian army. Legislation was to be the function of a native council, but no matter might come before this body without the authorization of the king. The latter also was endowed with final veto power. The natives did retain Albanian as their official language.

CHAPTER 8

Spain

SOME HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Maps showed Spain as a united country from the time of the fall of Granada (1492), by which date there had been completed the reconquest, by local Christian kings, of the territories captured by the Moors between 711 and 718. Actually, the Spaniards, having little unity of language, thought, or traditions, were not a homogeneous people. The marriage in 1469 of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile, which foreshadowed the union of the two largest kingdoms in Spain, was opposed by some contemporary statesmen because of the difference between the two peoples. A proud provincialism was the outgrowth of an obstructive geography, and of centuries of frontier existence occasioned by the struggles against the Moors. At times, foreign invasions, such as that of Napoleon, brought to the fore an embryonic nationalism, but ordinarily patriotism in Spain seemed to be "a local thing that reflected the geographical division of the country."

The two most practical elements in the population of early modern Spain appeared to be the Jews and the Moriscos.[1] The former were active in commerce and trading, and knew how to invest their capital in productive enterprises. The Moriscos were skilled in irrigation and reclamation, and did much to improve the livestock and extend the cultivation of cotton. The forcible expulsion of these peoples—the Jews in 1492 and the Moriscos in 1609—largely for religious reasons, left a population whose leaders,

[1] The Moriscos were Moors who remained in Spain after the fall of Granada.

fond of adventure and display, were inclined to despise labor as dishonorable.



SPAIN

Courtesy, Foreign Policy Association, *Headline Series.*

The very components of the population that in other countries became the middle class, in Spain often viewed labor as fit only for infidels and Jews. Those individuals who entered business despite this popular antipathy were burdened with fiscal and social disabilities. Since monasteries and nobles were ordinarily exempt from taxation, and since more and more land came into the possession of these privileged groups, the levies on surviving trade and industry were necessarily heavy. Whereas rulers of other lands curried favor with the middle class, most Spanish sovereigns blocked its rise. The army and the church were considered sufficient pillars of the monarchy. The same attitude was apparent in the colonial field, where narrow mercantilist regulations hampered ambitious colonial businessmen.

Thus even during the years of her greatest apparent glory Spain contained within herself the causes of decline. Supported in the sixteenth

century chiefly by the efforts of a few energetic rulers and by the influx of unearned silver and gold from the Americas, Spain's brilliance could not last because the authorities failed to adapt their economic outlook to the changing economic conditions of the world. The flow of precious metals, instead of being turned into channels of permanent advantage, was dissipated in extravagant pageants and expensive foreign policies.

The list of corroding influences upon Spanish development from 1500 to 1900 was long. Heavy military losses, the emigration of large numbers of colonial adventurers, the eagerness with which young men and women flocked to the monasteries and convents, the popular hostility towards foreign settlers even when these were officially encouraged to come to Spain (under Charles III), the relative poverty in mineral wealth, and the high percentage of illiteracy, all tended to weaken the monarchy. During these centuries, also, the government discriminated against agriculture in favor of sheep-raising. A powerful stock-raisers' corporation, the *Mesta,* organized in the medieval period, continued to exist until the middle of the nineteenth century. At its door must be laid responsibility for a declining emphasis upon soil cultivation. The Mesta was granted the use of an extensive "royal sheepwalk," no part of which could be worked or enclosed by the people. In consequence, "starting from La Mancha and Extremadura in April, flocks of sheep annually ravaged Castile, returning in September to the places whence they had come."

Spain's economic life, then, for most of the period between the discovery of America and the Spanish-American War, was characterized by unrest, high prices, corruption, lack of financial equilibrium, gross inequalities in the tax system, governmental interference in trade, widespread particularism, and worn-out traditions of nobility. The military disaster suffered at the hands of the United States in 1898 was the unfortunate but logical outcome of an unhealthy past.

With this historical sketch in mind, it is understandable why the opening years of the twentieth century should have witnessed a sorry state of things in Spain. The decade and a half between the closing of the war of 1898 and the opening of the First World War saw the national stage almost continually occupied by mob attacks on churches, convents, and police forces; strikes; martial law; colonial uprisings; attempts at political assassination; the suspension of constitutional guarantees; and military intrigues. Not until the outbreak of war in 1914 was there a temporary cessation of these symptoms of instability—and then the question of what course to pursue during the struggle served anew to arouse dissension among the people.

Although the choice of sympathies in 1914 was difficult for King Alfonso XIII (1886–1931), who had an Austrian mother and a British wife, the Spanish people readily fell into two opposing groups. Many intellectuals and, in general, persons who possessed liberal tendencies and antimonarchical and anticlerical views favored the Allied cause. The conservative elements sympathized with the Germans, as did some who were opposed to the French sway in Morocco and French anticlericalism. Those patriots too were anti-Allied who resented Great Britain's hold on Gibraltar. In the circumstances, the safest decision for the country was to remain neutral, and the *Cortes* (parliament) so voted. The wisdom of this policy became apparent when the belligerents began to send in orders for war materials. From 1915 to 1919 Spain, for the first time in many years, enjoyed an excess of exports over imports. After 1919, however, the adverse trade relationship was reëstablished.

Although it would seem that the increased industrial and shipping activities should have resulted in comparative prosperity and domestic quiet within Spain, such was not the case. No fewer than seven ministries held office during the period of the First World War, and ten more rose and fell within the next five years. Liberal, Conservative, and coalition cabinets alike failed of stability. This unrest was traceable to four major developments: (1) the discontent and growing radicalism of the laboring classes; (2) the existence of strong regionalist and separatist movements, especially in Catalonia; (3) interference in governmental affairs by military juntas or councils; and (4) continued military disasters in rebellious Spanish Morocco.

UNREST, COLONIAL DEFEAT, AND DICTATORSHIP, 1917–1930

Although labor unrest was general throughout Spain it was most conspicuous in Catalonia.[2] Here economic difficulty and regionalist dissatisfaction combined to make the opposition to the government exceptionally serious. In July 1917 most of the Catalonian members of the Cortes defied the government and met in a special assembly at Barcelona to demand reforms in administration and in the treatment of their section of the country. They charged that Barcelona's industries were burdened with crushing taxes, and that the revenue was squandered in Madrid or spent on improvements in other provinces. With the end of the war the

[2] Catalonia consisted of four provinces in northeastern Spain, including industrial Barcelona. The natives spoke Catalan.

unrest increased, and the wave of democracy that temporarily swept the continent encouraged the people to demand additional reforms.

In November 1918 a Catalonian parliamentary delegation issued a manifesto demanding the creation of "an autonomous Catalonian state" with its own cortes, a responsible executive, and its own judiciary. Catalan should become "the only official language," and the region should be united "with the other Spanish peoples in a federal union exclusively for foreign affairs, the army and navy, coinage, weights and measures, trade, customs, general communications, etc." The regionalists hoped to present this manifesto to President Wilson at the peace conference, but the fear of the government's military forces and the opposition of public opinion in the remainder of the kingdom prevented the taking of such a step.

Hardly had the excitement caused by the manifesto died down when, early in 1919, a general strike broke out in Barcelona. All constitutional guarantees were suspended, and, to make matters worse, the civil and military authorities clashed over means to end the strike. Bloody street fighting occurred among the strikers, strikebreakers, police, and soldiery, and similar tragedies were enacted in other parts of the realm. At one time the Spanish Employers' Association threatened a nation-wide lockout unless the government exercised moderation in its treatment of both employers and workmen. But the year 1920 brought with it a reign of terror, and in 1921 the premier was assassinated.

The stability of the ministries, constantly endangered by the labor and regionalist crises, was further jeopardized by the activities of numerous military juntas. These councils of army officers criticized governmental policies, attempted to interfere with the civil administration, and pursued obstructionist tactics with regard to the Moroccan situation. So objectionable did they become that Premier Antonio Maura early in 1922 attempted to dissolve them. To this the king objected, and so another ministry fell.[3]

During these years the army was fighting a losing war against the rebellious Riffian tribes in Spanish Morocco. The more the troops were beaten, the heavier were the taxes imposed upon the people at home and the more oppressive became the weight of military service, censorship, and personal restrictions. A dramatic climax was reached in July 1921 when a force of Riffians under Abd-el-Krim routed a larger Spanish army, killing about 12,000 men. The indignation in Spain was so great that a parliamentary committee was appointed to investigate the government's conduct of empire.

[3] In November 1922 the juntas were disbanded.

While the army continued the campaign against the rebels, the committee examined evidence in Spain and Morocco. A report was submitted to the council of ministers in the summer of 1922, but its contents were immediately suppressed. Though the exact charges and recommendations were not revealed, the report was believed to censure a large group of the highest officials and even the king himself. When it became evident that the report was not only being withheld from the public, but that its recommendations might be disregarded, protest meetings were held throughout the kingdom. The Cortes and the newspapers demanded the full disclosure of all accusations. In fear of a *coup d'état* the government dissolved the parliament and ordered new elections. The temper of the next national legislature, however, was quite the same as that of the old.

To add to the troubles of the authorities, there came another series of strikes and radical outbreaks. Regionalist agitation increased, and the news of the successful Fascist coup in Italy added to the general excitement. It occasioned little surprise when, in September 1923, Captain General Miguel Primo de Rivera, military governor of Barcelona, overthrew the national ministry, suspended the constitution, and set himself up as dictator of Spain. To assist him in his dictatorship he appointed a directorate containing, besides himself, eight generals and an admiral. Though it was evident that the coup was not directed against the monarchy, it was not known until some years later that the plan had been carried out with the consent of King Alfonso. The latter had extended a visit to France so as to arrive in Madrid shortly after the overturn and then had asked the general to place himself at the head of a military directorate and introduce necessary reforms.

Primo de Rivera, the Marqués de Estella, was born at Cadiz in 1870. During the Spanish-American War he served in Cuba and the Philippines, and later in Morocco. From 1915 to 1923 he was military governor, successively, of Cadiz, Madrid, and Barcelona. During his career he had several times come into conflict with higher authorities because of protests against what he considered the needless "butchery" of soldiers in Morocco. Upon assuming dictatorial control Rivera dissolved the Cortes, seized the documents dealing with the Moroccan scandal, established a censorship of press and speech, abolished trial by jury, put an end to some of the remaining vestiges of local self-government, issued treasury bonds, and adopted the slogan "Country, Monarchy, Religion!" His solicitude for religion earned for him the friendship of the Catholic Church.

The marquess soon discovered how difficult it was to set up a government that was at the same time strong and satisfactory to a discontented

people. Popular hostility to the dictatorship and, indeed, to the monarchy was increased by such incidents as the dismissal of provincial legislatures, the unending Moroccan troubles, the levying of heavy fines for slight misdeeds, and the exile of several popular republicans. The extreme censorship antagonized the leading intellectuals, many of whom began to devote their literary abilities to fighting the regime. Early in 1925, for example, thousands of copies of an antimonarchical pamphlet by the novelist, Vicente Blasco Ibáñez, were dropped over Spanish towns from airplanes.

Beginning in 1925, however, Primo de Rivera inaugurated policies calculated to win the support of public opinion. Martial law was abolished. Generous subsidies were granted to the shipping and shipbuilding industries. The military directorate was replaced by a civil cabinet. The good will of business was sought through the creation of a committee on industrial production which alone could sanction the establishment of new, or the extension of old, industries; the injunction upon Spanish coal consumers to obtain from 40 per cent to 60 per cent of their fuel needs from the domestic supply; and the passage of measures to aid commercial aviation.

Efforts also were made to settle labor disputes by arbitration, to break up some of the large landed estates, and to expand educational facilities. To please the Catalonians a protective tariff was raised. The support of a section of the working class was gained by the appointment to public-service positions of some leaders of the National Labor Confederation. As a concession to constitutionalism there was convoked a National Advisory Assembly (September 1927) to sit in place of the Cortes that had been dissolved four years earlier. The assembly, whose members were all nominated by the government, was given only consultative powers, but in 1928 it was directed to draft a new constitution to replace the one of 1876 which, though suspended, was still valid.

The backing of nationalists was sought by a vigorous foreign policy. In 1926 Spain and Italy signed a treaty in which each promised to maintain a benevolent neutrality if the other were attacked by a third party (presumably France). Then Spain served notice of intention to withdraw from the League of Nations because her demand for a permanent seat in the Council had been refused.[4] Finally, though this was owing chiefly to a blunder by Abd-el-Krim, the Moroccan situation was brought under control. In order to make good his claim to the title of "Sultan of Morocco," and to repay the French for their interference with the movement of his grain supply, Abd-el-Krim committed the mistake of attacking the French

[4] Before the required two-year notice of withdrawal took effect, Spain notified the League of her decision to retain membership. She did resign in 1941.

as well as the Spaniards. Reënforced by a Spanish army, the French soon brought the colonial conflict to a successful close. In May 1926 Abd-el-Krim surrendered, and within another year Madrid could announce the "pacification" of Morocco.

Despite these developments, indications of popular discontent were not lacking. In 1926 there was a mutiny in the artillery corps because men were promoted through influence rather than by seniority and merit. A plot, in the same year, to set up an independent Catalonia was frustrated mainly by the alertness of the French police, who arrested several Catalonian separatist leaders across the border. In 1928 a plot was unearthed in Barcelona to overthrow the dictator, and 1929 witnessed another outbreak in the artillery corps. Then thousands of university students struck because of the censorship and the allegedly bad treatment of the engineering classes at Madrid. Matters were made worse by the closing of the university and the dismissal of some professors. Soon it was deemed necessary temporarily to shut the doors of all higher schools. During these years frequent attempts were made to assassinate both the king and the dictator. Through all the manifestations there ran an undercurrent of republicanism that slowly but steadily was gaining in intensity.

In January 1930, after more than six years of difficult rule, Primo de Rivera resigned his powers as suddenly as he had assumed them. Illness, disagreements with the king, constant disorders, and the refusal of some recently appointed captains general to express their further confidence in him had induced the marquess to give up his office.[5]

Upon his retirement Primo de Rivera was succeeded by General Dámaso Berenguer. Faithful and loyal to the king but lacking in qualities of leadership, Berenguer headed an unfortunate administration. Though he inaugurated his regime by easing the censorship and adopting a conciliatory attitude towards the students, he was unable, in the face of the world depression, to introduce prosperity, provide employment for all laborers, and dispense bread to all who needed it. Even before he had time to outline his plans there were renewed student riots and strikes. Weary of the distress, moreover, a group of Catalonians began to agitate strenuously for "Catalonianism, Liberalism, Democracy, and Republicanism!"

The king and his council tried desperately in 1930 to regain the confidence of the people. The National Advisory Assembly was dismissed, but new parliamentary elections were promised for 1931. To aid the farmers, a decree was issued suspending the further importation of wheat. Tariff rates on manufactured products were boosted. Alfonso avowed that future

[5] He died in Paris a few weeks after his resignation.

military promotions should be determined by seniority and merit alone. Some of the fines "unlawfully" collected by the previous administration were returned. Concessions were made to the freedom of speech and meeting. The police, unless they could secure warrants, were forbidden to search homes. But all this was in vain. The increased freedom of discussion only showed how widespread the idea of republicanism had become. The people no longer wanted royal favors; they demanded royalty's abdication. In September 1930 a mass meeting in the Madrid bull ring cheered wildly for a republic. December brought a mutiny in the aviation corps and a premature republican revolt led by Niceto Alcalá Zamora, the son of a poor southern landowner.

Perhaps a word should be said at this point of Alfonso XIII. Courageous, an all-round sportsman, clever in repartee, this descendant of Bourbons and Habsburgs was an imperious person who liked to exercise autocratic power. The "sterility of parliament and the littleness of politicians" were objects of scorn in his eyes. Above all, he professed to be a Spanish patriot, intimating that the all-important question was of Spain, not of monarchy or republic. He long stayed on as ruler under conditions that might well have induced a weaker man to abdicate.

By 1930 the continued existence of the monarchy rested upon three factors of uncertain strength: the loyalty of the army (there was a general for every 300 men), the support of the great landowners and the Catholic Church, and the dissension within the ranks of the opposition (22 republican parties had been organized). Opposed to the old regime were the regionalists; the socialists and "New Industrialists," who longed for a changed order corresponding to their interpretation of the needs of the twentieth century; the intellectuals, who preached against the influence of the church; and the republicans, who hated the military and the royalists. The year 1931 was destined to witness a decisive conflict among the contrary-minded groups.

BIRTH AND PROBLEMS OF THE REPUBLIC

In February 1931 Premier Berenguer restored the constitution that his predecessor had suspended and ordered parliamentary elections. Contrary to the general's expectations, the people greeted this news with anger. Nearly all the antigovernment groups announced that they would refuse to vote in any election save one for a constituent assembly. They had no desire to participate in a resurrection of the document of 1876. Berenguer thereupon resigned, just one year after assuming power, and was succeeded

by Admiral Juan Aznar, another loyal monarchist. Orders now were issued for municipal and provincial elections in April 1931, following which there was to be a national election for a constituent assembly that would draft a new constitution.

To the dismay of the authorities the municipal elections resulted in a republican landslide. Aznar consequently resigned, and Zamora, on behalf of a republican junta, threatened revolution unless the king abdicated. Alfonso took ship and sailed to France. He did not formally abdicate but "suspended the exercise of the royal power" and left the country in order to permit the people freely to decide whether they preferred a monarchy or a republic. Zamora, however, immediately (April 14) proclaimed a republic with himself as provisional president and with executive authority vested in a previously selected coalition cabinet of moderate republicans and socialists.[6]

The new government set the date for constituent elections and pledged itself to bring about land and church reforms, personal liberty, and a fair degree of local autonomy. Although most of the political groups decided to await the results of the election before taking any further step, the provisional government was kept busy for the first ten weeks of its existence putting down antirepublican movements and communist riots, pleading with the Catalonian separatists not to impair the unity of the state, and passing urgent preliminary legislation. Many royal officials were imprisoned, and titles of nobility were abolished.

Two other serious developments commanded the attention of the government prior to the elections. First, anticlerical riots were precipitated when church officials appealed to faithful Catholics to vote only for deputies who would defend their religion. Churches, monasteries, and convents were burned, and the lives of members of religious orders were endangered. The Zamora Government showed little sympathy for this and proclaimed martial law in an attempt to restore order. Secondly, a group of Catalonians who feared that the constituent assembly would be only mildly liberal, and who regarded any Madrid regime as obnoxious, declared an autonomous Catalonian Generalidad, elected Colonel Francisco Macía president, and drew up a Statute of Autonomy that provided for virtual independence. It was obvious from the outset, therefore, that Spain's "Irish Question" would dis-

[6] President Zamora earlier in his career had been a monarchist and three times had occupied ministerial posts in royal cabinets. During the dictatorship, however, he became converted to republicanism, and in December 1930, as has been mentioned, he led a premature revolt against the king.

turb the harmony of the republic as it had that of the monarchy. The action of Catalonia, moreover, encouraged other regions, especially the Basque Provinces and Galicia, to demand home rule.

In June 1931 the people flocked to the polls in the first national election since 1923. The candidates for deputy represented 25 parties, including all shades of political opinion from monarchism to communism. The result of the balloting once more was a defeat for monarchy and a triumph for moderate republicanism. The Socialist Party became the largest single group in the Constituent Cortes. The Radical Party, which favored consolidation of the republic and liberal reforms, was second. The remaining seats were divided among a dozen other groups. Most of the representatives were young men, and only 14 of them had had any previous parliamentary experience.

The Cortes voted to keep in power the provisional ministry that Zamora had appointed and then proceeded to the consideration of a republican constitution. While the document was being pieced together, the cabinet devoted itself to the solution of the more immediate problems. Efforts were made to stabilize the peseta, effect administrative economies, and bring efficiency into the government. Half of the civil employees were dismissed, but the salaries of the remainder were increased. It required all President Zamora's persuasiveness to induce the Catalonian deputies to remain in the Cortes, for a plebiscite in Catalonia had resulted in an overwhelming endorsement of the Statute of Autonomy. Even so, it was necessary to dispatch soldiers to Barcelona to quell a radical-regionalist uprising.

Negotiations also had to be carried on with the Vatican concerning both the property damage done in the early days of the revolution and the future policies of the republic. Inasmuch as the entire non-Catholic population of Spain was less than 30,000, the relationship between government and papacy was of unusual importance. When the Cortes resolved to abolish a state religion, expel the Jesuits and confiscate their property, and prohibit members of religious orders from teaching or engaging in business, Zamora resigned in protest against what he regarded as unnecessarily harsh terms.

The chief executive post thereupon was entrusted to Manuel Azaña, minister of war in the Zamora Cabinet. As head of the war office, Azaña was reputed to have republicanized the army and converted it from a political clique into a spirited fighting force. So confident was the assembly of his ability and integrity that he was invested with extraordinary powers for the suppression of disorder. One of the most spectacular acts of the

assembly was to declare Alfonso XIII guilty of high treason. His property in Spain was confiscated and he was sentenced to "perpetual imprisonment" if ever again he set foot on Spanish soil.

In December 1931 the Cortes proclaimed the new constitution. Spain was declared to be "a democratic republic of workers of all classes." Its government was to consist of a unicameral legislature made up of representatives elected for four years by equal, direct, secret suffrage of all citizens over twenty-three years of age without distinction of sex. The president was to be elected for six years by the members of the Cortes and an equal number of popularly chosen electors. Successive presidential terms were forbidden, and no one might be a candidate for the highest office who was a military officer, a clergyman, or a member of the reigning family of any country. None of the president's acts was valid unless countersigned by a cabinet minister. The cabinet was made directly responsible to parliament.

In social and cultural matters the break with tradition was wide. There was to be no state church; marriages might be dissolved by mutual consent or on petition of either party upon due cause; education was secularized; and civil liberties were guaranteed. War was "renounced as an instrument of national policy" and the president, who could declare armed hostilities, might not exercise this function "except subject to the conditions prescribed in the pact of the League of Nations." The state might "participate in the development and coördination of industries and enterprises," nationalize public services, and socialize large estates. It was also permitted, with due compensation, to expropriate all types of property, regardless of ownership. Work was made a social obligation. In the matter of local autonomy the constitution merely recognized the compatibility of autonomous regions with the integral character of the state. Any area desiring autonomy had to submit to the Cortes for its approval a regional charter, and parliament might delegate to the local authorities the power to administer certain national laws.

By a special "temporary disposition" the Cortes was empowered to elect the republic's first constitutional president. The choice fell on Zamora, who had earlier resigned the provisional presidency. Azaña became prime minister. Instead of dissolving itself now and ordaining parliamentary elections, the Constituent Cortes determined to continue sitting as a regular parliament. The deputies felt that the body which had drawn up the constitution should be permitted to launch the legislative program that would convert its principles into practice.

In 1932, then, the Jesuit Order was dissolved. Its corporate property was confiscated and ordered distributed for social-welfare purposes. The

individual Jesuits soon left the land. Later legislation nationalized all ecclesiastical property, though leaving it in the custody of the clergy, and deprived churchmen of all governmental financial support after a specified date. An act of 1933 forbade members of religious orders to engage in industry, commerce, or the teaching of anything but religion. The church schools were to be closed, and all educational matters were placed under the minister of education.

After the flight of Alfonso, the pope had directed the clergy to accept the republic but to oppose by constitutional means the enactment of anti-clerical legislation.[7] The failure of these efforts led Pope Pius XI to issue (1933) the encyclical *Delectissimi nobis,* protesting against the separation of church and state. Once more Catholics were urged to obey the civil authority, but only in matters that did not infringe the rights of the Catholic Church. The members of the government were informed that their actions brought upon them automatic excommunication. This did not appear greatly to worry most of them.

The closing of the church schools and the prohibition of teaching by religious made worse the bad educational situation in Spain. The national illiteracy in 1931 was estimated at more than 45 per cent. Despite the shortage of funds, therefore, and the scarcity of lay teachers, 9600 new state schools were opened from 1931 to 1933. The salaries of the lay teachers were increased, and the minister of education was directed to build a complete secular school system with the least possible delay. Land reform proceeded slowly, but the Cortes provided for the distribution of 52,000,000 acres formerly held in large estates. There was to be no compensation to the nobles for these lands except where investments on improvements had not yet been realized or where the owners possessed no other property. The actual distribution of these lands involved considerable difficulty. The process was too slow to satisfy the peasants and too fast for the landlords.

To aid industry, the tariff, already the highest in Western Europe, was raised still further. Commercial treaties were negotiated. A large public-works program was initiated. Emphasis was placed on improved housing facilities in Madrid and other large cities. Because of its continuing deficits, the Spanish transoceanic steamship service was suspended. Plans were inaugurated for the economic development of Spanish Morocco. Economic prosperity, however, was not yet introduced to the Spanish people. The unemployed numbered perhaps 1,000,000 in an estimated population of 23,000,000.

[7] In 1931 Spain had 60,000 nuns, 20,000 monks, and 30,000 priests.

It was not to be expected that the autonomist groups would be satisfied with the home-rule concessions granted in the constitution. In April 1932 a meeting of Catalonians demanded the immediate recognition by Madrid of the Statute of Autonomy. Like the Sinn Feiners, the Catalonians founded a society called "We Ourselves" (*Nosaltres Sols*) and suffered no lull in the turbulence of their demonstrations. In September the Cortes finally recognized the Catalonian Statute of Autonomy. This gave Catalonia the right to use its own language, anthem, and flag; permission to establish a state government with president and parliament; the right to communicate officially with the rest of Spain in Catalan; and the privileges of raising taxes, creating a school system, and enforcing national laws in Catalonia. In December 1932 a Catalonian parliament met—the first such instance since 1705. The Basque Provinces, Galicia, and other non-Castilian regions now became the more insistent in *their* demands for similar grants of autonomy. To many Spaniards it seemed desirable that the republic should eventually become a federation of Spanish states.

All the acts just considered were the work of the constituent assembly that had been elected in June 1931 and sat until October 1933. During most of this period the premier was Manuel Azaña, leader of the moderates. Inevitably there appeared opposition to the continued dominance of this government. To the right were the royalists, who favored restoration of the monarchy; the clericals, who abhorred the anti-Catholic legislation; and the landlords, who preferred to keep their large estates. To the left were the communists, who desired a reconstitution of Spanish life on the Soviet model; the syndicalists, who advocated "the erection of a society based on trade-unions alone"; and the anarchists, who favored the entire abolition of government. The most radical elements were especially strong in Catalonia, so that at times the quarrel between Barcelona and Madrid looked more like a contest between radicalism and conservatism than between autonomy and centralization.

The first serious revolt against Azaña occurred in August 1932. Led by General José Sanjurjo, a group of royalists seized Seville and a few small towns. A loyal army quickly crushed the movement, and the general was captured and eventually exiled. A number of the other rebel leaders, who represented some of Spain's most aristocratic families, were exiled to the west coast of Africa. In January 1933 a syndicalist-anarchist revolt broke out at Barcelona. It spread rapidly to other cities, but once more loyal republican troops overcame the revolutionaries.

Less violent than these manifestations but equally indicative of the growing dissatisfaction were the results of two elections in the spring

and summer of 1933. First, municipal elections throughout the country showed a definite trend to the right. Then, the government's candidates for a tribunal created to decide on the constitutionality of laws were defeated. The Azaña Ministry thereupon resigned. In the succeeding weeks several parliamentary coalitions were attempted, with little success. It was therefore decided to hold the first national election under the republican constitution. About 12,500,000 voters, more than half of them women, cast ballots in November 1933. The result confirmed the general trend towards conservatism. The parties of the Right won 44 per cent of the seats in the Cortes, the Center got 35 per cent, and the Left 21 per cent.

The new Cortes met a few days after the election and Alejandro Lerroux, leader of the Radical Party (Right Center), formed a moderate ministry. Lerroux's program envisaged the payment of pensions to the impoverished members of the clergy, an amnesty for political offenders, reform of the electoral law, and a halt on the further closing of religious schools until sufficient lay teachers were available to meet the needs of the school population. Yet throughout the spring of 1934 the country was torn by strikes and disorders. Now the Reds of various shades rioted because the laws against the church and the landholders were not enforced quickly enough, because religious processions were tolerated during Easter Week for the first time since 1931, and because of the growing strength of conservative agrarian and youth movements. Despite the proclamation of a national "state of alarm" the violence continued and became worse. Finally, Lerroux resigned, to be succeeded for the next five months (May–October 1934) by the moderate Ricardo Samper.

The new premier faced the same difficulties as his predecessor, with several additional ones. Early in 1934 the Catalonian parliament, impatient with the dilatoriness of the legislature at Madrid, had passed some laws hastening the conversion of farm laborers and tenants into owners. These laws were declared unconstitutional by the supreme tribunal on the ground that such legislation could be adopted only by the central government. The authorities at Madrid acclaimed this decision, but Catalonia proceeded to put the laws into effect. At the same time the cabinet had to cope with a bloody independence movement in the Basque Provinces. Samper resigned the premiership, and Lerroux once more shouldered the chief ministerial responsibilities. Within a day he was forced to deal with the worst rebellion that had yet threatened a government under the republic.

The immediate cause of the rebellion was the conservative composition of the Lerroux Cabinet. The radicals, both within parliament and among the people, objected especially to the inclusion in the ministry of several mem-

bers of the Agrarian People's Party. This group was organized early in 1933 by José María Gil Robles, a lawyer and assistant editor of the leading clerical paper. Gil Robles advocated a kind of Catholic Fascism. He was opposed to most of the republic's land reforms, its concessions to labor, the expensive public works, and the extension of local autonomy. Intensely nationalistic and conservative, the party was pledged to the preservation of landed property, the defense of Catholicism, and the eradication of separatism. It drew its main support from the landed classes, industrialists, merchants, small-business men, and devout Catholic peasants and housewives.

When Lerroux offered several cabinet posts to these "Fascists," all radical groups coöperated in a general strike that soon became violent and merged with a desperate attempt by the Catalonian radicals to break away from Spain. "President" Luis Companys declared the independence of Catalonia.[8] The Basque Provinces also renewed the fight for separation. Again the Madrid Government triumphed, with the aid of the army and navy, and at a high cost in blood and money.

Meanwhile Lerroux, strongly backed by the Cortes (many of the radical members of which either were under arrest or refused to sit while martial law was in force), entrenched the position of the Right. The Catalonian Statute of Autonomy was suspended. Madrid assumed responsibility for the policing of Barcelona and other centers of disturbance. A Basque autonomy statute that had earlier been submitted to Madrid for consideration was laid aside. The regular municipal elections were postponed.

CIVIL WAR AND "LITTLE WORLD WAR," 1936–1939

The instability of the centrist ministries during 1935 led President Zamora to dissolve parliament in 1936 and call for new elections. The voters in February had to choose between a leftist and a rightist coalition. The left parties organized a Popular Front. The Center and Right combined in an effort to preserve the country from what they feared might be a proletarian regime.

The Popular Front got 258 seats in the new Cortes; the Center and Right secured the remaining 215 seats. Azaña, leader of the front, became premier at the head of a cabinet composed entirely of republicans. It contained not a single socialist, communist, or syndicalist. Azaña quickly proclaimed an amnesty for political prisoners and ordered the reinstatement of all workers who had been discharged for revolutionary sympathies;

[8] President Macía of Catalonia had died in December 1933.

the employers were to pay compensation for the lost time. While groups of unruly leftists burned churches and convents and attacked monarchist headquarters, the government took steps to restore Catalan autonomy and distribute large areas of land among the peasantry. Seventy thousand peasants had received land by the end of March 1936; but other thousands rose up and occupied many large estates—including two that belonged to the president.

In April 1936 President Zamora was removed from office, mainly because he supported the centrist viewpoint. Azaña was chosen president and Santiago Casares Quiroga became head of a new cabinet that still contained only republican members. The public disorders grew worse, and numerous acts of violence were attributed to the partisans of both Left and Right. The authorities imprisoned many Fascists and ordered the dissolution of the Spanish Phalanx, the most aggressive antigovernment group. The ministry was especially fearful of the restive army men. A decree therefore pensioned all military officers who had participated in politics. Politically minded officers who already were on the retired list lost their pensions, and a general shake-up occurred in the high command. Suspected officers were dismissed or transferred to distant parts. General Francisco Franco, once commander of the Spanish Foreign Legion in Morocco, was "exiled" to the Canary Islands. Clearly the controlling group of general officers was in danger of being rendered impotent. Quick action was necessary if the traditional power of the army was to be upheld.

It was evident, by this time, that the republic was approaching the decisive moment in its career. It had succeeded the monarchy in 1931 because the impoverished population was no longer willing to tolerate the rule of a small minority composed of army officers, estate-owners, clerics, and big industrialists. The reforms of the republic were intended to break the power and wealth of this minority. But they were put into effect at a pace that seemed far too slow for the impatient laborers and peasants. While the tension between Right and Left therefore became ever greater, the government tried to continue along a middle course. In the end, the extremists of each side came to regard force as the surest means of reaching their objectives. It remained only for an "incident" more serious than the rest to precipitate civil war.

About the middle of June 1936, José Calvo Sotelo, a fiery monarchist, launched bitter verbal attacks against the Quiroga Government. He uttered warnings of the army's growing impatience with the inability of the authorities to check popular excesses. There were frequent rumors regarding impending coups of both monarchists and communists. Each group, it was

said, was working feverishly to forestall the plans of the other. Madrid was "a nervous city." When, in July, a leftist police lieutenant in Madrid was murdered, several of his comrades killed Calvo Sotelo. Gil Robles placed responsibility for his death at the government's door. On July 17 several regiments in Spanish Morocco revolted, and civil war began.

General Franco left the Canary Islands and flew to Morocco to head the rebellious forces. With the support of most of the regular army, the Foreign Legion, and some Moorish contingents, he quickly made himself master of Spanish Morocco. Simultaneously garrisons in all parts of Spain mutinied. General Sanjurjo, leader of the unsuccessful monarchist coup in 1932 and apparently once again the choice of the antirepublicans, attempted to fly to Spain from his exile in Portugal. The plane crashed and the general was killed; Franco therefore emerged as the leader of the new movement.

Most of the military and naval officers, a majority of the soldiers, a goodly portion of the Civil Guards (constabulary), the Moorish troops, the Foreign Legion, and civilians of conservative, Fascist, monarchist, and clerical sympathies rallied around Franco's standard.[9] These were reënforced by thousands of well-trained "volunteers" from Italy and Germany and, for a time, from the Irish Free State. The established government could count on only a small part of the organized armed forces, including the military air force and a part of the navy. It had to seek additional aid from the radical labor and peasant groups. This popular militia included many women. The Basques, though strongly Catholic and conservative in sympathies, also generally gave their help to the established authorities, because Franco brought his Moors to fight in Spain. Thousands of foreign sympathizers, especially from the Soviet Union, France, and the United States, fought for the Madrid Government in such units as the International Brigade, the Debs Column, and the Abraham Lincoln Battalion. Finally, there was a sizable contingent of anti-Fascist Germans, Italians, and Poles.

The rebels apparently envisaged rapid victory in three steps: seizure of Spanish Morocco, capture of the provincial capitals, and overthrow of the government in Madrid. The first step was successful, but the others were blocked by the rapid arming and determined resistance of the "masses." Nevertheless, by November 1936 the rebels reached the out-

[9] The followers of Franco soon were called "Rebels," "Fascists," "Nationalists," and "Insurgents." The supporters of the Madrid Government came to be labeled "Loyalists," "Marxists," and "Reds." The only noncommittal terms from the point of view of international law seemed to be "rebels" and "established government."

skirts of Madrid, and the established government transferred its seat to Valencia. Germany and Italy thereupon recognized the Franco Government. Its leader came to be known as *El Caudillo,* "the Chief."

In the meantime several "loyalist" premiers had risen and fallen, until Francisco Largo Caballero assumed the chief portfolio in September. He unified the military command and converted the several proletarian units into a disciplined army. Being himself a socialist, he appointed several other socialists and two communists to his cabinet. Thus it was not until seven weeks after the civil war began that even socialists were included in the cabinet. The government's increasing dependence upon left-wing support as the fighting was prolonged made necessary the admission of decided leftists into the ministry. Once this process had started it was hard to go back. Indeed, after two months, Caballero, anxious to obtain the fullest support of Catalonia, assigned several cabinet portfolios to syndicalists. The established government now really *was* a Red government; it had not been so when the rebels first attempted to seize control.

Following a revolt of anarchists in Barcelona, the Caballero Ministry resigned (1937). It was succeeded by a more moderate one under Juan Negrín, a right-wing socialist and former finance minister. Thereafter the government, moving to Barcelona, followed a more conservative pattern, even the communists agreeing that social revolution should be subordinated to the successful termination of the war.

The defense of the established government stiffened materially once the rebels reached the limits of Madrid. Thus far the Franco Government had been the chief beneficiary of military supplies, especially planes and tanks, sent to Spain from Italy and Germany. Now, however, the "Loyalists" also received considerable aid of a similar type, from the Soviet Union. The Madrid forces, commanded by General José Miaja, repulsed the rebel attack and during 1937 pushed the "Nationalists" back to a safer distance. The Italian troops with Franco were badly defeated at Brihuega, on the Guadalajara front.

The year 1938 was definitely more favorable, from both the military and diplomatic viewpoints, to the "Insurgents" than the "Loyalists." The air superiority and tank equipment that Franco owed to the Italians and Germans, and the food shortage that affected chiefly the Barcelona Government areas, began to tell decisively. Just before Christmas 1938 Franco prepared what was to prove the major offensive of the war. Having as its objective the city of Barcelona itself, the campaign was bitterly fought for a month. Then the "Loyalist" capital fell. The end of February 1939 saw the resignation of President Azaña and the recognition of the Franco regime

by Great Britain and France. In March, Franco's soldiers at last entered Madrid and all remaining "Loyalist" strongholds capitulated. Franco had won, after more than 32 months of bitter fighting.

Besides the long-term task of reconstructing war-torn, impoverished Spain, Franco faced certain vital immediate problems. These included feeding the starving populace; getting rid of the thousands of Italians, Germans, and Portuguese who had helped him to victory; demobilization; establishing a provisional government; negotiating with France over the future status of about 300,000 refugees who had gone or been driven northward across the Pyrenees; "settling accounts" with "Loyalist" sympathizers and soldiers; and rebuilding as quickly as possible roads, railroads, bridges, public buildings, and factories that had been destroyed during the period of hostilities.

The foreign soldiers gradually departed, following the holding of a great "victory parade" in Madrid.[10] Man power for public works was procured through the imposition of labor service upon all males between 18 and 50 and the use of concentration-camp inmates. The council of the Spanish Phalanx met under Franco's presidency and drafted plans for the creation of a political and economic structure based on the Italian Fascist model. The repatriation of refugees was begun, and arrangements were made with France for the return of money and art objects earlier shipped northward by the "Loyalists." Wholesale arrests were instituted against the "enemies" of the civil-war days. There were executions and there were jail sentences—the latter often with the opportunity to achieve "redemption through the penalty of labor" on public projects.

The "we or they" attitude in international politics had become sufficiently crystallized by the summer of 1936 so that the outbreak of civil war in Spain threatened to precipitate another general war. The Fascist states, including Portugal under President Antonio Oscar de Fragosa Carmona and Premier Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, feared the rise of another "Bolshevik" state in Europe and hence determined to help Franco. Strategic and economic reasons were equally present with ideological ones. Italy and Germany felt that a Fascist Spain would strengthen their own influence, while a radical Spain would be of advantage to France and the Soviet Union. It was hoped, presumably, that the rebels, if victorious, would be generous in granting concessions to develop Spain's coal, copper, iron, and other

[10] In June 1939 the official journal of the Italian armed forces carried an article on Italy's military assistance to Franco. According to this report Italy sent 100,000 men to Spain. The activity of the Italian navy involved 149 vessels engaged on 870 missions. In February 1941 Mussolini sent Franco a "bill" for $275,000,000. It was not paid.

mineral resources. Finally, the triumph of a Fascist government friendly to Italy might strengthen the latter's pretensions to control in the western Mediterranean.

To forestall the eventualities contemplated by Mussolini and Hitler, the Soviet Union decided to assist the established authorities. France and Great Britain attempted, at least in the beginning, to steer a middle course. They were willing, for the sake of general peace, to forego their legal right to permit the sale of arms to the established government, but they also refused to accord rights of belligerency to the rebels. In Great Britain many persons, including some with investments in Spain, were less opposed to the "rebel" than the "Loyalist" economic views. The British Labor Party and the trade-unions, on the other hand, sympathized with the established government. Official Great Britain preferred to avoid any unnecessary entanglements at least until its rearmament program should have been completed. The French Government sided emotionally with the "Loyalists," but Premier Blum undertook to follow the lead of London, being convinced that only a policy of nonintervention would prevent Italy and Germany from openly interfering on behalf of the rebels. In August 1936, accordingly, France proposed a European agreement to ship neither arms nor ammunition to either party in the civil war.

Eventually, 27 European states, including all the great powers, agreed to set up in London an "International Committee for the Application of the Agreement Regarding Nonintervention in Spain." The committee held frequent meetings and was kept busy examining charges by the Soviet Union against Portugal, Italy, and Germany, and reciprocal charges by these powers against the Moscow Government. Since the committee did little more than examine these charges, a steady flow of supplies entered Spain. When it became apparent that not merely supplies but soldiers and pilots were being sent to Spain, France and Great Britain suggested the extension of the nonintervention agreement to cover foreign "volunteers" as well as weapons. In February 1937 such a ban became (theoretically) effective.

The nonintervention committee also took up the question of withdrawal of "volunteers" already in Spain. While the discussions were in progress there occurred a series of submarine attacks on neutral merchant vessels carrying cargoes for the Barcelona Government through the Mediterranean. Suspicion centered on Italy, and Moscow openly accused Italian submarines of having torpedoed two Soviet freighters. This new form of piracy led Great Britain and France to call a conference of powers to meet at Nyon, near Geneva. Germany and Italy refused to attend because the

Soviet Union did attend, but in September 1937 a Nyon Agreement was signed by nine states. An international patrol was established, and patrol zones were assigned to several signatories, with Great Britain and France undertaking to do most of the supervising. Eventually Rome also joined the "piracy patrol," and the submarine attacks ceased.

During the entire year 1938 the nonintervention committee tried to find a satisfactory formula for the withdrawal of the foreign "volunteers," but the last German and Italian fighters did not quit Spain until several weeks after the civil war was ended. Just before their departure, and coincident with Italy's occupation of Albania, Spain signed (April 1939) the Anti-Comintern Pact originally negotiated by Germany and Japan. Thus did the "Little World War" end in victory for the axis.

CHAPTER 9

Germany

FROM EMPIRE TO REPUBLIC

When the German Government in 1914 appealed to the Reichstag for war credits, all parties voted favorably. This support during a national crisis was not meant as an endorsement of the general peacetime policies of the government. There was considerable opposition in the empire to a number of arrangements. The chancellor was responsible to the emperor rather than to the lower house. The members of the upper house were appointed by and responsible to the rulers, not the people, of the federated states. As king of Prussia, the emperor virtually controlled the upper house which, moreover, had greater powers than the Reichstag. Criticism was leveled at the franchise in Prussia, where the wealthy citizens had more voting power than the poor ones. Social legislation had not kept pace with the needs of the twentieth century. It was despite these grievances that most Germans in 1914 rallied to the support of the fatherland against the foreign foe.

As the war continued, an increasing number of Germans, especially socialists, began to regard the struggle as imperialistic rather than defensive. A split in the ranks of the Social Democratic Party was evident by the spring of 1915. The majority, headed by Friedrich Ebert and Philipp Scheidemann, believed in continuing support of the war; the minority, led by Hugo Haase, opposed the granting of further war credits. Early in 1916 Haase announced in the Reichstag that his followers were opposed to any prolongation of the conflict, and a year later these men organized the

Independent Social Democratic Party, favoring immediate peace without annexations.

Some radicals regarded even Haase's group as too conservative. Led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, these communists denounced the war and advocated the forceful establishment of a proletarian dictatorship. In 1916 Liebknecht began to publish denunciatory letters over the signature "Spartacus," and his followers came to be known as Spartacists. The eventual imprisonment of the Spartacist leaders failed to lessen the agitation, particularly since the apparent inability of the army to win victory eventually alienated the affections of even the Majority Socialists and the Catholic Center Party under Matthias Erzberger.

Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, who had been in office since 1909, resigned in July 1917. His immediate successors were no more able than he had been to report victory or improve bad harvests. Finally, Prince Max of Baden organized (October 1918) a moderate coalition. Two Majority Socialists, Scheidemann and Gustav Bauer, were included in the cabinet. Prince Max was determined to grant widespread reform in order to save the tottering throne of the Hohenzollerns, for by the time of his appointment the discontent had become ominous.

The Allied blockade worked havoc with the German food supply. The situation was made worse by bad harvests, particularly during the "turnip year" 1916–1917. The masses starved and froze. Profiteering reached unprecedented heights. The Russian revolutions of 1917 set a tempting example to some people, and Russian agents spread subversive propaganda. Already in 1916 there had been a munitions strike. Though sternly suppressed, it was followed by a second strike in 1917 and a third in January 1918. Half a million persons in Berlin and Essen quit work on this last occasion for more than a week. The government dealt harshly with the leaders, and many of the men who had hitherto been exempt from military service because of occupation in the essential industries were sent to the front. Here they helped spread the idea of revolt among the soldiers.

The German navy, too, had become restless. It had been cooped up in the harbors with little for the sailors to do but discuss revolutionary doctrine and acquire a dislike for the officers. The latter themselves chafed under the prolonged inactivity, and many of them vainly petitioned the emperor for commissions in the army. Meanwhile it had become evident to many that Great Britain would not be starved out by the submarine campaign and that United States participation in the war would assume gigantic proportions.

When General Erich F. W. Ludendorff's great drives of 1918 col-

lapsed, the army appeared ready to quit fighting and go home. Prince Max now rushed through a number of reforms which converted Germany into a constitutional monarchy. The emperor was made a mere symbol of unity. Ministerial responsibility was introduced, and the Reichstag given control over war and peace. Freedom of speech, press, and assembly was granted, and an amnesty declared for political prisoners. Electoral reform was promised in Prussia. Finally, Max began to negotiate with Wilson for an armistice. He emphasized that the new German administration was a government "of the people, in whose hands rested both actually and constitutionally the authority to make decisions."

From October 1918 voice was frequently given to the idea that the emperor should abdicate, for Wilson insisted that as long as the imperial government was in power he would not discuss peace negotiations. On October 23 Haase demanded before the Reichstag that the emperor abdicate. The newspapers quickly took up the cry and on the evening of the twenty-ninth, Scheidemann, as leader of the Majority Socialists, requested Prince Max to get William's abdication. That night the emperor went from Berlin to the army headquarters at Spa, ostensibly to escape the influenza danger.

Meanwhile a disaster had occurred (October 28) at the naval base at Kiel. When the rumor spread that armistice negotiations would probably result in a surrender of the German fleet, the officers determined to forestall such an event. They preferred to seek an honorable death in an unexpected —and possibly successful—attack upon the British fleet. But the 80,000 sailors who would have been involved in this maneuver had no desire to become dead heroes. They refused to participate in a wholesale suicidal venture. Mutiny resulted, attended by arrests, shootings, and the raising of red flags. The spirit of revolt spread to the workers at Kiel, where revolutionary councils demanded the abdication of the Hohenzollerns and amnesty for the leaders of earlier mutinies. Other cities followed the example of Kiel, and soon the demand for a republic was general along the north-German coast.

The government hoped in vain to keep the remainder of the country ignorant of these developments. At a demonstration held in Munich on November 7, an Independent-Socialist editor, Kurt Eisner, demanded the overthrow of the Bavarian dynasty. The Wittelsbach family fled and, on the eighth, a "democratic and social republic" was set up in Bavaria with Eisner as its head. Similar republican proclamations were issued in Berlin and the chief industrial centers of the land. Indeed, the movement was so widespread as to be accompanied by relatively little disorder. The leaders

of the Majority Socialists, fearing the loss of followers to the more radical Independents, now warned Max that, unless the emperor abdicated, they would resign from the government and declare a general strike. Max, hoping to save the monarchy for the Hohenzollern family if not for William II, labored to secure the latter's abdication in favor of the infant son of the crown prince.

William, at Spa, refused to listen to the chancellor's entreaties. He expected the army to aid him in retaining the imperial crown. Eventually, however, the General Staff convinced him that the army would not fight the German people. At a conference of November 9 even Field Marshal Hindenburg agreed that abdication appeared the wisest step. Just as Ebert and Scheidemann called at the chancellor's palace to announce the expiration of the socialists' ultimatum, Max was informed that the formula of abdication was being considered. When, therefore, Ebert promised to maintain order and call a constituent assembly, Max felt justified in surrendering the government into his hands.

Early on November 10 William fled to the Netherlands. Not until November 28, however, did William send in a full abdication in his name and that of the family. By that time all the other German princes had fled, and the empire had been converted into a federation of republican states, provisionally governed by a Council of People's Commissars composed of three Majority and three Independent Socialists under the joint chairmanship of Ebert and Haase. The commissars besought the people to maintain order and protect private property. Most officials of the former imperial service continued to serve the new government, but the Spartacists refused to coöperate. They were as much opposed to a social-democratic republic as they had been to the empire. Through acts of terrorism they strove to prevent the calling of a national constituent assembly until such time as their tactics should have cowed a sufficiently large number of citizens into accepting the ideal of a communist regime.

It would seem that in the presence of such an enemy the Majority and Independent Socialists, who had split chiefly over the question of ending the war, might have become reunited. But during the period of estrangement the Independents had become more radical. They now favored the rapid nationalization of industry and the postponement of constituent elections until the socialistic rule should have become entrenched beyond possibility of upset. The Majority favored slower nationalization, urged compensation for property owners, and desired an early expression of popular sentiment through the ballot.

The question of an election date finally was settled by a national

congress of councils. In imitation of organizations formed by soldiers and workers in Munich and Berlin, local councils had appeared all over Germany. Frequently they had assumed governmental powers. In December 1918 a national gathering of these councils was held. The congress excluded communists, and decided upon January 19, 1919, for the constituent elections. The angry communists stirred up the sailors and marines in Berlin to revolt. When force was used to subdue the rebels, the Independent Socialists withdrew from all official posts. This enabled the Majority Socialists to fill the vacancies, even those in the Council of Commissars, with loyal supporters.

While awaiting election day, the commissars had to complete the demobilization of the returned troops, stave off starvation despite the continuing Allied blockade, institute some immediate economic and social changes, and hold in check the extremists of both Right and Left. The ingrained desire of many Germans for law and order, their patriotism, and their willingness to accept any government which gave promise of being able to function smoothly, rendered the problem of internal control less difficult than might have been expected. Yet, in anticipation of trouble from the Spartacists, the commissars held ready a well-equipped force of about 3000, commanded by ex-imperial officers.

The Spartacists, meanwhile, had formed armed bands which roamed the streets of the larger cities, ready for violence at any moment. The "voice" of these extremists was "Spartacus" Liebknecht himself. Nothing short of outright communism would satisfy him. The "brain" of the movement was the crippled Rosa Luxemburg. The communists chose January 6, 1919, for a supreme effort to oust the government.

On that day a vast crowd of armed workmen of Spartacist and Independent Socialist sympathies assembled in the center of Berlin. Had these men been resolutely led, the government might have fallen without resistance. The commissars, themselves recruited largely from the laboring classes, dreaded to use troops against their kind. One after another they refused the responsibility of dealing with the situation, until finally Gustav Noske accepted the task. "All right," he was reported as saying, "someone must be the bloodhound. I do not shirk the responsibility." An experienced strike-organizer, Noske was not afraid to deal with workers, but he had only a few thousand men with whom to face the mob. Fortunately for the government, the radical leaders failed their disciples at the crucial moment. They spent the day deliberating, until the crowds, cold and hungry, went home. Thereafter skirmishes between communist bands and the police or military continued daily until January 15, when both Liebknecht and

Luxemburg were arrested and killed on the way to prison. The Spartacist movement collapsed. On January 19 elections for the national assembly took place in an atmosphere of relative quiet.

Thirty million of the eligible 35,000,000 men and women over 19 voted, on a basis of proportional representation. By the time of the elections the old political parties had all been reorganized. The Conservatives had been reconstructed on a monarchist platform as the German National People's Party (Nationalists). The right wing National Liberals, chiefly businessmen, had been re-formed under Gustav Stresemann as the German People's Party. Though preferring a monarchy, this group supported the republic in the interests of order and unity. The Centrists, under Matthias Erzberger, favored a democratic republic, a bill of rights, and social legislation. The left-wing National Liberals and the Progressives united to form a new Democratic Party led by the banker, Hjalmar Schacht. They favored a republic, opposed a return of the military bureaucracy, promised legal guarantees for workmen, and advocated prosecution of the war profiteers. The Majority Socialists readopted the name of Social Democrats and continued to urge the gradual socialization of industry and property, while the Independent Socialists urged a more rapid nationalization process. The Spartacists, taking the name of German Communist Party, refused to participate in the elections.

When the returns were counted, the Social Democrats, with 163 out of the available 421 seats, became the largest single group in the assembly. The Centrists received 88 seats, the Democrats 75, the Nationalists 42, the Independent Socialists 22, and the People's Party 21. The remaining ten seats went to four minor parties. Thirty-six women were elected. To protect the gathering against violence, Ebert convoked the assembly for February 6 in the peaceful city of Weimar.

The assembly met on the appointed day and adopted a previously drafted provisional constitution as its basis for government. Thereupon the commissars surrendered their powers and a "Weimar Coalition" of Social Democrats, Centrists, and Democrats became the official government. Friedrich Ebert was chosen president of the republic. Ebert was an ex-saddler from Heidelberg who had come into prominence as coleader with Scheidemann of the moderate socialists. Upon assuming office he declared that he would regard himself as "the authorized representative of the entire German people, not as leader of a single party." Scheidemann became chancellor.

The assembly faced the threefold task of putting down internal opposition, concluding peace with the Allies, and drafting a permanent consti-

tution. Noske, as minister of home defense, attended to the first of these duties. There were violent strikes and there was much fighting. In Munich a communist government was established after a nationalist had murdered Kurt Eisner. Noske decided once and for all to "settle accounts with the lunatics," and with the aid of some former army officers crushed the radical movement by the summer of 1919.

The conclusion of peace proved to be more difficult. The various factions in the assembly spent much time accusing one another of having lost the war, and no group was prepared to accept the treaty as it was presented in May by the Allies. Scheidemann resigned the chancellorship rather than agree to the document. But in view of the severity of the punishment threatened by the Allies if the assembly rejected the terms, a majority of the delegates on June 23 agreed to the treaty. The final task of the assembly was completed in July 1919 with the adoption of a constitution. The document was based upon a draft made by Professor Hugo Preuss, a Democrat in politics and an opponent of states' rights. In the final balloting the Social Democrats, Centrists, and Democrats voted for the constitution, while the Independent Socialists, the People's Party, and the Nationalists opposed it.

The constitution defined the Reich as a federation of republican states called *Länder*.[1] The national government was given the usual powers of a central authority plus the paramount right to legislate upon railway and water traffic, the care of the poor, the protection of mothers, widows, and orphans, the protection of the flora and fauna, the use of natural resources, insurance, education, the protection of workmen, and the cinema. There was a bill of rights, and the suffrage was accorded to all men and women over 20 on a basis of proportional representation.

A president was to be elected by popular vote for seven years, without restriction as to reëlection. He might be removed by a popular referendum following impeachment by a two-thirds vote in the lower house. There was no provision for a vice-president. No action of the president was valid unless countersigned by the chancellor or appropriate minister. He might dismiss the Reichstag, although any particular pretext for such action was not to be used more than once, and new elections had to be held within sixty days. In time of emergency the president, acting with the chancellor, might suspend certain constitutional guarantees and issue decrees with the force of law (Article 48).[2]

[1] In 1920 there were 18 such Länder, but in 1929 Prussia annexed Waldeck and there remained 17.

[2] Legally the Reichstag could demand the repeal of any such measures, but in prac-

The chancellor was empowered to formulate policy and select the cabinet. The ministers did not need to be members of parliament, but they were made responsible to the Reichstag. Resignation of the cabinet had to follow only upon a specific vote of lack of confidence. A supreme court, sitting at Leipzig, was set up chiefly as a tribunal of appeals to ensure uniform interpretation of the national laws.

The chief legislative body was the Reichstag, with members elected for four years. After 1920 elections were held under the Baden system of proportional representation, whereby each party secured one deputy for every 60,000 votes that it polled. Since the number of voters fluctuated, the number of deputies changed with each election. This plan safeguarded the rights of minorities, but it had important defects. The delegates were elected in the order in which their names appeared on the party lists, and the top names had the best chance of victory. There was little contact between candidates and electors, since the latter voted for a party list rather than a personality. The political machines thus were able to keep their favorites in office. Finally, the system resulted in the appearance of more than a score of parties and the consequent inability of any one of them, at least until the advent of the National Socialists in 1933, to get a majority. The resultant inefficiency in legislation was grist to the mill of the Nazi propagandists.

The upper house, representing the states, was labeled the *Reichsrat*. It might hold up, but it could not veto, general laws passed by the Reichstag. Its consent, however, was necessary for the passage of any measure affecting the states as such. Each state was entitled to at least one delegate in the Reichsrat, and the larger states had one for every 700,000 of their population. Yet, lest Prussia secure a preponderating influence, it was provided that no state might have more than two-fifths of the total representation. The delegates to the Reichsrat were members of the various state cabinets and were paid by the state governments. In contrast to the Reichstag, the upper house did not die, although its composition changed frequently.

There was no state-supported church in the Reich, and religious freedom was guaranteed. Teachers became public officials. School attendance was made compulsory until the age of eighteen. Private schools were

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tice this was rarely done. In its effort to fight the depression, the Berlin Government eventually issued several hundred emergency decrees. Indeed, from 1930 to 1933 Germany was ruled under a "constitutional dictatorship," for in that period presidential emergency decrees virtually replaced parliamentary legislation.

tolerated only in exceptional cases and for religious instruction. Private business enterprises adapted for socialization might be transferred to public ownership upon payment of compensation. Provision was made for state insurance systems against sickness, accident, old age, and unemployment.

With the adoption of the constitution, the work for which the assembly had been called was completed. Instead of dissolving itself, however, that body moved to the Reichstag building in Berlin and proclaimed itself the official legislative organ of the republic. President Ebert's term of office was extended, and eventually continued by a regularly elected Reichstag until 1925.

For some time after the adoption of the constitution, the republic was in danger. While the government had concentrated its energies upon suppressing the communists, opportunity had been taken by rightist die-hards to form strong monarchist organizations such as the *Stahlhelm* (Steel Helmet). The monarchists had a long list of grievances against the republicans. It was rumored that cowardly republicans had made defeat inevitable by undermining the military power of the empire during the last months of the war. The Weimar Assembly was attacked for accepting the "Versailles Dictate" and for permitting Allied commissions to "overrun" the country. Some individuals feared that the authorities might surrender "war criminals" to the Allies for trial. Finally, it was charged that the assembly had refused to call regular elections, lest Hindenburg be elected to the highest office and the way thus paved for a monarchist restoration.

In March 1920 came an attempted *Putsch* or coup planned by Dr. Wolfgang Kapp. The latter, a New Yorker by birth and founder of a successful Prussian bank, had gained some notoriety during the war for a fierce attack upon Bethmann Hollweg's policies. General Walther von Lüttwitz, commandant of Berlin, and a Major Waldemar Pabst fell in with Kapp's scheme for a forceful restoration of monarchy. The three men placed themselves at the head of 8000 soldiers and early one morning marched the dozen miles from the military barracks to Berlin. Noske had only 2000 men to oppose the plotters, and the government fled to Dresden.

Kapp failed to make the most of his opportunities. Instead of playing the strong man he tried to conciliate his opponents. The chief factor in the overthrow of his regime of a week, however, was the attitude of the laborers. Heeding a manifesto by Ebert, the workmen throughout the land went on a general strike. The water, gas, electricity, and tramway services were tied up, and the railways were operated only where it was necessary

to do so lest the people be made to suffer undue hardship. Kapp fled to Sweden. He soon returned and surrendered to the authorities, only to die in prison while awaiting trial (1922). Lüttwitz and Pabst found refuge abroad.

The immediate danger of overthrow by the Right was past, but the government soon was faced with renewed attacks from the Left. The Independent Socialists urged the workers to continue the general strike until the hated Noske (who had organized the armed forces against the workmen) resigned, until the government's army was disbanded, and until regular elections for a Reichstag were called. Under such pressure the government accepted the resignation of Noske and set a date in June 1920 for parliamentary elections.

In these elections the strength of the groups which had formed the Weimar Coalition fell by more than 100 seats. The Nationalists, People's Party, and Independent Socialists all gained seats, while the Communist Party elected two delegates. In the first regularly elected Reichstag, accordingly, a coalition government was organized representing the People's Party, Centrists, and Democrats. Konstantin Fehrenbach, a Centrist who had been president of the Weimar Assembly, became chancellor.

The Kapp affair did not end the attempts of reactionaries to avenge the "betrayal" of the fatherland. They instituted a reign of terror against persons connected with the signing of the peace treaty, persons who gave aid to the Allied commissions in Germany, and individuals prominently identified with socialism. Jews and Catholics were attacked, and attempts were made upon the lives of Ebert and Scheidemann. The Centrist leader, Erzberger, who in 1917 had urged peace without annexations, was killed in 1921. In 1922 Walther Rathenau, successful industrialist, political philosopher, and efficient cabinet officer, was assassinated. The government replied to these acts by suspending the constitutional guarantees, but the agitation continued.

In November 1923 another coup, the Ludendorff-Hitler *Putsch,* was attempted from Munich. General Ludendorff and Adolf Hitler, of whom more later, planned to seize the government. Their scheme conflicted with the aims of a second group of Bavarian conspirators led by Gustav von Kahr, with the result that the plotters began to fight among themselves. Several leaders of this "beer-hall rebellion" were jailed, and the harassed authorities once more turned to the other problems that confronted the state. The more perplexing of these were reparation, the occupation of the Ruhr, separatist movements in the Rhineland and Bavaria, the drop in value of the mark, increasing unemployment, and a hungry populace. Economic

ties and patriotism acted as strong cohesive forces, else Germany might have crumbled into bits.[3]

INFLATION, DISILLUSIONMENT, HOPE

The German Government had been so confident of an early and successful conclusion of the war that little attention had been paid to increased taxation as a means of meeting the war expenditures. Instead, the authorities had relied upon the sale of war bonds and upon the printing press. Eventually the tax rates *were* raised and emergency sources of income created, but Germany financed only about 5 per cent of her war costs by direct levy, whereas Great Britain, for example, provided in that manner for 20 per cent of the extraordinary expenditures. At the end of the war there were almost five times as many marks in circulation as in 1913. Yet, because the world was ignorant of the facts and because there was for a time strong belief in the ability of Germany to recover quickly, the mark at the close of 1918 still was quoted at half of its par value—at 12 instead of 23.82 cents.

This situation could not last long. When the laws that had established maximum prices during the war lapsed, prices began to soar in proportion to the abundance of currency in circulation. The shortage of gold now became apparent with the realization that Germany's wartime adverse trade balance had amounted to $12,000,000,000. The raw-material reserves were at a low point, and the economic structure of the land was dislocated, for nearly every industry had been reorganized to serve the military exigency. In the face of curtailed credits, unfavorable trade balances, and reparation payments, the Germans, in order to get foodstuffs and raw products, resorted to paper money.

Even in this critical situation the government hesitated to tax more heavily, and realty and income-tax assessments were based upon the fluctuating paper mark instead of upon gold. Thus tax payments, when they fell due, had a lower real value than had been anticipated at the time of assessment. The circle of mounting deficits and further inflation became increasingly vicious with each passing month. By November 1922 a dollar, normally worth 4.2 marks, would purchase 7000 marks.

The crisis was heightened during the foreign occupation of the Ruhr. The seizure by the French of billions of Reichsbank notes and the attempt of the German Government to subsidize (through the printing press) the

[3] In 1922 the Social Democrats and Independent Socialists reunited and pledged themselves to preserve the republic.

patriotically idle workers of the occupied region completely destroyed the value of the currency. Only a miracle could have stopped the "toboggan slide" of the mark, and no miracle occurred. The mark, standing at 160,000 to the dollar early in July 1923, fell by the end of the month to more than 1,000,000 to the dollar. The printers found it difficult to meet the demand for paper notes, especially since 90 per cent of the government's revenue in the summer of 1923 was acquired by the simple process of assigning money value to scraps of paper. Late in 1923 the government owed the Reichsbank about 190 quintillion (190,000,000,000,000,000,000) marks.

When the paper-money fever was at its height the Reichsbank kept 1783 printing presses busy to meet the demand for notes. The middle of November 1923 saw the mark quoted at 2.5 trillion to the dollar in Berlin. Milk sold for 250 billion marks a quart and was scarce at that price. Even private firms and individuals printed "emergency money." Eventually it became difficult to assign high enough values to the notes to cover the cost of paper and printing.[4]

The results of this debacle were terrible. It became almost impossible to negotiate loans or make contracts. The middle class suffered most, since its debtors seized the opportunity to retire bonds, lift mortgages, and pay notes. Hitherto-comfortable incomes from investments and savings became worthless, and many persons who had expected to live on their incomes found themselves obliged to seek employment in an overcrowded labor market. Trade-unions, their funds worthless, were unable to fulfill their ordinary functions. Many industrialists, on the other hand, benefited by the cheap labor and cheap cost of materials and invested their financial surpluses in foreign securities. People hoarded goods and sought to exchange their marks for commodities having a more stable value, thus causing a veritable "flight from marks to goods."

In the autumn of 1923 the German people virtually repudiated the mark, and conditions became worse than at any time during the war. Peasants refused to take their products to the cities; merchants closed their shops; there was no standard of wages, and the rise in wages lagged far behind the increase in prices; thousands of war cripples and persons who had expected to live on fixed incomes faced starvation. Hunger riots became common, and the chaos was made worse by the activities of foreign troops in the Ruhr, by separatist movements in the Rhineland and Bavaria, and by the rise to power of communists in Saxony and elsewhere. National

[4] At its peak, the note circulation of marks exceeded 400 quintillion. The equivalent of this stupendous figure in dollars was only 60 million.

cabinets rose and fell with monotonous frequency, and the country appeared on the verge of collapse.

Lest Germany fall into complete dissolution, the authorities decided (October 1923) to launch one last, desperate program whereby the people were to lift themselves out of the mire "by the hair of the head like Munchausen." A new currency and new bank of issue were to be created, the budget was to be balanced, and a partial restoration of industry brought about. The men who were asked to perform these deeds were Finance Minister Dr. Hans Luther and Dr. Schacht. Equipped with emergency powers, these men stabilized the mark—though again at a disastrous cost to many Germans and to foreign speculators.

The printing of paper currency was halted. A *Rentenbank* was opened and empowered to issue *Rentenmarks* with an assigned par value equal to that of the prewar gold mark. Coverage was provided by a blanket mortgage on the national wealth of Germany. Altogether, 3,200,000,000 of these marks were issued, this being about half of the amount of Germany's prewar currency circulation. The Rentenmark was circulated along with the paper marks at a ratio of 1 to 1 trillion. Thus "there was created out of nothing . . . a currency which was kept stable by the confidence of the people."

The budget was balanced by ruthless measures. War claims were rejected, and thousands of public employees, many of whom had received lifetime appointments, were dismissed with little or no compensation.[5] Salaries were cut sharply. The government raised the tax rates, calculated tax payments on a gold basis, and instituted a better system of collection.

Many of these acts had to be repealed or modified later, but not until they had served their immediate purpose—not until the budget had been balanced and inflation stopped. Conditions also became easier when the Dawes Plan went into effect in September 1924, Germany got a large foreign loan, and the Ruhr was evacuated. A new Reichsbank then was created to take the place of the Rentenbank, and a *Reichsmark* was substituted for the Rentenmark. Until mid-1925 paper marks were redeemable at the rate of one trillion to one Reichsmark. The distress was not yet over, but a measure of stability and confidence was restored, and the path to economic recovery was made less thorny.

Small wonder, in view of all this, that in the years immediately follow-

[5] The Reich dismissed about 330,000 persons in all services, including the railway and postal systems; the states and municipalities dismissed 400,000 more. Many of these people later became Nazis.

ing the war a wave of pessimism swept over the German people. In their defeat it seemed to them that civilization was coming to an end. Many a thinker could find refuge and solace only in metaphysical speculation and mysticism. As if by predestination there were available to the spiritual pessimists a number of relevant philosophical treatises.

One of these works was the two-volume *Travel Diary of a Philosopher* by Hermann von Keyserling. Although the first volume was in the hands of the printer in 1914 and the second was merely revised during the war years, the completed work did not appear until 1919. Unable further to sustain a lively interest in Europe and eager to "let fresh influences play upon" him, Keyserling had undertaken a leisurely journey around the world. His observations on the trip confirmed him in his belief in the supremacy of the soul and the preëminent virtue of spiritual perfection. The diary praised the contemplative, unhurried life of Asia while indicting the bustling West which "recognized nothing to be unchangeable" and which "expressed its values in quantitative terms."

The philosopher, however, was enough Westerner to see good in individualism. The "new man" whom he wished to see arise was to be an idealistic individualist, a man who would "blend the inwardness of Asia with the vigor of Christian Europe." Wisdom, not knowledge, Keyserling thought, was necessary to save Western civilization. So great was the popular response to these ideas, at least for a time, that the volumes sold in tens of thousands, and a School of Wisdom was founded and endowed at Darmstadt for the training of sages.

Of even greater importance than the *Diary* to those who were pessimistic of the future was Oswald Spengler's *The Decline of the West.* Although this work, too, was conceived before the outbreak of the war and completed late in 1917 while German armies still were winning victories, it suited well the disillusioned, despairing Germany of 1919 and after. Displaying erudition in philosophy, literature, history, mathematics, and art, the book had for its theme the cyclic character of the historic process. History was regarded as a succession of civilization cycles, each with its birth in a spring and its death in a winter. The end of each cycle was as inexorable as its beginning. Three such periods had already come and gone: the Indian (beginning about 1800 B.C.), the Antique (from about 900 B.C.), and the Arabian (ushered in with the Christian and Moslem eras). The Western, dating from 900 A.D., now was in its winter and was doomed to die ere many more centuries passed. Then "there will be no more Western culture, no more German, English, or French." *The Decline of the West,* widely regarded as a well-founded prophecy of the downfall

of Western supremacy, achieved a considerable vogue. In it, the gloomy found confirmation of their fears, and the disillusioned, proof of the futility of things.

Books of pessimism and fatalism were not alone in popularity in post-war Germany. Volumes on the causes of the war, on how it might have been prevented, and on how it might have been won sold by the hundreds of thousands. There was a flood of memoirs, especially from officials who tried to justify their past actions and from persons who had been connected with the imperial household. Although Wilson was a much-discussed personality, no full-length German biography of him appeared until a decade after the signing of the peace treaty.

Descriptions of the war and of life at the front appeared in great quantities, and many went through numerous editions. Erich Maria Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front* (1929), and then his more mature *The Road Back* (1931), took the country by storm. Psychological novels and psychoanalytical studies led the lists of best sellers; and plays, in order to be successful, generally had to be tragic and horrible. In art, too, this spirit was reflected, and "expressionism" or "direct action in art" was carried farther in Germany than elsewhere. Somber, geometrical, and bizarre representations of machinery, death, fate, and mental disorders, were all the fashion. Truly it was a gloomy period in the history of the German mind. "Night falls over Europe," said Walther Rathenau, shortly before his assassination in the streets of Berlin.

The despair which was so characteristic of the middle-aged and older people in Germany—those whose dreams of a settled future had been blasted by the war—was not common among the younger persons. Their plans had not been upset, nor their calculations destroyed. They merely reflected upon the hunger, the privations, the restraints of the war period, and they regarded peace as a cause for optimism. This group believed that its elders had brought on the war by a blind groping in the dark, the result of silly conventions and old-fashioned ideas. But the younger people were made of different stuff. They would not be led blindfold along the path of destruction. They would know how to handle themselves in a future crisis.

As after the humiliation of Prussia by Napoleon in 1806, German youth now felt that regeneration depended upon a higher mental and physical development of the nation. The free, simple life of the ancient Germans, *that* was the cure for despondency and national lethargy. Gymnastics, forest air, sunshine, song, these were needed to revive faith and hope. Accordingly, organized youth movements, which had made some progress before 1914,

aroused renewed interest and attracted millions of recruits. Moreover, just as the ancestral Germans loved their contests of strength and agility, so modern youth chose athletics as the outlet for its restless energies. In every field the Germans strove to achieve superiority over the athletes of other nations.

The movement had its weaknesses. Sometimes freedom was confused with license. There was a tendency among some of the younger set to flout authority and to sneer at age. Many of the youth organizations became identified with political, religious, or class groups, and often strife ensued where brotherliness should have prevailed. The bad economic situation and the increasing ill will manifested among nations after 1929 led more and more of the growing young men and women to wonder if, after all, their optimism was justified. Eventually, many of them turned willing ears to the blandishments of the new prophets in brown shirts—of the followers of Adolf Hitler.

PARTIES AND POLITICS, 1924–1932

In 1924 the Reichstag that had been elected in 1920 was dissolved. During its session, four chancellors had striven to give stability to the republic. In the elections of 1924, however, the moderate parties with which these men were affiliated lost heavily, while the extremists, Right and Left, made sizable gains. Chancellor Wilhelm Marx (Centrist) therefore resigned, but eventually effected another moderate coalition. When, in order to pass certain railway legislation required by the Dawes Plan, it became necessary to secure a two-thirds majority, the government appealed to the Nationalists for support in return for the promise of some cabinet positions. The Nationalist Party responded by permitting its members to vote on the pending legislation at their own discretion. Thereupon enough Nationalists voted affirmatively to make possible the desired enactments. When an attempt was made to fulfill the pledge regarding Nationalist additions to the government, however, the other parties protested so strenuously that the Reichstag was dissolved and a second election was ordered for 1924.

In this election the middle parties regained a number of seats at the expense of both monarchists and communists, but the Nationalists elected enough delegates to make difficult the formation of a government. Marx resigned rather than admit Nationalists into his cabinet, and a Centrist-People's-Nationalist coalition was formed under Dr. Luther. A conciliatory foreign policy was assured when the portfolio of foreign affairs was left in the hands of Dr. Stresemann. The latter, indeed, remained in continuous

control of the foreign office under every government from November 1923 until his death in October 1929.

A few weeks after the organization of the Luther Cabinet, President Ebert died (February 1925) and it became necessary to hold Germany's first popular presidential election. According to law, the president had to be elected on a national ticket, the candidate who received a majority of all votes cast being the victor. In the event that no candidate got such a majority, a second election would have to be held. There was no elimination of candidates for the second election, and any party might nominate a new standard-bearer. The second election would go to the nominee who received the largest number of votes.

Two elections had to be held in 1925, for in the first balloting no candidate was successful. For the second election, the Centrists, Democrats, and Social Democrats jointly nominated the Centrist leader, Marx. The rightist parties also combined, nominating the aged and popular Hindenburg. The Communist Party renominated Ernst Thälmann. A spirited campaign ensued, each group striving to draw to the polls some of the millions who had neglected to vote in the first contest. The final returns (April) credited the 77-year-old Hindenburg with 14,650,000 votes. Marx got 13,750,000 and Thälmann secured 1,930,000. By refusing to join the middle parties, the communists in a sense made possible the election of the candidate of the Right, for Marx and Thälmann together had more votes than the victor.

Hindenburg's election was widely regarded as a blow at the republic. The marshal, however, took the oath to support the republican constitution without reservation, and his moderation soon won confidence at home and abroad. By adopting a German rather than a partisan policy he was able to reconcile many factions in Germany and bring together a host of former opponents.

In December 1925, after eleven months in office, the Luther Ministry resigned. It had fallen into disfavor with the Nationalists because of its sanction of the Locarno Pact, and had lost the support of other groups on domestic issues. Six weeks' time and a threat of presidential dictatorship were required before another cabinet was formed, again by Luther. Soon this government, too, fell (May 1926), over a question regarding the national flag.

The succeeding Marx Ministry experienced a lively battle on the subject of confiscating the property of the former ruling houses. Various court opinions had already been rendered, and the claims of the princes had usually been upheld. In June 1926 the matter was submitted to a refer-

endum. Fourteen million votes were cast for confiscation and only half a million against it. Since, however, a referendum was successful only if a majority of the entire qualified electorate registered assent, the result was 5,000,000 votes short of the number needed for confiscation. Chancellor Marx found it necessary to reorganize his ministry in 1927 and to admit some Nationalists. Before the Centrists would agree to this, the Nationalists had to promise to uphold the republic, endorse Stresemann's policy of conciliation, and consent to coöperation with the League. The arrangement was not satisfactory, and in 1928 the Reichstag was dissolved.

In the elections of May 1928 the Nationalists lost heavily, while the Social Democrats considerably increased their parliamentary membership. The Marx coalition of Center and Right elements therefore resigned, and the Social Democrat, Hermann Müller, who nine years earlier had signed the Versailles Treaty, became the first socialist chancellor since 1920. Müller's regime was not happy. Budgetary difficulties were immense. The acceptance of the Young Plan aroused nationalistic opposition. There was bitter debating over revised income taxes. The unemployment situation became critical. In March 1930 Müller resigned, and Dr. Heinrich Brüning, leader of the Centrist Party, formed a moderate coalition.

The new ministry desired to continue the policies of its predecessor, namely, to meet international obligations, provide agricultural relief, practice economy, and chart a foreign course based on the principles of Stresemann. Since the latter had died, in October 1929, the foreign portfolio was assigned to one of his close friends, Julius Curtius. The government's tenure was shaky, and several times the cabinet was saved merely because the opposition was divided among itself or because Hindenburg threatened to dissolve the Reichstag and rule as dictator under Article 48 of the constitution if the bickering did not cease. In July 1930, after the Reichstag rejected a government budget, the president carried out his threat. The legislature was dissolved, and new elections were ordered for September. Meanwhile, emergency budgetary decrees were put into effect.

The outstanding feature of the election of September 1930, for which 27 parties nominated candidates, was the gain made by the Communist Party and the National Socialists (*Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei*). Of the 35,000,000 votes cast, the Communist Party obtained 4,590,000, or 40 per cent more than it had polled in 1928. It increased its membership in the Reichstag from 54 to 77 seats. Even more striking were the gains of the National Socialists, who raised their Reichstag contingent from 12 to 107 and their popular vote from 809,000 (1928) to 6,400,000. They now formed the second largest group in the lower house, being led

only by the Social Democrats with 143 seats./Before analyzing this success of the National Socialists, also called Hitlerites or Nazis, let us consider the earlier history of the party and its leader, Adolf Hitler.

The future chief of the National Socialists was born on April 20, 1889, in Upper Austria, the son of a customs official. Against the wishes of his father, who wanted him to enter the civil service, Adolf Hitler indulged his talent for drawing, eventually going to Vienna to study architecture. Failing to gain admission to the imperial art academy, he eked out an existence as house-painter. His free time was spent in avid reading on the racial, moral, social, economic, and political problems confronting the German-speaking people in Austria and Germany. At work and after work he meditated upon these subjects, and with the passing of time the spirit of German nationality grew stronger in him and the hatred of international socialism increased. He argued with his fellow-workmen, particularly over politics and economics, and he steadfastly refused to join the Austrian Social Democratic Party. On several occasions he fled before his irate fellow-laborers. In the end he came to attribute his inability to get and hold a job to the machinations of the socialists. Since he associated immorality and radicalism with Judaism, regarding socialism as a ruse of international Jewry to control the workers, Hitler (a Catholic) also became an anti-Semite.

In 1912 Hitler went to Munich, and when the war broke out he requested permission to fight in the Bavarian army. Apparently he preferred not to join the Austro-Hungarian forces because he objected to the fact that the Dual Monarchy was a state composed of several nationalities rather than a national state. He acquitted himself well in action on the western front, was wounded and gassed, and received the Iron Cross. The events of the German revolution of 1918 filled Hitler with bitterness. He remained in comparative obscurity until 1923, but then, with Ludendorff and others, participated in an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the government. For his part in this, Hitler was sentenced to five years' imprisonment, but he was released after having served a few months. Through his enlistment in the Bavarian army Hitler had lost his citizenship in Austria, and because of his imprisonment he was for a long time unable to acquire citizenship in Germany. It thus happened that the leader of one of the most nationalistic groups in the world was for years (until 1932) a man without a country.

Upon his release from prison Hitler put new life into the National Socialist German Workers' Party, a political organization which he had joined in 1919 and which had suffered a decline during his enforced inactivity. A party program of "Twenty-five Points" had been drawn up for

the group in 1920 by an engineer named Gottfried Feder, one of the half-dozen original colleagues of Hitler and later economic adviser to the Nazis. Eventually this outline of party policy was expanded by Hitler in a book of memoirs entitled *Mein Kampf*.

According to the original pronouncements the ultimate goal of the Hitlerites was a "Third Reich," [6] a Greater Germany wherein should be united *all* those of "German blood," including the "Germans" in Austria, the Netherlands, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Alsace. Jews were regarded as having alien blood. The achievement of this "program for the ages" envisaged abrogation of the treaties of Versailles and St. Germain; refutation of war guilt; revision of reparation; reacquisition of colonies; expulsion of all persons not of German blood; governmental assurance of employment and decent living conditions for the citizens; abolition of high interest and confiscation of war profits; nationalization of trusts and department stores; agrarian reform; state care for the aged; religious toleration for all sects not dangerous to the welfare or morality of the nation; and parity with the other great powers in armaments. German supremacy on the continent was to be assured through alliances with Great Britain and Italy and through eventual wars with France and the Soviet Union. Several aspects of the program were modified in later pronouncements by Hitler, but the catch-words of the movement remained anti-Semitism and anti-Bolshevism.

A party organization was developed and the *Hakenkreuz* (hooked cross), better known by its Sanskrit equivalent of swastika (卐), became the Nazi emblem. As with the Italian Fascists, there was an elaborate ritual and a military ceremonial. Ordinary party members, who in 1932 numbered 700,000, paid monthly dues and were expected to be faithful attendants at meetings, to which there was generally an admission charge. Above this rank and file were the *Sturmabteilungen* (S.A.), or "storm troops," assigned to protect Nazi meetings and break up radical gatherings. Both the regular members and the storm troops wore the party uniform of a brown shirt. There was also a smaller group of "Elite Guards," the *Schutzstaffeln* (S.S.), who were assigned as bodyguards for Nazi leaders and to carry out especially difficult missions. They wore a black blouse decorated with a white skull.[7]

For purposes of agitation and organization the Reich was divided into districts and "cells," each "covered" by trained speakers. Hitler was a highly successful orator, able to sway large audiences, but it appeared to

[6] The first Reich was the Holy Roman Empire; the second, from 1871 to 1918.
[7] The members of the S.A. and the S.S. soon came to be called, respectively, "Brown Shirts" and "Black Shirts."

be his manner of speaking more than the content of his speeches that produced the electric result. He became popular with German womanhood and the nationalist youth, which latter was organized in a Hitler Youth Society.

One of the pillars of the early Hitlerite movement was the white-collar section of the middle class. When judged by income and standard of living, many of the 3,500,000 individuals in this category fell into proletarian ranks. Yet, unlike the workers, they did not look to the socialists for economic relief. Class pride made them seek aid elsewhere, and Hitlerism promised help. Equally badly off, equally unwilling to acknowledge a common interest with the proletariat, and equally ready to try Nazi remedies, were thousands of former army officers, soldiers' widows, and retired tradesmen.

There were numerous other Nazi enthusiasts. The anti-Semitism appealed to professionals who resented the competition of Jewry in law, medicine, banking, and trade. Retail shopkeepers, their livelihood endangered by chain stores, favored the National Socialist plan of governmental protection for small dealers. Much support came from peasants, particularly in southern Germany. In June 1931 the estimated debt of the farmers was $3,000,000,000, and, since these people had no sympathy with the Marxist attitude towards private property, they tended to rally around the Nazi standards.

University students and graduates formed another source of Nazi strength. The number of university students in the Reich increased by 60 per cent between 1914 and 1930, and thousands of unemployed educated persons had come to despair of any improvement in their lot under the existing system. Any program of overturn seemed promising to them, and in addition they generally favored the ending of reparation payments, the reacquisition of colonies, and a large army. Finally, a number of industrialists, such as Fritz Thyssen, who feared communism more than National Socialism, supported Hitlerism. Feder was careful to point out that the proposed socialization of trusts was not aimed "at the real creators of our heavy industry—the Krupps, Kirdorffs, Thyssens, Mannesmanns, and Siemens."

Labor and some of the stronger Catholic districts gave only scant support to Hitler. Less than 15 per cent of his following in 1932 came from the ranks of labor, and even of this group some probably were attracted more by the promise of jobs through Nazi influence than by political conviction.

In the fortnight preceding the election of September 1930, the Nazis

held more than 30,000 meetings. They constantly reminded their listeners of Germany's "enslavement" and of the government's "subserviency" to the Allies. The "war-guilt lie" was furiously attacked, and reparation was denounced. Hitler's election manifesto urged the voters to "send the betrayers of their future to the devil." In protest against existing conditions and against the apparent inability of the groups in control to remedy them, the voters, as has been indicated, cast their ballots in unprecedented numbers for both the Nazis and the communists. Yet Chancellor Brüning was able to muster sufficient moderate support in the Reichstag to remain in office until May 1932.

Early in 1932 Brüning suggested that President von Hindenburg's term be extended by the Reichstag and the country thus spared the expense and trouble of an election. Hitler opposed this suggestion, and March was set for the election. Hindenburg and Hitler both were candidates, the latter becoming a citizen by accepting an appointment as attaché of the Brunswick Legation at Berlin. Ernst Thälmann again was the candidate of the Communist Party, and the extreme nationalists nominated Theodor Düsterberg. Hindenburg received 18,650,000 votes, one-half of 1 per cent less than the required majority for election, and 7,300,000 votes more than Hitler. Thälmann was third with 4,980,000 ballots. In the second election, the president was reëlected by a plurality of 6,000,000 votes. Hindenburg, hailed even in Paris as the "safest" candidate, began his second term in his eighty-fifth year.

A few weeks after the presidential contest, Brüning's Centrist-Socialist Government resigned. The chancellor's system of government by emergency decree had accomplished little. Unemployment figures had risen to 6,000,000, and the budgetary deficit had soared. Nationalists therefore clamored for more effective action. The president selected as the new chancellor Lieutenant-Colonel Franz von Papen, the same who in 1915 had perpetrated illegal activities in the United States during the period of her neutrality. Papen chose for his colleagues a group of conservatives who soon were dubbed the "Almanach de Gotha Cabinet." It was evident that the new government could not command a majority in the Reichstag, and the latter was immediately dissolved. The resulting elections (July 1932) gave the Hitlerites 230 seats, an increase of 123 since 1930. They now had exactly as many deputies as the Social Democrats and Centrists combined. When the Reichstag convened, Captain Hermann Wilhelm Göring, one of Hitler's lieutenants, was elected speaker. After some further organization business, the house adjourned until September. When it reassembled,

the chancellor immediately dissolved it and ordered still another election. Papen had the support of Hindenburg, but was denounced by the Nazis and communists as a dictator.

In the election of November 1932 the vote of the Nazis fell off by about 2,000,000, while the Communist Party gained 700,000 votes. No party or group of parties gained control of the Reichstag, and the Papen Cabinet therefore resigned. Hindenburg now invited Hitler, as the head of the largest party, to form a government; but when the Nazi leader demanded dictatorial powers, the president turned to General Kurt von Schleicher. The new government lacked the backing in the Reichstag necessary to ensure longevity. Eight weeks later (January 1933) Schleicher resigned and Adolf Hitler became chancellor.

ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND DECLINE, 1924–1932

The German Empire of pre-1914 days was a closely knit economic organism deriving wealth and power from a fertile soil, an abundance of raw materials, an intelligent industrial leadership, a skilled and hard-working laboring class, a well-coördinated network of rail- and waterways, overseas possessions, a thriving shipping business, profitable foreign investments, rich markets, and an excellent international credit standing. The First World War completely dislocated this intricate mechanism and made necessary widespread readjustments.

Not only did the war cause material damage and death or incapacity to millions of citizens, but the peace treaty deprived Germany of one-tenth of her population and one-eighth of her European land area. She lost two-fifths of her coal, two-thirds of her iron-ore reserves, one-tenth of her manufacturing establishments, one-seventh of her agricultural production, all her colonies and foreign investments, most of her merchant marine, and nearly all foreign-trade contracts. In addition, she had to face a hostile Europe and suffer temporary occupation of her chief industrial region, the Ruhr. In one respect Germany was fortunate: there was no need to reconstruct war-torn areas, since most of the fighting had been done on foreign soil.

During the years immediately following the war, Germany sank lower and lower in the economic scale until nadir was reached with the collapse of 1923. Just as dissolution seemed imminent, government and people united in a determined effort to save the fatherland and rebuild its economic structure. Thereafter an upward trend set in which continued for

six years, until the middle of 1929. In this year, the volume of industrial output exceeded that of 1913. Germany now seemed second only to the United States in industrial development and standard of living.



From Landman, J., *Outline History of the World Since 1914,* 1934.
Courtesy, Barnes and Noble, Inc.

This "industrial efflorescence" was the result of many causes. The enormous foreign sale of German currency and notes, the inflation, and then the wholesale repudiation of the paper money added about $2,000,000,000 to the real wealth of the country. Benefit also was derived from foreign capital, especially after the going into effect of the Dawes Plan. German foreign loans—public and private—in the period 1924–1928 inclusive, reached $1,620,000,000, about 70 per cent of which came from the United States. Some of this borrowed money was immediately reëxported in the form of reparation, but the remainder was utilized in industrial rehabilitation and expansion.

Another factor that helped recovery was the introduction of the "rationalization movement" into German industrial and business life. Ascribing the phenomenal rise of United States industry to rationalization and mass production, the Germans became convinced that only a coupling of these policies could lead to economic regeneration. Experts were delegated to investigate United States methods. Specifically, rationalization aimed at

standardizing products and materials, introducing scientific management and planning, spreading vocational guidance and training, and promoting the formation of trusts to prevent ruinous competition.

Astounding savings were effected by rationalization. The average output per man, in the industries concerned, was 20 per cent higher in 1930 than in 1913. In the coal industry, 562,000 persons in 1925 produced 133,000,000 tons of coal; in 1928, after rationalization, 556,000 persons produced 151,000,000 tons. The number of employees in the automobile industry was reduced from 87,000 in 1925 to 83,000 in 1927, yet the value of the finished product rose from 771,000,000 to 908,000,000 marks. Similar results were obtained in agriculture and other departments.

That rationalization also had its drawbacks, no one could deny. The movement was sometimes carried to extremes, and the Germans themselves came to speak of the need for "rationalizing rationalization." That certain methods produced gratifying results in the United States was no guarantee that they would be equally useful under European conditions. The almost boundless hope placed in rationalization encouraged extravagant borrowing which later proved difficult to repay. Readjustment to smaller-scale production when the supply ran ahead of the demand became difficult. The system threw an increasing number of men out of employment. Despite these disadvantages, rationalization was a prime factor in Germany's economic renaissance.

Germany's industrial rise was owing, in addition, to the three "c's"—coal, chemists, and cartels. Despite the republic's coal losses, the demands of the iron and steel industries were met without difficulty. Reorganization and mechanization of the mines, along with the achievement of a higher mining technique, brought production up to a level comparable to that of prewar years. To compensate for the loss of some of the black-coal reserves, the production of the less valuable but readily available brown coal or lignite was greatly increased. Since lignite was only one-fifth as expensive as coal, much of the product was converted at the source into electricity and transported cheaply and directly as power.

The traditional renown of German chemists was upheld after the war, and Germany became the world's largest exporter of chemicals. Great advances were made in the development of dyes, drugs, fertilizers, and photographic materials, and success was attained in synthetics. There appeared on the market synthetic quinine, camphor, indigo, nitrates, rubber, and gasoline, and artificial silk, resin, and leather. The production of synthetic nitrates became the largest single branch of the chemical industry. The domestic output of nitrates increased from 12,000 tons in 1913 to

800,000 tons in 1928. The imports of Chilean nitrates decreased in similar proportion. Thus Germany minimized her dependence upon the outside world for the raw materials of industry.

Realizing the value of trust combinations for greater efficiency in production, the Germans perfected the "vertical" trust system, "uniting all stages and parts of an industrial process, such as coal mines, iron mines, steel mills, and shipyards." The government supported the process of combination. Perhaps the greatest trust-builder was Hugo Stinnes. At the time of his death (1924), Stinnes was said to have had an interest in 1400 business undertakings and to have controlled a fifth of Germany's total production.

The trust was not the only form of combine popular in Germany. As early as 1873 there had appeared a type of organization known as the cartel, which "may be loosely defined as any association of independent enterprises formed to regulate for the common benefit either prices, production, markets, or the conditions of purchase or sale, or for two or more of these purposes." It represented a form of voluntary "economic planning."

In 1914 there were several hundred such cartels, but during the war they were not especially useful since the enormity of war needs virtually eliminated competition. After the war they enjoyed a mushroom growth. In 1923 there were about 1500 cartels. These so abused their ability to control purchases, sales, and prices that a Cartel Law was passed (1923), providing for governmental supervision of their activities. Thenceforth the influence of domestic cartels declined, but compensatory progress was made in the formation of international cartels, particularly in the steel, rail, and potash industries. The largest of these international production- and price-controlling organisms was the Continental Steel Cartel representing Germany, France, Belgium, the Saar, Luxembourg, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary. But it was hard to make the members of international cartels abide by their limited production quotas and harder still to make them pay fines for overproducing.

Governmental aid was not confined to industry. Shipping and other essential lines of endeavor received support as well. The subsidized rebuilding of a merchant marine was undertaken with zest. In 1913 the German merchant marine had ranked second only to that of Great Britain. In 1920 it occupied twelfth place, following Spain and Denmark. By 1930 it had risen again to third place, behind Great Britain and the United States; and the ships were new and up to date in construction. In aircraft Germany similarly rose to a position of preëminence. Forbidden to manu-

facture warplanes, the Germans developed commercial planes which achieved enviable records for safety and speed.

Much good accrued to Germany, finally, from the establishment therein of branches of United States firms such as General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, Eastman Kodak, Otis Elevator, Mergenthaler Linotype, and National Cash Register. These enterprises brought foreign capital into the land, gave employment to German labor, and utilized German raw materials. The Germans imitated the methods of these companies and readily adopted such ideas as chain stores, "five-and-tens," and ready-to-wear suits.

But Germany's economic recovery was not of long duration. Even while prosperity rode high, factors appeared which forecast approaching decline. The adverse developments included an increasing difficulty in securing foreign loans; continual reparation quarrels; inability to recapture completely the Russian market and those of other prewar customers; the lessened demand for military and naval supplies; foreign tariff walls; the tendency of Germans to cut down on the consumption of rye and potatoes in favor of wheat and vegetables, thus dooming many farmers to surplus crops and to debt; and the decreased requirements of man power owing to the progress of rationalization.

There was a gradual but steady increase in the number of unemployed university graduates and workers of both the overall and white-collar types. During the depression years following 1930 the situation became acute, and by 1932 Germany, with her population of 64,000,000, had an army of unemployed numbering 6,500,000. Unemployment-insurance schemes and doles seemed utterly inadequate to meet the problem, and thus campaign material was provided for both Nazis and communists.

The government of Chancellor Brüning (1930–1932) strove to deal with the crisis, but the international situation precluded any domestic solution of the difficulties. Despite its heavy reparation obligations the German Government had appropriated money prodigally for various laudable but perhaps nonessential welfare projects, and simultaneously had kept the per capita tax burden lower than that in either Great Britain or France. This procedure had been justified as the only means of forestalling revolution and securing national loyalty, but the policy was dangerous since it necessitated undue reliance upon foreign loans. A crash was destined to come as soon as external conditions made further loans impracticable.

When Germany and Austria, in 1931, announced plans for a customs accord, the power of French finance and diplomacy was mobilized, as we have seen, to frustrate this move. French funds invested in the German-

speaking countries were withdrawn, and further loans were made contingent upon unacceptable political terms. Apparently in order to prevent Great Britain from aiding the borrowers, the French drew heavily on the gold reserve of the Bank of England. The latter therefore found it impossible to continue making short-term loans to the Reich. Slight assistance was received from the Federal Reserve Bank in the United States, but so close to bankruptcy was Germany that only concerted international action could be of avail.

In June 1931, it will be recalled, President Hoover proposed an international one-year moratorium on war debts and the postponable reparation item. Such an arrangement was effected, to run until June 30, 1932. Early in the latter year, Brüning announced that Germany would not be able to resume reparation payments when the moratorium expired. The annual exportation of reparation moneys required consistently favorable balances of trade, and Germany could not accumulate such balances under existing tariff and trade-restricting conditions. The Lausanne Reparation Conference of 1932 did little to solve the dilemma, and Chancellors von Papen and von Schleicher soon reiterated Brüning's declaration. Germany, they said, could not make further reparation while her economic life was stagnant.

FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1919–1932

From 1919 to 1932 it was the chief aim of German diplomacy to regain for the fatherland admission into the family of nations. This goal was urgent as a protective measure for the weakened state and necessary for the revival of trade. German statesmen, however, were divided on the question of whether the new orientation should look towards Soviet Russia or the Allies. The group which preferred to look eastward advocated alliance with the Bolsheviks and defiance of the treaty restrictions. Those who looked westward proposed the fulfillment of treaty obligations and reconciliation with the former enemies.

At first it appeared that the pro-Russian viewpoint might triumph. In 1922, as we have seen, the German and Russian delegates to the Genoa Economic Conference concluded a trade treaty at Rapallo. Four years later the principles of the Rapallo agreement were reaffirmed in a treaty of friendship negotiated in Berlin. Then the eastward trend of policy was temporarily halted by those who advocated "a policy of fulfillment and reconciliation." These men were led by Dr. Stresemann.

Born in 1878, in Berlin, the son of a beer merchant, Stresemann grew

up to be a skillful organizer, and when only 23 years old became secretary of the Union of Saxon Chocolate Manufacturers. Two years later he was a founder of the League of Saxon Manufacturers, formed to reorganize the decadent local industries. In 1907 Stresemann was elected to the Reichstag as a National Liberal, and ten years later he became the head of this party of big business. During the war he advocated the vigorous prosecution of hostilities, and after the revolution he reorganized his followers into the German People's Party, which favored a monarchy but was willing to support the republic for peace, internal unity, and business revival. As a member of the Weimar Assembly he voted against acceptance of the Versailles Treaty.

In August 1923 Stresemann became chancellor, but the internal disorder and the foreign occupation of the Ruhr led to his downfall within a few months. Appointed foreign minister by his successor, Chancellor Joseph Wirth, he occupied this post until his death in October 1929. The cardinal points of Stresemann's foreign policy, the peace treaty having been signed, were reconciliation with France and Germany's reëntry into the community of nations as a respected partner. A gifted orator, honest and tactful, he soon acquired general trust, though he did have numerous enemies both at home and abroad. In 1926 he, Briand, and Austen Chamberlain were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for their contributions (at Locarno) to the cause of world peace. Stresemann was seriously ill most of his days, and the strenuous duties of office eventually claimed his life.

As foreign minister he was responsible for the discontinuance of passive resistance in the Ruhr. He eloquently urged adoption of the Dawes Plan, thus preparing the way for the avacuation of the Ruhr, the restoration of foreign confidence in Germany, and the negotiation of commercial treaties. His greatest work was the negotiation of the Locarno treaties (1925) and the admission of Germany into the League (1926).

Since permanent peace in Europe was improbable as long as France was haunted by the specter of German recovery and revenge and Germany feared French designs on the Rhineland, Stresemann several times suggested to France the signing of a guaranty pact, and in 1925 his proposal met with favor. The result was the Locarno Pact, which was to go into force immediately upon Germany's admission to the League. The republic accordingly applied for membership, and a special session of the Assembly was called for March 1926.

Germany requested a permanent seat in the Council as a condition of her membership. To her astonishment, this was followed by similar demands from Spain, Brazil, Poland, China, Czechoslovakia, and Iran. Im-

mediately a complicated situation arose. Stresemann insisted that Germany's admission be free of international bargaining. Yet, since Spain and Brazil occupied nonpermanent seats in the Council, their votes were needed to give Germany a permanent seat. To make matters worse, it soon developed that Chamberlain was supporting the Spanish position while Briand was upholding Poland. The Swedish delegate to the Council, Dr. Östen Unden, next announced that he would not vote to give Poland a permanent seat since all the circumstances involved were contrary to the spirit of the Covenant. The League then adjourned until September without having acted on Germany's application. So great was the reaction in Germany that the policy of eastward orientation once more appeared attractive. It was at this time that the Treaty of Berlin already referred to was concluded with the Soviet Union.

When the Assembly met again in September 1926, Germany was unanimously elected to membership and was given the only additional permanent Council seat. By another resolution, the number of nonpermanent Council members was increased from six to nine. It was expected that Spain, Brazil, and Poland would be elected to such seats, but the former two powers at once gave notice of their intention to withdraw from the League.

German membership in the League soon led to further favorable developments. In 1927 the last Allied commissions in Germany were withdrawn. In the same year a German was appointed to the Permanent Mandates Commission. In 1928 Germany, owing largely to the efforts of Stresemann, adhered to the Kellogg Pact for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy. At the meeting of the League Assembly in 1928 the way was opened for a renewal of reparation parleys, which led to the adoption of the Young Plan (1929) and the complete evacuation of the Rhine territory (1930).

After Stresemann's death, his foreign policies were continued for a time by his friend and successor, Dr. Curtius, but the latter resigned in 1931 after the unsuccessful attempt at economic coöperation with Austria. Thereafter the conduct of foreign relations became increasingly difficult, largely because of the activities of the various nationalistic groups and the diplomatic intransigeance of France. Although many of the postwar grievances that had irritated the Germans were removed by the close of 1932, there remained as disturbing factors the questions of Germany's eastern frontiers, union with Austria, reacquisition of the colonies, repudiation of war guilt, equality with the other great powers in armaments, and further revision of the reparation schedule. Early in 1933 these problems were

passed on to a wholly new German Government—a National Socialist Government.

DER FÜHRER

On January 28, 1933, after an incumbency of only eight weeks, Chancellor von Schleicher resigned because of the president's refusal to allow the dissolution of a hostile Reichstag. Two days later the chief ministerial post went to Adolf Hitler, whose party held 196 of the 584 seats in the chamber. Associated with Hitler in the cabinet was a group of nationalistic conservatives, headed by Papen as vice-chancellor, Dr. Alfred Hugenberg, leader of the National People's Party, as minister of commerce and agriculture, and Konstantin von Neurath, nonparty nationalist, as minister of foreign affairs. The inclusion of these conservatives, to check any "dangerous" Nazi experiment, apparently was made a condition of Hitler's appointment by Hindenburg.

Since the Nazis were in a minority in the cabinet and in the Reichstag, Hitler demanded dissolution of the latter and new elections on March 5. During the preëlection weeks the government instituted repressive measures against the Communist, Social Democratic, and Center parties. Papen, moreover, was appointed Reich Commissioner for Prussia, a post equivalent to that of Prussian Premier. He promptly brought about dismissal of the Prussian Diet and ordered new elections to be held simultaneously with those for the national legislature. Thus the Nazis, confident of victory, also hoped to gain control of a body which hitherto had been a stronghold of socialism.

A few days before the voting the Reichstag building in Berlin was nearly destroyed by fire. The followers of Hitler placed the onus for the deed upon the Communist Party; the latter, pointing out that a subterranean corridor led from the residence of Nazi Reichstag President Göring to the basement of the Reichstag building, accused the Hitlerites of plotting the affair to discredit communism. Further restrictions now were put on the electioneering rights of the antigovernment parties.[8]

In an atmosphere tense with excitement, 39,000,000 citizens cast their ballots on the fifth of March. More than 17,000,000 voted for National

[8] In December 1933 Marinus van der Lubbe, a young Netherlands communist, was convicted of setting fire to the building. A German and three Bulgarian communists who were held with him were acquitted. The Netherlander, who seemed to be in a stupor during the trial but who doggedly maintained that he had done the deed without accomplices, was executed in January 1934. See Bullock, A. *Hitler, A Study in Tyranny*, 1953, pp. 237–238.



This chart shows the political trend in the election of the Weimar Assembly and nine subsequent elections of the Reichstag. The number of seats in the Reichstag varied with the size of the popular vote. The estimates are in most cases based on the election reports in the *Deutscher Geschichtskalendar*. Note the increase in the size of the revolutionary parties—Communist and Nazi—after the economic depression of 1929.

THE GERMAN ELECTIONS, 1919–1933

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Published by Houghton Mifflin Co.

Socialist candidates, and an additional 3,000,000 supported the allies of the Nazis, the German National People's Party. The Nazis captured 288 of the 647 seats in the new Reichstag and the Nationalists 52. The Nazi-Nationalist coalition thus received approximately 52 per cent of the popular vote and a majority in the Reichstag. The Social Democrats polled 7,000,000 votes, the Centrists, 5,500,000, and the Communist Party, 4,750,000. The results in the separate Prussian election were similar.

On March 23, 1933, the new Reichstag, by a vote of 441 to 94, passed the Law to Combat the Misery of People and Reich, which in effect suspended the constitution and endowed the Hitler Government with dictatorial power.[9] Henceforth the Hitler Cabinet alone was to have the right to enact laws for the Reich. To explain to the people and the world this startling development and any novel policies that the authorities might in future undertake became the function of a specially created "Ministry of Propaganda and Enlightenment" headed by Dr. Paul Joseph Goebbels.

It may be convenient now to recall some of the factors that underlay the Nazi rise to power. The war and the peace settlement left Germany crushed, spiritually and materially. The Germans could not easily forget the humiliation of defeat and of the "dictate of Versailles." The continuing hostile attitude of France; the quarrels over the Ruhr, the Rhineland occupation, the Saar, and reparation; the wrangling over disarmament—all these fed the anger of many Germans. In such circumstances, the republic's acceptance of disabilities, its policy of reconciliation and fulfillment, and its apparent inability to assert itself more strongly in international affairs rankled in the hearts of many, especially the younger war veterans and the youth that believed itself deprived of a glamorous and secure future by the "treachery" and "cowardice" of the complacent republican politicians. During the temporary economic revival from 1924 to 1929 these factors remained somewhat in the background. But they did exist, and it required only a few years of hard times and increasing unemployment to bring them out in full force.

Many of the Germans, too, were weary of the manner in which the democratic parliamentary system was functioning. Those Germans who could remember the days when order and discipline prevailed in the Reichstag, and many of those who had merely heard or read about such days, were impatient with the bickering and quarreling and time-wasting that

[9] The negative votes were all cast by the socialists who attended the session. The remaining 26 socialist deputies and all 81 communists were either abroad, in hiding, or under arrest. The Reichsrat passed the enabling act on the same day as the Reichstag.

characterized the republican lower house. In place of decision and patriotic accomplishment, the politicians offered words and empty promises. Increasingly many Germans became convinced of the need for a "strong man" to restore German prosperity and prestige.

Psychological factors also played an important role. The republic seemed unable or unwilling to pay due attention to the inner feelings and desires of many citizens. The official toleration of attempts to drag down the ideals and heroes of imperial Germany; the readiness with which the old imperial flag was abandoned, and the old orders and colorful military uniforms were given up; and the friendship for the Soviet Union—all these alienated the sympathies of prominent elements of the population: the aristocrats, the young university people, the conservative peasants, the believers in *Kultur* and in Germany's mission, and the rank-and-file war veterans who hated the politicians. The Nazi leaders understood these grievances, and with their remarkable propaganda methods capitalized them. Oratory, posters, banners, songs, uniforms, ceremonies, ritual, discipline, historic tradition, theories of race superiority, anti-Semitism, enthusiasm, the dynamic personality of Hitler—these things attracted millions of Germans at a time when the alternatives appeared to offer worse depression and continued foreign impasse.

Having surrendered its legislative powers, the Reichstag elected in March 1933 adjourned, while Chancellor Hitler proceeded to "coördinate" under the Nazi aegis the political, economic, and cultural life of the nation (a process termed by the Nazis *Gleichschaltung*). The supreme and final authority in all matters was Hitler himself, later to be known officially as *Der Führer*. This principle of leadership *(Führerprinzip)* was calculated to emphasize the unity of purpose of the whole nation.

ANTI–SEMITISM

The most spectacular immediate consequence of the National Socialist triumph was a reign of anti-Semitism,[10] and most prominent among the anti-Semites were Hermann Göring and Julius Streicher. Göring was a war ace and one of the most militant Nazis. He had participated in the Hitler-Ludendorff *Putsch* of 1923 and then had fled to Italy where he studied the Fascist system. Now Göring became deputy-minister of the interior for Prussia, federal commissioner of aviation, and Reich minister without portfolio. Streicher had been a schoolteacher in Nuremberg and was the

[10] According to the census of 1925, the full Jews in Germany numbered 560,000, that is, 0.9 per cent of the population.

editor of *Der Stürmer,* the most violently anti-Semitic (and often obscene) newspaper in Germany. Under their leadership, the storm troops and other Hitlerites launched wild attacks upon the Jewish population. Göring explained the situation by saying: "We have been telling the people for years that they might settle accounts with the traitors. We stand by our word: accounts are being settled." After a time, and partly in response to foreign protests, physical violence against Jews lessened—only to reappear with greater fury in 1938.

The first far-reaching anti-Semitic legislation was a civil service law of April 1933. This act ordered the dismissal of all officials who were "non-Aryan" or whose previous political activity did not offer surety that they would "at all times act unreservedly for the national state." The law applied to officials and employees of the national, state, and municipal governments, to employees in semipublic enterprises and social services, to court officials and attendants, notaries, policemen, teachers, professors, and army officers. The only exceptions were persons who had been appointed before August 1, 1914, or who had "participated with a fighting troop in a battle" in the First World War, or whose fathers or sons were killed in the war. Later legislation removed these exceptions.

A "non-Aryan" was defined as any person descended "from non-Aryan, particularly Jewish, parents or grandparents." It was sufficient if only one grandparent had "professed the Jewish religion." Later it was decreed that a person with a Jewish great-grandfather or yet more remote Jewish ancestor, even if the latter had been baptized, might also be regarded as "non-Aryan" and ineligible for office. "Aryans" married to "non-Aryans" were placed under the same restrictions as the latter.

Through this law and its successors, the civil services and professions were ruthlessly "cleansed" not merely of Jews but of all elements objectionable to the Nazis. By the end of 1938 there were virtually no practicing Jewish or anti-Nazi "Aryan" doctors, dentists, nurses, professors, teachers, judges, lawyers, court clerks, or notaries. Tens of thousands of these had been placed under "protective arrest" in concentration camps. From 1938 no Jews were admitted to German schools. Eventually the Jews were barred, in practice if not always in law, from any connection with the stage, musical performances, the cinema, and journalism. Jewish artists could appear only before Jewish audiences; they were forbidden to present the works of "Aryan" composers or authors.

Inasmuch as the program of the Nazis excluded Jews from the fellowship of "German people," the authorities modified the laws governing citizenship. In 1933 the government decided to withdraw German citizen-

ship at will from "undesirables" who had been naturalized by the Weimar Republic and from individuals who, having fled abroad, conducted anti-Nazi propaganda or refused to return on the demand of Berlin. The property of such persons and of any other "antistate" elements was made subject to confiscation. In 1935 all Jews were deprived of German citizenship and classified merely as subjects *(Staatsangehörige)*.

The actions of the government were supplemented by the anti-Semitic activities of societies, associations, corporations, and individuals. Governing boards reconstituted themselves without Jewish members. Most firms eventually dismissed all Jewish employees. By order of the Association of German Booksellers and Publishers, no books by Jews were to be published in the Reich. On May 10, 1933, bonfires were made in a number of cities and university towns of the works of about 150 writers whose works were regarded as Jewish, pacifistic, radical, liberal, immoral, or in any other way "un-German." Local boycotts of Jewish shops continued. Jews were generally excluded from public markets, summer and winter resorts, and playgrounds.

Throughout 1936 and 1937 there were put into effect the Nuremberg or Ghetto Laws of September 1935. These forbade marital and extramarital relations between Jews and citizens of "German or kindred blood," deprived all Jews of German citizenship and political rights, and forbade any German female under forty-five to assist in a Jewish household. A decree of April 1938 required all Jews who possessed property worth more than 5000 marks ($2000) to render an itemized report of their belongings to the state, which was empowered to make use of the property thus reported in furtherance of a Four-Year Plan that had been inaugurated in 1936. Another order compelled every Jew who did not already have given names that were officially classed as Jewish to add "Israel" or "Sarah" to his or her name. Jewish children born in future might be given only such names as were to be found in a "permissible" list; and the names had to be "spelled in the Yiddish manner so as to stamp them as foreign and ridiculous in the eyes of the Germans." In the fall of 1938 there came a period of utter tragedy, during which the Jews were eliminated from the economic life of the Third Reich.

Following a report that Poland would refuse to readmit any Polish Jews living abroad whose passports were not validated by the end of October 1938, the Nazis rounded up thousands of Polish Jews who had long been resident in Germany, herded them aboard railroad cars, shipped them to the Polish border, and there forced them to walk across into Polish territory. The Polish authorities strove to resist this wholesale dumping of

freezing and panic-stricken unfortunates and finally threatened, in retaliation, to treat similarly Germans who were living in Poland. Official negotiations followed, the whole affair was labeled a "misunderstanding," and the deportations ended—but not so tragedy.

One of the deported Polish Jews sent a postcard to his seventeen-year-old son in Paris, telling of his unhappy adventure. The boy, Herschel Grynszpan, brooded over the matter and then went to the German Embassy, apparently determined to kill the German Ambassador. When he arrived at the embassy he shot the third secretary. Two days later the young diplomat died, whereupon, early in the morning of November 10, there broke loose in Germany a horrible attack on Jewish persons and property. Propaganda Minister Goebbels maintained that the attacks were the "spontaneous" result of the "justifiable and understandable anger of the German people over the cowardly Jewish murder of a German diplomat," but the terror obviously was organized and directed. The government, after a time, "requested" the population to cease demonstrating and promised to give a "final answer" to the assassination "by way of legislation and ordinance."

The promised decrees soon appeared. Holding German Jewry collectively responsible for the act of a brooding Polish adolescent in Paris, the Berlin Government eliminated it from the economic life of Germany. The authorities imposed a collective fine of $400,000,000 on the Jews of Germany. The fine was assessed in the form of a capital levy of 20 per cent of the property of all Jews owning more than $2000 worth of goods.

The property reports submitted by the Jews earlier were now of considerable use to the government. Lest the market be unduly disturbed by the sudden disposal of stocks by Jews seeking cash, restrictions were placed on such transactions. Only agents of the Four-Year Plan were authorized to purchase, at their own price, personal properties which the Jews might have to sell. Jewish shopowners were required to repair at their own expense damages done during the attacks on November 10. Further decrees eliminated Jews, in 1939, from the retail, mail-order, and handicraft trades, and "Aryanized," at bargain prices, the remaining Jewish businesses.

Then Jews were relegated to full ghetto life. In the cities certain districts were closed to Jewish dwellers and certain streets were barred to Jewish pedestrians. Jews were forbidden to drive automobiles. All Jews had to join a Reich Union of Jews, supervised by the minister of the interior. The union was to absorb all existing Jewish organizations, speed up emigration, and assume the full burden of supporting Jewish schools and the Jewish poor. Lucky were those who had been able to flee beyond the borders of the Third Reich.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC "COÖRDINATION"

Soon after Hitler came to power, steps were taken to create a totalitarian state. A decree of March 1933 dissolved all provincial legislatures, except the newly elected one in Prussia, and ordered their reconstitution under Nazi control. The life of all state and local diets was to be four years, subject to automatic termination in case of dissolution of the Reichstag before *its* term of four years expired. The several state cabinets were empowered to promulgate laws, even laws contrary to the state constitutions, without consulting their respective diets. On the first anniversary of the Hitler regime (1934), the Reichstag unanimously adopted a measure abolishing the "popular representation of the states" and authorizing the Reich Government to "determine new constitutional law." The unanimous acceptance of this bill on the same day by the Reichsrat, the direct parliamentary representative of the states, automatically made that body superfluous. Municipal diets were abolished on the second anniversary of the Hitler regime.

Meanwhile an edict of 1933 had placed over each state a Reich Regent, chosen by the chancellor. Eventually these regents became well-paid "intermediary agents between the central and the local administrations." In Prussia, where Hitler himself was regent, he appointed Göring as minister president. The latter thus became *the* ruler of that largest German state, responsible only to the Führer. Perhaps largely because Göring objected to a diminution of his power in Prussia, a plan to obliterate the old state boundaries and redivide the Reich into new administrative units of approximately equal population-size was indefinitely postponed.

While the superiority of the central government was thus being established, the National Socialist Party became identified with the state itself. All other parties were abolished. The communists went first and the Catholic Center Party held out longest. Freemasonry was abolished, and the trade-unions were broken up, their leaders being arrested and their buildings and funds confiscated. Simultaneously there occurred the gradual absorption into Nazi ranks of such veterans' organizations as the Steel Helmet and such conservative political groups as the National People's Party. A law of July 1933 confirmed the fact that the Nazi party was "the only political party in Germany." The example of Italy in this regard was followed to its end by another law of 1933, which declared that the National Socialist German Workers' Party had become "the carrier (*Trägerin*) of the government and was inseparably connected with the state." Thereupon Ernst Röhm, storm troop leader, and Rudolf Hess, deputy-leader

of the party, were made members of the cabinet. With the creation of a *Jugendführer* or "Leader of the Youth," and the subordination to its incumbent (Baldur von Schirach) of all German youth organizations, the state became politically totalitarian.

On the economic level the original Nazi program had a many-sided appeal. The attack on department stores pleased small shopkeepers. The condemnation of high interest charges attracted debtors. The denunciation of Marxism and unions was welcome to industrialists. Nazi peasants hoped for debt relief and the breakup of large estates. Obviously, the program could not at once be fulfilled. At the start, indecision and conflicting theories marked the Nazi economic way; but gradually there was evolved a program of state supervision and planning.

At first the Hitlerites coördinated the largest industries by appointing Nazi supervisors. This was relatively easy since thorough organization had long been a characteristic of German business and professional life. The commissars purged the existing business, professional, labor, and peasant organizations of "objectionable" members and reconstituted them in accordance with their own principles. In July 1933, however, the chancellor warned his followers against unauthorized interference in private business affairs. Thereupon the supervisors, who often had been appointed because of party service rather than executive ability, were gradually removed from control.

To provide immediate relief for the unemployed some novel schemes to "make" work were advanced. Within a year unemployment figures were reduced from 6,000,000 to 4,000,000. This was accomplished chiefly by requiring certain industries, for example the Ruhr mines, to take on more men than the production would normally warrant; replacing dismissed liberals, Marxians, and Jews by Nazis, and not recording the names of the former on the relief rolls; opposing the employment of married women; reducing the hours of labor to a maximum of 40 per week; and enlisting several hundred thousand young men in a "voluntary" labor corps. Members of the corps received food, shelter, and small wages in return for work on governmental projects and large estates.

To replace the trade-unions that were abolished in 1933 and the employers' associations that were dissolved in 1934, there was established the German Labor Front. Controlled by Dr. Robert Ley, this body (with 30,000,000 members in 1939) was intended to coördinate all German intellectual and manual employers and workers. Its prime function was the indoctrination of Nazi principles, but it was given some power to arbitrate in labor disputes. Associated with this Labor Front was a recreational

organization called "Strength through Joy." It arranged cheap vacation trips for workers and their families.

Relations between capital and labor were regulated by laws of 1933 and 1934. This legislation, rejecting the idea of an inevitable capital-labor conflict, upheld the principles of leadership and "the common welfare before individual welfare." Strikes and lockouts were prohibited. Employers with more than 20 workers were designated as "leaders," while their employees officially became "followers." Each such business was required to choose a council to advise on the running of the business, working conditions, and ways of increasing efficiency. The council members were to be nominated by the leader and elected by the followers. In case of dispute, the workers might appeal to a "trustee of labor."

Provision was made for thirteen such labor trustees to supervise thirteen geographical areas. Charged with the maintenance of industrial peace, these appointees of the Reich Government were empowered to supervise the councils, fix wage scales, check wholesale dismissals of employees, act as referees in disputes between leaders and councils, and even oust inefficient or inconsiderate employers from their own businesses. Violators of the new social ethics were to be haled before Economic Courts of Honor. After the introduction of the Four-Year Plan in 1936, much of this was disregarded.

In respect of foreign trade and commerce the Nazis put into practice all the principles of economic nationalism. Every means was employed to create a self-sufficient "balanced" economy, that is, to make Germany an autarkic state *(Autarkie)*. Pressure was exerted to decrease imports and increase exports. Raw materials were rationed. Tariffs were raised and citizens were urged to "buy home products." No one could engage in a new business without governmental permission. Currency-exchange privileges were granted foreign travelers on German ships and in Germany. Shipping lines were reorganized. German firms were directed to ship their products on national vessels. The development of synthetics or *Ersatzmittel* was feverishly pushed. Coördination and economic independence were the keywords of all striving.

The new developments in agriculture were interesting. It seemed likely that the Junkers or noble landholders of East Prussia and Pomerania were mainly responsible for the downfall of the Brüning, Papen, and Schleicher governments in 1932 and 1933. All three chancellors had contemplated relieving the economic distress by breaking up some of the large and debt-burdened landed estates—and all three had failed. For a brief period after Hitler's rise to power it appeared as though another effort would be made

in this direction. Eventually, however, it became clear that the Nazis would not thus repay the Junkers who had helped pave the way for their advent to power. Besides, large estates could be worked more efficiently than small homesteads.

It was of great import for the German peasants when Richard W. Darré became minister of agriculture. Believing that Germany should in future depend for her leaders upon a hereditary, Aryan, landholding nobility, Darré was instrumental in the promulgation (1933) of a novel Hereditary Farms Law. In order to create a new "farmer aristocracy" which would eventually be the chief source of strength of the German people, it was ordained that every farm of less than 309 acres must pass undivided, upon the owner's death, to his legal heir. The new owner was made responsible for the educational and professional training of the immediate remaining heirs. Only the head of the homestead was to enjoy the *honorary title* of "farmer" *(Bauer)*. Hereditary farms could not be sold, mortgaged, or attached for debt. Only those might be "farmers" who were able to prove their "Aryan" ancestry to 1800. The minister of agriculture was empowered to regulate agricultural production, prices, and distribution.

Despite export difficulties owing to trade barriers and boycotts, and despite raw-material shortages, economic conditions showed some improvement by 1935. The national income rose above that of 1932, and the official unemployment figure fell to 1,750,000. The national wealth seemed to be more equally distributed, and the specter of starvation was banished. Some of this development was owing to the widespread official work-creation schemes and the establishment of labor camps for youths; some to intensive rearmament. This was true particularly after Hitler's repudiation (1935) of the restrictive military clauses of the Versailles Treaty. The conscription and equipment of a large army were of considerable aid in the further reduction of unemployment figures.

And then, in 1936, Germany really moved on to a "war economy." The entire economic life of the Third Reich was subordinated to the demands of a Four-Year Plan. "In four years," said Hitler, "Germany must be entirely independent of foreign countries with respect to all those materials which can in any way be produced through German capability, through German chemistry, or by our machine and mining industries." The execution of the plan was entrusted to General Göring, although Dr. Schacht was minister of economics.

It became increasingly evident during 1937 that Schacht and Göring were in disagreement. The former, worried by the increase in the debt, advocated greater economy, a slowing down of the Four-Year Plan, and

more emphasis on the export business. Göring's attitude was expressed in the sentiment "cannon before butter"; he interfered more and more in the affairs of private business in order to relieve the raw-material shortage, increase the grain deliveries of farmers, and speed up rearmament and public-works programs. Schacht therefore resigned as minister of economics, and was relieved as head of the Reichsbank. Dr. Walther Immanuel Funk, long a friend and economic adviser of Hitler, replaced Schacht in both capacities.

The chief emphasis in the raw-material campaign was placed (*a*) on the development of synthetic fuel, rubber, and fabrics, and (*b*) on an increased production of iron through salvage, the more intensive working of old mines, and the development of a commercially satisfactory method of utilizing low-grade ore. The cause was aided by legislation which required the use of a certain proportion of rayon or artificial wool in all textiles and limited the use of rubber for toys and bathroom supplies. After the absorption of Austria into the Reich in March 1938 the Four-Year Plan was speedily introduced into that new province.

The government imposed drastic penalties, even death, for the failure of subjects to surrender their foreign currency. Efforts were made to encourage a greater consumption of indigenous foods, and dairy products were rationed. The rearmament and public-works (especially motor-highways) programs provided much new employment (particularly after military service was made compulsory for two years instead of one). In May 1938 the number of unemployed was only 338,000, and of these, most were regarded as unemployable. Indeed, the country now actually suffered a labor shortage.

The late spring of 1938 found the government concentrating on three main domestic items. First, to repeat, there was the Four-Year Plan. The successful completion of this was all the more necessary because foreign countries were becoming less eager to trade with Germany on her own terms. Germany wanted raw materials but she would pay for them only in goods or in special marks that had little free utility, and often payment was long deferred. Trade could not flourish in such circumstances.[11]

Secondly, there was the desire to weld Germany's potentially great military might into an efficient whole. The march into Austria had shown that the army, in its mechanized units, was not functioning so smoothly as

[11] The Germans were especially fond of paying their debts with razor blades and mouth organs, and in at least one case with a hippopotamus. See Miller, D. *You Can't Do Business with Hitler,* 2 ed., 1942.

had been hoped. The speed and competence of the Czechoslovak mobilization in May 1938, when a crisis seemed to have been reached over Sudetenland, convinced the Nazis that they had further preparations to make. Simultaneously fortification work was pushed at a feverish pace along the western frontier, where the German complement of the French Maginot Line was to be made impenetrable. For this work, many of the unemployed men in Austria were drafted.

Finally, there was the need to integrate Austria with the German economic system. This was difficult since Austria, though rich in iron ore and hydroelectric power, did not produce enough food for her population. From the point of view of sufficiency in foodstuffs, the absorption of Austria made the German economic problem more, rather than less, serious. Later, the annexation of the German-speaking portions of Czechoslovakia further aggravated this situation, for there again the new territories added to the manufacturing wealth of the Reich but increased the need for grain.

To combat the labor shortage, a decree of 1938 made all "state members" subject to conscription for short-term labor service "on nationally urgent tasks." Compensation for such conscript labor was to equal that for similar private labor, and the Reich Labor Trustees were empowered to establish maximum wages for all work. The labor decree applied to every male and female capable of working, with the necessary exemption of expectant mothers, mothers with young children, and so forth.

Funds for carrying out the program were derived from various sources. There were the regular taxes. There were expropriations of properties still held by Jews and by Catholic monastic orders and societies (especially in Austria). There were special levies that deducted from 35 to 40 per cent of the profits of large corporations before the distribution of dividends. There were energetic campaigns for "voluntary" contributions in aid of Winter Relief Work, and increased taxes on bachelors, spinsters, and childless couples. Loans were floated at relatively frequent intervals. Generally these were heavily oversubscribed, partly because of popular approval of the purposes of the loans, partly because businessmen, forbidden to expand their operations except by special permit, found it desirable to invest their surpluses in government bonds, and partly because organizations such as insurance companies found it expedient to invest heavily in government enterprises. As part of the general campaign, a demand for the return of Germany's colonies also became more insistent. Thus did the Nazis with their totalitarian politics and economics prepare for the total war which they precipitated in 1939.

CULTURE AND RELIGION

The coördination of German culture (literature, the press, music, painting, sculpture, architecture, the theater, moving pictures, and the radio) was entrusted to a Reich Culture Chamber under the direction of Dr. Goebbels. Through this body the Reich intended to "determine the intellectual course" and "cleanse" the national spiritual life of all that was non-Nazi or "non-Aryan." An extreme censorship was established, and cultural activities came to be largely political and propagandistic. "Anyone who dares to question the National Socialist world outlook," said a Nazi official, "must be branded as a traitor."

The chief task of the schools came to be "the education of the youth for service . . . in the spirit of National Socialism." Objectivity in the teaching of history was discarded as "one of the numerous fallacies of liberalism." To students in the secondary schools and universities it was made clear that "a good examination record will be valuable only if accompanied by a good S.A. record." In the curricula main emphasis was to be placed on the inculcation of Nazi racial theories; the description of "the great traditions, history, and culture" of the German people; the cultivation of the politician-soldier and of the "military spirit"; and the development of strong physiques through athletics and compulsory labor on farms and in camps. The traditional list of German heroes was extended to include Adolf Hitler, Leo Schlageter (killed while resisting the French occupation of the Ruhr), and Horst Wessel (composer of the party song and victim in 1930 of a fatal brawl).

The Nazi view of German racial supremacy had as a corollary the desire for the greatest possible increase of a healthy "Aryan" population. Every conceivable means was used to encourage early marriage and large families, particularly among blond-haired, blue-eyed people. The bearing of "Aryan" children by unmarried girls was officially encouraged with almost equal ardor. The state frowned, however, on reproduction among individuals who had heritable diseases or who were chronically alcoholic or congenitally feeble-minded. In 1934, accordingly, there went into effect a sterilization law "for the prevention of inherited disease in posterity." The law in its scientific aspects met with the general approval of authorities on sterilization in foreign countries, but there was fear that it might be perverted for political purposes.

It could hardly be expected that the judicial system of Germany would remain unaltered. The legal system, based largely upon Roman law (which supposedly "served the interests of the materialist system of the world"),

was to be scrapped for a system resting upon German common law *(Volksrecht)*. Thus justice would be brought in closer touch with "the German consciousness," and the strong forces of the nation would be protected against the weak elements. Since "the individual is nothing, while the people is everything," justice must be based upon the popular feeling of right as much as on legal texts. The new justice was exemplified in a decree that established tribunals called "People's Courts." These courts were, in general, to be composed of two judges and three laymen, all appointed by Hitler. Their chief jurisdiction was over cases of high treason, a term which was so defined that it might include even the distribution of a banned newspaper. Choice of defense counsel before these tribunals was subject to the approval of the court president, and there was no provision for appeal. The extreme penalty for treason was decapitation by means of the ax.

Coördination in the Third Reich encountered its most persistent opposition in the sphere of religion. Until 1933 German Protestantism comprised 29 groups. To achieve unity and control, a group of Nazi "German Christians" moved to establish a single Protestant Church under a bishop appointed by the Führer. To forestall such action, representatives of the various churches organized a German Evangelical Church Union, to be presided over by a Lutheran bishop (for the Lutherans formed the majority of German Protestants). The first man chosen for this post was Dr. Friedrich von Bodelschwingh. Since he was prominent chiefly for social-welfare work and had not been identified with any political faction, it was hoped that the government would refrain from interference.

But the German Christians were not content. Particularly was this true of one Dr. Ludwig Müller, Nazi chaplain and friend of the chancellor, who himself wished to be national bishop. He and his followers refused to accept Bodelschwingh's election. In Prussia, moreover, Göring declared that the churches had no right to act without his approval; he claimed the spiritual as well as the political powers of the former king of Prussia. Accordingly he appointed a lawyer, Dr. August Jäger, to be Reich Church Commissioner for Prussia. When Jäger proceeded to dissolve all local church councils, appoint German Christians to clerical offices, and use storm troops to enforce his edicts, Bodelschwingh resigned (June 1933). Strenuous efforts were simultaneously made to convert all pastors and theological students to the German Christian point of view. Parallel developments took place in other predominantly Protestant German states.

The strife led President von Hindenburg to plead for harmony within church ranks. Thereupon Jäger was dismissed, and deputies of the Müller and Bodelschwingh factions met to draft a constitution. The completed

document provided for a Lutheran Reich Bishop elected by a national synod and assisted by a spiritual cabinet of one representative from each of the three chief German Protestant divisions. A July election was set for a threefold vote by the Protestant church membership: a referendum on the constitution, the election of local church boards, and the election of delegates to the national synod. Two candidates were nominated for nearly every office, one by the German Christians and one by the Bodelschwingh group. The government actively supported the former and hampered the latter. The press and the radio were made available only to the Müllerites. Hitler broadcast an appeal to the voters to elect only those candidates who would support the "new national policy." The German Christians gained control of the national synod and elevated Müller to the office of *Reichsbischof*.

The strife was not yet ended. There was a division of opinion among Bishop Müller's own followers. The moderate elements were content to leave matters as they now were. The extremists wished to do away with the Old Testament, discard the crucifix, and revise the New Testament so as to make of Jesus Christ a historical rather than a divine figure. This group also was bent upon ending the split between Protestantism and Catholicism and eventually uniting all "Aryan" Germans in one national church. Led by a fiery wartime submarine commander, the Rev. Martin Niemöller, some thousands of anti-Müllerites now formed a Pastors' Emergency League. In January 1934 Müller, uneasy over the opposition, the growing membership of the Pastors' Emergency League, and the resignation of his own appointees to the spiritual cabinet, attempted by decree to make himself dictator. This only increased the ardor of the opposition, and the decree was rescinded. Müller then appointed Jäger to the post of Law Steward of the German Evangelical Church so that he might unify the whole religious administration.

Dr. Jäger induced several of the regional churches, in Saxony and Brandenburg, for example, to surrender their traditional autonomy and accept the full authority of Bishop Müller. But the opposition in other areas continued. The Pastors' Emergency League was disbanded, but its work was carried on by a Confessional Synod headed by Niemöller and the Protestant bishops of Bavaria and Württemberg. This synod refused to regard the Nazi revolution as a revelation of the Divine Will or to serve two masters: God and political leaders. The reply to all this was the arrest, suspension, transfer, or retirement of hundreds of pastors and the removal of the two south-German bishops. This last action led to widespread protest meetings, and Jäger was once more dropped from office.

Thus far, Hitler had taken little public part in the church conflict. He adopted the attitude that, as long as it remained loyal to the state, the church might settle its own difficulties. But in September 1935 he decreed the supremacy of the Nazi State over the Protestant Church. The Reich Bishop was shorn of his authority, and control of nondoctrinal church affairs was placed in the hands of Hanns Kerrl, minister for church affairs. The new minister was placed in charge of the personnel, property, and finances of the Protestant churches. Henceforth resistance to Nazi church policy would constitute lawbreaking.

In 1937 it was made a crime to collect or contribute money for the Confessional Synod or any other church group not approved by the minister for church affairs. Only church news that had the approval of Kerrl might be published, and he usually passed only information emanating from the German Christian movement, still led by Müller. Pastors who displeased the authorities were jailed without trial. Niemöller, incarcerated since 1937, was tried secretly in 1938, on charges of sedition. The court freed him on all major charges, but the police rearrested him and, without publishing any new charge, placed him in a concentration camp. The conflict continued briskly into the summer of 1939, but in the second month of the new war, the clerics agreed to a truce. In view of the national emergency, the Confessional Synod agreed to accept temporarily the administrative headship of Kerrl.

Meanwhile a conflict had been in progress involving the Nazi State and the Catholic Church. Hitler was grieved that relations between the Vatican and German Catholics were regulated by three separate concordats—between the papacy on the one hand and Prussia, Bavaria, and Baden severally on the other. Accordingly the Catholic von Papen was sent to Vatican City to negotiate a single concordat for all Germany's Catholics. The latter hoped that such a treaty would end the unpleasant encounters between storm troops and Catholic organizations that frequently occurred in the early days of Nazi control.

In July 1933 a new concordat was signed. The Catholic clergy was forbidden to participate in Reich politics, and all future diocesan appointments were to be made by the Holy See after consultation with the government. The latter sanctioned the continued existence of the Catholic Action as a nonpolitical society. Catholic schools, youth groups, and cultural organizations were not to be disturbed if they refrained from political moves. It was not long before friction developed over the interpretation of this instrument. Nazi political leaders strove to restrict the freedom of the Catholic Action, the Catholic Youth Movement, and the Catholic press.

Quarrels arose over the control of education, and leading Catholic churchmen openly denounced the sterilization law and the attacks on the Old Testament and the crucifix. Perhaps the most outspoken cleric was the archbishop of Munich, Michael Cardinal von Faulhaber. Apparently to forestall his arrest, the pope in 1934 conferred upon him the rank of papal legate, which brought with it diplomatic immunity.

In the ensuing years the struggle was marked by police action, press suspensions, and violence. A number of monks and nuns were imprisoned on the charge of smuggling money out of Germany. Membership in the Hitler Youth was made compulsory for boys and girls, who thus were more effectively removed from clerical influence. Pressure was brought to bear on parents to register their children in public rather than confessional schools, and in 1937 most of the Catholic schools in Bavaria were converted into state institutions. When the pope criticized Nazi interference in religious matters and accused the government of having violated the concordat, his protests drew intemperate replies from Nazi officials and precipitated a new series of trials of monks and lay brothers on charges of immorality and exchange-law violations. But even after the outbreak of the Second World War, Catholic clerics in Germany continued to denounce Nazi efforts to destroy the institutions of the church and the family.

Meanwhile Streicher's *Der Stürmer* printed more and more scurrilous references to Jesus Christ; and *Das Schwarze Korps,* organ of the S.S. commanded by Heinrich Himmler,[12] decorated its pages with blasphemous articles and cartoons aimed at making Christianity seem ridiculous. In 1937 Hitler awarded the National Prize, Germany's substitute for the Nobel Prize, to Alfred Rosenberg—outstanding philosophical foe of Christianity and spiritual leader of the Neo-Pagans, who advocated a return to old Teutonic rites.

POLITICS AND PURGES, 1933–1939

The Reichstag that was elected on March 5, 1933, was dissolved by the government in October of the same year, coincident with Germany's withdrawal from the disarmament conference and announced intention to resign from the League.[13] New elections were called for November, at which time the people were to elect deputies and register their approbation or disapproval of Nazi diplomacy. About 96 per cent of the qualified elec-

[12] This same Himmler was the dread chief of the Nazi secret police, called *Geheime Staats-Polizei* or *Gestapo.*

[13] The state legislatures also were dissolved, and no new ones elected.

torate went to the polls. Of these, 93 per cent endorsed the government's policies. And 92 per cent of the ballots were in favor of the single (Nazi) list of candidates. Such an endorsement strengthened the hands of the government at home and abroad.

Yet, early in 1934, it became evident that there was dissatisfaction within Nazi ranks. Particularly was this noticeable among the storm troops (S.A.), many of whom had once been communists. They resented the circumstance that the "socialistic" items in the party program were seemingly being forgotten. Many rank-and-file Nazis regarded the labor laws as a betrayal of their interests. Some were angry because of the decline in real wages. Others were still awaiting the jobs they had been promised. And the personal extravagances of a number of Nazi leaders added to the ill will and restlessness.

The leadership of the discontented Brown Shirts was assumed by Captain Röhm, their chief of staff. The latter seemed eager, furthermore, to incorporate a large number of storm troops in the regular army or *Reichswehr*. To this, both the Reichswehr generals and Hitler were opposed, and in April 1934 it was announced that all S.A. men were to go on vacation during July. In June Röhm himself was given leave of absence "for reasons of health," and it was rumored that his troops might be reduced in numbers since the Reichswehr had no faith in a large "people's army." Meanwhile Vice-Chancellor von Papen also had raised his voice in opposition, denouncing the extreme censorship, the resort to terrorism, and the use of force in religious disputes. The apparent intent of the government to weaken the storm troops, and the fact that nothing happened to Papen for his temerity, seem to have induced the malcontents to consider an early seizure of power. Before their plans were completed, Hitler liquidated their leaders (and some other prominent anti-Hitlerites) in a "Purge of June 30."

It was not known how many scores of persons were killed in the blood purge. Most prominent among the victims were, besides Röhm, former Chancellor von Schleicher and his wife; Erich Klausener, leader of the Catholic Action, and several of Papen's assistants. Papen himself was arrested by Göring but was saved by his closeness to Hindenburg. After Hitler gave the Reichstag his version of the affair, the legislature thanked him for his vigorous forestalling "of civil war and chaos."

Soon after the purge the government reduced the number of storm troops. The primary function of this semimilitary organization had been accomplished by the "winning of the streets" from the opposition elements. The membership, however, had continued to grow, and Röhm at one time claimed command of 2,500,000 men. Increase in size was accompanied

by a decline of discipline, and neither Hitler nor the Reichswehr favored so large a private army. Consequently the S.A. was reduced in size and largely disarmed. Even the better-disciplined, black-shirted Nazi bodyguards or S.S. were restricted in their activities. The Reichswehr emerged in 1935 as the supreme military organ of the Third Reich, particularly after the reintroduction of conscription and a large standing army.[14]

Less than five weeks after the purge, Hitler rose to new political heights. On August 2, 1934, the aged President von Hindenburg died. On the preceding night the cabinet had adopted a decree providing for the union of the offices of president and chancellor from the moment of Hindenburg's death. From August 2, therefore, Hitler ruled alone. Declining the title of president, he asked to be called only Der Führer. "In the next thousand years," he said, "no more revolutions will take place in Germany."

In the period 1935 to 1938, certain prominent leaders of the high command and of the foreign office fell into disfavor with Hitler. Some of these men were not actual members of the Nazi Party. Some were still fundamentally Christian in sympathies or continued to represent the outlook of Prussian Junkerism. Some opposed the Nazi policies in the Rhineland and Spain and the formation of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis. At any rate, the Führer's displeasure was vigorously manifested early in 1938 when he reorganized both these branches of the national administration. Using the marriage of War Minister Werner von Blomberg to a lady of much lower "station" as a convenient time determinant, Hitler dismissed not merely this officer but also Commander-in-Chief Werner von Fritsch, Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath, and others of similar sympathies. They were replaced by men who were more closely attuned to Hitler's methods and views, men such as the raucous-voiced, promise-breaking new Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, and the political-minded General Wilhelm Keitel.

Another reorganization was effected in 1939. Hitler placed virtually all able-bodied males over seventeen, who were not actually engaged in military service or were not members of the S.S., under the direct "educational" control of the storm-troop organization now headed by Viktor Lutze. The S.A. was thus made responsible for the continued physical fitness and military education of nearly every German man before and after the completion of his required service in the army. Thus the ground was well prepared for the international aggressions of 1939.

[14] In October 1935 the German General Staff, abolished by the Versailles Treaty, was publicly reëstablished.

THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES

One of the most tragic consequences of the Nazi policies was the fate of hundreds of thousands of persons who were driven from their homes and rendered "stateless." No word picture could give full understanding of the misery of these refugees—this human flotsam. The problem of dealing with large numbers of stateless refugees already had been thrust upon the world as an aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. To deal with the Russian and other early postwar refugees, there had been created, under League auspices, the Nansen International Office for Refugees. This was joined, after the advent of the Nazi Government in Germany, by a League-supervised Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, established to deal with the specific question of refugees from the Third Reich. Both organizations were concerned mainly with the political and legal protection of their charges, and both were scheduled to end their labors at the close of 1938. The political developments of 1938, however, made the closing of these bureaus untimely, and hence the League approved a plan for combining them under a single High Commissioner of the League of Nations for Refugees with headquarters in London. Sir Herbert Emerson was appointed the first such commissioner.

Meanwhile the treatment meted out to the Jews by Germany induced the United States Government to ask (1938) a number of foreign states whether they would help create an international committee to facilitate the emigration of refugees from Central Europe. Funds for the project, it was expected, would be forthcoming from private organizations and individuals. (And funds were necessary because Berlin, while declaring its anxiety to get rid of the Jews, yet made it very difficult for them to emigrate.) All invited powers except Italy responded to the call, so that 32 nations were represented at a meeting at Evian in France. Machinery was set up to consider ways of handling the problem, humanitarian sentiments were expressed, and, while all agreed that something should be done quickly, each wanted the others to do it. Caution had to be exercised not merely because of the economic and racial problems of each state represented, but lest any false move act as an invitation to other countries to imitate the German example of "human dumping." In the end, an Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees was set up, headed by George Rublee of the United States.

The committee was to assist refugees by undertaking "negotiations to improve the present conditions of exodus and to replace them with con-

ditions of orderly emigration" and by approaching "the governments of refuge with a view to developing opportunities for permanent settlement." The crisis over Sudetenland postponed the activities of the committee and ended by increasing its burden. Eventually, Rublee managed to inaugurate discussions with a German representative regarding a possible solution of the problem, though Berlin did not officially recognize the existence of the committee on refugees.

Early in 1939 Rublee brought to the committee in London a German statement on the subject of refugees. The German proposals envisaged the emigration of 150,000 youthful Jewish "pioneers" over a period of five years. When these had established new homes overseas, their dependents would be permitted to follow them. The emigration was to be financed partly out of remaining Jewish property in Germany and partly by foreign contributions. Meanwhile limited opportunities to earn a living would be reopened to the Jews who were left behind.

Mr. Rublee resigned after having argued in favor of the German statement, and was succeeded as director by League Commissioner Sir Herbert Emerson. The committee then adjourned, merely "taking cognizance" of plans to set up a resettlement corporation to "serve as an agency for financing emigration from Germany and for maintaining such contacts with the German authorities as might be necessary for the purpose." There, in effect, the international effort to solve the problem rested when war broke out anew in September 1939.

CHAPTER 10

Central Europe

AUSTRIA

a. STORM AND STRESS, 1918–1932

In November 1916 the aged Emperor-King Francis Joseph died. His reign of 68 years ended, as it had begun, amid tumult and warfare. He was succeeded by his grandnephew, Charles. The new ruler was good-natured and courageous, but inexperienced in statecraft. Though his intentions were good, his decisions often were belated and his actions undiplomatic.

The events of 1916 to 1918 broke the morale of the Austro-Hungarian people. The entry of the United States into the war and the dissemination of Allied propaganda behind the lines helped to undermine the faith of the people in their government. Czech revolutionaries worked against the monarchy, there was mutiny among the Slavic and Hungarian soldiers and the sailors in the Adriatic, and the people in many cities faced starvation. Imitating the Russian example, mobs in Vienna shouted: "All power to the soldiers' and workers' councils." The German-speaking deputies in the parliament at Vienna proclaimed a separate German-Austrian state. In a last effort to hold his domains together, Charles issued a manifesto (October 1918) calling for the formation of a federative state in which each people should form an autonomous community. But it was too late for federation. On November 11, eight days after an armistice was signed with Italy, Emperor Charles renounced all share in the government.[1] He immedi-

[1] Two days later he renounced all share in the government of the Kingdom of Hungary.

ately left Vienna and soon afterwards went into Swiss exile with his family.

Even before Charles had quitted Vienna, the Social Democrats, Christian Socialists, and German Nationals had set up a provisional government in German-Austria by an almost bloodless revolution. On November 12 this government issued a tentative constitution that declared German-Austria to be a republic and an integral part of the new German Reich. Meanwhile the non-German portions of the Dual Monarchy had gone to form the new states of Czechoslovakia and Hungary or to increase the territories of Italy, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Poland. The absence of violence attending the breakup of the monarchy was owing largely to the action of Charles in releasing all officials from their oath of allegiance to him.

In the interim between the creation of German-Austria and the elections for a constituent assembly in February 1919, the provisional government watched over Austria's welfare. The presidency was rotated among the controlling party leaders, mostly Social Democrats and Christian Socialists. These men quickly suppressed some minor communist uprisings and desired the establishment of law and order at the earliest possible moment, for many were the difficulties and hardships that faced Austria immediately after the war.

At the close of hostilities, thousands of armed Czech, Polish, and Hungarian soldiers marched home through Austria from the various fronts. More than a million Russian and Italian ex-prisoners of war also returned home, and though they probably were anxious to leave Austria quickly, many paused to snatch some compensation for their suffering in the prison camps. In Vienna, the returned German-Austrian soldiers threatened violence unless food and shelter were provided.

As a member of the Dual Monarchy, German-Austria had been the center of a relatively self-sufficient economic unit. It had received raw materials and foodstuffs from Bohemia and Moravia, had secured grain from Galicia and Hungary, had had two excellent ports on the Adriatic, and had sold its manufactures to the various parts of the empire as well as abroad. All this suddenly was changed. The great iron, steel, automobile, railway, electrical, textile, paper, and banking industries were ruined because the raw materials now were located in foreign areas, because tariff walls were raised by nationalistic neighbors, and because Austria could produce only a fraction of the food that she needed for her population.

The unemployment problem soon became appalling. Nearly every important organization in Austria was overstaffed as a result of the territorial losses. The Austrian bureaucracy had been notorious for its numerous employees, and now thousands of officials were without livelihood. The

same was true of thousands of postmen, railwaymen, bank clerks, and newspapermen. Doctors, professors, and merchants were starving, as were many former army and navy officers and the dispossessed aristocrats. For four months after the close of armed warfare the Allies maintained their food blockade of the Central Powers. Austria suffered especially severely from this action, and in 1919–1920 thousands of Austrian children were sent abroad, especially to Scandinavia, to be fed and reared. For a time, many of the unemployed, starving, and freezing Viennese were sent into the Vienna Woods to chop down trees for firewood which the wealthier inhabitants purchased, not because they wanted it but because that seemed the most expedient way to keep the proletariat busy and relatively quiet. Conditions improved when United States relief supplies were sent to Austria.

The chaos gave rise to a general desire for the early restoration of order and economic stability. Hence the assembly elections of February 1919 resulted in a triumph for the moderate parties. The provisional government resigned its control into the hands of a "Pink Coalition" consisting of the urban Social Democrats and the agrarian Christian Socialists. Karl Seitz was elected president of the assembly and Karl Renner became chancellor; both were Social Democrats. The Constituent Assembly confirmed the declaration of the provisional government that German-Austria was a republic and an integral part of Germany. Then most of the Habsburg family was banished and its property confiscated. No effort was made to maintain the economic arrangements that formerly had existed with the other parts of the Dual Monarchy. Hence it was a shock to Vienna to learn from the French Foreign Office, just prior to the publication of the German peace treaty, that an Austro-German union would not be permitted by the Allies.

The Treaty of St. Germain which Austria was compelled to accept in September 1919 confirmed this prohibition and stipulated that union might take place only with the (unanimous) consent of the League Council. Even the name "German-Austria" had to be changed to "Republic of Austria." The assembly now had to proceed with the making of a permanent constitution, for this matter had been suspended in order that the document might be made to fit in with the projected German constitution. In October 1920 the assembly adopted an instrument that followed closely a draft presented by the Christian Socialists. The latter, fearing the dominance of the radical Viennese proletariat in any centralized state, devised a federal system similar to that of Switzerland.

The constitution created a government consisting of a president and a bicameral legislature. The lower house *(Nationalrat)* was composed of

members elected for four years by all citizens over twenty. It could not be dissolved except by its own resolution or law. The upper house *(Bundesrat)* was to contain a minimum of three and a maximum of twelve representatives from each of the nine provinces or *Länder*. The representatives were to be elected by the provincial diets, and their powers were to be chiefly advisory. The chancellor and cabinet were made responsible to the lower house. Together the two councils constituted the Federal Assembly which, until 1929, had the power to elect a president. In 1929 provision was made for popular presidential elections. Every act of the president had to be countersigned by a cabinet minister. The provincial diets got considerable autonomy, and in numerous instances the enforcement of national laws was left in their hands. In the matter of social, labor, and agrarian legislation, the assembly merely outlined a program, the execution of which was left to the provinces.

After the first parliamentary elections held under the new constitution, the Christian Socialists combined with the Pan-German Party to form a new government. The Federal Assembly elected Dr. Michael Hainisch, a man of considerable scholastic repute, to be Austria's first president. In the same month (December 1920) Austria was admitted to membership in the League of Nations.

Almost fifteen months after the adoption of the constitution the boundaries of the new republic were finally delimited (December 1921). Austria comprised nine provinces: Burgenland, Carinthia, Lower Austria, Upper Austria, Salzburg, Styria, Tirol, Vorarlberg, and Vienna. The area of Austria was 32,369 square miles and the estimated population, 6,800,000. The inhabitants of Vienna alone numbered 1,800,000.

During 1921 economic conditions in Austria became terrible. The winter of 1920–1921 was particularly harsh, and thousands starved to death. The government had recourse to inflation, and the Austrian crown, worth 20 cents at par, soon stood at 3000 to the dollar. Early in 1921 the despairing authorities appealed to the League for funds with which to purchase food. The reply of the League was to send a commission of investigation. Meanwhile international loans and charitable expenditures provided temporary relief.

The economic situation gave added impetus to the movement for union with Germany. A bill for a plebiscite on the Anschluss was presented in the parliament. If the vote favored union, the government should petition the League for its consent. The Allied Powers, however, threatened to punish Austria if the bill were passed. The proposal was dropped, but a number of provinces decided that, even if Austria were forbidden to

unite with Germany, this prohibition could not apply to the individual states. Plebiscites in the Tirol and Salzburg overwhelmingly endorsed union. When Styria and Upper Austria prepared to hold plebiscites, the Allies threatened intervention and the central government blocked the project.

From June 1921 to May 1922 Dr. Johann Schober, police president of Vienna and leader of the Pan-Germans, was premier. The Schober governments puzzled over ameliorative financial measures and countermanded a number of the steps toward socialization that had been taken by the earlier and more radical ministries. An attempted *rapprochement* with Czechoslovakia and a budget crisis resulted in Schober's overthrow. In May 1922 there came into power as chancellor Ignaz Seipel, a middle-aged Catholic priest who was leader of the Christian Socialist Party. Seipel proceeded on a foreign tour to get financial aid for Austria. Premier Facta of Italy took the occasion to announce that Rome would consider any union between Austria and Germany, or Austria and the other Danubian states, a cause for war. After vainly visiting several capitals, Seipel (September 1922—at which time the crown stood at 77,000 to the dollar) addressed an appeal to the League.

The League Council submitted to Austria a plan whereby certain western governments would guarantee a loan of $130,000,000 for 20 years. Such Austrian assets as the government tobacco monopoly should serve as security, and Austria should pledge certain economic reforms. The League would appoint a commissioner-general, resident in Vienna, but there would be no infringement of Austrian sovereignty. Austria must repeat her promise not to alienate her independence. The parliament accepted this arrangement (First Geneva Protocol, 1922) and authorized the ministry to carry out the agreement. Dr. Alfred R. Zimmerman of Rotterdam became the League Commissioner, and in 1924 a new monetary unit, the schilling, replaced the crown. Financial progress was rapid and in 1926 League control came to an end.

Similar advances could not be reported in other fields. The general unrest was alarming, and in 1924 there followed in fairly rapid succession an attempt to assassinate Seipel, a strike of metalworkers, and a railway strike. The weary chancellor resigned, to be succeeded by another Christian Socialist, Rudolf Ramek.[2] The difficulties continued during Ramek's incumbency (December 1924–October 1926) and by the close of 1925 the unemployed numbered 300,000. The discontent and economic stagnation once more brought to the fore the idea of Anschluss; demonstrations in its favor became so popular that Italy and the Little Entente warned the

[2] At this time Dr. Hainisch was reëlected president.

government to prevent any overt action. When Ramek resigned he was succeeded by Seipel, who soon came into conflict with the Social Democrats over old-age and invalid pensions. By July 1927 the cabinet was faced with a situation approaching civil war. To understand this crisis it is necessary to consider the development of two powerful, rival, political organizations, the *Heimwehr* and the *Schutzbund*.

From the earliest days of the republic there existed a bitter feeling between the industrial and the rural interests in Austria. The workers of Vienna and of the Styrian mining districts formed an industrial proletariat with socialistic and anticlerical leanings. They formed the core of the Social Democratic Party. Most of the remaining Austrians were agrarian, conservative, and religious. They supported the Christian Socialist and Pan-German parties, and hated Marxism.

After the war Vienna fell into the hands of the Social Democrats, and municipal control was extended to many fields. Rents were forced down by law to so low a figure that apartment houses became a drug on the market. In addition, a high rent-tax was levied, and the proceeds were used to build municipal houses for the workmen. The *Karl Marx Hof,* completed in 1930, was the largest dwelling house in Europe, with 1400 apartments. The municipality acquired control of bus and trolley lines and of subway, water, and lighting systems. It established a municipal brewery, a bakery, an iceshop, and a crematorium—this last over the protests of the Catholic Church.

Most of this was anathema to the peasants, and the bitterness between Vienna and the rural hinterland expressed itself in the organization of rival militant bodies: the agrarian Heimwehr and the socialist Schutzbund. The program of the Heimwehr called for the overthrow of the socialists and union with Germany. Under the leadership of Walter Pfriemer and Ernst Rüdiger von Starhemberg, the Heimwehr, in the early years of its existence, associated itself with the Hitler movement in Germany. By 1931 the Heimwehr included 60,000 armed men, of whom only 10 per cent were laborers.

The Schutzbund in 1931 counted a trained membership of 90,000 men, concentrated in the industrial regions. It possessed quantities of munitions, stored away in such places as the office buildings of socialist newspapers; the government from time to time raided these private arsenals. Frequently the Heimwehr and the Schutzbund arranged for demonstrations in approximately the same place on the same day, and then the government could with difficulty preserve order. Since, by the peace treaty, Austria's

army was limited to 30,000 men, the government had the smallest armed force in the country.

Now it happened that in July 1927 a jury acquitted three members of the Heimwehr who had been accused of the murder of two socialists in Burgenland. Proletarian sentiment stamped the accused as guilty, and on the day following the verdict thousands of Viennese workmen went on strike, swarmed into the fashionable *Ringstrasse,* overpowered a small police force, and set fire to the beautiful Palace of Justice. Rioting continued for three days, during which scores were killed and hundreds wounded. The palace was partially destroyed; thousands of records were burned, water-soaked, or scattered; and business temporarily came to a standstill.

Following this crisis, clashes between the two organized factions occurred in alarmingly rapid succession. Several times during 1929 and 1930 the Heimwehr threatened to march on Vienna, as the Italian Fascists had marched on Rome, and put an end to what they considered a weak parliamentary government. In September 1931 Pfriemer proclaimed himself dictator and ordered his followers to seize public buildings in Styria. The Austrian army quickly put down the attempted *Putsch.* The leaders were arrested—and acquitted by a jury in Graz. By 1932 it was clear that Austria could enjoy neither domestic nor foreign quiet so long as the Heimwehr and Schutzbund continued to exist as private militias.

The foreign objections to an Austro-German union were based on a variety of considerations: (1) Alone, the area of Germany was smaller than that of France; united with Austria, Germany's area would have exceeded that of France. (2) The combined populations of Germany and Austria were one and three-fourths times that of France. (3) Had Austria been annexed to Germany, then Czechoslovakia, herself containing 3,000,000 German-speaking people, would have been surrounded by German territory. (4) Anschluss would have made Germany, rather than weak Austria, the immediate neighbor of Italy and might thereby have complicated the question of the South Tirol. (5) An Austro-German union, by placing a powerful block across central Europe, would have weakened the Franco-Czechoslovak and Franco-Yugoslav alliances from a military point of view. (6) Though Austria had little coal, she had iron and timber and a superabundance of hydroelectric power. The combined economic strength of Germany and Austria was formidable.

The two countries immediately concerned might have experienced further advantages from union. Austria would have got a free market in

Germany and better commercial treaties with foreign areas, and could have made use of Germany's highly developed marketing system. Germany would have found more direct trade relations with southeastern Europe, would have had the use of Austria's power resources, and would have had a sizable accretion to her military strength.

Not all the citizens of Germany and Austria favored Anschluss. Many German Protestants were not anxious to incorporate in the Reich 6,000,000 Austrian Catholics. Some Germans felt that the Austrians were too easy-going and carefree to be desirable adjuncts to the population. On the other hand, devout Austrian Catholics feared the loss of influence of the church in case of union with Protestant Germany. There was also a general dislike of Prussia. The Austrians, except for some of the more aggressive businessmen, disliked Prussian efficiency. Many Viennese feared that union with Germany might reduce their capital to the status of a second-rate provincial city.

At any rate, organizations were founded in both countries to agitate for Anschluss. In 1927 a German and an Austrian committee met to discuss means for giving the two states an identical criminal code. In the summer of 1928, 200,000 Germans visited Austria during a festival to commemorate the centennial of Franz Schubert's death.

In 1929, when Chancellor Seipel resigned (owing to strife within the Christian Socialist ranks and to illness), he was succeeded by Ernst Streeruwitz, who included several pro-Anschluss leaders in his cabinet.[3] Streeruwitz's tenure was brief and stormy. Soon after he took office he had to answer a public charge of Briand that the armed forces of Austria made her a menace to her neighbors. The Austrian Government denied this, but the socialists claimed that the authorities were in collusion with the Heimwehr. Thereupon the Heimwehr demanded a revision of the constitution whereby the influence of the industrial proletariat would be decreased. When Streeruwitz opposed the suggested changes, his ministry fell; Johann Schober came back into power (September 1929) with a cabinet that tried to steer a middle course between radicals and conservatives. Several constitutional amendments were adopted which strengthened the power of the president in time of crisis, substituted popular for parliamentary election of the president, and reduced the political power of the courts.

Having restored order, Schober attended the Hague Reparation Conference in 1930 and secured for Austria a release from her reparation

[3] Meanwhile, however, the Federal Assembly had chosen Wilhelm Miklas, an opponent of Anschluss, to succeed President Hainisch.

obligations until 1944. Then he visited several capitals to seek more favorable trade arrangements and a new loan. His efforts met with limited success, but the economic outlook for Austria remained bleak. At one point in 1930 the unemployment figures embraced one workman of every four in the land. The perennial question of Anschluss thereupon again assumed prominence, but Berlin and Vienna dared go no farther than to sign a protocol for a projected customs union (1931). This was immediately opposed by France and the Little Entente, and financial pressure was brought to bear to make Germany and Austria renounce the document. This they did, two days before the World Court, by a vote of 8 to 7, rendered an advisory opinion that the contemplated pact would have violated Austria's pledge in the First Geneva Protocol (1922) not to jeopardize her independence.

Though the renunciation eased the international tension, it left unsolved Austria's economic difficulties. In 1932 the world witnessed in Austria a sovereign state literally begging the League for a credit of a few million dollars in order that the starving inhabitants might be fed. The republic strove frantically to secure favorable trade treaties with her neighbors, usually without avail. Chancellor after chancellor resorted to desperate methods in vain attempts to prevent further decrease in the country's diminutive gold supply. The leading banks crashed, and eventually no funds were left with which to pay doles.

During the summer of 1932 money was offered Austria—under political conditions that were unacceptable to her patriots. At length, however, economic need overcame all other considerations, and the parliament, by a vote of 82 to 80, ratified the Lausanne Protocol. This document, drawn up under League auspices, gave Austria a loan of $42,000,000 for 20 years in return for a promise that the republic would not enter into any political or economic union with Germany. The opposition to the loan had been headed by Dr. Schober, who died in the midst of the debates on the protocol. The fight for acceptance of the protocol had been led by Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss, a Christian Socialist.

b. AUSTRIA'S FIVE-YEAR WAR AGAINST NAZISM, 1933–1938

The elevation of Hitler to the German Chancellorship in January 1933 moved the question of Anschluss to a different plane. Some years previously a Nazi party had been established in Austria. The members wore the same uniform as their German colleagues and adhered to anti-Marxism and anti-Semitism. They were recruited mainly from the lower bourgeoisie and the

peasantry, and they placed their chief hope in political union with the Third Reich. The movement grew slowly, and no Nazi was elected to parliament in 1930. In the provincial elections of 1932, however, the Hitlerites won seats in several local diets. Upon the triumph of the Nazis in Germany, the Austrian Hitlerites, led by Dr. Alfred Frauenfeld, determined to bring about Anschluss.

In this endeavor they had the support of Germany. Although Berlin realized the danger of outright annexation of Austria, there appeared to be no serious obstacle to the accomplishment of this end by indirect means. Since the Austrian Nazis took orders from Hitler, it was believed that a National Socialist victory at the polls would complete Austro-German union despite the objections of the former Allies. To force the Austrian Government to hold new elections and to ensure the winning of these elections, the German Nazis exported funds and agitators to the little republic. Slanders, assaults, and the detonation of paper bombs in public places became frequent occurrences. These activities encountered the determined resistance of Chancellor Dollfuss, who until recently had himself favored Anschluss.

Dr. Engelbert Dollfuss was born on a small farm in 1892. After working his way through school he studied law in Vienna and economics in Berlin. During the First World War he served at the front, advancing from private to lieutenant. Then he entered politics, as a Christian Socialist. In due time he became a parliamentary deputy and gained recognition as an agricultural expert. He was appointed minister of agriculture in 1931 and in the following year was asked to form a cabinet of his own. His coalition of Christian Socialists, Heimwehr, and Agrarian League had a majority of one over the Social Demoerats and Pan-Germans. Dollfuss' simplicity of manner, good nature, and religious fervor charmed those who came in contact with him. Because of his resolute spirit and because he was less than five feet tall, he was popularly dubbed "the Millimetternich."

Dollfuss successfully fought for the acceptance of the loan under the Lausanne Protocol, reformed the civil service and the railway administration, and bargained for currency and trade treaties. In 1933 the lower house of parliament adjourned itself indefinitely when the speaker and both deputy-speakers resigned in the midst of an excited discussion. Since by law only one or another of these men could call a meeting, the parliament was unable legally to reconvene. President Miklas thereupon invested Dollfuss with emergency powers, and the government soon issued hundreds of decrees.

Many of these decrees were aimed at the Nazis and at other political

groups objectionable to the government, Restrictions were placed on the freedom of the press and of assembly. Nazi propaganda was barred from Austrian radio broadcasts. German agitators were expelled. It was forbidden to wear the Nazi uniform or display any political emblem other than the Austrian flag. In June 1933, after bombs had been thrown at a detachment of auxiliary police, the National Socialist Party was outlawed. Meanwhile the authorities had also dissolved the Socialist Schutzbund, abolished the Communist Party, appointed commissions of public safety to rule the provinces, and required a new oath of loyalty from all state employees. Berlin replied with a scheme to injure Austria economically. A visa charge of $400 was placed on German tourists who wished to visit Austria.

As the struggle continued, the Austrians expelled Theodor Habicht, Hitler's special "inspector for Austria," and the Germans sent home the Austrian press attaché in Berlin. German planes dropped propaganda leaflets over Austrian towns, and violent anti-Dollfuss speeches were broadcast from Munich. An armed Austrian Legion, consisting of Austrian Nazis who had fled to Germany, was organized in Bavaria. The Austrian Chancellor appealed to the world for moral and economic backing, and at the London Economic Conference pleaded eloquently (June 1933) for increased foreign trade and tourist traffic so that Austria might not be forced by economic necessity to submit to German domination.

Upon his return from London, and after conversations with Mussolini, Dollfuss turned from defense to attack. He wanted to build up a concrete alternative to Nazism—a Catholic, anti-socialist, authoritarian, *Austrian* movement. He believed that the republic "could live alone," and he hoped to unify it on a basis of Austrian patriotism. To this end he created the Fatherland Front, which was to be above all parties. Its chief support came from the Christian Socialists and the Heimwehr. The latter, still led by Starhemberg, had changed its views on the Anschluss because of the methods of the Nazis and now upheld the idea of an independent authoritarian Austria.

Aside from the ever more serious economic dilemma, Dollfuss faced three urgent political problems: the position of the Social Democrats, the drafting of a new constitution, and continued resistance to the Nazis. The Social Democrats, still the largest organized political group, had thus far given the chancellor their support, regarding him as the best safeguard against a Nazi coup. He, on the other hand, was as much opposed to the "Reds" as to the "Brown Shirts." Furthermore, the Heimwehr's hatred of the Social Democrats had increased with the passing of years, and its

leaders demanded the destruction of socialism as the price of their loyalty to the Fatherland Front. Mussolini, too, indicated a desire to see Austrian socialism liquidated. And so the authorities, in February 1934, dissolved all political parties and raided Social-Democratic headquarters in several cities. The socialist leaders, sensing their last chance to fight back, called a general strike. The government retaliated by declaring martial law, outlawing the Social Democratic Party, and ordering the execution of any civilian caught with firearms. Civil war resulted.

While the Austrian Nazis remained aloof, the government forces everywhere emerged triumphant. The city hall in Vienna was taken over almost immediately. The most serious fighting occurred in the Viennese municipal dwellings, especially the Karl Marx Hof. Here the workers held out for four days against machine-gun and light-artillery fire. Then, after a promise of amnesty for all but certain leaders, the socialists capitulated. Some of the leaders escaped abroad, others were hanged, and still others, including Mayor Seitz of Vienna, were imprisoned. The opportunity also was taken to deprive Vienna of self-government and make it subordinate to the mayor, himself an appointee of the chancellor. Thus the organized Austrian Social Democratic Party came to an end—and many of the bitter socialists became Nazis.[4]

A new constitution was next provided. Dollfuss recalled the parliament, which had been out of session for more than a year, and submitted to it a completed instrument of government. With nearly half of its members, including all socialists, absent, the legislature approved the document and then went out of existence. The preamble of this constitution, as proclaimed in May 1934, read: "In the name of God Almighty, from whom all law emanates, the Austrian people receives this Constitution for its Christian, German, Federal State on an estate basis." Legislation was entrusted to a Federal Diet assisted by four appointed advisory councils representing, respectively, the state, the cultural institutions, the economic corporations or guilds, and the provinces. The diet, chosen from among the four councils, was empowered to enact into law bills suggested by the government. The president, to be elected at a secret session of all Austrian mayors, was accorded broad powers. Thus was the democratic republic converted into an authoritarian state on a corporative basis.

Simultaneously with the proclamation of this constitution, President Miklas announced the ratification of a concordat between Austria and the Holy See. This document provided for state financial aid to church officials

[4] In March 1934 all trade-unions were abolished, and the workers were urged to join a new government-controlled guild.

and to Catholic seminaries; that the Catholic Church might give religious instruction to all Catholic children in the elementary and middle schools; and that the Austrian Government would be given an advance opportunity to protest the appointment of any archbishop or bishop. If no agreement could be reached on such an appointment, the pope was free to fill the vacancy as he saw fit.

Meanwhile the activities of the Nazis had again become serious. An official announcement listed 140 bomb outrages in the first week of 1934. Foreign tourists were frightened away, railroads were blocked, powerhouses were destroyed, and individuals were assaulted. Dollfuss, Starhemberg (who had become vice-chancellor), Dr. Kurt von Schuschnigg (minister of education and leader of his own *Sturmscharen* or "storm bands"), and the other cabinet officers fought back vigorously. The reaction to the German purge of June 1934 encouraged Dollfuss to proceed even more energetically than heretofore. He ordered all persons, on pain of death, to turn over to the government whatever supplies of explosives they might possess, and he arrested hundreds of suspected Hitlerites.

The increasing vigor displayed by the government induced the Nazi leaders to attempt an early *Putsch,* lest they suffer the fate of the Social Democrats. On July 25, 1934, a group of armed Nazis seized the government radio station in Vienna and forced the announcer to broadcast a statement that the Dollfuss Ministry had resigned. Shortly thereafter another group of Nazis, wearing Heimwehr uniforms, entered the chancellory and captured several members of the cabinet who had just been engaged in consultation. Among the Nazi attackers was Otto Planetta, who shot Dollfuss twice.[5] The Nazis were so easily able to seize the chancellory because the government, warned of a plot, had asked for a Heimwehr guard—and when the disguised conspirators arrived they were looked upon as the requested protectors. The real Heimwehr men arrived almost immediately afterward and laid siege to the building.

While the loyal troops withheld their fire lest harm come to the captive officials, Dollfuss was slowly expiring. No physician was called, and his prayers for a priest went unheeded. President Miklas deprived the imprisoned cabinet of its authority and announced that no agreement forced from its members would be valid. Eventually the conspirators began to negotiate for their own surrender.[6] With the aid of the German Minister

[5] The Nazis wanted Dollfuss to make way for Dr. Anton Rintelen, Austrian Minister to Italy. Rintelen was sentenced to life imprisonment, but later became an official in Nazi Germany.

[6] The radio station was recaptured by the government after a short battle.

to Austria they agreed to free their victims in return for a promise of safe-conduct to the German border. In the evening the government forces entered the chancellory. The Nazis, contrary to their expectations, were arrested—because the safe-conduct had been promised only if none of the captives was injured. Dollfuss' death had altered the situation.

The Heimwehr, loyal army, and police had to put down other Nazi uprisings throughout the state. The conspiracy was widespread, and the Austrian Legion had been ready to pour into Austria as soon as the news of Nazi success in Vienna should have arrived. Starhemberg became acting chancellor, while Mussolini rushed troops to the Austrian border. Il Duce believed the German Nazis to have been implicated in the revolt and was ready to use force to uphold Austrian independence, particularly since he was personally fond of Dollfuss.

The Hitler Government denied any complicity, removed the members of the Austrian Legion to northern Germany, recalled the German Minister who had acted as intermediary for the plotters, and appointed Papen as its new envoy to Vienna. No connection was established between the Austrian conspirators and the German Nazis at the trial of the former, although Planetta and others who were executed for murder or treason shouted *"Heil Hitler!"* just before they died.

Before the end of July, Schuschnigg became chancellor. His task was made somewhat easier by the reaction among Austrians to Dollfuss' murder. Relative quiet prevailed while he tried to follow the principles championed by his predecessor. Nazi activities diminished, and better relations with Germany were restored. The Austrian press was forbidden to publish information regarding German rearmament and ordered to print only pro-German comments on the impending plebiscite in the Saar. France and Italy, moreover, in their accord of January 1935, agreed to consult in the event that Austrian independence should be threatened.

After 1934 there was an increasingly strong sentiment for revival of the Habsburg monarchy in Austria. The new constitution made no mention of the word "republic," and both Schuschnigg and Starhemberg had monarchist leanings. As the disorder and economic crisis had become progressively worse, more and more of the Austrians—clericals, aristocrats, soldiers, and anti-Nazi businessmen—had come to look upon a Habsburg restoration as the only remedy for Austria's troubles. Indeed, in 1935 the parliament repealed the laws of 1919 under which the leading Habsburgs had been excluded from the country. Thus the way was paved for a restoration of Archduke Otto, eldest son of Emperor Charles, as soon as international circumstances should permit.

In April 1936 the government introduced compulsory military service, thus repudiating a provision of the Treaty of St. Germain, and thus also abolishing such private armies as the Heimwehr. An "armistice" in the struggle with Germany was sealed by an agreement of July 1936, whereby Germany promised to respect the sovereignty of Austria and recognized that National Socialism in Austria was entirely a problem of the Austrian Government. On the other hand, Mussolini, now an axis partner, was beginning to show a lessened interest in Austrian independence.

Economic conditions in the little republic were bad. Dependent on imported foodstuffs, unable because of tariff walls to sell enough of its manufactures abroad, treated in unfriendly manner by Germany and indifferently by Italy, its citizens divided into Pan-German Nazis, Austrian Nazis, upholders of the Catholic corporate state, advocates of a Habsburg restoration, and underground socialists and communists, Austria's position was difficult. Schuschnigg strove to follow in the footsteps of Dollfuss, but the German pressure, combined with a certain tactlessness and dilatoriness on his own part, eventually nullified his plans.

In February 1938 Schuschnigg visited Hitler and received an ultimatum —which Mussolini later advised him to accept. Thereupon he formed a new cabinet, assigning the portfolios of justice, foreign affairs, and the interior to Nazis. After the Nazi minister of the interior, Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart, visited Hitler, the Fatherland Front was opened to Nazis and a wide political amnesty was granted. The Nazis in Austria now paraded openly, in defiance of the laws and despite a renewed pledge of Schuschnigg to maintain Austrian independence.

Suddenly, on March 9, 1938, Schuschnigg announced that a plebiscite on Austrian independence would be held on March 13. He hoped thus to prove wrong Hitler's argument that a majority of Austrians now wanted Anschluss. Two days before the plebiscite was to be held, Hitler threatened to act unless the poll was canceled. Schuschnigg thereupon "took leave of the Austrian people" over the radio, and on March 12 Seyss-Inquart assumed power. He at once invited Hitler to send in the German army to "preserve order," and by the close of the day the occupation of Austria was completed. Hitler in great emotion visited his native Braunau.[7]

The time chosen by Hitler for the coup was propitious from an international point of view. In Great Britain, Anthony Eden had recently left the cabinet and a proappeasement group was in control. In France there

[7] Miklas resigned and Schuschnigg was jailed. Seyss-Inquart became governor of Austria, renamed Ostmark. Seyss-Inquart's "name might easily have become the synonym of fifth columnists in place of Quisling's had it not been so awkward."

was a cabinet crisis. Italy, with many of her soldiers in Ethiopia, Spain, and Libya, accepted the fact and received Hitler's promise of eternal gratitude. Now *Hitler* announced the holding of a plebiscite, simultaneously with elections for the first Reichstag of a Great Germany. Before the plebiscite was held two laws legalized the "reunion" of Austria with the Reich and introduced the Four-Year Plan into the new province. Anti-Semitic decrees were quickly put into force in Austria, there was horrible cruelty, and leaders of the Fatherland Front and monarchists were especially harshly dealt with. Otto von Habsburg was declared a traitor and threatened with death in the event of his appearing on German soil.

The plebiscite was held on April 10, 1938, in all Great Germany. The ballot listed the single question: "Do you agree to the reunion of Austria with the German Reich carried out on March 13 and do you vote for the (Reichstag) list of our Leader, Adolf Hitler?" More than 99 per cent of the votes cast were in the affirmative. Thus about 7,000,000 more German-speaking people were added to the population of the Reich. But many Austrians continued to have faith in the age-old prophecy: *Austria erit in orbe ultima*—"Austria will endure on earth forever."

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY

a. POLITICS AND ECONOMICS

The attitude of the ruling Magyars towards their subject nationalities did much to hasten the collapse of Hungary. Even in the darkest war days, the Magyars disregarded the demands of their minorities for liberal treatment. Indeed, when Emperor-King Charles issued his federalization manifesto in October 1918, the Magyar leaders declared the Compromise of 1867 void.[8] An independent Hungary was proclaimed, joined with Austria only through the person of the sovereign. This action inspired the parliamentary deputies of the subject Romanians and Slovaks to insist on similar rights of self-determination. Moreover, when Wilson recognized the independence of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the respective minorities in Hungary demanded union with their fellow-nationals.

A courageous effort to prevent dissolution was made by Michael Károlyi. He organized a National Council made up of his personal followers in parliament, plus compatible elements from the Social Democrats and non-Magyar groups outside parliament. This revolutionary coalition, backed

[8] This document regulated Austro-Hungarian relations from 1867 to 1918.

by the Budapest garrison, secured Károlyi's appointment as premier late in October 1918.

Despite his titled ancestry and great wealth, Károlyi had been an advocate of universal suffrage and the breaking up of large estates. During the war he professed to fear worse consequences from a German victory than an Austro-Hungarian defeat. He was relatively popular with the Allies and hoped to receive special treatment for his country by assuming control. One of his first acts as premier was to get a release for his subordinates from the oath of fealty to Charles. Then, after ordering the demobilization of all Hungarian troops, he proceeded to Belgrade in an attempt to obtain from General Louis Franchet d'Esperey, commander of the French *Armée de l'Orient,* better armistice terms than the Italian General Armando Diaz had earlier granted Austria-Hungary. Franchet d'Esperey, however, assigned even more Hungarian territory to Romania and Yugoslavia than had Diaz. Károlyi's disappointment was slightly assuaged when Charles announced his retirement from participation in the affairs of Hungary.

On November 16, 1918, Hungary was declared a republic. The National Council ordered the election of a constituent assembly by universal suffrage. Károlyi, meanwhile, drew up a platform promising liberal press laws, trial by jury, freedom of association, agrarian and educational reforms, separation of church and state, settlement of the nationalities problem, friendship with the neighboring states, and the conclusion of a separate peace with the Allies. The unfavorable foreign and internal conditions made it impossible to put this program into effect. The subject nationalities no longer were interested in "rights"; they desired separation from Hungary. The Allies, far from treating Hungary with special consideration, tightened the blockade. Returning soldiers swelled the ranks of the unemployed, and foreign ex-prisoners of war ravaged the countryside. The conservatives objected to the proposed breaking up of the large estates. Communistic ideas trickled in from Russia.

Soon the Social Democrats deserted Károlyi, and the National Council tried to thrust him aside by electing him provisional president of the republic. The final blow to Károlyi came with the news that the peace conference had awarded Transylvania to Romania. The president thereupon resigned and went into exile (March 1919). Now, in anticipation of Károlyi's exit, plans had already been drawn up by Sigmund Kunfi, a socialist member of the government, and Béla Kun, an imprisoned communist, for a union of the Social Democrats and the recently formed workers' and soldiers' councils. The coalition was prepared to take the

reins at any time. When Károlyi departed, Kun was released from prison to become head of a new government. An ex-bricklayer, Alexander Garbai, became president.

Béla Kun was a journalist and politician who served as an officer in the Austro-Hungarian army until taken prisoner by the Russians. In the prison camp he formed friendships with a number of Russian radicals, and during the revolution in March 1917 he was released. After the war, he reëntered Hungary and edited a subversive newspaper. He came into frequent conflict with the police and on one occasion was wounded and imprisoned. It was while he rested in jail that Kun negotiated the coalition with the Social Democrats.

The people's commissars, as Kun's cabinet officers called themselves, ousted all political opponents, forbade the sale of alcoholic liquors, and formed a well-disciplined "Red Army." Soon the Social Democrats were ousted from the government and then church property, mines, banks, means of communication and transportation, firms employing more than 25 persons, estates of more than 100 acres, and all private property above a certain minimum allowance were nationalized. A radical constitution was adopted, and preparations were made for spreading the "Red" gospel into the neighboring states. While Kun led his "Red Legions" against Czechoslovakia, the opposition at home was put down by a ruffian named Tibor Szamuelly.

The communist regime was doomed to early failure. The refusal of the peasants to accept a new currency for their foodstuffs and the maintenance of the Allied blockade brought the cities to starvation. The trade-unionists were angry because factories were shutting down for lack of raw materials. Thousands of counterrevolutionists, or "Whites," led by Archduke Joseph, Stephen Bethlen, and Nicolas Horthy, vice-admiral in the former Austro-Hungarian navy, gathered at Szeged in an area occupied by French troops. Withdrawing from Czechoslovakia lest the wrath of the Paris Conference be converted into military measures against him, Kun now led his legionaries against a Romanian army that was marching toward Budapest. This time Kun was defeated. In August 1919 he fled to Vienna—there to be placed in a mental hospital. Eventually he made his way to Russia.

For a few days after Kun's flight, a Social Democrat took charge of the government, but soon Archduke Joseph, who had been proclaimed regent by the returning counterrevolutionaries, appointed a monarchist premier. This return of Habsburg influence so frightened Hungary's neighbors that they insisted upon Joseph's withdrawal from the government. In

the meantime, the turmoil exceeded anything the country had yet experienced. The Romanian army occupied Budapest for three months, pillaging whatever could be sent or carried away by train, truck, or person. After the Romanians finally left Budapest, Horthy, who had succeeded Joseph in command of the "White" forces, entered the capital (November 1919). He ordered the calling of an assembly to decide on the future form of government and make peace with the Allies.

Elections at last were held early in 1920. No party received a majority, but most of the delegates had monarchist leanings. The assembly virtually restored the former monarchical constitution, but since an Allied note precluded the return of a Habsburg to the throne, Horthy was designated regent. The next twelve months witnessed a wave of reactionary legislation and a wholesale massacre of Jews. Not until Bethlen became premier, in April 1921, was order restored.

In the circumstances, Charles was encouraged to return to Hungary and reclaim the throne on Easter Sunday 1921. Horthy, however, refused to surrender his powers without the prior consent of the assembly. Besides, the Allies protested and Czechoslovakia threatened military action unless Charles left Hungary immediately. The disconsolate Habsburg returned to Switzerland. In October he came to Hungary once more and led a hastily gathered force on Budapest. Horthy attempted unsuccessfully to dissuade Charles from his enterprise and, when Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia began to mobilize, the regent sent troops under Julius Gömbös to dispute the royal contingent's entry into the capital. Charles was captured and taken to a British war vessel in the Danube.[9] The Little Entente then forced Hungary to adopt a dethronement act, deposing the Habsburgs and making the kingship elective.

Early in 1922 the constituent assembly came to an end. Except for the ratification of the Treaty of Trianon, its accomplishments during two years were virtually nil. It did not settle the question of monarchy, and it neglected to ordain the method of election of its own successor. Horthy and Bethlen thereupon drew up an electoral decree that restricted the number of voters and substituted open for secret balloting in the country districts. Consequently, the delegates elected to the new assembly were overwhelmingly progovernment.

The real head of the government and virtual dictator of the land from April 1921 to August 1931 was Premier Bethlen, the "Sphinx of Europe." He was born of a noble and wealthy family in Transylvania in 1874. Enter-

[9] Charles and his family were exiled to the Madeira Islands. In 1922 he died of pneumonia.

ing parliament for the first time in 1901, he soon evinced an uncanny ability to clinch the argument in a debate with a few clear-cut sentences. The war and the peace treaty left him impoverished and embittered, since, as one of the Hungarian "optants," he preferred losing his large estates in Transylvania to acquiring Romanian citizenship (see p. 356).

When the Bethlen Ministry came into office it was confronted with two urgent tasks: the freeing of Hungary from fear of interference by the Little Entente and the financial and economic reconstruction of the kingdom. The worry over the Little Entente was reduced when Hungary became a member of the League of Nations in 1922. Although Hungary, by signing the Covenant, pledged herself not to attempt a forceful revision of her boundaries, her own sovereignty and integrity were simultaneously guaranteed. Her new status, moreover, entitled her to assistance in the settlement of her financial difficulties.

Hungary promptly appealed to the Reparation Commission for financial relief. The commission drew up a plan which was adopted by the League Council late in 1923. The plan provided for an international loan, the payment of reparation in twenty moderate annual installments, the assignment of certain state revenues as security for the loan, and the appointment of a League Commissioner-General. Hungary accepted the terms, and Jeremiah Smith, Jr., a Boston financier, went to Budapest as agent of the League. Under his supervision the kingdom balanced its budget eighteen months sooner than had been stipulated under the reconstruction plan. In 1926, therefore, the League ended its control. Smith, whose good humor and sympathy had made him extraordinarily popular, donated his fee to Hungary's poor. The budget continued to show a surplus until 1930.

Economic reconstruction was more difficult to achieve than financial rehabilitation. The Hungary which was partitioned by the peace treaty had been a well-defined geographic unit and a political entity of many centuries' standing. The Treaty of Trianon detached from the old kingdom two-thirds of its area and three-fifths of its population, leaving the new Hungary without a seacoast, with negligible timber and water-power resources, and with few railway terminals.

Attempts to foster a new industrial life were partially successful, but Hungary remained predominantly agricultural. Eighty-two per cent of the land surface was devoted to agricultural purposes and pasturage. Although more than half of the population continued to earn its livelihood directly from the soil, Hungary was still a land of large estates. In 1930 one-third of the agricultural area was concentrated in about 1500 large holdings,

while approximately 750,000 small owners possessed less than half of the cultivable soil. In the years after 1930 Hungary suffered heavy losses owing to the falling price of grain in the world market.

Because of its importance as an exporter of foodstuffs and an importer of manufactures, Hungary occupied a strategic position in any move to bring about a Danubian federation. Numerous conferences were held during the great depression among the Little Entente, Austria, and Hungary, at which an economic league was the chief topic of discussion. Each time the same obstacles to union were encountered. The states displayed so much jealousy of their sovereignty that concession and compromise were difficult. The question of what form to give the projected union was another stumbling block. And the great powers, fearing a loss of markets because of the privileged position that the industries of Austria and Czechoslovakia would have in federation, were lukewarm toward any effective unification schemes. Several times the unsuccessful outcome of the conferences resulted in tariff wars among the conferees.

b. RESTORATIONISM AND REVISIONISM

Hungarian foreign relations after 1920 were shaped primarily by the questions of the kingship and the peace treaty. The lenient attitude of the courts toward monarchist agitators, combined with the royalist sympathies of Bethlen, might have led to an early solution of the monarchical complication, but for a split among the royalists themselves. The Legitimists insisted upon the coronation of the youthful Archduke Otto. His cause was ably promoted by his mother, the beautiful Zita, who never wearied of planning to regain her husband's crown for her son. The "Awakened Magyars" rallied around Archduke Albrecht, popular and wealthy Hungarian Habsburg. Albrecht's cause, too, was fostered by an ambitious mother, a Belgian princess of considerable spiritual and material resource. To finance their schemes, a group of monarchists undertook the wholesale counterfeiting of French francs. When the plot was discovered in 1926, the Little Entente became panicky again and the government reluctantly prosecuted the offenders. Several high officials were implicated, and the culprits, pleading patriotism, were given short prison sentences.

But there was renewed nervousness in the Little Entente with the approach of the day in 1930 on which Otto would reach majority. On this day, the headship of Otto was acknowledged by all members of the family, including Albrecht who, having in the meantime married a commoner,

was no longer a rival for the throne. The government was prepared to meet a coup, but nothing exciting transpired. Otto, studying at the University of Louvain, disclaimed any desire to endanger the peace of Europe.

The agitation for boundary revision was more ominous than that for monarchical restoration. The peace treaty not only greatly reduced the size of Hungary but assigned almost 3,000,000 Magyars to neighboring states. Romania received 1,500,000 Magyars, Czechoslovakia almost 1,000,000, and Yugoslavia 500,000. Upon its publication in Budapest the treaty was printed with black bands around it, and an irredentist movement was precipitated that became intensified with each succeeding year. In churches, schoolrooms, homes, trolleys, restaurants, and dance halls, everywhere were displayed maps of the old Hungary, with the lost territories in black and the whole surrounded by a crown of thorns. On these maps was printed the question, "Can it remain thus?" and the answer, "No! No! Never!" These three words, *"Nem! Nem! Soha!,"* appeared on stamps, envelopes, postcards, badges, posters, plates, buttons, and other objects. The propaganda was world-wide and was especially successful in Great Britain and Italy. Various societies were active in obtaining foreign sympathy for revision. In 1931 two Hungarian aviators gave wide publicity to the movement by flying from Newfoundland to a point near Budapest in a monoplane named *Justice for Hungary*.

A treaty of friendship was signed between Italy and Hungary in 1927. This was soon followed by a shipment of arms from Verona to Hungary. The shipment, labeled "machine parts," attracted the suspicious attention of Austrian customs officials and was subjected to an inspection. Since the Treaty of Trianon forbade the importation of war materials into Hungary, the Little Entente entered a protest with the League of Nations (1928). An investigation followed, but, because of the possible implication of Italy, Hungary merely received a mild rebuke. Thenceforth Mussolini often expressed himself in favor of revision of the Treaty of Trianon.

In 1931 and 1932 the agitation for revision and restoration suffered a temporary decline. The reason was the need for foreign financial aid in the midst of the world depression. France, when appealed to for help, made a loan contingent upon the cessation of revisionist agitation. The loan was negotiated, but Premier Bethlen resigned (August 1931). The new premier, Juluis Károlyi, was a friend of Bethlen's and a half-brother of Michael Károlyi. He, too, was beset by problems of financial rehabilitation and political unrest. Fascist disorders and communist riots became frequent sights, and tariff wars with Czechoslovakia and Romania added to the difficulties.

After little more than a year Károlyi resigned, and in October 1932 was succeeded by Julius Gömbös.

Although it was unusual for a commoner to win such high office in Hungary, Gömbös had gained recognition as a shrewd and forceful leader. He had played an important role in Horthy's elevation to the regency and had been conspicuous in preventing Charles from regaining the throne. His appointment was a blow to the Legitimists but pleased the revisionists and the Italophils. The Gömbös Government emphasized agrarian change, a secret ballot, and continued agitation for revision. It also dismissed many civil servants, cut salaries and pensions, and raised the tax rates. But the volume of exports continued low, and unemployment increased.

The most spectacular developments of the Gömbös administration grew out of revisionism. A monarchical restoration could, in Gömbös' opinion, be postponed, but the rectification of Hungary's boundaries was urgent. Several times it appeared as if economic necessity might lead to a *rapprochement* between Hungary and the Little Entente, but on each occasion the negotiations failed because the entente first demanded a cessation of revisionist agitation and Gömbös refused any such condition. Meanwhile, in 1933, a paper in Vienna claimed that many carloads of rifles and machine guns had been forwarded from Italy to the Hirtenberg armaments factory in Austria for transshipment to Hungary. The Little Entente threatened appeal to the League, but was satisfied to have the British and French governments investigate the charges. As in the case of the arms incident of 1927, not much was done about the situation. Austria returned to Italy whatever portions of the shipment were still at Hirtenberg.

Throughout the remainder of 1933 and in 1934 Italo-Austro-Hungarian relations became constantly closer. A personal friendship developed among the respective premiers, Mussolini, Dollfuss, and Gömbös. In 1934 these men signed the Rome Protocols and negotiated several trade agreements. The documents brought no appreciable upswing in the economic life of any signatory.

In the spring of 1934 Hungary and Yugoslavia accused each other of fomenting trouble along their mutual boundary. The bitterness of the Magyars further increased when new political and business restrictions were imposed on the minorities in Romania. By this time, too, the Hungarians had begun to complain of the military provisions of the peace treaty that kept them in a state of virtual disarmament while permitting the neighboring countries (except Austria) to arm at will. The atmosphere in east-central Europe therefore was tense as the summer of 1934 drew to a close

And into this atmosphere there burst the news of the assassination (October 9) at Marseille of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and Foreign Minister Barthou of France.

The king had arrived in France for an official visit, and was being driven through Marseille when a bystander leaped on the running board and fired into the car. Alexander died almost instantly; Barthou died within a few hours. The assassin, Vlado Gheorghieff Chernozemsky, was trampled to death by the crowd. He was a Macedonian émigré in league with Croatian émigrés from Yugoslavia who had organized a terrorist society with training camps in Italy and Hungary. The terrorists hoped that the death of the king would lead to a breakup of the Yugoslav State and the "freeing" of Croatians, Magyars, and Macedonians from Serbian control.[10]

The whole situation so closely resembled the events of 1914 that Europe was gripped by a fear of war. But as it took several days for the police to identify the assassin, Yugoslav feelings had time to subside. After burial of the king, Yugoslavia appealed to the League Council to fix responsibility for the deed. The appeal was couched in general terms, but the finger of blame was pointed at Hungary. Belgrade, moreover, expelled many Hungarians who had been resident in Yugoslavia. At the Council hearing (December 1934), the plaintiff was supported by France and the Little Entente. The Council unanimously adopted a resolution which was accepted as a settlement of the controversy. "Certain Hungarian authorities" were declared responsible, "at any rate through negligence," for some of the "acts having connection with the preparation of the Marseille crime." The Budapest Government was therefore asked to seek out and punish these authorities. Thus Yugoslav sentiment was appeased, Hungary's dignity was upheld, and peace was preserved.

Throughout 1935 and 1936 Premier Gömbös continued to foster friendship with Italy and Germany, to advocate treaty revision, and to contemplate the extension of secret suffrage to the rural areas. Following his death in October 1936 the cabinet was reconstituted by Kálmán Darányi, a wealthy landowner and experienced administrative official. Darányi, like Gömbös, received his chief support from the landowners, civil servants, clerics, and the more well-to-do peasants. To this group the question of replacing the regent by a king seemed of no immediate importance. The chief opposition group was led by Tibor Eckhardt. It advocated a restora-

[10] The Croatian terrorist leader in Italy was Dr. Ante Pavelich. In 1941, after the Nazi invasion of Yugoslavia, Pavelich became "head" of a new Croat state. The leading conspirator in Hungary was Gustav Perchetz. His followers, including Chernozemsky, had learned to shoot and throw bombs on a farm near the Yugoslav border.

tion of the Habsburgs as the greatest safeguard against the importation of Nazism.

Hungary repudiated the Treaty of Trianon in 1938 when Darányi announced rearmament as one of the main features of a five-year plan of economic development. Darányi further outlined a scheme to curb Jewish economic and professional activities and a project to speed up land reform in favor of the peasant masses. These proposals were intended to "steal the thunder" of the various Nazi groups that had begun to spring up, but there was a feeling in parliament that more vigorous measures should have been taken in this connection.[11] Darányi consequently was overthrown and succeeded (1938) by Béla Imredy, a respected, conservative, Catholic financier of anti-Nazi but pro-German sympathies. (This seeming paradox applied to many Magyars. They sympathized with Germany in international affairs but had no desire to see their large estates broken up and the hold of the nobility on government posts shaken by a National Socialist government. Following the union of Austria and Germany, the Budapest Government drew even closer to the latter, for it now absorbed about 70 per cent of Hungary's agricultural exports—the main item by far in her foreign sales.)

Imredy at once turned attention to the Jewish question. The Jews numbered 5 per cent of the population but held about half of the positions in trade, banking, and the professions. This was owing, in part at least, to the dislike of many Magyars for business as an occupation, but the figures were impressive. A decree therefore limited Jewish participation in any business, industry, or profession to 20 per cent. In 1939, on the eve of his introducing new anti-Semitic legislation, Imredy resigned; he had found a remote Jewish strain in his own ancestry. His office was taken over by Count Paul Teleki, a prominent geographer and Boy Scout leader.

Teleki quickly secured passage of a strict anti-Jewish law. The proportion of Jews in business and industry was limited to 12 per cent of all persons engaged in such callings; in the professions, the Jewish limit was placed at 6 per cent. No Jew might hold public office nor occupy a leading position in journalism, the theater, or the cinema. The state was empowered to expropriate, with compensation, Jewish farms of more than half an acre. Jews might vote in parliamentary elections, but only for Jewish candidates, and those elected might not exceed 6 per cent of the membership of the house.

[11] The most prominent Nazi group was organized in 1937 by Major Ferenc Szalasi. In 1938 Szalasi was imprisoned, but he was soon released and reorganized various Nazi groups into the Arrowcross Party.

The German annexation of the Sudeten areas in 1938 and the consequent weakening of the Czechoslovak state led to a political crisis in Hungary, where the revisionist element demanded the immediate occupation of Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine. Imredy had resisted this pressure and had contented himself with a somewhat disappointing Vienna Award. But then, in March 1939, Carpatho-Ukraine was annexed and Hungary's population rose from 8,000,000 to 11,000,000.[12]



From Landman, J., *Outline History of the World Since 1914,* 1934.
Courtesy, Barnes and Noble, Inc.

As the year 1939 wore on, Hungary signed the Anti-Communist Pact, severed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and announced her withdrawal from the League of Nations. During the electoral campaign of May 1939, however, Teleki emphasized his government's intention to keep Hungary independent of foreign control. On this basis and that of social reform his supporters gained a majority in the new parliament, although the Nazi groups registered sizable gains. (On this occasion, Hungary for the first time since the war had an election in which the voting in all districts was secret.) Soon after the election, former Premier Bethlen announced his retirement from political life, saying: "Nowadays only those who breakfast on Jews, lunch on aristocrats, and after dinner hand out fortunes and properties that do not belong to them are national heroes."

[12] On the Vienna Award and Carpatho-Ukraine see pp. 289 and 290.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

a. PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE

The strongest state to emerge from the Dual Monarchy was Czechoslovakia, a republic consisting of the provinces of Bohemia, Moravia, Austrian Silesia, Slovakia, and Ruthenia, and comprising an area of 54,207 square miles.[13] Czechoslovakia enjoyed an economic stability and a foreign respect unusual for one of the newer states of Europe. Credit for this achievement belonged largely to two former college professors: Thomas Garrigue Masaryk and Eduard Beneš.

Masaryk was born in Moravia in 1850, the son of a Slovak coachman. Despite poverty, he got an excellent scholastic training and eventually became a professor of philosophy at Prague. He married an American girl, Charlotte Garrigue, and adopted her surname as his middle name. Through her family connections he acquired a useful acquaintance in the United States. In pre-1914 days he was conspicuous as a Czech nationalist and a philosophical liberal. He early succeeded in making himself unpopular with the Austrian authorities by his views on national and social rights for the subject Slavs, and when the war broke out he determined that "Austria must be opposed in grim earnest, to the death."

Feeling that he could be more useful to Czech liberation if he were free from the danger of arrest, Masaryk went to Italy in December 1914, and spent the next four years disseminating propaganda and organizing opinion in the leading Allied states. In Russia he helped organize Czechoslovak legions; in the United States he raised funds; in France he set up propaganda headquarters; everywhere he aroused sentiment for Czechoslovak independence. Contact with the "revolutionary movement" at home was provided by an efficient "secret service" directed by Masaryk's student and friend, Eduard Beneš.

Beneš was born in 1884 near Pilsen (Plzen). He studied law and philosophy and became a prolific writer on social, economic, and political subjects. He was also a professor of philosophy and sociology in Prague and an admirer of democracy. When war came, Beneš felt that the Dual Monarchy either "would come to an end through losing the war, or it would come to an end in a social upheaval and revolution after the war." Consequently he was determined "to carry out a revolution." Although at

[13] The first three districts had belonged to Austria, the others to Hungary. The Slavic natives of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia were known as Czechs; those of Slovakia as Slovaks; and those of Ruthenia as Ruthenians, Carpatho-Russians, or Ukrainians.

first remaining at home in order to keep Masaryk informed, Beneš eventually found it necessary to flee. Arrived in Paris, his ability helped secure hearings for the cause and maintain communications with the revolutionists in Austria-Hungary.[14]

The tasks confronting the revolutionaries were difficult. Sentiment was divided on what course to pursue to gain freedom. Some prominent leaders —Dr. Karel Kramář, for example—advocated relying for support on Russia and Pan-Slavism. Masaryk and Beneš preferred to seek help from the democratic states of the West. Even Russia's defection in 1917 did not entirely remove this bone of contention. Tact and patience were required to convince the Allies that the Czech leaders were not Austrian spies. All sorts of clever ruses and subterfuges had to be devised in order to maintain communications between the leaders in Paris and those at home. Money had to be raised, capable journalists had to be found, articles, pamphlets, and manifestoes had to be got up, imprisoned leaders had to be replaced, and recognition had to be secured for the National Council of Czechoslovakia (sitting in Paris) as official spokesman for the Czechoslovak people.

The first intimation of success came in 1917 when the Allies listed as one of their war aims an autonomous Czechoslovak area. Then, when Allied victory seemed assured, Masaryk issued a declaration of independence. A Czech National Council at Prague, presided over by Antonín Švehla, reiterated the declaration of independence and took over the administration from the imperial officers. A Slovak National Council voted for union with the Czechs in a single state. The overturn was almost bloodless, and on November 14, 1918, a provisional assembly proclaimed the republic. Masaryk was elected president, Kramář became premier, Beneš was appointed foreign minister, and Štefánik, minister of war. Kramář and Beneš represented the republic at the peace conference. Thus ended three centuries of Habsburg rule in the realms of "good King Wenceslas."[15]

In February 1920 the provisional assembly adopted a constitution providing for a democratic parliamentary regime with separation of powers. The lower house was to consist of 300 members elected for six years by the compulsory vote of all men and women over 21. The Senate, half as

[14] Ranking only below Masaryk and Beneš as a founder of the republic was the Slovak, Milan Štefánik, who became a general in the French Army.

[15] The provisional assembly represented only Czechs and Slovaks. The German-speaking minority hoped to join Germany or Austria, the Magyars hoped to remain with Hungary. Blood was shed when Czech troops occupied the "German" towns in Bohemia and Moravia, but Masaryk promised equal treatment and the disturbances gradually ceased.

large, was to be elected for eight years by all voters over 26. The ministry was made responsible to the lower chamber, which could pass laws over the veto of the upper house. The president was to be elected for seven years by the two houses meeting together. No one (except Masaryk) might serve more than two consecutive terms. Masaryk was elected president for his first full term in 1920 and reëlected in 1927 and 1934. Beneš succeeded the aged leader upon his resignation in 1935.

There soon appeared numerous political parties. The political alignments were based in the first instance upon ethnic divisions and then subdivided according to economic and religious interests. Thus there grew up both Czechoslovak and German parties labeled Agrarian and Social Democratic. Similarly, there were Czechoslovak and Slovak People's Catholic parties, and German and Hungarian Christian Socialists. Communistic and independent groups also took root. The cabinets therefore were based on coalitions.

The most pressing domestic problem was that of land reform. In 1918 about 2 per cent of the landlords in Bohemia owned one-fourth of the land. In Moravia one-third of the land was controlled by 1 per cent of the landowners. In Slovakia half of the land was in possession of 1000 persons. Most of the big landholders were German- or Magyar-speaking members of the former ruling classes. Laws were passed that provided for the expropriation of all estates exceeding in size 375 acres of arable land or 625 acres of mixed arable and nonarable land. Lands formerly belonging to the Crown or to the Habsburg family were to be expropriated without compensation, while in other cases compensation was fixed at a level below the real value of the property before 1914. The land thus acquired by the state was to be sold on easy terms to peasants, ex-service men, and any landless persons who were willing to till the soil. In no circumstance were more than 37.5 acres to be assigned to any one individual. Eventually hundreds of thousands of citizens became "middle-class farmers."

The breakup of the large estates precipitated a quarrel between the government and the Roman Catholic Church. Many of the estates had been church property, and the ecclesiastical authorities looked with disfavor upon the expropriation policy. Popular opinion supported the government, although most of the population was nominally Catholic. Expropriation was not the only point of friction between church and state. Estrangement arose out of the circumstance that most of the high church offices in these Slavic provinces had been given, under the monarchy, to "Germans" and Magyars, who were accused of using their clerical influence as much to foster the cause of the Habsburgs as that of Providence. The services had generally

been conducted in German, Magyar, or Latin, and the schools had been used as monarchist-clerical propaganda agencies. The republic therefore secularized education and abolished compulsory religious instruction in the schools. In Slovakia, hundreds of new state schools were opened.

The government insisted that the papacy redraw the diocesan boundaries to conform to the state frontiers, that natives be appointed to high clerical office, and that the local tongue be used wherever the parishes were predominantly Slavic. Some radicals and nationalists in parliament demanded an absolute separation of church and state, and early in 1920 there was established a Czechoslovak National Church which proclaimed its independence of the papacy and abolished the requirement of celibacy for the clergy. This church gained almost no Slovak adherents and few Czech members.

The quarrel between the two authorities came to a head in 1925 when the anniversary of the burning of John Hus, fifteenth-century heretic, was proclaimed a national holiday. After a deadlock of two years and a half, during which diplomatic relations were severed, both sides agreed to compromise. Harmony was restored by the signing of a *modus vivendi* in 1927. The diocesan boundaries were to coincide with the republic's borders, the state was to continue paying the salaries of the clergy but was to have a voice in the nomination of bishops, only Czechoslovak citizens were to be eligible for appointment as bishops, all church officials were to take an oath of allegiance to the state, the native language was prescribed for certain services, and the papacy abandoned its opposition to Hus Day.

From an economic point of view Czechoslovakia was fortunate. A splendid system of railway lines was inherited from the Dual Monarchy, along with approximately 80 per cent of its industries. Though comprising only one-fifth of the area of Austria-Hungary and including only one-fourth of her population, Czechoslovakia became the possessor of four-fifths of the ex-monarchy's manufacturing equipment, three-fifths of its breweries, nine-tenths of its soft coal, and three-fifths of its iron ore.

On the agricultural side the situation was equally favorable, Czechoslovakia being virtually self-sufficient in food supply. Under the old regime Bohemia produced 90 per cent of the empire-kingdom's sugar beets, 80 per cent of the hops, and 75 per cent of the fruit. Slovakia produced large quantities of flax, maize, wine, and tobacco. The soil was rich in graphite, copper, lead, and silver. From 1919 to 1931 Czechoslovakia enjoyed a consistently favorable balance of trade. Her chief economic handicap was her landlocked position, but this was mitigated by provisions in the peace treaties that granted her access through foreign territory to the sea at Hamburg, Stettin, and Trieste.

Since the country had an industrial equipment that originally took care of the needs of a large empire, the existing population could not absorb the entire manufactured output. Consequently Czechoslovakia depended for her economic prosperity upon foreign trade. Her best customers until 1933 were Germany, Austria, Great Britain, and Hungary in the order named, while her purchases were made chiefly in Germany, Austria, and Poland.

b. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MINORITIES PROBLEMS, THE MUNICH AGREEMENT

Business was not the only incentive for harmonious foreign relations. The republic was 600 miles long and varied in width from 50 to 125 miles. Its access to the sea depended upon the upholding of the peace treaties. Five countries, most of them at one time or another hostile, completely surrounded the state: Germany, Poland, Romania, Hungary, and Austria. For half the length of her boundary she was surrounded by a pincers formed by the German and Austrian borders; hence her eagerness to prevent Anschluss. Except for the region of the Carpathians and the Erzgebirge, her frontiers offered little natural protection.

Masaryk and Beneš, the latter of whom was foreign minister from 1918 until 1935, pursued four main lines of policy: (1) support of the League as the protector of small states and the mainstay of peace; (2) support of the peace treaties to which the republic owed its life; (3) endorsement in larger European affairs of the policies of Great Britain and France, especially the latter; and (4) united action, through the Little Entente, with Yugoslavia and Romania in Central European matters.

Between 1923 and 1927 it appeared that the bonds of the entente might be loosed. But then a series of events gave new life to the entente relationships: the continuing Anschluss agitation in Germany and Austria; the conclusion of a treaty of friendship between Italy and Hungary followed by arms shipments from the former country to the latter in 1927 and 1933; the vigor of Magyar irredentist agitation; and the consideration during the depression years of a Danubian federation to improve the economic standing of the countries concerned. In 1934 and 1935 the crisis resulting from the murder of King Alexander of Yugoslavia appeared to offer a successful test of the strength of the alliance bonds. But then the problem of minorities helped bring ruin to all three members of the entente.

Czechoslovakia, according to the census of 1930, had 15,000,000 inhabitants, of whom two-thirds were Czechs or Slovaks. The remaining third was made up of 3,300,000 "Germans," 700,000 Magyars, 550,000

Ruthenians, and additional Poles and Jews. At the peace conference of 1919 Czechoslovakia signed a minorities treaty for the protection of these nonnational subjects, and the constitution guaranteed legal equality without distinction as to race, language, or religion. In accord with these promises, schools were provided for the minorities, official business was conducted in a minority language where one-fifth of the population used that tongue, the printed matter on bank notes was repeated in three languages, and a voice in the government was assured the minorities through proportional representation in parliament.

Despite these concessions, difficulty was experienced with the subject peoples. At first, relations with the Carpatho-Russians were particularly strained. Ruthenia was assigned to Czechoslovakia by the peace conference to provide the new state with a natural boundary in the Carpathian Mountains and to bring it in direct contact with Romania, thus forming a ring around Hungary. The republic was bound by treaty to extend local autonomy to Ruthenia, but since the Ruthenians had been kept in a relatively backward state by the ruling Magyars, the Czechoslovaks withheld autonomy lest—so they said—the better-educated Magyars and Jews in the province obtain control. Since the Catholic Church and the Magyars still controlled the educational system of Ruthenia, the government established state schools with instruction in the native tongue, and decreed that, until such time as Ruthenians capable of holding office might be developed, Czechoslovak officials should be put in the important positions. At last, in 1927–1928, Ruthenia was granted an autonomous administration and an elective local diet. This lessened the discontent, but the Ruthenians still maintained that too many offices were reserved for persons who had the interests of Czechoslovakia rather than those of Ruthenia at heart.

The population question was further complicated by the antagonism of the Czechs and Slovaks themselves. The Czechs, who outnumbered the Slovaks two to one, were more Westernized than their compatriots and tended to dominate the governmental partnership. They had a higher percentage of literacy than the Slovaks, were more inclined towards political liberalism and religious skepticism, and were more interested in industry and commerce than agriculture.[16]

Disagreements and quarrels, sometimes violent, soon arose. The Slovaks accused the Czechs of monopolizing the desirable offices and violating the Pittsburgh Pact of 1918 wherein Masaryk, in order to get the support

[16] Two-thirds of the people in Slovakia and Ruthenia depended directly on the soil for their subsistence, while fewer than half of the people in the west were dependent upon agriculture.

of the Slovaks in the United States, had promised Slovak autonomy. The Slovak People's Catholic Party especially was anxious to secure autonomy for the province, gain freedom from governmental interference with the school system, and ensure the continuing influence of the clergy. In 1924 came a Slovak boycott of everything of Czech origin, but between 1926 and 1929 several incidents occurred that lessened the dissension: Slovaks were taken into the cabinet; the republic's quarrel with the papacy was terminated; and a law granting administrative autonomy to the provinces went into effect. But then another factor revived the strife—Hungarian irredentism.

The Czechs accused the Magyars in Slovakia and in Hungary of fomenting a separatist movement aimed at the reunion of Slovakia with the Magyar kingdom. A crisis was reached in 1928 when a Slovak deputy, Professor Voytech Tuka, was accused of being a Hungarian irredentist and was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment for high treason. During the trial and appeal, Slovakia seethed with unrest. The upholding of the verdict by the highest tribunal in 1930 lessened the agitation, but further trouble was caused by rumors that Tuka was being mistreated in jail. The Czech-Slovak controversy thus remained a potential danger to the unity of the state.

The most serious minority problem in the long run proved to be that of the millions of German-speaking people in Bohemia and Moravia. These had, on the whole, comprised the upper class in pre-1914 days, and they now formed a powerful opposition unit. At first they boycotted the elections, but gradually they realized that more might be gained by active participation in politics. Masaryk encouraged this attitude, and in 1926 two "Germans" were appointed to the cabinet. Naturally there were irreconcilables on both sides, and in 1930 some Bohemian nationalists damaged theaters in which German films were being shown. The triumph of Hitlerism in the Reich in 1933 gave the problem a dangerous international aspect.

The Czechoslovak Government took energetic measures to limit Nazi propaganda, but the *Sudetendeutsche Partei,* headed by Konrad Henlein, polled more votes than any other party in the parliamentary elections of May 1935. A coalition of the democratic parties succeeded in retaining control of the cabinet, but before the year was out the new president, Beneš, and the new premier, Milan Hodža, faced the worst situation in Czechoslovakia's history. And Germany conducted a vigorous diplomatic and press campaign against its neighbor to the south.

The Czechoslovaks were accused by the Goebbels propaganda machine of mistreating the "Germans" and of being in league with the Soviet Union

to spread "Semitic Communism." Beneš and Hodža defended their minorities policy, denied any intent to spread abroad doctrines of any kind, explained that strong measures were made necessary by the dangerous activities of Henlein's followers, and promised the German-speaking subjects more cultural autonomy. But the Sudeten-German Party demanded political autonomy and staged a huge demonstration near the German border in October 1937. Thereupon Prague forbade all political meetings and postponed some forthcoming municipal elections. When the elections finally were held, in May and June 1938, the Henleinists captured 90 per cent of the vote in the "German" districts, whereas in 1935 they had polled only 67 per cent thereof. This gain was owing in part to Germany's recent absorption of Austria.

It is impossible to give here a detailed account of the happenings between March and October 1938 which broke up Czechoslovakia. Briefly, after Neville Chamberlain refused to commit Great Britain to lend France military aid in the event of a war provoked by German action against Czechoslovakia, the Henleinists presented Prague with an Eight-Point Program. The program demanded complete autonomy, ideologically as well as politically, and reparation for damages caused by "injustices inflicted since 1918." Despite pressure from London and Paris, Prague rejected the demands, and when troop movements were observed in Germany the Czechoslovak army was mobilized. The crisis thereupon subsided temporarily, and the Czechoslovak Government agreed to accept unofficial British mediation in the minorities dispute. Viscount Runciman went to the scene of the difficulties, but spent most of his time interviewing Nazis and did little to bring the sides together.

On September 15, 1938, while Chamberlain was trying to find out from Hitler at Berchtesgaden what he really wanted, Henlein issued the first public statement demanding annexation of the affected area to Germany. Although the Sudeten areas had never belonged to Germany, he cried: "We wish to be home in the Reich!" Meanwhile it had been made clear to Prague that in the event of armed resistance to German military action, she could not count on the support of any great power. The Soviet Union agreed to fight if France did, but France would not act without the prior commitment of Great Britain, and such a commitment was not forthcoming. Czechoslovakia therefore announced acceptance of certain Franco-British proposals for the cession of territory to Germany. Thereupon Poland and Hungary demanded territories in Teschen and Slovakia, respectively. Premier Hodža then was succeeded by General Jan Syrový.

Chamberlain, on September 22, flew to Godesberg to confer with Hitler

and was disturbed by the increased severity of new German demands. Nevertheless, he had a British diplomat transmit them to Prague without comment, Czechoslovakia having meanwhile ordered general mobilization. Beneš protested that the demands went far beyond the scope of the Anglo-French proposals earlier accepted by his government. While Great Britain and France half-heartedly declared their determination to fight if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia, Hitler threatened military force unless all his demands were accepted by October 1.

President Roosevelt and Mussolini now appealed for further negotiations, and on September 29 Chamberlain, Daladier, Mussolini, and Hitler met at Munich. They signed the Munich Agreement. By this agreement and some supplementary documents, Germany gained 11,000 square miles of Czechoslovak territory rich in industry, electric power, and military installations, plus 3,500,000 inhabitants, including several hundred thousand Czechs. And the Nazi military position in Central Europe was vastly improved.

An annex to the Munich Agreement contained the promise of an Anglo-French "guarantee" of Czechoslovakia's new borders and provided that, "when the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia has been settled, Germany and Italy for their part will give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia." This stipulation regarding Polish and Hungarian minorities was necessary because, as the September 1938 crisis approached its height, Poland and Hungary clamored for treatment similar to that granted Germany. Poland wanted that part of industrial Teschen which the Allies had awarded to Czechoslovakia, plus some neighboring regions; Hungary demanded the return of Slovakia.

When the Munich Agreement was announced, Warsaw sent an ultimatum to Prague requiring the surrender of Teschen and three neighboring districts. On October 1, 1938, Prague yielded, and Polish troops occupied an area of 400 square miles with a population of 225,000. Of these, only about 80,000 were Poles and more than 120,000 were Czechs. Now Poland supported the claims of Hungary, with whom she wanted a common frontier. Italy approved, but Germany, though willing to enlarge Hungary at Czechoslovak expense, had no desire to see a relatively strong Polish-Magyar front established between herself and the east. When Hungary and Czechoslovakia requested Germany and Italy to arbitrate their dispute, the German and Italian foreign ministers met in Vienna and on November 2 announced their decision. The Vienna Award did not establish a common Polish-Magyar frontier but assigned to Hungary a part of Ruthenia and southern Slovakia. The area of the cession was 4600 square miles and

the population 1,000,000. Altogether, Czechoslovakia lost to her neighbors more than one-fourth of her area and almost one-third of her population.

c. THE COLLAPSE OF "CZECHO-SLOVAKIA"

Within Czecho-Slovakia, as the diminished republic now spelled its name, great changes had meanwhile been taking place. On October 5, 1938, feeling that German pressure might be relaxed if he left the scene, President Beneš resigned. The National Assembly thereupon chose as his successor Dr. Emil Hácha, president since 1925 of the supreme court. On the same day the Syrový Cabinet was replaced by one headed by Rudolf Beran. One of the last acts of the Syrový Government had been the granting of autonomy to Slovakia and Ruthenia, the latter now named Carpatho-Ukraine. Thereafter the Czecho-Slovak Cabinet was to contain representatives of Czechia (Bohemia plus Moravia), Slovakia, and Carpatho-Ukraine.

Partly as a reaction to the "desertion" of her allies and partly because of German pressure, the republic completely reversed a number of her traditional policies. Officials who had been strongly identified with the earlier regime were dismissed. Monuments to Masaryk and Beneš were taken down. The Communist Party was suppressed and Masonic lodges were encouraged to dissolve themselves. Close economic relations were established with Germany, for Czecho-Slovakia had become a relatively poor agrarian state. Anti-Semitic outbreaks became frequent, especially in Slovakia where the Hlinka Guards, named after a nationalistic priest, pursued tactics similar to those of the German Brown Shirts. Upon Andrew Hlinka's death, his followers came under the leadership of another Catholic priest, the separatistically inclined Father Joseph Tiso, premier of autonomous Slovakia.

A new difficulty facing Czecho-Slovakia in 1938 and early 1939 was how to care for the numerous refugees who fled from the areas ceded to her neighbors, especially Germany. Many of these refugees were "Aryans" whose political outlook or national background differed markedly from that of the new masters. Many were Jews. To aid Czecho-Slovakia in handling this situation and recompense her in part for her recent losses, Great Britain and France agreed to participate equally in a gift of $40,000,000 to the republic and to lend her an additional $40,000,000. With this $80,000,000 at her disposal, Czecho-Slovakia would, it was hoped, be able to provide necessary foreign exchange for some refugees, find means of settling others within her own border, and in general rebuild her economic

structure. The future, however, had other things in store for the ill-fated republic.

To quell the mounting disturbances in Slovakia, Premier Beran in March 1939 dismissed Tiso. The latter thereupon conferred with Hitler in Berlin, and on March 15 German troops occupied what was left of Masaryk's republic. Czechia was declared (March 16) a German "protectorate," named Bohemia-Moravia, under the nominal presidency of Hácha but the actual control of a "Reich Protector." Slovakia, too, became a "protectorate," and was required to "conduct its policy in close coöperation with the German Government." At Hitler's command, Father Tiso was installed as head of the puppet Slovak state, a situation which was not pleasing to the papacy. Meanwhile, through military occupation, the Carpatho-Ukraine was incorporated in the Hungarian Kingdom, which thus gained a common frontier with Poland and brushed aside a major section of the Treaty of Trianon. Czechoslovakia, for the time being, was no more.

German action in 1938–1939 with respect to Austria, the Sudeten areas, Czechia, Slovakia, and Memelland [17] added about 77,000 square miles and 20,000,000 people (including several hundred thousand more Jews) to the area and population of the Third Reich. Population pressure within Germany was thus increased rather than decreased, and the areas in question (except Slovakia) "were actually more dependent upon foreign sources of food supplies and raw materials than was the German Reich."

POLAND

a. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, 1919–1939

Throughout the nineteenth century a Polish national spirit continued to grow while Polish territories were ruled by Germans, Austrians, and Russians, and while Polish heroes eagerly participated in revolutions in Western Europe. At last, in 1914, many patriotic Poles thought they discerned in the war the long-sought-for opportunity to set up a Polish national state. Thanks to the friendship of the Allies and the efforts of Joseph Pilsudski and Ignace Jan Paderewski, this hope was realized.

Born in 1867, in Russian Poland, Pilsudski was reared in an atmosphere of revolt against tsarist autocracy. After visiting a number of universities and being expelled from each for revolutionary activities, he was sent to

[17] After 1933 there was considerable strife between Memel Nazis, supported by the Reich, and Lithuanian officials. On March 22, 1939, Lithuania acceded to German threats and surrendered Memelland to the Reich.

Siberia for several years. Upon his return he helped found the Polish Socialist Party, whose basic creed was Polish liberty rather than Marxian theory. He was again arrested and, after he had feigned insanity, sent to a combination asylum and prison in St. Petersburg. Here he remained for some months, but in 1901 escaped through the help of a Polish physician. Pilsudski fled to Austrian Poland and eventually settled in Cracow. He returned to Russia to participate in the Revolution of 1905, but in 1907 he was back in Cracow. Here he organized and drilled a secret Polish military force. When the war broke out, he offered to lead the men against the Russians, considering them the worst oppressors of his people.

Pilsudski and his followers hoped to use Austria "as the sword against Russia and the shield against Germany." They wished to take advantage of Austria's relatively liberal Polish policy to organize a Polish army as the instrument of eventual independence. Not all Poles shared this view. A considerable group, led by Roman Dmowski, preferred to fight on Russia's side in the belief that Polish unity depended on the defeat of the Central Powers. A third group wanted to achieve Polish independence unhampered by the restrictive aid of either Russia or Austria. This view was most popular among the Poles who lived abroad. Their ablest representative was the pianist, Paderewski.

In August 1914 a Supreme Polish National Committee was formed at Cracow. Those Poles who preferred to look for Russian aid in their unification scheme organized a Polish National Committee in Warsaw. Austria accorded recognition to the Cracow committee and organized two Polish Legions, commanded by Austrian generals of Polish extraction. Pilsudski's force was absorbed in the first legion, and in 1916 he was given command of a brigade. Meanwhile the Central Powers and Russia competed in the issuance of manifestoes dealing with the future of Poland. This convinced the Poles that they could expect as little from one side as from the other, and that salvation lay in independent action. Encouraged by Wilson's speech of January 1917, in which he held that "statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent, and autonomous Poland," and heartened by the Russian evacuation of Poland in the same year, Pilsudski told his followers: "Russia is beaten now; next we must fight Germany." Berlin replied by arresting Pilsudski and inducing Austria to disband the Polish Legions and dissolve the Supreme Polish National Committee.

At the close of the war Pilsudski was released by the Germans and went to Warsaw. He took command of the Polish soldiery as "Chief of State" and on November 16, 1918, announced an independent Polish Re-

public. Meanwhile, under Dmowski's leadership, the Polish National Committee that had been set up in Warsaw in 1914 had moved its headquarters to Paris. Thus there were two bodies claiming to represent Poland. The Allies, identifying Pilsudski's Socialism with Russian Bolshevism, recognized the committee in Paris, as did the conservative Polish bourgeois and peasant groups. Pilsudski's Government was supported by the laborers, the more radical peasants, and a rapidly growing army of war veterans. The contest for authority, combined with the hostility of Poland's neighbors, local separatist movements, starvation, and the general disorganization following upon four years of warfare, foreboded little good for the new state.

Eventually the major political differences were reconciled by Paderewski, who was held in esteem by his own country and had won the confidence of the Western nations. Paderewski was in the United States when the war ended, but he quickly sailed for Paris and then went on a triumphal tour of Poland. In January 1919 he became premier and foreign minister, while Pilsudski continued as chief of state. The cabinet included leaders from all important political and geographical groups in the country. While Pilsudski set out to establish wide frontiers for Poland by force of arms, Paderewski went to the Paris Peace Conference to render the same service around the diplomats' table.

Filled with a desire for natural frontiers, the Polish leaders sought to incorporate in the reborn state Lithuania, the Ukraine, Galicia, part of the new Czechoslovakia, and as much more of Germany and Russia as they could claim on ethnological, linguistic, historical, or sentimental grounds. Poland now actually engaged in war with Lithuania, the Ukraine, and Russia; threatened war on Czechoslovakia; disregarded the admonitions of the Allied Supreme Council—and ended by accepting frontiers which gave her an area of 150,000 square miles rather than the 282,000 square miles that her spokesmen had demanded.

Paderewski resigned as premier in December 1919, largely because of popular dissatisfaction with his accomplishments at the peace conference. Pilsudski remained as chief of state until after the adoption of a constitution and the election of a president. The constitution was drafted by a constituent assembly elected by universal suffrage. Although its work was completed in March 1921, the assembly postponed parliamentary elections and retained control of the government until November 1922.

The constitution provided for an upper house called the Senate and a lower house called the *Seym*. Any bill passed by the Seym and vetoed by the Senate was to become law if repassed in the lower house by a

majority of eleven-twentieths. The constitution established universal suffrage at 21 for the Seym and 30 for the Senate, with proportional representation. The president was to be elected for seven years by the Senate and Seym sitting together. Owing to the large number of parties, government came to be carried on through the bloc system.

The first parliament elected under the constitution chose a president in December 1922. He was assassinated two days after taking office and was succeeded by Stanislas Wojciechowski. In consequence of these elections Pilsudski gave up his position as chief of state and became chief of staff. During the next few years political conditions in Poland were reminiscent of the days of the decadent kingdom. Conservatives and radicals in the parliament were deadlocked, land reform lagged, the financial situation was critical, and corruption prevailed. To make matters worse, the president and the chief of staff, though at one time friends, became estranged. Pilsudski, indeed, went into temporary retirement, though he remained in close touch with the army and the Left groups in the Seym.

The marshal became more and more irritated at the dilatory tactics of the politicians, the lack of legislative accomplishment, and the perpetual parliamentary bickering. In May 1926, when one of his bitterest enemies, Vincent Witos, became premier, Pilsudski denounced the government for its weakness and corruption, for neglecting the army, and for withholding proper recognition from the Socialist Party. When it appeared that the authorities might institute judicial proceedings against him, Pilsudski led three regiments in a March on Warsaw. After a three days' battle Pilsudski entered the capital while the president and premier resigned and fled (May 14). The marshal refused to set up a formal dictatorship. Instead, he brought about the election as president of his friend Professor Ignace Mościcki, a successful chemist. He himself was content to become minister of war in the cabinet of Casimir Bartel.

In the next few months a bitter conflict developed between Pilsudski and the Seym. Although many deputies had come to dislike the forceful policies of Pilsudski, the latter, by controlling the army and attracting public opinion, was able to force through the legislature several constitutional changes. These amendments gave the president greater control over the budget; permitted him, with the consent of the cabinet, to dissolve both houses of parliament; and empowered him in certain circumstances to issue decrees with the force of law in economic and fiscal matters. The powers of the cabinet were extended to include some legislative functions. When the Seym attempted to reassert its authority and defeated the ministry on two motions, Pilsudski requested the president to appoint him premier.

From October 1926 until June 1928 (with a slight interruption because of illness) Pilsudski was premier. He was able to rule through parliamentary channels because the national legislature did not dare to oppose him. Hostility to this veiled dictatorship increased, however, and in June 1928 the marshal resigned on the grounds of illness and disgust with the corruption and inefficiency of the Seym. Bartel once again became premier, and Pilsudski reassumed the office of minister of war.

Parliamentary difficulties did not cease with the reorganization of the ministry. On the contrary, Pilsudski's own Socialist Party now joined the opposition. Thereupon Pilsudski attacked the politicians as unworthy intriguers who had "purposely framed the constitution so that the greatest shame which savage ignorant brains could devise would be placed on the nation's most popular men." As minister of war he continued to dictate Polish policies and urged a revision of the constitution to increase the power of the national executive. The draft of such a constitution was published in 1929. But instead of adopting the document, parliament was persuaded (1932) to authorize the president for three years to issue decrees with the force of law.

Pilsudski showed his contempt for the parliament in a variety of ways. In 1929 he refused to attend hearings on the budget, but when it was announced he criticized it severely. When the finance minister was impeached for the unauthorized expenditure of large sums, Pilsudski assumed responsibility for the act and defied the Seym to try him. The case was suspended. Frequently the convening of parliament was postponed by presidential decree, while opposition voices were silenced by arbitrary action. Pilsudski announced: "It is the deputies who endanger Poland most!" [18] Eight different ministries, all controlled by Pilsudski, guided the republic from 1928 to 1935. The governments, because of their preponderantly military make-up, were popularly known as "Cabinets of Colonels." [19] In 1933 Pilsudski's friend, President Mościcki, was reëlected for another seven-year term.

In 1934 the government submitted to the Seym another new constitution. The opposition leaders declared that the original constitution of 1921 could be supplanted only with the consent of two-thirds majorities in both houses. The ministry maintained that ordinary action by the lower house was sufficient. Thereupon the opposition withdrew from the hall, and the

[18] Witos, three times premier, and other opposition leaders and deputies were jailed for conspiracy between 1930 and 1932.

[19] Special favors were bestowed on the rank and file of the army. In 1931 Pilsudski exempted soldiers from a general wage cut for government employees.

government bloc rushed the measure through the required three readings in a single sitting. The new constitution was promulgated in 1935.

As supplemented by a later electoral law, the document put an end to parliamentary democracy in Poland. Henceforth there were to be 208 deputies in the Seym, two for each electoral constituency. The candidates were to be nominated by local councils, chambers of commerce, and other corporate bodies, and approved by special electoral boards. The deputies were to be elected for five years by citizens over 24. The Senate was to consist of 96 members, one-third appointed by the president and two-thirds elected by citizens over 30 who had been decorated for military or civil service or occupied high military or civil posts.[20]

The president was made largely independent of parliament and given a suspensive-veto power. He was empowered to appoint or dismiss ministers and summon or dismiss the Seym and Senate at his discretion. In future the president was to be chosen for seven-year terms as follows: the existing chief executive *might,* and an assembly of electors designated by parliament from its membership *must,* nominate a candidate. If two individuals were thus selected, a popular vote would be required to choose between them. If the retiring president failed to nominate a candidate, then the candidate of the assembly of electors was to be the new president.

Thus did Pilsudski arrange for a continuance of the "constitutional dictatorship" even after his own strong hand should have been withdrawn from the control of affairs. For the marshal's health was rapidly failing, and he had found it necessary to take frequent vacations abroad where the climate was more favorable to him. On the ninth anniversary of his attack on Warsaw, Marshal Pilsudski died (1935).

Early in 1937 it appeared that Poland might join the group of totalitarian states. President Mościcki recognized Marshal Edward Śmigly-Rydz, friend and comrade-in-arms of Pilsudski, as "leader of the nation." Ignace Paderewski thereupon issued a warning against the trend towards authoritarianism, and several liberal and labor groups petitioned the president for a more liberal electoral law. During 1938 Mościcki and other older friends of the late Marshal Pilsudski expelled certain Fascist, anti-Semitic elements from the government. Believing that neither democracy nor fascism would suit Poland's national genius, they hoped to lead her to a "lawful and disciplined democracy." In the parliamentary elections of 1938, the candidates —representing districts rather than parties—were nearly all government

[20] Political parties as such could not be represented in the Polish Parliament, but they continued to exist outside parliament.

supporters. But before another year passed, Poland had disappeared from the map as an independent state.

On the economic side, Poland, like her neighbors, suffered in the post-war years from inflation and instability. The ravages of the war and of prolonged hostilities with Russia, a series of bad crops, an unsettled agrarian situation, and knotty minorities problems constituted a grave threat to the republic. Eventually, in 1923, a coalition cabinet of experts was appointed, headed by Premier and Finance Minister Ladislav Grabski. This government, entrusted with emergency powers to stabilize the finances, remained in office until late 1925.

Grabski energetically checked the depreciation of the Polish mark. He introduced economy into government departments, reduced railway subsidies, advanced tax rates, and imposed additional levies. Then he repudiated most of the national debt, set up a Bank of Poland, and declared a temporary halt on the issue of paper money. But these reforms ended in failure. They seemed to be too drastic and bore too heavily on the people as a whole. The harvest of 1924 was so bad that large quantities of foodstuffs had to be imported and the cost of living rose. About the same time, in consequence of a minorities dispute, German purchases of Polish-Silesian coal came to a stop, and in 1925 a tariff war ensued with Germany.[21] The funding of Poland's debts to the United States and Great Britain and the successful floating of another United States loan offered only temporary relief. Premier Grabski resigned, but his successors were no more able to create financial stability.

When the currency unit, the zloty, fell to one-half of its par value, the government invited Professor Edwin W. Kemmerer of Princeton University to study financial conditions in Poland and make recommendations for their improvement. This invitation was confirmed by the Pilsudski dictatorship which came into being in May 1926. The Kemmerer Commission made sweeping recommendations, many of which were promptly adopted by the Polish Government. The application of sound monetary principles, a good crop in 1926, and an increased foreign demand for Polish coal because of the British coal strike in the same year, bade fair to inaugurate a period of economic prosperity. A foreign loan was obtained in 1927, and at the same time Charles S. Dewey, assistant secretary of the treasury of the United States, was engaged as financial adviser. From 1927 to 1932 the Pilsudski regime kept the zloty stable and balanced the

[21] The tariff war ended in 1934. Meanwhile German-Polish trade had dwindled from $300,000,000 in 1924 to $43,000,000 in 1933.

annual budgets. When Dewey resigned in 1930, Poland seemed well on the road to financial equilibrium.

The economic depression that affected the world after 1930 naturally made itself felt in Poland. By the strictest curtailment of expenditures the budget was balanced through the fiscal year 1931–1932 without recourse to inflation. The per capita wealth of Poland at this time was about one-third of the per capita wealth of France. But from the fiscal year 1932–1933 on, the official expenditures exceeded the revenues, and by the end of 1934 the unemployed totaled 300,000 in a population of 32,000,000.

Almost as pressing as the financial question was the agrarian situation. The socialists and the radical peasants, influenced by the example of Russia, favored the breaking up of the large estates and the redistribution of the land on a wider basis. The peasants of Galicia and of former Russian Poland, in particular, clamored for more land. Restrictive immigration acts in the United States and Germany added to the misery of the constantly increasing landless proletariat. The conflicting interests of the estate owners and the agrarian radicals, and the fairly even influence of Right and Left in the parliament, held up for six years the application of remedial measures. At last, in December 1925, an act was passed which provided for the parceling of large estates at the rate of 200,000 hectares (494,200 acres) annually for ten years. Expropriation by the state should occur only in the event that voluntary parceling fell behind the required minimum. Payment for the land should be made in cash and bonds. Although neither extremist group was satisfied with the law, it did prove to be a working compromise.

During the great depression, the interest rates on certain forms of land mortgages were lowered and the short-term credits of farmers were extended. A decree of 1934 enabled the peasants to convert their short-term indebtedness (usually at 12 per cent interest) into fifty-year bonds bearing 4.5 per cent interest. Creditors were required to accept these conversions at par. Since more than 60 per cent of the population was directly dependent upon agriculture, these measures were of national importance.

In the course of years new railways were built and old ones improved, virtually all the arable land of the country was placed under cultivation, thousands of new houses were built, and production as a whole increased rapidly. Even so, the standard of living remained relatively low, and 1936 witnessed clashes between government forces and some of the debt-burdened, land-poor peasants. The lack of markets proved to be one of the republic's chief handicaps. This difficulty was accentuated by the prevailing fashion of high tariffs and by the great depression. The strenuous efforts of the government to build up manufacturing industries were hampered

by the shortage of working capital. And the authorities dealt harshly with any radical labor movements, for Poland's geographic proximity to the Soviet Union made such developments seem doubly dangerous.

b. THE MINORITIES

Since fewer than three-fourths of Poland's 27,000,000 inhabitants in 1919 were of Polish nationality, the peace conference at Paris required the republic to sign a minorities treaty guaranteeing equality of rights to all citizens. Minority nationals were to be given the choice of becoming Polish citizens or leaving the country, and in no case might they be deprived of property or the free exercise of their religion. The right of minorities was guaranteed to establish schools and receive a fair share of state support for these schools wherever the minority formed a "considerable portion" of the population. There were to be no restrictions on the use of minority tongues in business, courts, public meetings, and religious services. Appeal might be made to the League Council whenever any of these privileges was violated.

The largest minority group in Poland was the Ruthenians or Ukrainians in the east and south, who formed, according to Polish figures, one-seventh of the total population. The Jews, scattered throughout the land, came next with one-twelfth of the total, and the Germans were third with one twenty-fifth. Between 1920 and 1924 the position of minorities was particularly hazardous, and there was considerable, albeit unsuccessful, agitation among nationalistic Poles to denounce the minorities treaty.

A law of 1922 granted local autonomy to eastern Galicia, but the Ruthenians complained of Poland's governmental policies. "The lack of consistent administration, . . . the endeavor to colonize the Polish soldiery on the expropriated lands in preference to the local peasantry, the flooding of the region with new, inexperienced, and inefficient administrators," all seemed to bear witness to an attempt at the enforced Polonization of the eastern provinces. In 1924 the Soviet Government protested to Warsaw and brought the matter to the notice of the world. Moscow claimed a direct interest in the treatment of these people because of the large number of Ukrainians in the Soviet Union.

Though Poland replied defiantly to the Soviet notes, Premier Grabski secured the passage of three laws concerning the use of minority languages in administrative offices, courts, and schools. Polish was confirmed as the state language, but the parallel use of Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and White Russian was permitted in the conduct of official and judicial business.

Private schools giving instruction through the medium of any one of these languages were to be tolerated. Wherever the parents of 40 children, in a region containing a non-Polish minority of at least 25 per cent, so requested, the state schools were to provide instruction in the minority tongue. Instruction in the Polish language in history and geography remained compulsory.

Even when these laws eventually were enforced, relations remained inharmonious. The Ruthenians continued to complain of mistreatment, and some of them formed a Ukrainian Military Organization to fight for an independent Ukrainian state. The Polish Government took severe repressive measures. In 1930 the laments of the minority reached the ears of the League Council, which remitted them to a committee for consideration. While the committee investigated, the situation in Poland became aggravated. The Ukrainian peasants stopped paying taxes, and the government dispatched soldiers to arrest the leaders and compel obedience to the laws. The League Committee eventually upheld the policy of the government.

Late in 1935 the government and the Ukrainian leaders arrived at a "gentlemen's agreement" wherein the minority was promised greater consideration for its demands. Before long a specially called Ukrainian Congress expressed dissatisfaction with the operation of the compromise. The authorities, on the other hand, placed responsibility for several political murders on Ukrainian nationalists. The matter threatened to become serious at the time of the Munich Agreement in 1938 when Germany, Hungary, and Poland expanded their possessions on the ground that Czechoslovakia had been unjustly ruling *its* minorities; but no overt act took place. In 1939, after the outbreak of the Second World War, the Soviet Union occupied that part of Poland which was inhabited by the Ukrainians.

Similarly disturbing had been the Jewish question. The Jews for some years after the war were subjected to bitter persecution. They were accused of being pro-German or pro-Bolshevik, of lacking Polish patriotism, of refusing to conform their lives to the standards of the nation, and of valuing profits above the national welfare. They were the frequent victims of assault and murder, and they derived no benefit from the language laws of 1924. So serious were the rumors that spread abroad concerning the mistreatment of Jews that two foreign missions, one British and the other from the United States, were sent to Poland to investigate. At length, in 1925, the Polish authorities and the Jews came to a conciliatory Declaration of Warsaw.

By its terms the Jews, through their political representatives, promised to recognize their duties and obligations to the Polish State and confine

any opposition tactics to constitutional channels. In return, the authorities undertook to pay more attention to the educational and economic interests of the Jewry. Laws granted the Jews the same linguistic and religious rights as the other minorities, permitted them to keep their shops open on Sundays instead of Saturdays, and reduced certain special taxes on small business that had affected mainly Jewish storekeepers. No elections were to be held on Saturdays so that Orthodox Jews might not be deprived of their franchise.

These laws temporarily improved the situation of the Jews, but the effects of the great depression and the anti-Semitic excesses of the Nazis in Germany after 1933 led to a revival of the latent anti-Jewish attitudes. The number of violent attacks on Jews increased from year to year. In 1937 the country's Jewry engaged in a two-hour protest strike, but this only led to more assaults. The government strove to check the excesses, sent the most active agitators to concentration camps, and refused to pass new anti-Jewish laws. But by 1939 it was widely recommended in Poland that all Jews be settled in Palestine or the French colonies.

The German minority problem involved two quarrels. There was, first, the question of the farmers who with the aid of the Hohenzollern Government had colonized Prussian Poland. The Poles attempted to evict these colonists, who held the land under contracts from the German Government, without compensation. Germany took up the case of her nationals and appealed to the League Council. Poland denied the competency of this body, and the dispute was placed before the World Court. The latter upheld the jurisdiction of the Council and handed down an advisory opinion that Poland must respect the private rights of the German nationals. In consequence the Warsaw Government eventually agreed to compensate the evicted Germans.

The second difficulty concerned the Germans in industrial Upper Silesia. Here the minority protested against Polish mistreatment and discrimination, particularly in educational opportunities. A *Volksbund* was organized to agitate for better conditions, and the sympathy of the Reich was solicited. It was alleged that the Poles exerted every form of pressure from censorship to terrorism to intimidate the German minority. Berlin several times brought the Silesian troubles to the attention of the League but got little satisfaction. In 1937 the German and Polish governments exchanged guarantees of cultural and religious autonomy for their respective minorities, but the dispute really involved the broader problem of a general revision of Germany's eastern frontiers. As such, it was a constant threat to peace.

c. DANZIG, THE POLISH CORRIDOR, AND VILNIUS

The Paris Peace Conference provided for the conversion of the German port of Danzig into a free city under the economic authority of Poland and the general supervision of the League. Although nearly all inhabitants of the city at the time were Germans, it was decided that such an arrangement would best solve the problem of giving Poland access to the sea. The League accordingly asked the Danzigers to draw up a constitution and make an arrangement with Poland. Polish-Danzig Agreements were reached in 1920 and 1921, and a Danzig constitution received approval of the League Council in 1922.[22]

Danzig was to be governed by a *Volkstag* and a Senate, with executive power in the hands of a League High Commissioner. The high commissioner was to arbitrate in disputes between Danzig and Poland, both areas having the right of appeal to the League Council. Poland was made responsible for the foreign relations of the free city and given supervision over its commercial customs. The port was not to be used as a military or naval base without the previous consent of the League. A customs union was established, and a joint harbor board was to administer the port. In short, Poland would control the economic and diplomatic life of the free city, while the inhabitants would enjoy political autonomy.

Relations between Danzig and Poland soon were strained. During the first five years the League Commissioner handed down almost fifty decisions. Through 1927 "there was hardly any session of the [League] Council at which Danzig affairs did not appear on the agenda," and even the World Court was called upon to settle disputes. The difficulty of drawing a line between economic and political matters and the traditional hatred between the two peoples made the situation dangerous. Moreover, the Danzigers looked with fear upon the rival port-building project inaugurated by Poland at Gdynia.

In order to diminish the dependence of Polish merchants and shippers upon the Danzig harbor facilities, Warsaw, with the aid of a French syndicate, pushed the development of Gdynia, a few miles west and north of Danzig. In 1920 "Gdynia was a bleak region of sand dunes. A few fishermen's huts comprised its residential area. Today [1934] Gdynia is a city of more than 50,000 inhabitants. . . . In 1924, . . . 24 ships with a total weight of 14,000 tons entered the port. In 1930, 2200 ships weighing 2,000,000 tons loaded and unloaded cargoes. . . . In 1933, 7200 ships

[22] The area of the free city was 754 square miles; its inhabitants, according to the census of 1929, numbered 400,000, of whom 96 per cent were German.

with a tonnage of 5,670,000 and representing 23 countries docked at this Polish port." [23] Naturally the Danzigers worried over this enterprise which deflected their chief business, shipping, to the neighboring city. Although Warsaw pointed out that Danzig's volume of trade consistently exceeded the prewar figures, the Danzigers with equal truth indicated that by 1933 Gdynia's trading volume had surpassed that of the free city.

The Germans in the Reich frequently expressed sympathy with the Danzigers, and the Hitlerites declared their determination to right what they called a glaring wrong of the Versailles Treaty. When the Nazis came to power in Germany, there was fear in Poland regarding future German official policy. This was increased when, in the elections of May 1933, the Danzig Nazis gained control of the free city's Volkstag and Senate. However, the Nazi president of the upper house, Dr. Hermann Rauschning, advocated conciliation with Poland. Two agreements were signed, wherein Poland promised Danzig more freight traffic and Danzig agreed to the establishment of special schools for the children of Polish residents. Later it was provided that Danzig would get 45 per cent of Poland's sea-borne foreign traffic while the remaining 55 per cent would pass through Gdynia. During 1934 Polish-Danzig affairs continued to reflect a general improvement in Polish-German relations. Rauschning's retirement late in 1934, however, and his replacement by a more militant Nazi, once more clouded the outlook.

West and south of Danzig was a stretch of territory 260 miles long and ranging in width up to 80 miles, which formerly comprised in part the provinces of West Prussia and Posen. Through it flowed the Vistula River, one of the main arteries of commerce in east-central Europe. The Versailles Treaty assigned this land to Poland, with a consequent division of Germany into two unconnected sections: Germany proper, extending eastward as far as Pomerania, and East Prussia. The cession was justified by the Allies on the ground that "the interests which Germans in East Prussia, who number fewer than two millions, have in establishing a land connection with Germany, are less vital than the interests of the whole Polish nation in securing direct access to the sea."

Through the creation of this "Polish Corridor" Poland became an economic unit. Germany was weakened economically and militarily and found it harder to exert her influence in the Baltic region. Particularly difficult was the fate of East Prussia, which no longer had a free market in the area of the corridor for its timber, cattle, and horses. Eventually Ger-

[23] Douglass, P. F. *The Economic Independence of Poland,* 1934, p. 7n. Reprinted by permission of the author.

many was granted freedom of transit for passengers and freight through the corridor to and from East Prussia. The arrangement, however, was not satisfactory. Germans who desired to cross the area without passports and without submitting their belongings to customs inspection had to travel in highly uncomfortable "sealed" cars.

A further grievance of the Germans in the Reich was the belief that the Poles were mistreating the German minority in the corridor. The exact ratio of Germans to Poles in the region in 1918 was never determined, but the latter soon came to comprise a large majority of the inhabitants. The Warsaw Government induced many Germans to leave and encouraged the colonization of the land by Polish settlers. In 1934 the resident Germans numbered perhaps 100,000.

The Polish Corridor therefore was one of the prime factors in the mutual ill will manifested by Germany and Poland. A commercial treaty between the two powers was held up for nine years because of disputes over the corridor and the minority difficulties. In 1925, at Locarno, Germany refused to subscribe to a guarantee of her Polish frontiers. Thereafter official reference often was made to the urgent need for a revision of the eastern boundaries. Poland's claim that her economic life depended upon the retention of the corridor was consistently supported by France. A ten-year nonaggression pact signed by Germany and Poland in 1934 eased the tension, but conditions remained sufficiently upset so that H. G. Wells, writing in 1933, could prophesy that the next great war would begin over the Polish Corridor in 1940. He was wrong only in setting the date a few months late.[24]

Another Polish boundary dispute concerned Vilnius (Wilno), in medieval times the capital of Lithuania. Later, when Lithuania and Poland became united, Vilnius gradually came under the cultural and economic domination of the Poles. After the partition of Poland in the late eighteenth century, the district remained under Russian control for about 125 years. Following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the Lithuanians declared their independence and attempted to set up a government at Vilnius. Fighting ensued, and Bolshevik troops captured the city, to be dislodged in turn by a Polish army. Meanwhile the Allied Supreme Council laid down the Curzon Line (1919) as a provisional Polish-Lithuanian frontier and assigned the city and most of the province of Vilnius to Lithuania. Poland, still engaged in war with Russia, accepted this as a temporary disposition. By the Treaty of Moscow (1920), Russia ceded Vilnius to Lithuania.

24 Wells, H. G. *The Shape of Things to Come,* 1933. For the relation of the corridor to the outbreak of the Second World War, see pp. 508 ff.

When the Russo-Polish War came to a close, the Poles claimed Vilnius. An armed clash with Lithuania resulted. The League Council dispatched a military commission to the scene to end the fighting, and in October 1920 the two governments signed the Agreement of Suwalki whereby the Curzon Line, in slightly revised form, was again accepted as a provisional boundary and Vilnius was once more assigned to Lithuania. On the day before this agreement was to come into force, General Lucien Zeligowski, a Polish freebooter with several thousand followers, occupied the city. Although the Warsaw Government disclaimed responsibility for the act,[25] the Poles hailed the general as a hero. Lithuania appealed to the League, but the Council recommended direct negotiations between the disputing powers. When these failed, the Conference of Ambassadors in 1923 laid down another boundary—allotting Vilnius to Poland.

Lithuania refused to recognize this disposition, and the "state of war" that had existed between her and Poland since October 1920 continued until the end of 1927. Then the League Council again took note of the situation when Lithuania complained that her nationals in Vilnius were being mistreated, and Poland complained that the same was true of the Poles in Lithuania. Marshal Pilsudski and the Lithuanian Premier were requested to come to Geneva, and there an agreement was reached whereby Lithuania consented to end the state of war and Poland promised to respect the territorial integrity of Lithuania. But so far as Lithuania was concerned, the question of Vilnius was not settled. In 1928 the Lithuanian Government promulgated a new constitution which designated Vilnius as the capital of the country, although the actual business of government was being carried on from Kaunas (Kovno). This drew a rebuke from the League Council, and the Vilnius controversy remained a disturbing factor in European politics until 1938. Then, during the forceful German absorption of Austria, Poland induced Lithuania to restore normal diplomatic relations and give up the campaign to reincorporate Vilnius. In 1939, however, after the Nazi-Soviet partition of Poland during the Second World War, the U.S.S.R. ceded the 10,000 square miles of disputed territory to Lithuania.

d. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The external relations of Poland were shaped largely by her geographical propinquity to a number of unfriendly powers. To the east there was the Soviet Union; to the north, Lithuania and East Prussia; to the west, Germany. Poland, accordingly, placed her hope for security upon military

[25] "Pilsudski disavowed its paternity at the time, but confessed to it later."

alliances and arbitration agreements. In 1921 alliances were formed with Romania and France, and a treaty of neutrality was signed with Czechoslovakia. In 1922 friendly relations were established with the Little Entente. Three years later arbitration treaties were negotiated with Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Czechoslovakia, and Austria; the Locarno Agreements were accepted; and a concordat was signed with the Holy See. In 1929 Poland, the Soviet Union, Estonia, Latvia, and Romania agreed to the Litvinov Protocol whereby the Kellogg Pact became immediately effective among the signatories. In 1931 Poland reached a nonaggression accord with the Soviet Union.

Several efforts were made by Poland to create a Baltic Union of Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, and Lithuania. There were obvious advantages to such a confederation, but little progress was made in its direction. Moscow opposed any plan that might create a Polish hegemony in the Baltic; Lithuania harbored no friendship for Poland; and Finland leaned towards a Scandinavian rather than a Baltic orientation.

During 1933 Poland gradually drew away from France and sought closer relations with Germany and the Soviet Union. The Poles were no longer content to be regarded as satellites of France. For a time Warsaw hesitated between accepting the friendship of Berlin or of Moscow, but in the end amicable arrangements were made with both parties. A ten-year nonaggression pact was concluded with Berlin in 1934, providing for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the creation of a "propaganda alliance" under which each government would seek to enlighten its people on the advantages of *rapprochement*. The Bolsheviks looked upon this with suspicion, but soon an earlier Polish-Soviet nonaggression accord was renewed until 1945. The new orientation of Polish foreign policy aroused considerable opposition in the Seym lest it lead to a loss of French protection and ultimate diplomatic isolation. But Foreign Minister Colonel Joseph Beck discounted such fears.

For a time, indeed, it appeared as though Hitler and Beck would bring about a genuine improvement in German-Polish relations. In October 1938 Poland, owing largely to Germany's aggressive actions, was enabled to enlarge her territory and population at the expense of Czechoslovakia. Warsaw's wish to achieve a common boundary with Hungary was fulfilled in March 1939, through the latter's annexation of Ruthenia. During a 1939 visit to Warsaw by Nazi Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, the spirit of the German-Polish agreement of 1934 was called to mind through cordial speeches. But before the year was out, Nazi boots pounded on Polish soil in the opening stages of the Second World War.

CHAPTER 11

The Soviet Union

OLD REGIME AND REVOLUTION

Nicholas II, from 1894 to 1917 "Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias," ruled an empire that comprised almost one-sixth of the land surface of the globe. His 8,764,000 square miles of land stretched eastward from Central Europe to the Pacific Ocean, and southward from the Arctic to the Black and Caspian seas, Persia, and China. The inhabitants numbered 180,000,000, about half of whom were Russians proper, or Great Russians. The remainder consisted of Little Russians or Ukrainians, White Russians, Poles, Finns, Letts, Turks, Mongols, Armenians, Jews, and many others. The cultures of these peoples differed greatly, ranging from the advanced civilization of the European Russian nobility and intelligentsia to the semi-barbarous life of Siberian aborigines.

Among every 1000 Russians subject to the emperor in 1914, there were 17 nobles, 125 merchants and townspeople, and more than 800 peasants. Until 1860 these last, with some exceptions, had been serfs, living on government or privately owned estates. Then Tsar Alexander II abolished serfdom and prescribed a redistribution of the land. About half of the cultivated area of European Russia was assigned to villages or *mirs*, each peasant being given the right to till a share of the soil belonging to the community. The government advanced the money to compensate the nobles for the resulting property losses, but the people were expected to reimburse the state over a term of years.

Certain obvious benefits accrued to the peasants from the grant of personal freedom. But many troubles remained to sadden their lot. Often the freed serfs were unable to support their families on the farm allotments from the mir. This became worse with the passing of years, for the increase in available allotment lands failed to keep pace with the rise in peasant population. An unduly large portion of each year's income was absorbed by remittances to the government for the land; by heavy direct taxes imposed by the village, the province, and the state; and by burdensome indirect levies. There was little incentive to improve holdings since most of the mirs periodically redistributed the plots. The regulations of the village authorities were strict, and peasants generally were not allowed to migrate to cities without the approval of the mir.

These evils were somewhat mitigated after the revolutionary outbursts of 1905. Edicts remitted the unpaid redemption dues of the peasants, reduced the power of the mirs over their members, and gave each villager the right to demand outright his share of land held by the community. As direct owner of the property, then, the peasant might use, lease, or sell his holding. To some of the more enterprising countrymen these opportunities had great appeal, and they availed themselves of the right to become independent owners. Many of the peasants, who were "by taste and tradition petty cultivators," soon began to crowd one another "for the opportunity to rent lands at a figure which did not leave them, in return for their labor, as much as they might have earned by working for wages on a neighboring estate." Some were unable "to maintain their holdings under the more individualistic system and sold them to their neighbors, becoming agricultural laborers themselves or going into the cities in search of work." Hence conditions failed to improve sufficiently to create a satisfied peasantry; 1914 still found millions of farming households living in poverty and greedy for additional land.

The plight of Russia's 2,500,000 industrial workers was deplorable. They suffered from the ills usually associated with the beginnings of industrial revolutions and were prevented by the government from giving expression to their grievances. Some unions were broken up, strikes were suppressed, and there was relatively little social legislation. As a consequence, the industrial proletariat listened eagerly to apostles of reform, and, since the workers were herded together in factories and slums, it was easy to agitate among them and reach them with propaganda. During the Revolution of 1905 the workingmen demonstrated their temper by strikes and riots in the larger cities, and by 1914 they seemed ready for another violent outbreak.

The percentage of illiteracy among the Russians was one of the highest in Europe, and the bane of the population was its thralldom to vodka, a strong alcoholic drink made from grain or potatoes. The sale of vodka had been made a state monopoly in order to raise revenue and lessen the evils of private dispensation, but drunkenness remained a widespread curse. The masses, on the whole, were coarse, and they feared and hated the upper classes. The state-controlled Orthodox Church wielded considerable influence over the peasantry, but it was a loyal supporter of the tsarist regime and did little to raise the people from their low cultural level.

Political conditions in the empire were unstable. The censorship was notorious and the police administration ruthless. Nicholas II was ill suited to the exercise of autocratic powers over a vast domain. Though well-intentioned and patriotic, he was easily swayed by the arguments of whatever person happened to be with him at any particular moment. He was especially dominated by the Tsarina Alexandra, who herself was under the influence of a Siberian "monk" named Gregory Rasputin. The latter's origins and life were shrouded in obscurity, but he appeared to have hypnotic powers. He acquired his control over the empress because he alone seemed able to soothe the hemophilic and cranky young Tsarevich Alexis. It was said that a word from Rasputin was sufficient to bring about the appointment or dismissal of a minister or general, and his authority was not always wielded for the good of the nation. The autocracy required firm leadership. It could not endure under a weak-willed imperial family and an illiterate adventurer.

After the uprising of 1905, Nicholas had granted his people a parliament (*Duma*) with limited powers. The electoral law rendered certain a conservative majority in this Duma, and the government continued its traditional policies. In 1914 parliament, with the exception of five deputies, upheld the administration in its decision to go to war. The dissenting legislators, who were sent to Siberia, belonged to an organization called the Bolshevik faction of the Social Democratic Party.[1]

[1] The radical groups in pre-1914 Russia were the Constitutional Democrats, intellectuals and businessmen who favored responsible government of the British type; the Social Revolutionaries, chiefly peasants led by middle-class reformers, whose aim was the transfer of land to the peasantry and who resorted to terrorism to bring about collectivization of agriculture; and the Social Democratic Party, which found its strength among the industrial workers and advocated the abolition of private property and the control of production by the masses.

At a meeting of Social Democrats in London in 1903, opinion was divided on party discipline, organization, and coöperation with nonproletarian revolutionaries. One group, led by N. Lenin, favored strict discipline, a centralized organization, and independence from bourgeois support. The other preferred a looser party organization and the admission of nonproletarian sympathizers. A vote was taken on these views, and

Despite some military victories in the first weeks of the war, it soon was evident that Russia would experience difficulty in any extended prosecution of the conflict. The country was ill prepared for war. There was a lack of factories and shortage of equipment; transportation facilities were wanting; the generalship was poor, and the empress and civil nobility interfered in military matters; corruption was rife in government departments; and there were rumors of treason in high ranks. The German armies before long inflicted disastrous defeats upon the Russians, which further weakened the morale and disorganized the industrial structure of the land.

In the first three years of the struggle the tsar called out 15,000,000 men—far more than could be suitably equipped and fed. Millions of hands thus were withdrawn from the fields, where they should have been engaged in planting and harvesting, and millions of men had to be fed at public expense. Since the soldiers' rations in many cases exceeded the average consumption of the individual peasants in peacetime, food was required in greater quantities than during normal periods. In addition, the government paid allowances to the families of soldiers.

The railway system was incapable of handling the wartime traffic. The empire in 1914 had 40,000 miles of railway track—one-sixth as many as the United States, for an area three times as great. It was impossible expeditiously to forward supplies to the front, particularly where there was need for north-south shipments. Rumors of terrible conditions and enormous casualties among the fighting men leaked back from the lines, while woeful tales of misery at home filtered out to the trenches.

The pressure of wartime demands for goods and the success of several strikes made prices soar. Governmental expenditures were four times as high in 1916 as in an average prewar year, and, although much of the extra outlay was financed through Allied loans, taxes were boosted and resort was had to inflation, with the result that prices were stimulated to further rises. At the same time, to facilitate mobilization, the government instituted prohibition, thus depriving itself of income from vodka sales.

The bad conditions notwithstanding, little heed was paid by the authorities to the numerous demands for a more liberal policy. The officials discouraged voluntary popular movements, even where these were motivated by a desire to aid the war effort. A minister of the interior once rejected the offer of a provincial council to provide certain comforts for the troops on the ground that "any form of voluntary coöperation by the Russian

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the majority indicated a preference for the Leninist ideas. The partisans of the latter came to be known as *Bolsheviki,* from *bolshinstvo,* meaning "majority," while the others were called *Mensheviki,* from *menshinstvo,* meaning "minority."

people tended towards revolution." Thus the groups in control simultaneously betrayed their fear of the lower classes and maintained an uncompromising attitude. Nicholas himself wavered and hesitated, undecided on any course of action. The assassination of Rasputin in December 1916 by a group of aristocratic conspirators did little to help the situation.

The doom of the old regime was heralded by a general strike in Petrograd in February 1917. The walkout, though unorganized and unplanned, led to street demonstrations by the proletariat, which was weary of the war, the defeats, the privations, and the high prices. The city garrison refused to fire on the demonstrators and fraternized with the people. Had the tsar quickly called in troops from outside the city to suppress both the mobs and the Duma, which also was displaying a restive spirit, or had he agreed to the demands of the liberals for a new cabinet and responsible government, he might have postponed the approaching crisis. Nicholas, however, could not act with decision. Unwilling to grant concessions, too irresolute to take swift action, he simply did nothing.

The vacillation of the ruler goaded liberal-minded men both within and outside the Duma into a revolutionary stand and supplied the more radical agitators with propaganda material. Early in March 1917 there were mob attacks in the larger cities and some peasant riots, while accusations of treachery were hurled against the government from the floor of parliament. The tsar ordered the Duma to go home and the workingmen to cease striking and return to work. These decrees precipitated the revolution.

The legislative chamber refused to disperse. Instead, it elected a committee to lead a revolution against the decadent autocracy. Simultaneously the radical elements outside the Duma organized a Petrograd Soviet (Council) of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which invited all factory and army units to send delegates to its deliberations. The Duma committee and the soviet agreed to coöperate, and on March 14 a provisional government, headed by Prince George Lvov, came into being. The cabinet included a majority of Constitutional Democrats. Its most radical member was the Social Revolutionary, Alexander Kerensky, vice-president of the soviet's executive committee.

On March 15 Nicholas recognized the new government and abdicated in favor of his brother, Grand Duke Michael. The latter refused to accept the crown until an assembly, chosen by universal, secret suffrage, should have decided upon the future form of government. Six days later Nicholas and his immediate family became prisoners in the imperial palace near Petrograd. Thus the rule of the Romanovs, founded in 1613, came to an abrupt end.

The provisional government immediately issued decrees easing the press censorship, freeing political and religious prisoners, recognizing the right of workmen to unionize and strike, and humanizing the disciplinary codes in the army and the navy. Most of the civil and military officials in Russia agreed to serve under the new government, since the tsar himself had legalized its status. The Allied countries, following the example of the United States, accorded prompt recognition.

Despite these favorable omens the Lvov Cabinet, dependent upon a misalliance between the parliamentary revolutionaries and the Petrograd Soviet, was destined to have a short existence. The Duma had desired the overthrow of the tsar, for one reason, because he failed to prosecute the war with sufficient vigor, while the workingmen had been partially motivated by a wish to end the war. The soviet wanted a thorough revision of the property-holding system, a program with which most of the moderates in the Duma had little sympathy. Finally, whereas the government attempted to solve its problems by enunciating elaborate principles, without regard to the psychology or impatience of the masses, the soviet perfected a central organization, sent agents to establish branch councils at strategic points throughout the land, spread seditious propaganda, and urged all labor, military, and naval units to send representatives to the parent soviet.

By a famous "Order Number One" of March 14, the Petrograd Soviet instructed the army and the navy to disregard any commands of the provisional government that conflicted with the soviet's regulations. Local revolutionary committees were set up by the soldiers and sailors, which assumed control over the auxiliary military weapons. Disposition of the latter was to be entrusted to the officers only when the respective local committees were certain that such action would not jeopardize the interests of the revolution. Army discipline thus was shattered, for the soldiers enjoyed their newly gained "responsibilities" and unceremoniously shot those officers who could not grasp the "significance" of the changed situation. There also resulted bitter quarreling among the men, for some desired to remain loyal to their officers, while others refused to fight and started marching home.

In June 1917, at the initiative of the Petrograd Soviet, there met the first All-Russian Congress of Soviets. The thousand delegates included Social Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, and Bolsheviks, the last in a small minority. The gathering indulged in fervent speechmaking against imperialism and in favor of peace without annexations and without indemnities, while the chief practical accomplishment was the appointment of an All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets. This body, with a

membership of 300, was to act as a sort of soviet parliament. It was placed under a presidium of twenty, mainly Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

As it gradually became apparent that the Lvov Ministry was unable to cope with the difficult situation, one after another of the moderate members resigned from the cabinet. By July only three of the original appointees, including Kerensky, remained. The latter had risen to be head of the government, and he resorted to eloquence and skillful parliamentary procedure in an attempt to restore domestic order while continuing the contest against the Central Powers. By this time, however, even a Social Revolutionary Government was unsatisfactory to the masses, who craved peace and whose leaders demanded direct control over the means of production. Kerensky's postponement of elections for a national assembly weakened the confidence of many people in his ultimate motives.

In the fall of 1917 Russia was at the threshold of another revolution. The soldiers were staging the greatest mutiny in history. The peasants, when they felt certain of the downfall of the tsar and the landlords, rose and seized what lands they could. Many workers in the towns sought to take over control of factories and plants and to run them without private ownership. In order to give more force to their ideals, they formed local soviets and organized themselves into "Red Guards." The subject nationalities, notably the Ukrainians and Finns, took advantage of the general confusion to establish their independence, and the armies of Germany and Austria-Hungary were swarming over the western portions of the country. In the face of these conditions, Kerensky's grant of local autonomy to the provincial councils, establishment of universal suffrage, and promise of social and economic reforms as soon as external conditions permitted, failed to satisfy any considerable portion of the people.

The Bolsheviks, overwhelmingly outnumbered in the soviet congress, organized local soviets and agitated against Kerensky. Everywhere they shouted the slogan "Peace! Land! Bread!" and promised freedom for oppressed nationalities. The campaign was ably directed by Lenin, the "father of Bolshevism," who had been helped by the Germans to return to Russia from Switzerland. The Germans aided the revolutionaries not out of any sympathy for their ideals but in order to undermine the Russian state system and end the war on the eastern front. The failure of the Allies to redefine their war aims, as Kerensky suggested, also reacted to the latter's disadvantage. The cause of the Bolsheviks received a setback in July when Kerensky put down a premature uprising which had been opposed by Lenin and reacted unfavorably upon the cause of all radical antigovernment

groups. An equally futile reactionary coup under General Lavr Kornilov in September, however, enabled the Bolsheviks to recapture their lost ground and enhance their reputation.

Kornilov was an able strategist who had become popular among the soldiers for his energy and humaneness and his daring escape from an Austrian prison. He had been made commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the Kerensky Government, with almost no restrictions upon his military powers. For a time it appeared as though the general and Kerensky were jointly contemplating the establishment of a strong and moderate government that would cut short the internal disorder and continue the war against the Central Powers. However, when Kornilov started to march on Petrograd, Kerensky became frightened of a military dictatorship and hastily assembled some Red Guards to meet the general. Kornilov's men now refused to follow him any farther, and the government was saved without striking a blow. Since the Red Guards were mainly Bolsheviks, the prestige of these last was considerably enhanced among the people.

At last, at a party meeting of October 1917, the Bolsheviks decided upon a *coup d'état*. On November 6 and 7 Petrograd was seized by force, and the members of the government were arrested, only Kerensky managing to escape. The date for the event had been chosen so as to precede the meeting of the second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which had been called for the seventh. When this body assembled, therefore, it was faced with a *fait accompli*. Since the gathering contained a Bolshevik majority, it received the announcement with glee and constituted itself the supreme authority in Russia.

The spirit of this second revolt soon spread, and everywhere in Russia the local soviets seized power. The congress meanwhile appointed a Bolshevik-controlled central executive committee and an administrative board called "the Soviet of People's Commissars." The chairman of this cabinet was Lenin, while Leon Trotsky became commissar for foreign affairs, Alexei Rykov for the interior, and Joseph Stalin for nationalities.

The program which the commissars were expected to launch envisaged the following: (1) conclusion of peace with the Central Powers; (2) quelling of local revolts and combating of separatist movements that had been in progress since the end of the old regime; (3) revision of the economic, social, and political structure of the state, and establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat to last, supposedly, until the entire population would be ready to participate in a communistic government; and (4) spreading of the proletarian revolution throughout the world. Simultaneously, it would

be necessary to care for the returning soldiers and provide food and shelter for distressed multitudes in the cities.

As an earnest of the good intentions of the new government, the long-postponed elections for a constituent assembly were held on November 25. To the chagrin of the Bolsheviks, this first Russian election in which the suffrage was universal, secret, and direct, resulted in an overwhelming victory for the Social Revolutionaries. Had the government been of the responsible type, the Bolsheviks would now have resigned their authority into the hands of the majority party. Having no intention thus to jeopardize their control, they postponed the meeting of the assembly until January 1918 and strove in the meantime to consolidate their strength and intimidate their opponents.

Despite these tactics the assembly, when it met, elected a Social Revolutionary president and voted down a Bolshevik proposal to disarm all classes of the population save the workmen. The Bolsheviks thereupon dissolved the "reactionary" assembly by force. Local soviets which betrayed anti-Bolshevik sympathies were likewise dissolved and their leaders imprisoned or exiled. A working-class dictatorship replaced the short-lived democracy. It may be interesting, at this point, to survey the careers of the two most prominent commissars.

Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, alias N. Lenin,[2] was born in 1870. The Ulyanov family, though it belonged to the lower nobility, was known for its radical tendencies. Vladimir's brother, Alexander, was hanged for complicity in a plot to kill the tsar. Other siblings were under police surveillance, and Vladimir himself was expelled from a university for participation in a student riot. A few years later he was permitted to enter another university and eventually got a degree in law. In the meantime he had become absorbed in the study of Karl Marx's *Capital*. He joined a radical group and soon became one of its most active members, paying for this temerity with an involuntary sojourn in Siberia. While in exile he married Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya, who aided him in his revolutionary activities throughout the remainder of his life. In 1900 he went to Switzerland and, except for a brief visit during the Revolution of 1905, remained outside Russia until 1917. During these years he edited radical newspapers and traveled extensively in Western Europe, making the acquaintance of outstanding agitators. In 1903 he became the leader of the Bolshevik faction of the Social Democratic Party.

Lenin was unprepossessing in appearance: short, thickset, bald, and

[2] Lenin sometimes used the initial "N.," but not the name "Nikolai."

bearded. He never knew poverty, but he led a simple life, working hard and regularly taking physical exercise. He was full of confidence in his powers, conscious of his intellectual ability, and possessed of an iron will. He was uncompromising and unscrupulous in matters of policy. He disliked fruitless discussions, and his calmness and skill in sizing up an opponent made him a dangerous adversary in debate. Capitalism appeared to him as evil incarnate and world revolution as the highest goal. To achieve the destruction of the former and the attainment of the latter, he regarded all means fair.

In 1917 the Germans permitted Lenin to return to Russia in a sealed car to conduct subversive propaganda. He carefully planned the overthrow of the provisional regime and took note of the widespread peasant and worker movements which, after the first outbursts of violence, had assumed a new phase and now aimed at consolidating the social and economic results of the overturn. After several months of activity he decided that the time had come to strike, and in October he converted his followers to the same view.

One of Lenin's ablest lieutenants was Lev Davydovich Bronstein, alias Leon Trotsky, born in 1879 as the son of a prosperous Jewish peasant. Trotsky enjoyed little formal schooling but was an avid reader and grew up to be a man of literary culture. The inequality and injustice which he saw about him in his childhood made lasting impressions upon his sensitive mind, and while still young he came under the influence of radical thinkers. Between 1898 and 1917 he spent four years in prison, was twice exiled to Siberia, and lived abroad for twelve years.

Like Lenin he traveled widely in Europe, lecturing and writing. When the break between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks occurred, he for a time led a middle group of Trotskyists and did not go over to Lenin's side until 1917. During the war he was expelled from France and Spain and deported to the United States, living in New York for a time in 1917 and then attempting to return to Russia. On the way he was held in a concentration camp at Halifax, but upon representations from Kerensky he was allowed to proceed. In appearance Trotsky was more striking than Lenin. His features were characterized by a prominent nose, black eyes, a high forehead topped with a mass of wavy hair, and heavy lips. Fond of theatrical display and susceptible to flattery, he nonetheless proved himself an indefatigable worker and an able organizer. A strong believer in discipline and system, he laid the foundations for the powerful and efficient Red Army.

THE END OF FOREIGN AND CIVIL WAR

The conclusion of a separate peace with the Central Powers was accomplished through the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 3, 1918).[3] By the terms of this and some supplementary pacts Russia gave up 500,000 square miles of territory, with 66,000,000 inhabitants, and agreed to pay a heavy indemnity. The conclusion of this peace, harsh though it was, permitted the Bolsheviks to concentrate upon domestic affairs. Most urgent among these was the need to deal with numerous counterrevolutionary movements. From 1917 to 1920 the Bolsheviks were engaged in a life-and-death struggle with an opposition variously led by nobles, clergymen, republicans, adventurers, ex-tsarist officers, and champions of local rights. For a time several groups of counterrevolutionaries were aided by the German invaders. Later the Allies sent men, money, and munitions to be used against the Reds.

The Allies hoped by restoring bourgeois control to rebuild the eastern front against Germany. They wanted to keep from German or Bolshevik hands the war supplies at Murmansk and Archangel which they had earlier placed at the disposal of the Russians. They were angered by a Bolshevik repudiation of all Russian debts. The Allied blockade was therefore extended to Russia; Allied and United States military contingents were sent to Murmansk, Archangel, and Vladivostok; and, when Turkey quit the war, the French captured Odessa while the British attacked Baku.[4] Thousands of Czech and Slovak soldiers who previously had deserted to Russia from the Austro-Hungarian armies likewise turned against the Bolsheviks. Nationalists in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, and the Transcaucasian states declared their independence. And Romania stepped into Bessarabia.

Wherever they were sent, the foreign troops coöperated with anti-Bolshevik natives to set up "White" governments. Around Murmansk and Archangel there was established a North-Russian Provisional Government. In Siberia, Admiral Alexander Kolchak, with the aid of Allied and Czech soldiers, founded an All-Russian Government. In the south of Russia there were governments under Generals Anton I. Denikin and Peter Wrangel. Nikolai Yudenich placed himself at the head of a government in the Baltic

[3] Late in 1917 the Bolsheviks denounced and published the texts of the wartime Secret Treaties to which Russia had been a party. Negotiations for a separate peace were undertaken only after the Allies had refused a proposal of Trotsky to consider a general peace, with self-determination for all subject peoples and "no annexations and no indemnities."

[4] The Japanese dispatched thousands of soldiers to Siberia.

area, while General Baron Karl Gustav Mannerheim assumed control in eastern Finland and Karelia. In the beginning it appeared that the Bolsheviks would be overwhelmed by all these foes. The few Red Guards could not cope with enemies who outnumbered them several times. At one stage the followers of Lenin were in control only of Petrograd, Moscow, and a few provinces surrounding these cities.

Two factors, nevertheless, played into the hands of the radicals. First, the intervention of foreign soldiers in a domestic matter induced a number of patriots, especially young officers, to aid the Reds in repelling the outsiders. Secondly, many peasants, although they did not understand the theories of the Bolsheviks and did not like their grain-requisitioning policies, were even more opposed to the restorationism of the Whites. Of the two evils, requisitions and landlordism, the peasants apparently preferred the former. The requisitions, they felt, would stop eventually; but landlordism, if reinstated, might remain a permanent bane. Consequently the Russian masses in general obstructed the progress of the counterrevolutionaries as much as they dared.

While the Red-White conflict was at its height, it seemed dangerous to the Bolsheviks to keep the ex-imperial family confined near Petrograd, where it might become a rallying point for reactionaries. Hence the Romanov prisoners were sent to the Ural town of Ekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk). It was planned to subject the former emperor to a public trial, with Trotsky as state prosecutor; but when, in the summer of 1918, the Whites under Kolchak fought their way to the neighborhood of Ekaterinburg, the local soviet officials became panicky and ordered the shooting of Nicholas, Alexandra, their son, and four daughters.

As the months rolled by, the Bolsheviks gradually developed two weapons with which to cut short domestic and foreign opposition. To crush the counterrevolutionaries there was created an Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counterrevolution, Speculation, and Sabotage, known from its initials as the Cheka. Trotsky believed that "terror, as the demonstration of the will and strength of the working class, was historically justified," and Felix Dzerzhinsky, who was placed at the head of the Cheka, agreed. The Cheka arrested and executed at will, and then merely presented reports of its activities to the commissars and the central executive committee. There were no reliable statistics on the number of lives taken by this revolutionary tribunal, but it broke the backbone of the opposition and almost obliterated the bourgeoisie and intelligentsia.

The tsarist generals and foreign troops were dealt with by the Red Army which, by 1919, had become a well-drilled force of 100,000 men,

led largely by ex-imperial officers loyal to Russia. As the Bolshevik army grew, the Allies became less anxious to continue their armed intervention. Besides, the actions of the Whites alienated the sympathies of Western labor and of some Western diplomats, who eventually contented themselves with contributing supplies and a few officers to the cause of restoration. In the summer of 1920 Great Britain, the United States, and Italy raised the Russian blockade.

The Red Army fought until late in 1920 to restore internal peace. Its first successes came against Yudenich, who was driven back from the neighborhood of Petrograd to Estonia. The latter soon repudiated the general and in February 1920 signed a treaty with Russia at Dorpat (Tartu). This same month saw the capture and shooting of Admiral Kolchak and the breakup of his government in Siberia. Supported by Czechs, Kolchak had got control of the Trans-Siberian Railway and of most of the larger towns between Vladivostok and the Volga, but he was unable to penetrate far into European Russia and lost his life in the attempt. Between July and October 1920 peace treaties were signed with Lithuania, Latvia, Finland, and Poland.

The war against the Poles, who wanted to extend their borders to the limits of 1772, was especially difficult, for they were helped by French officers and supplies. In May 1920 they occupied Kiev, but then the Bolsheviks rallied and drove them back to Warsaw. After several months of war a peace was signed at Riga, and a compromise boundary was accepted by both parties. Meanwhile General Denikin in southern Russia was also being defeated. In order to continue his struggle he conscripted the populations under his control and compelled Red prisoners to fight under his standards. In the spring of 1920 he resigned his command into the hands of General Wrangel and fled the country. The new commander held out in the Crimea until November; then he too went into exile. After six years of continuous warfare, Russia was at peace.

This "Russia" of 1920 comprised only a fraction, if a large one, of the former empire of the tsar. Poland, Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, White Russia, the Ukraine, Transcaucasia, Bessarabia, and eastern Siberia, all were independent or under foreign occupation. There remained as Russia only an association of autonomous regions known, since the spring of 1918, as the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (R.S.F.S.R.). The four Baltic states, Poland, and Bessarabia seemed permanently lost; the other areas were all soon regained.

Between 1919 and 1921 Bolsheviks took over the governments in the Ukraine, White Russia, and the Transcaucasian states of Azerbaijan, Ar-

REPUBLICS OF THE SOVIET UNION 1940

menia, and Georgia. Under Russian instigation these last three then combined to form the Transcaucasian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. In 1922 delegates from the four Bolshevik states signed a treaty of union. This Treaty of Moscow went into effect in 1923, and the new federation was termed the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.).[5] The word "Russian" was omitted from the official title since it was hoped that

[5] While under Allied occupation, Siberia east of Lake Baikal had been set up as an independent Far Eastern Republic. In 1922, after the Japanese soldiers were withdrawn, a constituent assembly voted for incorporation in the R.S.F.S.R.

Courtesy, Foreign Policy Association, *Headline Series.*

other countries, inhabited by non-Russians, might eventually join the U.S.S.R.

In 1924 two Central Asiatic republics, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, entered the union. Tadjikistan, formed out of those parts of Uzbekistan that were peopled by the Tadjiks, was admitted in 1929. The constitution of 1936 recognized eleven republics by redividing Transcaucasia into Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, and by listing two new members: Kazak and Kirghiz. Soviet acquisitions in 1939–1940 increased the number of republics to sixteen, as shown in the accompanying map. Despite the supposed equality of the republics, the R.S.F.S.R., comprising the larger part

of the area and population of the union, dominated the combination. The members of the federation theoretically retained considerable autonomy and reserved "the right freely to leave the union." Their constitutions, and that of the U.S.S.R. itself, were all patterned after that of the R.S.F.S.R. as adopted in 1918 and amplified on later occasions.

GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY TO 1939

To the older Bolsheviks, communism was both a philosophy and a method. Philosophically, it aimed at the building of a classless society through the abolition of private property and the common ownership of all means of production and distribution. Its method involved first a national, and then an international, social revolution under a dictatorship of the working people. These principles, traceable to the *Communist Manifesto* published in 1848 by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, underlay the constitution of the R.S.F.S.R.

This constitution proclaimed Russia a socialist republic of workers and peasants, with authority vested in soviets of workers', peasants', Cossacks', and soldiers' deputies. All land, forest, mineral resources, livestock, factories, shops, banks, and means of production, communication, and transit were declared the property of the state. Labor was made the duty of every citizen. Workingmen were guaranteed freedom of religious and atheistic opinion, and the enjoyment of education. Oppression of national minorities was forbidden, and foreign workers who came to dwell in Russia were to have the same status as native laborers.

Supreme authority in the R.S.F.S.R. was lodged with an All-Russian Congress of Soviets. The congress, until 1936, was composed of one deputy for every 25,000 *voters* in the cities and one delegate for every 125,000 *inhabitants* of the provinces. Since the resulting body was unwieldy, the congress empowered an All-Russian Central Executive Committee to act as "supreme legislative, administrative, and controlling organ of the R.S.F.S.R."

This committee was given power to issue decrees, unify and coördinate legislation and administration, and appoint a cabinet known as the All-Russian Council of People's Commissars. The importance of the committee increased proportionally with the declining influence of the congress. The latter at first met frequently, then annually, and eventually biennially. Eventually also, it merely approved whatever the committee had ordained. Since even the committee soon was regarded as too large for efficient work, it came to meet only a few times a year, leaving the control of affairs and

the supervision of the commissars to a presidium of about forty. Under the watchful eyes of this body the council of commissars or *sovnarkom* carried on the actual work of governing the state. All decrees of the sovnarkom required eventual submission to the central executive committee for ratification or annulment.

Local authority was given to local soviets, closely supervised by the central government. The cities were to be governed by soviets elected on a basis of one deputy for each 1000 of the population. Representation was based upon vocation rather than geographical division, and the people in the various occupations were to vote separately, the ironworkers in one group, the textile workers in another, and so on. For housewives and individual workmen, resort was to be had to a special type of districting. In villages and small towns the peasants, home workers, teachers, and doctors were to meet together to elect one deputy for each 100 inhabitants. Voting was generally by show of hands.

Representation in the soviets above the local councils was made indirect. The village soviets until 1936 sent delegates to district congresses of soviets and these in turn to regional congresses. From these last were chosen the All-Russian Congress. The town and factory soviets were permitted to elect their All-Russian Congress delegates directly, and also to send representatives to the district and regional congresses. The city workers originally were given more direct representation in the All-Russian Congress because they formed the core of the Communist Party.

The franchise was accorded to all men and women over eighteen who were workers, soldiers, or sailors. This rule applied equally to Russians and to foreigners living in Russia. The following groups in general were deprived of the suffrage and the right to hold office: (1) persons who hired labor for profit or who lived on an income not derived from their own direct labor; (2) businessmen, traders, commercial agents, monks, and clergymen; (3) members of the former dynasty, police, gendarmerie, and secret service; and (4) individuals and the children of individuals who opposed the process of farm collectivization. In 1934 citizenship and suffrage rights were restored to those former landlords, members of the bourgeoisie and wealthier peasantry, priests, and White policemen and soldiers who had been engaged for at least five years in "socially useful work" or who had served faithfully in the Bolshevik army. According to Soviet figures, only 2.5 per cent of the adult population now remained disfranchised.

The constitutions of the remaining republics in the U.S.S.R., and of the union itself, were similar to the one just described. The supreme organ in the Union was the All-Union Congress of Soviets elected, until 1936,

by the city and regional soviets in each of the republics, again on a basis of one deputy each to every 25,000 urban electors or every 125,000 rural inhabitants. Since the congress contained more than 1500 delegates, it met only biennially, for about a week, to approve the work of the Union Central Executive Committee and the Union Council of Commissars.

Until 1936 the Union Central Executive Committee consisted of two bodies, a Union Soviet and a Soviet of Nationalities. The Union Soviet was elected by the All-Union Congress and represented the republics in proportion to their population. The Soviet of Nationalities was elected by the local central executive committees in the various republics, subject to confirmation by the All-Union Congress. The creation of this council of nationalities emphasized the fact that the Soviet Union included scores of distinct national groups and encouraged the perpetuation of cultural and linguistic differences among these groups. Until 1936 the whole committee met three times a year, its two branches sitting and voting separately. Between sessions, the committee's powers were delegated to a Union Presidium which supervised the work of the Union Council of Commissars, the cabinet of the U.S.S.R.

Subordinated to the Union Central Executive Committee was a Union Supreme Court. Its functions were (1) to provide the supreme courts of the republics with "guiding interpretations on questions of the general legislation of the union"; (2) to protest decisions of the republican supreme courts that might contradict union legislation or be adverse to the interests of other members of the federation; (3) to decide legal conflicts among the republics; and (4) to examine cases against high officers accused of committing offenses in connection with their official duties.

The soviet governmental system had four distinguishing characteristics. First, although the U.S.S.R. was a federal state, the central government had unusually broad powers. The member republics might legislate freely only on affairs of definitely local importance. Secondly, since the Bolsheviks believed that the individual's attitude towards political questions was determined by his occupation, representation rested upon a vocational rather than a geographical basis. Thirdly, the electoral system, until 1936, was highly indirect. The peasants were six steps removed from the Union Council of Commissars and the urban workers four steps. Thus many non-Communist deputies were weeded out in the successive elections, and the supreme authority was free of popular control. Finally, there was no separation of powers. The Union Central Executive Committee had supreme legislative, administrative, and judicial control in the land.

In December 1936 the All-Union Congress of Soviets adopted a new

constitution. The economic basis of the U.S.S.R., according to this charter, was "formed by the socialist system of economy and the socialist ownership of implements and the means of production." Socialist ownership had "the form" of state, coöperative, or collective-farm ownership. Every peasant household on each collective farm was to have "for its own use a small piece of land attached to the homestead and . . . a dwelling house, productive livestock, poultry, and minor agricultural implements." Legal protection was extended to "the right of personal property of citizens in the income from their toil and savings . . . as well as the right of inheritance of personal property." Thus there would be "realized the principle of socialism: 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his toil.' " [6]

The new constitution ended the unequal weighting of town and country votes. Since by this time most of the rural households were collectivized, the authorities felt it safe to equalize the political weight of peasantry and industrial proletariat and to end the indirect method of building up the governmental hierarchy. Final authority now was given to a Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. which contained two equipowerful houses: the Union Soviet and the Soviet of Nationalities. Members of both houses were to be elected every four years. The Union Soviet was to be chosen by the citizens "by electoral districts on the basis of one deputy for every 300,000 of the population." The Soviet of Nationalities was also to be elected by the citizenry, but in a manner to represent the constituent republics. All citizens over eighteen were permitted to "take part in the election on the same basis," and voting was made secret. The directive organ of the Supreme Soviet was to be the Presidium of about forty; this body also was to keep watch over the Union Council of People's Commissars. The first election under the new constitution was held in 1937. It represented a total victory for the Stalinist candidates—there being no others. The regular elections of 1941 were postponed because of war.

The All-Union Communist Party was the foundation stone of the soviet governmental structure and the source of its power. Without directions from the party "no important political or organizational problem was ever decided by the soviets." The roll of the party in 1939 included 2,500,000 members and probationers.[7] In addition, there were several

[6] This represented a considerable modification of the original Bolshevik maxim: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."

[7] Soon after they came into power, those Bolsheviks who had been active in the days of tsardom formed a Society of Old Bolsheviks. Intelligent and well educated, these persons for some time monopolized the important party and state offices. They lived under a rigid code of discipline and morals. In 1935 the society was reported dissolved.

junior Communist societies, such as the *Komsomol* or Alliance of Communist Youth. New members of the party came to be recruited chiefly from among the graduates of the Komsomol, but not every graduate was admitted. From 1939, an applicant for membership had to be endorsed by three party members of three years' standing. It was impressed "on the mind of every candidate that there must be complete subordination of all personal feelings to the welfare of the party." Communists had to be at the disposal of their superiors, obey orders implicitly, go without question wherever and whenever they might be sent, devote their spare time to preaching communism, and be ready to defend the revolution with their lives.

Each year a committee purged the party of some of its members. The percentage of expulsions varied, affecting 2 per cent of the membership in one year and 25 per cent in another (1934). The grounds for dismissal included drunkenness, immorality, slackness in propagandist zeal, tax evasion, nonpayment of dues, attendance at church services, the cultivation of bourgeois associations, and tolerance shown to people of "heretical" views. Individuals who utilized their party standing merely to advance their own careers also were expelled. Lenin was said to have likened such persons to radishes—"red" outside but "white" at heart. Sometimes delinquents were reprimanded or demoted rather than expelled.

The wages or salaries of Communists varied widely, and in 1934 a tax was placed on all Communist incomes in excess of a certain monthly maximum. Officials got traveling allowances and sometimes living quarters and automobiles. Individuals who gave evidence of prowess with the pen frequently were rewarded for their literary propaganda activities by being permitted to share in the returns from sales of their productions. Other compensations of membership included eligibility for important governmental and party offices and preferred treatment when food shortages might lead to the issuance of ration cards. Until 1935 the children of Communists were given prior claim over other children to the available scholastic instruction.

The organization of the Communist Party was outlined in a constitution of 1925, amended in 1934 and 1939. At the base of the pyramidlike party structure were thousands of local "cells." These elected representatives to a party congress which, being too large for efficient work, merely approved the decisions taken by its smaller committees.[8] Of these the most important

[8] Originally this congress met every two years, but gradually its gatherings became even less frequent. In addition to the local cells and the congress, the party hierarchy included county, provincial, city, and regional committees. There were no separate parties representing the federated republics in the union.

were a central committee and a commission of party control. The latter was charged with consolidating the unity of the party and maintaining discipline and loyalty among the adherents.

The central committee—the actual directive agency of the party—was composed of about seventy members with almost as many alternates. Although it met frequently, its functions were carried on through two small bureaus and a secretariat. An organization bureau *(Orgbureau)*, consisting (1939) of nine regular members, was responsible for fixing the conditions of membership in the party, for promotions and demotions, and for supervising the propaganda. It was subordinate to the political bureau *(Politbureau)* which, with nine members, determined the general policies of the party and, through it, of the state. The secretariat was responsible "for the current work of organization and execution." The personnel of these three bodies was closely interlocked.[9]

The chief officer of the party was the secretary-general of the central committee. Joseph Stalin, as incumbent of this office and at once a member of the Politbureau, the Orgbureau, and the secretariat, was for almost three decades the most important factor in the determination of the party's policies. Inasmuch as the party was "the helm of the government," he became the dictator of the Soviet Union. In 1941 he took the title of president of the council of people's commissars or premier.

To uphold its class dictatorship during the transitional period in which the U.S.S.R. was presumably to be prepared for thoroughgoing communism, the party resorted to a variety of means. It was the only organized political group in the land. Since the number of available party candidates was limited, the village soviets sometimes were made up largely of non-Communists. However, at least until 1936, the indirect process of selection for the higher offices invariably led to elimination of the nonparty deputies from the superior governmental agencies. The strict censorship, the propaganda, the open voting (until 1936), and the disfranchisement of the naturally hostile groups, were all of help to the Communist candidates in the cities.

In the early days of Bolshevik control, criticism of the party's policies was not entirely prohibited. Constructive suggestions in line with Communist policy were accepted, though they had to come from within the party, not from organized opposition groups. Stalin, however, holding that "the party is not a debating society," repressed all opposition. Suppression was originally enforced by a Unified State Political Administration, known from its initials as the OGPU. This agency was the heir of the Cheka, which was abolished in 1922. In 1934 the dread OGPU, which had in-

[9] For certain changes after the Second World War, see p. 660.

flicted many summary death sentences, was replaced by a commissariat (later ministry) for internal affairs. The latter, whose initials spelled NKVD (later MVD), might inflict penalties, without public trial, up to exile at hard labor for five years.

ATTEMPTED PURE COMMUNISM AND "NEP," 1917–1928

The Soviet Government, soon after coming into power, decreed the nationalization of the land, the natural resources, and the means of production and distribution. The immediate goal was to permit the peasants to use the land according to their needs, and to place the factories, mines, and transportation facilities under control of the workers. The products of industry and agriculture were to be turned over to the state for distribution among the people on a basis of need. Thus, crops raised by the peasants in excess of their own wants were to be used in feeding the industrial proletariat, while the manufactured output of the latter was to be distributed among the peasantry. A Supreme Economic Council was charged with keeping the factories supplied with raw materials and fuel, providing food for the laborers, and making available to the peasants such manufactured goods as they might require.

While these projects were being formulated, the government issued food cards. For purposes of rationing, the people were divided into four classes according to the "social usefulness" of their jobs. Group I included the heavy-manual laborers, while Group IV was composed of the "parasitic elements" of society who performed no "useful" work. Since the unfortunates in this lowest category received a food allowance one-fourth as large as that assigned to persons in Group I, many of the "parasites" died of hunger. The state depended on requisitions from the peasants to secure the food.

In order to ease the housing situation in the cities, the local authorities were empowered to seize all apartment houses and dwellings and to quarter in them workers' families. Jewelry and other valuables above a small minimum were confiscated, as were "surplus" articles of dress and house furnishings. Private trading was listed as a counterrevolutionary activity, while foreign trade was made a state monopoly and all foreign and domestic debts were canceled. The substitution of barter for the money economy was encouraged. The church was shorn of its power and wealth, and private schools were abolished. Marriage became a civil ceremony; wedlock and divorce were made easy; and the state undertook to care for unwanted children. Women were placed on a level of civil and economic equality

with men. There was an attempt to loosen family ties, since family life was regarded as one of the pillars of capitalism.

It had been planned to devise a schedule of nationalization and to confiscate at first only the large trusts, allowing the smaller businesses temporarily to carry on under the old forms. Actually, the early process of nationalization was haphazard, taking on the character of a punitive rather than an economic measure. The workers were impatient to oust their bosses and managers and to run the factories under the supervision of elected committees. Generally the rate of pay was increased and the hours of labor were shortened, but since few of the men were trained in management there was little discipline and less efficiency.

The railway system—demoralized during the war—threatened to break down completely. In the fall of 1919, according to Trotsky, 60 per cent of the locomotives were "diseased," and the state engineers predicted that, barring a miracle, the railway "epidemic" would result in "death" before the passing of another year. It rapidly became almost impossible to transport the grain that had been requisitioned from the peasants or even the few manufactured products that were being turned out by the crippled factories. The resulting upward swing of prices was accelerated by inflation. The motive behind the continued issuance of paper money was as much to ruin the currency and force the general acceptance of a barter economy as to meet current governmental expenses.

For a while it seemed as if even the most radical transformations might be successful. As long as the counterrevolution of the Whites and the intervention of the Allies continued, many of the changes were regarded by the workers and peasants as phases of a transient "War Communism" dictated by the military emergency. With the return of peace, however, the procedure began to appear impracticable and conducive more to chaos than to the increased welfare of the masses. The chief opposition to the Communist regime came from the peasants. At first even these, in fear lest the landlords come back, had offered little resistance to the emissaries of the state who came to requisition their surplus crops. But when the danger was past, the peasants anticipated a new-found prosperity, for they interpreted the abolition of landlordism as the end of rents and taxes and the right to an extra strip of land. By 1920, indeed, they had occupied more than 96 per cent of the arable soil in European Russia. They had no inclination to listen to theories concerning state ownership of land or the desirability of sharing their produce with the urban proletariat.

In return for their grain, the peasants wanted money or manufactured goods, neither of which was available in quantity. There was little hard

money in circulation, and the peasants wanted none of the worthless paper. There was a dearth of manufactured goods because importation had almost ceased, the factories were short of raw materials, equipment had broken down, management was poor, and transportation facilities were almost nonexistent. The peasantry began to hoard its crops and plead poverty whenever the government requisitioners appeared.

To enforce requisitions, the state organized the poorer peasants into committees to denounce the wealthier peasants and make them surrender their surpluses. This added the bitterness of intravillage strife to the other difficulties and did little to increase the grain supply for the cities. The war and devastation, and the fact that the counterrevolutionaries for a time controlled southern Russia, added to the grain shortage. Despairingly, the state armed the workmen, enrolled them in a Food Army, and sent them into the villages to force the peasants to disgorge their hoardings. Each district was assessed a quota on the basis of existing production statistics, but the searchers frequently disregarded the quotas and sometimes left the peasants without sufficient sustenance for their own families.

It was now the turn of the peasants to despair. In self-defense they resorted to passive resistance. Since everything above their barest needs was to be taken from them, they would raise only enough to keep alive. Several other factors came to the aid of the peasants in their decision to cut down production. No fertilizers were being imported. The domestic manufacture of agricultural machinery was at a standstill. In 1920 and 1921 the country suffered from a severe drought. The grain harvest of 1921 was only two-fifths as large as that of 1913. Famine resulted—one of the worst in the history of Russia. Several million persons starved to death in city and country. More might have perished but for the generosity of foreign, especially United States, relief contributions.

Meanwhile the Supreme Economic Council was unable to carry out its functions. Despite the issuance of official decrees lengthening working hours, reintroducing piece work, and establishing rewards for production above the required minimum, the industrial output in 1920 was but 13 per cent of that in 1913. In 1913 fifty times as much metal ore had been mined as in 1920, while the production of oil had been twice as great, that of cotton three times as great, and that of steel twenty-five times as great. Cries of "Down with the Soviet Government!" became frequent during 1920 at popular meetings, and Tambov witnessed a military outbreak. In 1921 the sailors at Kronstadt, once the very hotbed of Bolshevism, mutinied. Although most of the mutineers were recent recruits of peasant background,

the uprising convinced the government that a change in policy was urgent. Lenin decided to effect a strategic retreat.

At the tenth party congress, in 1921, the Communists voted to adopt a New Economic Policy (NEP). They now realized that their enthusiasm had carried them too far, that they had pushed ahead with insufficient regard for the obstacles which an agrarian Russia offered to an industrial dictatorship, that the peasantry was more interested in land and profits than in Communist theory, and that, in order to keep the political changes that had been effected, it might be necessary to make economic concessions. Such a course would involve retreat, but it need not be a rout. The Communists might retain control of the government, the transport system, foreign trade, banking, and large-scale industry, while granting minor concessions in such things as local trading and graduated wage scales. Lenin recommended that the party change its tactics from "assault to siege," retaining "as much communism as the exigencies of the situation would permit, and no more."

The essential features of the NEP were as follows: (1) The requisition of foodstuffs was replaced by a fixed tax on agricultural production; any produce raised above the amount of the tax might be disposed of in the open market. (2) Private retail trading was permitted under certain restrictions, but the state competed with retail stores of its own and encouraged consumers' coöperatives. (3) Small factories and shops employing fewer than twenty workers were restored to private capitalists. (4) A money economy was reintroduced. (5) To secure liquid capital, profit-sharing concessions for mining, manufacturing, transportation, and large-scale agricultural and engineering projects were offered to foreigners on favorable terms. (6) A graduated wage scale was introduced, and the method of food rationing was modified so that it became legal to buy certain additional goods in the open market. (7) The compulsory membership of workers in the trade-unions was abolished. (8) Plans were laid for the future coördination of all industry in a state-controlled system.

It appeared for a time as though the NEP would cure the major economic ills of the country. The area sown to grain increased rapidly. In 1925 the state permitted the renting of land for short periods and the employment of a limited number of farm laborers. Thereupon some of the more enterprising peasants leased their neighbors' lands and hired extra hands. As a result, the peasantry again fell into three classes: the poor, those who were fairly well off, and the well to do. In 1928 the authorities revised the tax schedule so as to exempt entirely the poorest 35 per cent

of the peasantry, tax lightly the middle 53 per cent, and burden heavily the remaining 12 per cent, the more prosperous *kulaks* or "fists."

The state had no intention of allowing the kulaks to develop into a strong class holding large stretches of land. They were tolerated for a time because their enterprise was needed to increase the production of grain, but they were given to understand that the government contemplated their eventual downfall. As one means of combating the kulaks and simultaneously increasing the grain output, the Bolsheviks elaborated an earlier program for the creation of state and collective farms. Every effort was made to secure modern machinery and ambitious workers for the enterprise, but little progress was made before 1928.[10]

In the industrial sphere the state continued its virtual monopoly of manufactures. Several hundred state trusts were created. Each was placed under a committee of managers responsible to the Supreme Economic Council. Wage rates were settled by direct bargaining between the trusts and the trade-unions. About half of the profits went to the government, from one-tenth to one-seventh was expended for the welfare of the workers, and the remainder was used for expansion and reserves. In 1926 the volume of industrial production approximated the prewar level, although quantity was achieved at the expense of quality. State trusts produced 77 per cent of the total industrial output, while coöperatives accounted for 5 per cent, foreign concessionaires for 3 per cent, and private enterprise for 15 per cent.

For the first few years after the introduction of the NEP, private trading flourished. In the fiscal year 1923–1924 three-fifths of the retail trade was handled by private merchants. Individuals who took advantage of this opportunity to gain profit, however, were generally unpopular and came to be called Nepmen. The government fought the Nepmen, especially through consumers' coöperatives. Admission to the latter was open to everyone except priests and kulaks. During the fiscal year 1926–1927 these societies handled half the retail trade of the country, while private traders controlled about one-third and the state shops accounted for the remaining sixth. The state expected eventually to turn the business of its stores over to the coöperatives. The exploitation of the foreign concessions was surrounded with difficulties, and the agreements eventually were canceled or forfeited.

Although the NEP did much to heal the ravages of the early Communist experiments and gradually brought production back to the prewar

[10] To end the widespread illegal distillation of home-brew, the Communists in 1925 ended prohibition and reëstablished the government vodka monopoly.

level, considerable hardship was caused by the disparity between the prices of grain and of manufactured products. The state allowed grain to sell at the world market price, but manufactures could be bought only at figures arbitrarily set by the state trusts. Thus, in 1928, the cost of grain was half again as great as in 1913, but the price of manufactured goods was three times as high.

While the NEP was in force state bureaus gathered statistical information on every phase of the union's economic life. The data thus accumulated were used in the projection of a five-year plan for the further increase of production. In October 1928 the First Five-Year Plan was inaugurated. Before considering its details, it is necessary to relate the story of a quarrel among the leaders of the Communist Party.

THE SUPREMACY OF STALIN

Until the spring of 1922 Lenin, chairman of the Politbureau of the Communist Party, was dictator of the Soviet State. With his prestige he was able not only to shape governmental policies but to prevent any outward appearance of disharmony among the lesser party leaders. The tremendous strain of the work gradually began to tell on Lenin's health. In 1922 he suffered a stroke and temporarily lost the use of his right arm and leg. Upon his recovery he once more applied himself to his work, but soon found it necessary to entrust many administrative duties to others. In 1923 he suffered a second stroke. He lived in agony for months, buoyed up by the hope that his marvelous physique eventually would triumph over sickness. But during an evening in January 1924 he died. To the rank and file of the Communists his tomb in Moscow became a shrine; to the party leaders, his passing signalized a struggle for control.[11]

Outstanding among the candidates for leadership of the party and government were two men: Leon Trotsky and Joseph Stalin. Firebrand, organizer of the Red Army, prominent member of most of the important party organs, Trotsky was, after Lenin, the best known of the Bolsheviks. He had many enemies. Some Communists were repelled by his aggressiveness, rudeness, and vanity. His impatience to inaugurate a world upheaval regardless of the difficult domestic situation, and his disdain for the peasantry as being far too backward to be of any aid in the firm establishment of communism, antagonized others. The Old Bolsheviks had not yet forgiven him for his opposition to Lenin up to the very year of the success-

[11] Soon after Lenin's death the name of Petrograd was changed to Leningrad. Moscow had become the capital in 1918.

ful revolution. Finally, his opponents made effective capital of the trenchant epithets which he and Lenin had hurled at each other in the early days of their acquaintance, and of his failure to attend Lenin's funeral.

The main opposition to Trotsky came from three men: Stalin, Leo Kamenev, and Gregory E. Zinoviev.[12] The chief of this triumvirate was the Georgian peasant Stalin, really Joseph Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili, who was born in 1879, the son of a shoemaker. Inspired by a decree of Alexander III which made it possible for poor men's sons to enter the priesthood, Joseph's parents sent the boy to a theological seminary. The burly youth, however, had little desire to become a priest and displayed greater acquaintance with Marx than with the Bible. He was soon expelled from the clerical institution and became actively affiliated with the Social Democratic Party. Fearless, unscrupulous, and taciturn, Dzhugashvili proved adept in the execution of dangerous missions. Of all the aliases which he found it expedient to assume, none seemed to fit him better than that of "Stalin," meaning "Steel." In 1903 he was one of the first to follow the lead of Lenin as a Bolshevik.

Stalin, despite his cunning, was six times arrested and exiled between 1902 and 1913. Five times, through sheer physical prowess, he managed to escape, but in 1913 he was sent to the Arctic Circle and remained a prisoner until released after the March Revolution. It appeared that the tsarist police on no occasion recognized in him a previous offender, else one or another of his sentences might have been death instead of exile. In disregard of the danger, Stalin preferred to agitate from within Russia rather than from the safety of an office abroad. He worked incessantly, writing articles and pamphlets, organizing revolutionary circles, forging bank notes, and "expropriating" money to finance the cause.

Of short, stocky build, with coal-black hair and an olive skin, Stalin looked every inch an Asiatic fighting man. After the November Revolution he won distinction as a military leader, particularly in the successful defense of Tsaritsin (later Stalingrad) against the Cossacks. When the government of the R.S.F.S.R. was organized, Stalin, already secretary-general of the party, was made commissar for nationalities (1917–1923). He was instrumental in the unification of the Transcaucasian Republic and in the organization of the U.S.S.R. Himself a member of a national minority, he saw to it that the rights of the lesser national groups were protected.

[12] Kamenev, a close friend of Lenin, had once studied law in Paris. Zinoviev, a cruel but able organizer, was director of the association charged with promoting the world revolution.

The rival leaders, both of whom professed to be loyal Leninists, expressed antithetical views on several major points. Stalin believed capitalism to be so firmly entrenched in the West that any effort to bring about its immediate overthrow would be futile. He preferred to concentrate on "socialism in one country" rather than upon uncertain attempts to dislodge capitalism from the West. Trotsky, on the contrary, was intolerant of any letup in the world revolutionary movement.

Further, Stalin, the peasant, was aware that the welfare of the U.S.S.R. in the last analysis depended upon the coöperation of the country's food-producers. Hence he advocated the establishment of better relations between the government and the peasantry, even though this entailed a prolongation of the compromise with petty capitalism. Trotsky had no desire to wait until the peasants became reconciled to communism. Revolution in the capitalistic West appeared to him far more important than economic prosperity in the U.S.S.R. He would simply force the agrarians in all lands to bow to the rule of the "enlightened proletariat." Finally, whereas Stalin was convinced of the necessity of hiring foreign capital and technical assistance to hasten the industrialization of the U.S.S.R., Trotsky looked upon any deal with Western financiers or experts as treason.

The duel for supremacy began immediately after Lenin's death, and from the outset Stalin seemed to have the advantage. During his long tenure as secretary-general he had had ample opportunity to see that a majority of the important party posts, especially those in the central committee, were filled with his adherents. Elevated to succeed Lenin as chairman of the Politbureau, he quietly worked with Kamenev and Zinoviev to oust Trotsky as commissar for war and member of the council of labor and defense. Early in 1925 this was accomplished, and soon thereafter Trotsky's followers were removed from the war and navy departments. The fallen leader was temporarily exiled to the Caucasus "for his health," and given only a minor job in Moscow.

With Trotsky out of the way, Stalin sought compromise with the peasants and the foreign concessionaires. So great was his apparent retreat from communism that his erstwhile supporters, Kamenev and Zinoviev, turned against him. Stalin skillfully got the approval of the party congress of 1925 for his actions and saw to it that his latest antagonists were demoted and ordered to cease their opposition. He also recruited a new circle of supporters headed by Alexei Rykov, chairman of the council of commissars; Dzerzhinsky, head of the OGPU; and Nikolai Bukharin, member of the Supreme Economic Council and editor of the party newspaper, *Pravda (Truth)*.

Trotsky, seeing in the changed situation an opportunity to retrieve his position, joined forces with Kamenev and Zinoviev in an effort to oust his enemy from control. Once more the party backed Stalin, for he had made his policies appear as a fulfillment of the wishes of the congress, whereas Trotsky persistently strove to bend the party to his will. The "deviationists" received another admonition to cease their opposition and submit to party discipline. When they persisted in anti-Stalinist agitation, the dictator ordered the OGPU on their trail. Every move of the dissenters was watched, and they were given no chance to express their views in speech or press. Driven to meet in secret, the Trotskyists eventually were charged with the illegal organization of an opposition group. Late in 1927 Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinoviev were expelled from the Communist Party, and in 1928 the trio was sent to outlying parts of the union.

For a brief period Stalin's leadership seemed unchallenged. Kamenev and Zinoviev recanted and were reinstated in the party. Trotsky, however, from Central Asia, continued to agitate against the man whom he regarded as "the outstanding mediocrity of the party." Experienced revolutionary that he was, Trotsky managed to keep in touch with a considerable number of dissatisfied workingmen who shared his distrust of Stalin and the peasants. When, in the winter of 1928–1929, his activities inspired several disturbances, the OGPU was ordered to stamp out the opposition. Wholesale arrests were made, and Trotsky was accused of "preparing for an armed struggle against the Soviet power." Promptly deported, he settled down near Constantinople and soon produced an autobiography, an account of the Bolshevik Revolution, and innumerable attacks on Stalinism.

All Stalin's actions against Trotskyism were upheld by later party conferences. During 1929 and 1930 Stalin was equally successful in crushing a "rightist deviation" led by Rykov and Bukharin. In 1934 these men and Mikhail Tomsky, leader of the trade-unions, were again denounced as "right deviationists" and deprived of their posts on the central committee. At the same time Zinoviev was once more ousted from the party, for "Trotskyist deviation," and in 1935 he was sentenced to prison for ten years.

Slowly but surely Stalin pushed ahead. Never openly forcing his views on anyone, carefully giving the impression of merely carrying out the mandates of the party, the "man of steel" appeared, in 1935, to be one of the most firmly entrenched of continental dictators. And then, in August 1936, a startled world was informed by the Soviet press that Zinoviev, Kamenev, and five others were accused of having formed terrorist groups to assassinate eight Soviet leaders, including Stalin, and of having carried

out the "foul murder" of Stalin's aide, Sergei Kirov, in December 1934. Nine other men were charged with "being members of the underground Trotskyite-Zinovievite organization" and with having participated in "the preparations to assassinate" the seven marked officials remaining after Kirov's death. All defendants were linked with Trotsky (who had since gone to Mexico) and with the Nazi secret police. They were charged with having planned a Fascist dictatorship.

The public trial was held before the Union Supreme Court and, to the astonishment of the world, the accused vied with one another in their eagerness to confess guilt and to implicate others not yet on trial. All but two pleaded guilty to the whole charge and verbally castigated themselves for having betrayed Stalin. Within five days the defendants were declared guilty and sentenced to be shot. Twenty-four hours later the press reported that the executions had been carried out. Trotsky and his son, Lev Sedov, were also "convicted by the evidence" and made subject to "immediate arrest and trial" if ever discovered on Soviet soil.

Meanwhile the government had investigated other highly placed personages, and another sensational trial occurred in 1937. The alleged Trotskyite conspirators now included Karl Radek, former editor of *Izvestia*, Grigori Sokolnikov, former ambassador to Great Britain, and Grigori Piatakov, former assistant commissar for heavy industry. They were charged with having agreed to support Germany and Japan in a war against the U.S.S.R. and with promising the two states "a large number of political and economic privileges and territorial concessions." All seventeen defendants pleaded guilty, and thirteen were sentenced to be shot. Four, including Radek and Sokolnikov, were given prison terms on the ground that their crimes had been "political" rather than "terroristic."

A specific enumeration of undisputed facts in the Moscow trials yielded meager results. Several prominent Old Bolsheviks were indicted for plotting against the Stalin regime. They were accused of conspiring to assassinate high officials, form alliances with enemies of the Soviet Union, ensure an industrial breakdown in the event of war, and substitute a Fascist state for the existing setup. The defendants were brought to court, confessed guilt, and were condemned to punishment. Trotsky, in exile, was linked to all charges and denied connection with any of them. Nothing else was definitely known, although the partisans of each side speculatively elaborated upon these facts.

Throughout 1937–1938 and into 1939 there were numerous additional purges and trials, and, apparently, hundreds of executions of civil, military, and church officials. Marshals, admirals, commissars, and vice-commissars

were demoted, dismissed, imprisoned, or shot, and entire branches of the administration were reorganized. Inefficiency, sabotage, and conspiring with foreign agents were the usual charges. The need to replace so many officials in short order led to the appointment of numerous young and inexperienced Soviet-reared executives under whose direction it was difficult to achieve efficiency and discipline. Hence a vigorous campaign was launched, in 1939, against lazy, tardy, and irregularly attending workers. And at the end of the year, Stalin again was undisputed head of the Soviet Union.[13]

THE FIVE-YEAR PLANS

It was under the watchful eye of Stalin that the First Five-Year Plan, which supplanted the NEP, entered into operation (1928). The plan was a complete forecast of the economic and cultural life of the Soviet Union for the quinquennium 1928–1933. It was formulated, inaugurated, and directed by a State Planning Commission or *Gosplan*. No major step in industry, agriculture, transportation, or finance might be undertaken without the prior consent of the Gosplan.

Under the plan it was hoped within half a decade to increase the industrial output of the U.S.S.R. by 136 per cent and the agricultural output by 55 per cent. The production of oil and coal was to be doubled, that of iron ore trebled. The power capacity was to be multiplied by three. Technical schools were to be established and foreign experts hired. The cost of production was to be lowered by a third and the productivity of labor doubled. One-fifth of the peasant holdings were to be collectivized. Illiteracy was to be virtually wiped out, the number of books published greatly increased, and music and dramatic performances made available to every village.

To make possible the proper distribution of raw materials, foodstuffs, and manufactured products, the Russians strove to improve their transportation facilities. Old lines were mended, new ones constructed, the wages of employees raised, and the service regularized. Progress was made in motor-transport facilities, but the building of hard-surface roads proceeded slowly. Technical-assistance agreements were signed with foreign companies and individuals, and generous terms were offered to skilled foreign workmen who would agree to come to the U.S.S.R. Since the union's credit standing abroad was poor, it was necessary to raise at home the funds required for the execution of the plan. The three chief sources of

[13] In 1940 Trotsky was killed in Mexico by a former disciple.

income were the profits made by the state trusts, taxes, and domestic loans.

An effort was made to secure for the plan the fullest coöperation of the citizenry. That the program would bring hardship was no secret, particularly after the reintroduction in 1928 of a food-rationing system. By oratory, press, radio, cinema, parades, ceremonies, and processions, the people were stirred to a fever of excitement. "Shock brigades" of young Communists vied in the accomplishment of production tasks. The spirit of competition was systematically exploited, prizes were awarded when production quotas were exceeded, and the completion of any exceptionally difficult job in advance of schedule was invariably made the occasion for a celebration.

The plan in operation seemed actually to outstrip the plan on paper. The oil industry completed its five-year assignment in two years and a half. The 1933 quota output was reached two years early in the manufacture of agricultural machinery, automobiles, and tractors. The five-year production goals in peat, sugar, coal, and electrical equipment were passed after three years. The output of iron, steel, and textiles ran ahead of schedule. The 1100-mile Turkestan-Siberian Railway was finished more than a year ahead of time. A 900,000-horsepower hydroelectric plant at Dnieprostroy was dedicated ahead of schedule in 1932.

In agriculture the results for a time appeared equally gratifying. Although the plan envisioned a collectivization of only 20 per cent of the peasant homesteads by 1933, almost 60 per cent of all farm holdings were reported merged in collectives by 1931. Each collective farm or *kolkhoz* was managed by an elected board of directors. Since nearly all the board members were Communists, the state controlled the kolkhozi. Progress also was made in the development of the state farms or *sovkhozi*. By 1932 only 5.5 per cent of the retail trade remained in private hands. So encouraging were these results that the date for the ending of the plan was advanced to December 1, 1932.

Nevertheless, the plan lagged in two important items: a lowered cost of production and an increase in the productivity of labor. Moreover, quantity of output was being produced at the expense of quality. The automobile works at Nizhni-Novgorod (Gorki), which had been expected to turn out 144,000 cars per year, was closed three months after its much-celebrated opening. In 1932 there was a shortage of grain and livestock. Why?

So comprehensive a plan would have been difficult to fulfill in any country. It was especially hard in the industrially backward U.S.S.R. For a time, the projected schedule actually was exceeded, particularly in con-

struction work and in the setting up, with foreign help, of foreign machinery. But once the factories were built and the machines installed, it became evident that the untrained native workmen were more likely to ruin than run the complex engines. There was a shortage of technical labor, and the factories were staffed largely with inexperienced ex-peasants, many of whom were addicted to drink—a situation reflected in the growing number of industrial accidents.

A further check to efficient production resulted from the "democracy" that prevailed in the management of the factories. The proper operation of the new plants was hampered by the reservation of numerous privileges to the workers. Whereas the successful direction of large-scale industry demanded a fairly rigid discipline and a certain minimum of regimentation, the U.S.S.R. permitted workmen to delay carrying out an order of management until they had previously met to discuss its propriety. This "interference of democratic meetingism" was one of the most serious obstacles to the success of the plan.

To make matters worse, the Gosplan had failed to provide for an extension of transportation facilities adequate to meet the needs of expanding industry. In consequence freight piled up in the depots, perishable goods rotted at the terminals, and the factories ran short of raw materials. At one time the commissar for transport estimated that 10,000,000 tons of freight were assembled for shipment, but could not be dispatched for lack of trains and crews. The fact that some parts of the program were completed far ahead of schedule while others lagged threw the entire scheme out of balance.

In order to maintain the feverish enthusiasm which the official propaganda created among the people, and to enable the laborers to work at top speed over a period of years, a plentiful food supply was essential. Yet the government found it necessary to curtail the sustenance allowances of its workers. Since neither the U.S.S.R.'s credit nor her rubles enjoyed much standing abroad, and since she was in desperate need of foreign machines and goods, she had to export and sell at any price huge quantities of grain, timber, oil, and other domestic products. To obtain a surplus for export the state drastically reduced the rations, once more introduced grain requisitions, and hastened agricultural collectivization.

To induce farmers to pool their interests, the state extended tax reductions and easy credit facilities to the members of collectives. Persistent nonjoiners were subjected to a crushing tax, were ordered periodically to surrender specified quantities of grain, and were deprived of their farms if they failed to meet the quotas. It was chiefly the kulaks who suffered. They

had little desire to merge their property with that of their poorer neighbors, to get in return merely a share of the profits proportionate to the amount and quality of labor which they would contribute in the fields. The state then attempted to "liquidate the kulaks as a class" by inciting the poorer against the richer peasants. In each collective a liquidation committee was formed to select the victims for the local "drive." The hounded kulaks banded together for self-defense, attacked the property of the collectives, and destroyed their own crops and livestock lest these fall into the hands of the hated opponents. Thousands were exiled to Siberia or the north to build roads and other public improvements. Some of the less courageous kulaks entered the collectives but first slaughtered their animals, preferring to eat them rather than surrender them to the kolkhozi. Altogether more than a third of the country's livestock was killed, with a resulting meat shortage in 1931 and 1932. The union also was short of the necessary agricultural machinery to work the large collective farms.

The net result of these stringencies and of the continued export of badly needed supplies was a lowering of the standard of living beneath that which had prevailed in the later years of the NEP period. There was a parallel decline in the efficiency and enthusiasm of labor and in the progress of the Five-Year Plan. The authorities took steps to counteract these adverse influences. Between 1930 and 1932 the workday was lengthened, discriminations against non-Communist skilled workers were lessened, and the control of factory managements over employees was increased. Differential wage rates were instituted to reward quick workers and stimulate slow ones. The rationing of certain staples was ended and the size of the remaining rations increased. Simultaneously, the war against private trading was continued. The state wanted greater efficiency among its citizens, but only within the framework of the socialist system.

In agriculture the concessions were equally sweeping. The process of collectivization was slackened. The abler members of the collectives were given managerial posts. Five per cent of the net income of each collective was set aside as a fund to reimburse members for the animals and machinery which they contributed to the association. Peasants and petty craftsmen were allowed to exchange food and manufactured goods. These dispensations came too late to prevent famine in 1932–1933. Unfavorable climatic conditions, heavy requisitions, and the drive on the kulaks, all contributed to an agricultural crisis that was especially severe in the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Here the proportion of kulaks and dissatisfied members of the collectives was relatively large, and the government decided to enforce complete submission by means of what has been called

"organized famine." The requisitions were continued despite the shortage of grain, and the censorship was tightened so that news of the resulting starvation might not escape. Foreign correspondents were refused access to the affected regions until the famine was over. In 1933 the people, weak and submissive but aided by favorable weather, produced a bumper crop.

The plan had important repercussions on the union's foreign relations. Because Russian goods were placed on the world market at prices which often were below the cost of production, the Soviets were accused of "dumping" their products in order to demoralize the capitalistic system and prepare the way for world revolution. But the chief object of the Bolsheviks probably was to secure certain urgently needed manufactures. Although willing to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements with any states that cared to solicit her business, the U.S.S.R. was determined to dispose of her requisitioned surpluses under any conditions. Meanwhile the Gosplan compiled figures for a second five-year plan, hoping to avoid the mistakes of the earlier program.

In 1933 the Gosplan announced that the "achievements of the First Five-Year Plan made it possible to set, in the Second Five-Year Plan [January 1933 through December 1937], the task of finally abolishing the capitalist elements and classes generally . . . ; it has also permitted the raising of the great question of . . . securing the technical and economic independence of the U.S.S.R."

The new plan stipulated that the industrial output in 1937 was to be more than double that of 1932. The agricultural output was to be doubled, and collectivization and mechanization completed. The capacity of the steel mills and the production of coal were to be doubled, while the output of automobiles was to be multiplied by seven and that of fertilizers by ten. The number of skilled specialists was to be increased by 46.5 per cent. The kulaks, all remaining "capitalist elements," and any still-existent "private property in production," were to be "liquidated." Illiteracy was to be ended.

Several general differences between the first and second plans were evident. The second plan placed more emphasis on quality and paid greater attention to transportation facilities. The "giant mania" was less conspicuous. The later program allocated the new industries in closer proximity to the raw materials and forecast an eastward trend in the future establishment of manufacturing plants—this latter being important from the viewpoint of military protection.[14] Finally, to stimulate local industries, raise

[14] The wisdom of this step became especially apparent after the German invasion of the U.S.S.R. in 1941.

the standard of living, and increase the real wages, greater emphasis was placed on the production of consumers' goods.

The estimates of the Second Five-Year Plan generally appeared on the road to fulfillment in the opening years of the program. On the other hand, the advances in transportation once more lagged, and neither the cost of production nor the price of goods fell so rapidly as had been anticipated. Hence the avowed goal to "overtake and outstrip America" was far from realization when the Second Five-Year Plan gave way to the Third Five-Year Plan in January 1938. Nonetheless, by the time of war in 1939, amazing progress had been made under the several plans.

The middle of 1939 saw 93.5 per cent of all peasant households collectivized.[15] The 245,000 collective farms accounted for 99 per cent of the area sown to grain, and the production of foodstuffs had increased at a steady rate. Most of the collective farms were of the *artel* type. They combined communal features with the limited individual ownership of homesteads, minor implements, and livestock. These possessions were heritable. Each farm was required to deliver a specified quantity of grain to the state at fixed prices. Tractors and combines had to be rented at a high fee in grain from government tractor stations. The peasants were permitted to sell any surplus directly to consumers, but resale was forbidden.

There was a slow but steady trend toward urbanization, the percentage having risen from 18 in 1914 to 25.5 in 1937. The number of industrial workers increased rapidly, as did the number of persons in the direct employ of the government. The center of population moved eastward as Siberia and Central Asia experienced an influx of settlers. Emphasis also began to be placed on small items of luxury, and the government encouraged a spirit of domesticity in its subjects; but since there was a serious lag in the production of consumers' goods, the standard of living rose only slowly. Savings-bank deposits increased steadily, but the accumulation reflected a shortage of purchasable goods as well as an increase in wages and thrift. The census of 1939 gave the Soviet Union a population of 170,500,000, an increase of almost 16 per cent over 1926.

EDUCATION AND RELIGION

Through its persecution of the intelligentsia and the professionals, and of the well-to-do people whose patronage supported these groups, the gov-

[15] Two million households were still noncollectivized. They had to deliver higher grain quotas and pay higher taxes than their collectivized brethren.

ernment inflicted upon the state a serious cultural loss. It was the middle and upper classes which had supplied most of the empire's famed artists, actors, musicians, singers, dancers, scientists, educators, doctors, and writers; but with the death, exile, or suppression of these individuals the country was left with a sort of cultural vacuum. Worse still, almost two-thirds of the men and seven-eighths of the women were illiterate, for the war and revolutions had interfered with a program of the Duma to establish compulsory education by 1922.

The Bolsheviks, however, were determined to "liquidate the bourgeois ideology" and build up a new culture. Every "toiler and toiler's child" was to be given the right to a schooling. Wholesale illiteracy obviously would hamper the material development of the state and make impossible the effective spreading of the gospel of socialism. Unless the people were literate and able to absorb instruction in the principles of Marxism, they would fail to understand, or misinterpret, every policy that the authorities inaugurated. To the schools, therefore, was assigned the threefold task of enlightening the adults, preparing enthusiastic young Communists to carry on the revolution, and developing new technicians.

Since the control of education was entrusted to the local authorities, the drive against illiteracy did not progress uniformly throughout the union. Wherever it was necessary to restrict enrollment, discrimination was made, until 1935, in favor of the children of party members. Special efforts were made to enroll the adults in factory schools or university extension divisions. As far as possible the schools were staffed with Communists. The fall of 1938 saw 33,000,000 children in elementary and secondary schools and more than a million persons in the higher institutions of learning. According to official figures, 81 per cent of the population was literate in 1939. A decree of 1933 made a minimum of seven years of school attendance compulsory, the ultimate goal being "obligatory technical education for all children up to the age of seventeen years." Forty Latinized alphabets had been created by 1935 for nationalities that hitherto had had no written languages.

In their efforts to shape a new ideology the authorities relied not merely upon schools and teachers but upon the stage, the cinema, art, literature, radio, and music. There was constant official direction of and curb on creative accomplishment, but the U.S.S.R. soon did produce some outstanding personalities in literature, science, and art. Boris Pilniak, author of *The Bare Year,* an account of the famine and war years, and of *The Volga Flows to the Caspian Sea,* became perhaps the best known of

the younger writers. Leonid Leonov, whose *Badgers* vividly described the peasant struggle against the Communist ideal, and the poet Demian Bedny, also acquired an international reading public. Vsevolod Meierhold achieved recognition as a stage director, and the work of Sergei Eisenstein and Vsevolod Poduvkin in the production of films aroused admiration in Europe and the United States. Other prominent members of the new intelligentsia included the physicist, Abram Joffe, and the biophysicist, Petr Lazarev. Of the prerevolutionary intellectuals who continued to serve Russia, perhaps the best known were the dramatist, Maxim Gorki, and the physiologist, Ivan Pavlov. In 1935 there was performed at the Metropolitan Opera House in New York a grim Soviet opera composed by the 28-year-old Dmitri Shostakovich and entitled *Lady Macbeth of Mtzensk*. His Seventh or Leningrad Symphony was widely acclaimed in the United States in 1942.

Since the followers of Lenin looked upon religion as an "opiate for the people," they resolved to banish the influence of the clergy. The Orthodox Church was disestablished, its properties were confiscated, and many of its edifices were torn down or converted into clubhouses and museums. The clergy was deprived of control over education, marriage, cemeteries, and the registration of births and deaths. At first religious instruction was forbidden, but eventually the teaching of religion to small groups was permitted outside school or church buildings. The state refused to have any relations with a church hierarchy but agreed to extend to congregations the use of some of the confiscated religious property.

Since the Communists at first aimed their shafts specifically at the Orthodox Church and raised the ban on the free propagation of other faiths and of atheism, various religious groups, such as the Lutherans, Baptists, and Methodists, by dint of considerable social-welfare work, won converts from Eastern Catholicism. This situation spurred into renewed activity the Orthodox Church, which had continued to exercise some influence over the peasants. The state, quick to observe this, promptly limited the activities of all clerical bodies to preaching in churches. A constitutional amendment of 1929 forbade the general propagation of any spiritual doctrine except atheism. The fight against religion was made an aspect of the struggle against counterrevolution, and "godless societies" sprouted in profusion.

Although attendance at church was not prohibited to the mass of citizens, it was forbidden to members of the Communist Party. Such anniversaries as Christmas and Easter continued to be observed, not as religious holidays, but as "traditional days of rest." An effort was made to

substitute for them such revolutionary holidays as Lenin Day. Religion, clericals, and worshippers were held up to ridicule, and some of the most famous churches and monasteries became antireligious exhibition halls.

THE U.S.S.R. IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS TO 1939

The ultimate mission of communism lay in four steps: (1) the overthrow of the existing order; (2) the temporary establishment in all countries of a dictatorship of the proletariat; (3) the creation of a world federation of soviet republics; and (4) the achievement of a universal Communist society. To launch this program was the self-imposed task of an international gathering of Communists at Moscow in March 1919. Assured of the support of the Bolshevik Government, the congress organized itself as the Third (First Communist) International or Comintern,[16] drew up a plan of action, and elected Gregory Zinoviev as its first president.

At the Comintern headquarters in Moscow came to be represented most of the Communist parties of the world, but the Russian Communist Party dominated the proceedings. In its periodical congresses the International laid down rules of discipline for individual and national members, outlined a program of anticapitalistic activities, and encouraged the organization of new national branches. It sent out speakers and agitators, set up printing presses, raised funds and made contributions to needy Communist groups, dispatched representatives to watch over the doings of the national members, determined the policies of all affiliates, and tried to stir up the workers in the West and the peasants in the East against the existing order. The Communist International regarded itself as the "general staff of the world revolution."

The Comintern caused great annoyance to foreign governments. The authorities in Germany, Hungary, and the Baltic states bitterly resented the aid rendered by the body to the radicals who, in the postwar years, set up or tried to set up local soviets. In the United States there was a "Red Scare" which eventually led to the deportation of hundreds of alien suspects. In many parts of the United States, displaying a red flag was made punishable by imprisonment. Eventually, many Western governments

[16] The First (Socialist) International, really the International Working Men's Association, was organized in 1864 by Karl Marx and held annual sessions until 1876. The Second International, with which were affiliated most of the Socialist and Labor parties of the world, was established in 1889. Its activities were checked by the First World War, but it came to life again in 1919. The Second and Third Internationals remained hostile to each other. The Red anthem was called the "Internationale." Its words were written in 1871 by Eugene Pottier.

extended to the Communists freedom of speech, press, and assembly provided there was no violence and no incitement to direct action. In eastern and southern Europe, and in many of the colonial regions of Africa and Asia, agitators continued to be arrested upon identification as Communists.

At the outset the Third International and the Soviet Government worked in close harmony. From 1918 to 1921 the policy of the Soviet Government in foreign affairs was to promote world revolution, use Russia as a base from which to launch the onslaught against capitalism, and aid Bolshevik uprisings wherever they might occur. Efforts were made to convert the masses of Asia to communism in the hope that they might then be united, under Russian leadership, in a gigantic "crusade against capitalism and imperialism."

To arouse sympathy among the Orientals, the Bolsheviks denounced the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907 that had divided Persia into foreign spheres of influence, gave up most of the special privileges which the tsarist governments had acquired in China, surrendered all extraterritorial and financial rights in Turkey, and encouraged the Afghans to resist British control. In September 1920 they called together at Baku the First (and only) Congress of Peoples of the East. Nineteen hundred delegates, representing forty nationalities, attended the gathering. Since the deputies represented only certain elements in their respective countries and not the governments, little practical progress was made towards the formation of an Oriental Communist alliance.

As 1921 drew on, capitalism in the West seemed more solidly entrenched than ever, while attempted pure communism had failed in Russia. Hence, coincident with the adoption of the New Economic Policy, the Soviets, convinced of the need to consolidate their power at home and improve the economic situation, were ready to enter into a truce with the bourgeois world. They realized that they were dependent upon the capitalist world for manufactures and technical advice, and they knew that these essentials would be available only if they could promise in return a cessation of Bolshevik propaganda. Consequently the supply of funds to the Comintern was curtailed, and efforts were made to convince other countries of the independent status of the government and the International. Many high officials in the government, however, continued simultaneously to occupy ranking positions in the International.

For the sake of trade or other concessions the Soviet Government, over the objections of the International, occasionally ordered its representatives abroad to check Bolshevik propaganda. Sometimes the Comintern scolded the state for its domestic and foreign compromises with the

bourgeois system, but these reprimands were lightly treated by the leaders who, like Stalin, claimed that the only worth-while communistic propaganda was the success of the Russian experiment. Meanwhile the bourgeois states, made confident by successful resistance to radical propaganda and anxious to "do business" even with the Bolsheviks, were equally willing to negotiate.[17]

The first fruit of the new attitudes was an Anglo-Russian trade agreement of 1921. This provided for the resumption of normal trade relations subject to the mutual renunciation of propagandist activities. Before the end of the year the Russians had completed similar trade pacts with eleven other states. Although Russia automatically was accorded *de facto* recognition [18] by the countries which thus signed conventions with her, full diplomatic relations were not yet restored. Most of the treaty signatories merely exchanged commercial representatives with Russia. The flow of capital into Russia, moreover, remained inadequate to meet the needs of Russian economy. The chief reason for this continued Western aloofness was the fact that the Bolsheviks in 1918 had repudiated Russia's foreign debts, totaling $8,000,000,000.

Hence George Chicherin, commissar for foreign affairs, notified the powers that his government, though not feeling bound to honor the debts incurred by the former regime, was ready to discuss the matter at an international congress simultaneously with the questions of Russian recognition and the extension of foreign credit. Chiefly through the efforts of Lloyd George, Russia thereupon was invited to attend an economic conference at Genoa. Some of the Western statesmen felt that the Chicherin note and the inauguration of the NEP signalized a reversal of Soviet economic policy.

The conference opened in 1922 with all Russia's creditors represented except the United States. The lenders demanded that the repudiated debts be recognized, that compensation be paid the foreigners whose private property in Russia had been nationalized, and that a juridical system be set up to protect and enforce future contracts. The Russians held out for cancellation of Russia's war debt and for large foreign credits. They prom-

[17] Gradually, especially after the rise of Nazism, the Comintern, while still working for world revolution, transformed itself largely "into an international body whose chief and immediate goal was the defense of the Soviet Union." In 1935 the Comintern permitted the various national Communist parties to coöperate with the liberal-bourgeois elements in a fight against fascism, while simultaneously continuing to "bore from within" in order to "create a united proletarian front."

[18] *De facto* recognition means recognition of a government as actually existing, with no implication as to its legality. *De jure* recognition implies recognition of legal existence.

ised to recognize all prewar foreign obligations provided the Allies accorded Russia an even larger sum for damages caused by the military intervention. Several weeks were spent in fruitless negotiation. Then, to the dismay of the former Allies, the Russian and German delegates to the conference signed the Treaty of Rapallo. This secured for the Moscow Government *de jure* recognition by a great power, freed Russia of her German debts, opened the way to commercial agreements, and lessened Soviet dependence upon the good will of London and Paris.

By the end of 1923 Russia had got *de jure* recognition only from Germany and a few minor states. She therefore announced that henceforth prior unconditional recognition would be expected from any country that desired to discuss trade, concessions, or debts. A "prize" in the form of an especially favorable commercial treaty was offered to that great power which first accorded recognition. Mussolini at once arranged for conversations with Bolshevik representatives. While the Italo-Soviet talks were in progress, British elections resulted in the elevation to the premiership of MacDonald, leader of the Labor Party. In February 1924 the MacDonald Government extended to the U.S.S.R. unconditional *de jure* recognition. This news spurred the Italians to quicker action, and Rome formally recognized the Soviet Union a few days later. Russia thereupon opened negotiations for commercial treaties with both Great Britain and Italy. Before the close of 1924 nine other countries recognized the Bolshevik Government.

The fortune that attended Soviet foreign endeavors in 1924 did not last into the following year. A proposed treaty with Great Britain, respecting a debt settlement and credits, was thrown out by the Conservative Government which succeeded the Labor Ministry. Efforts to negotiate a trade agreement with France came to nought, chiefly because the Bolsheviks frowned upon the importation of luxuries—the main item in French exports. Even the link with Germany seemed to be weakened when the latter signed the Locarno Pact, which was regarded in Moscow as a conspiracy against the U.S.S.R. Fearful lest a European bloc be formed against her, the Soviet Union concluded nonaggression pacts with several near-by countries.

Anglo-Soviet friendship was further strained when the Bolshevik trade-unions contributed funds to aid the participants in the British strike of 1926. In 1927 Chamberlain warned Moscow that diplomatic relations would once more be severed unless anti-British propaganda in Europe and Asia ceased. Then, unexpectedly, the British police raided the private offices of Arcos, Ltd., the Soviet trading corporation in London. The

police believed that the Bolsheviks possessed secret documents that had recently disappeared from the British War Office. Although the papers were not found, Downing Street declared that sufficient evidence of illegal activities had been uncovered to warrant the termination of diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. Parliament so voted. Not until 1929, when a second Labor Government was in power, was Anglo-Soviet diplomatic intercourse resumed.

The same year that witnessed the rupture in Soviet-British relations saw a crisis in Soviet-French affairs. The French, despite their official recognition policy, adopted an unfriendly attitude towards Moscow. They were vexed by Moscow's continued ban on the importation of luxuries and by their inability to redeem the Russian bonds that had been purchased prior to the summer of 1914. The Soviet-German *rapprochement* frightened them, and they interpreted as an affront a remark of the Soviet Ambassador to Paris that he would regard it as his duty in case of a foreign war against the Soviets to encourage the soldiers and workers of the bourgeois states to join the Red Army. In 1927 Poincaré rejected a Soviet offer regarding debts and credits and demanded the recall of the ambassador. In this year, also, the Chinese Nationalists raided the Soviet Embassy in Peking, and the Soviet Ambassador to Poland was assassinated by an exiled White.

Such incidents caused uneasiness in Moscow, and further attempts were made to ensure security against united European action. Nonaggression treaties were negotiated with Persia and Latvia, the Kellogg Pact was signed, and a number of the U.S.S.R.'s neighbors were induced to adhere with her to the Litvinov Protocol (1929). Moscow also helped to bring about a reconciliation between Fascist Italy and Turkey, and made an arrangement with Germany whereby the Reich guaranteed to German industry a large Soviet credit.

It was now the turn of France to become worried. Paris was alarmed at the growing Russian-German-Italian-Turkish friendship and disgruntled over France's inability to capture a profitable share of Soviet foreign trade. In 1930, therefore, France raised the cry that the Bolsheviks were "dumping" their goods upon foreign markets in order to break down the Western economic system, and she advocated the formation of a Pan-Europa minus the U.S.S.R. Soviet imports into France were placed under a licensing system which made it possible for the government virtually to abolish such imports. Soon thereafter Belgium inaugurated a similar measure. The cry of dumping was quickly taken up in other countries, notably the United States and Great Britain. In 1931 interested parties who objected either to

Soviet sales competition or to the Soviet system agitated for embargoes on Soviet shipments, especially of wheat, timber, and cotton.

Then there came about another change in the attitudes of the U.S.S.R. and the European states towards each other. Moscow became suspicious of the anti-Communist tactics of the Hitlerites in Germany, who pronounced a Soviet-German war inevitable. Germany suffered severely from the world depression and hence was growing less valuable as a Soviet customer. It was therefore felt that greater efforts might be made to gain the advantages of increased trade with France and the United States. The states of Western Europe, on the other hand, now regarded prosperity as more important than prejudice.

The path to a reorientation of international policies seemed cleared at a Geneva conference of 1931 which deliberated upon the feasibility of a European union. At this gathering Maxim Litvinov, commissar for foreign affairs, created a favorable impression and aroused some enthusiasm for a plan to negotiate an economic nonaggression pact between capitalism and sovietism. Although this suggestion was not adopted, the door was opened for further individual developments. France, especially, seemed to reverse her former stand. She was anxious to destroy the solid front of those states —Germany, Italy, the U.S.S.R., and Hungary—which advocated a revision of the peace treaties. As a first sign of the new development, a Franco-Soviet treaty of neutrality and nonaggression was signed in 1932.

As 1933 opened, the United States remained the only major power that refused to recognize the U.S.S.R. Washington wished to have no dealings with a government that neglected to fulfill its international obligations (Russia's American debt, including interest charges, amounted to about $800,000,000) and that attempted to subvert democracy in other lands. But when, in 1932, the value of American sales to the U.S.S.R. dropped to $13,000,000—one-third as much as those of Great Britain and one-tenth as much as those of Germany—an important section of American businessmen came to favor closer relations with the Soviet Union. And the latter, meanwhile, had found new cause for worry in Eastern Asia where Japanese and Soviet interests threatened to clash in Manchuria and Mongolia. In 1933, therefore, Moscow welcomed the invitation of President Roosevelt to discuss the resumption of diplomatic relations. Litvinov thereupon journeyed to Washington, and diplomatic relations between the two states were formally reopened in November 1933.

Each government agreed to respect the territorial integrity of the other and to prohibit "the formation or residence on its territory of any organ-

ization or group" which aimed at "the overthrow of, or bringing about by force of a change in, the political or social order" of the other.[19] The U.S.S.R. also assured to visitors from the United States the right to worship in their own churches and promised not to refuse entry into the country to United States ecclesiastical functionaries because of their "having an ecclesiastical status." All United States-Soviet financial questions were left to future settlement through the regular diplomatic channels. The U.S.S.R. waived her claims for damages arising out of United States intervention in eastern Siberia from 1918 to 1920, while reserving the right to claim damages in connection with the United States military activities at Murmansk and Archangel in northern Russia.[20] Those in the United States who had expected recognition to lead to an enormous increase in trade with the U.S.S.R. were disappointed, for Soviet purchases in the United States remained at a low figure.

Fear of a Japanese imbroglio and of the ultimate aims of Nazi Germany not only induced the U.S.S.R. to welcome the opportunity for United States recognition and for strengthening the ties of friendship with her smaller neighbors, but led her to view the League of Nations with an almost kindly regard. At first the Soviets would have nothing to do with the League, considering it a superweapon of capitalism. By 1927 they had been ready to participate in an economic conference held under League auspices, and in 1928 and 1929 they sent representatives to preparatory disarmament gatherings. In 1932 the U.S.S.R. took part in the Geneva Disarmament Conference. Hence it caused little astonishment when, in 1934 (the year after Japan and Germany submitted their resignations), the Soviet Union was admitted to League membership with a permanent seat on the Council.

In 1935 the growing *rapprochement* with France, stimulated by mutual fear of German rearmament measures, led to the signing of a Franco-Soviet pact of mutual assistance which was in some ways reminiscent of the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894. Then, while sympathizing actively with the established government during Spain's civil war and plainly showing displeasure over the Anti-Comintern Pact, the U.S.S.R. strove to keep strong its diplomatic connections with Paris and Prague. However, it refused to come alone to the defense of Czechoslovakia against Germany in 1938. The Franco-British acquiescence in Germany's demands at Munich,

[19] A strict interpretation of this provision would seemingly have required the Soviet Government to expel the Comintern unless the latter withdrew all support from the Communist movement in the United States.

[20] The United States had made no attempt to appropriate territory in eastern Siberia; instead, she had exerted a restraining influence on Japan.

indeed, marked another turning point in the relations of the Soviet Union with the great powers of Europe.

After the signing of the Munich Agreement and then the Anglo-French acceptance of a German protectorate over Czechia and Slovakia, Moscow openly mistrusted the leadership of London and Paris. The first concrete evidence of a new Soviet orientation was the "resignation" (May 1939) of Foreign Commissar Litvinov, leading Bolshevik advocate of collective security in coöperation with Britain and France. He was succeeded by Viacheslav M. Molotov, close friend of Stalin and advocate of a nationalistic Soviet foreign policy.

CHAPTER 12

Southeastern Europe

ROMANIA

Long "the sore spot of Europe," the Balkans continued, in the period 1919–1939, to be characterized by restlessness and instability. To the turbulence and corruption that were the heritage of centuries of Ottoman misrule, the more recent decades added the conflicting Near Eastern policies of the great powers and the rivalries of half a dozen Balkan nationalisms. National lines were not clear cut in Balkania, which for hundreds of years served as a channel of entry from Asia into Europe for many and varied peoples; yet the virus of nationalism was strong. Each racial group had, or thought it had, proud traditions and heroic legends, and a mission to fulfill. Often these missions clashed.

The restive Balkan peoples suffered severe hardship during the First World War and occasioned bitter tilts at the Paris Peace Conference. After 1918 the confusion and disorder abated little. Nationalist demands sometimes became more unreasonable, irredentisms grew fiercer, governments were overthrown at record rates, new chains of alliances were formed, and intrigue and violence appeared to be little less common than they had been before the war.

Romania chose her side well in the war and was rewarded in the peace negotiations. When the boundary lines were finally adjusted, the kingdom comprised an area of 122,282 square miles—more than twice the prewar figure. Land was acquired from the former ally, Russia, and the ex-enemy,

Austria-Hungary. The latter gave up Transylvania, most of Bukovina, and part of Temesvár. From Russia was taken Bessarabia, after a local council voted for union with Romania. The Soviet Government refused to recognize this annexation, and the fear of a possible Soviet attack drove Romania into defensive alliances with Poland and France. Not until the two claimants signed a nonaggression pact in 1933 was the war danger in Bessarabia made remote rather than imminent.

The census of 1930 listed 18,000,000 Romanian subjects, including more than 4,000,000 nonnationals. There were among the inhabitants 1,500,000 Transylvanian Magyars, 1,000,000 Bessarabian Ukrainians, 750,000 Germans, an equal number of Jews, and 250,000 Bulgarians. The problem of minorities consequently was serious, especially since the Romanians had a long record of discrimination against nonnational elements. In 1919 Romania signed a minorities treaty only after the Allies had presented as an alternative the surrender of some of her recent territorial gains. Despite the treaty, complaints of injustice were frequent and loud, notably among the Magyars.

Particularly objectionable to the Hungarians was the land legislation. In 1914 about half of the arable land in Romania was held by a few thousand proprietors. Some of the big estates comprised 40,000 acres, while a million small farms measured less than 25 acres apiece. To appease a discontented peasantry, legislation was passed between 1917 and 1921 providing for the expropriation of several million acres from the large holdings. Private estates in the "old kingdom" were to be cut down according to a scale, so that no farm of more than 1250 acres would remain. Compensation was provided through national bonds, and the land acquired by the state was to be distributed among the peasants on easy terms and at 65 per cent of the expropriation price. The maximum size of estates in the newly annexed territories was fixed at a level considerably lower than that for the "old kingdom." Thus in Transylvania private holdings were not to exceed 300 acres. Here the Magyars were the chief losers, for almost 80 per cent of the holdings in excess of 200 acres were in their hands.

So rapidly were the land laws put into effect that the largest Romanian farm in 1924 measured only 1235 acres, and by 1932, 90 per cent of the farm land was controlled by small peasant proprietors. Progress was simultaneously made in the organization of coöperatives for the improvement of cultivation and the purchase of tools, seeds, and livestock. Some discontent arose from the practice of the government in sending people to settle on expropriated lands far from their native villages.

The application of the land reforms to Transylvania precipitated a lengthy international dispute. By the terms of the Treaty of Trianon, Magyars who lived in Transylvania and who wished to retain their Hungarian citizenship rather than become Romanian nationals were allowed to opt, that is, express a choice to that effect, within one year. Optants were given permission to keep their holdings in Transylvania. When Romania expropriated the estates of foreigners, the Magyars objected to the League of Nations that this action could not apply to their properties which were guaranteed by treaty. The quarrel was made more serious by Magyar charges that the Romanian officials were unfair in their appraisals of Transylvanian estates, and that compensation was being paid in depreciated bonds.

Hungary espoused the cause of its optants and appealed to the League Council. The latter tried from 1923 to 1928 to settle the dispute, but Romania refused to recognize the jurisdiction of either the League or the World Court in what she considered a domestic affair. In 1928 the League despairingly washed its hands of the matter and urged the disputants to negotiate directly. The quarrel dragged on until 1930, when the former Allies and Hungary agreed to contribute to a fund for the reimbursement of the dispossessed optants. Unfortunately the settling of the optants' dispute failed to pave the way for a genuine Romano-Hungarian *rapprochement*. Hungary's desire to recover Transylvania, and bitter Magyar memories of the looting of Hungary by Romanian soldiers in 1919, still barred the way to the establishment of friendly relations. As a member of the Little Entente, moreover, Romania was pledged to help prevent the restoration of the Habsburgs regardless of the wishes of the Magyars and to uphold the provisions of Trianon.

In 1923 Romania adopted a new constitution. The former three-class system of voting was abolished, universal suffrage was granted, Jews were made eligible for citizenship, and provision was made for parliamentary representation of minorities. Subsoil resources and forests were declared the property of the nation. The Chamber of Deputies was to be elected for four years by the entire voting body, but the Senate was to contain life and ex-officio, as well as elected, members. The king might appoint and dismiss ministers without regard to the wishes of parliament; he also was given a suspensive veto.

Before the war there had been two principal parties in Romania, the Liberal and the Conservative. The latter represented the wealthy, landed, pro-German aristocracy. The Liberal Party advanced the interests of the banking and industrial groups, and was opposed to foreign economic in-

fluence.[1] Although pro-Allied, the Liberals, who happened to be in power, postponed Romania's entry into the conflict until Allied chances of victory seemed good and until a satisfactory bargain had been struck. Thanks to the ability of its leaders, Jon C. Bratianu and his sons, Jon and Vintila, and the support of the monarchs Carol I (1866–1914) and Ferdinand (1914–1927), the Liberal Party ruled the country with few interruptions from 1866 to 1928. After the war the Liberals seemed exceptionally firmly entrenched. Not only had they led the country to victory, but the rival party had disappeared: the landed aristocrats had been discredited by their pro-German sentiments and crushed by the breakup of the large estates. Yet the Liberals were soon challenged by a new opposition group, since the assignment of property and the extension of suffrage to the peasants brought about a political revolution.

The Bratianus antagonized many people by their extreme economic nationalism, which deprived the country of necessary foreign capital; by their high-tariff policy, which hurt the agrarians; and by their indirect-taxation schemes, which placed the heaviest burden on the poorer classes. Further opposition came from the newly acquired territories. For the first eight years after the war the government was controlled by groups representing the "old kingdom," although the latter included less than half the population of the new Romania. This was owing largely to King Ferdinand's arbitrary choice of ministers. When the opposition showed signs of becoming strong, an electoral law was passed (1926) which gave control of parliament to the party that polled 40 per cent of the votes.

In protest against these acts, Dr. Julius Maniu, an able speaker who had had experience in the Hungarian Parliament before the war, organized the dissident groups into a National Peasant Party. It advocated friendship with all neighbors, close coöperation with the League, responsible government, free elections, state aid to farmers, and a cordial reception to foreign capital. The party's great opportunity came with the deaths of King Ferdinand and Jon Bratianu in 1927. Premier Vintila Bratianu was not able to exert the same degree of control as had his brother, and anti-government demonstrations were held throughout the kingdom. Eventually, Bratianu's inability to negotiate a foreign loan led to his resignation (1928). Maniu, elevated to the premiership, immediately ordered elections. His party elected 322 of the 387 deputies.

Premier Maniu now attempted to place Romania "on the constitutional basis which brought prosperity to the Western states." The censorship was

[1] In 1924 the Liberals secured the passage of a law requiring foreign mining and oil-drilling companies to dispose of a controlling share of their stocks to Romanians.

lifted, anti-Semitism was suppressed, and foreign capital was invited. Railways and public works were built, educational opportunities were extended, a foreign loan was floated, and the currency was stabilized. But in 1931 the party was forced out of power by King Carol II. To understand this move it is necessary to go back to another story.

In 1925 Romania was stirred by the actions of Crown Prince Carol in renouncing his right to the throne, deserting his second wife, Princess Helen of Greece, and going to Paris to live with his mistress, Magda Lupescu. Since Carol was disliked both by his mother and by the Bratianus, his elopement was made the occasion for the passage of a law which disbarred him from the throne, designated his five-year-old son Michael as crown prince, and provided for a council of regency in the event that Ferdinand should die before his grandson came of age. Ferdinand died in 1927 and Michael became king, with the queen-mother and the Bratianus dominating the regency council. Late in 1928, however, Maniu became premier. The National Peasants were inclined to favor Carol's return and accession to the throne—provided he became reconciled with Helen, who steadfastly refused to have her marriage annulled. The exiled prince, incidentally, was popular with the army.

It was not astonishing, therefore, that Carol should have returned to Bucharest in June 1930 and have been proclaimed king. In parliament, Vintila Bratianu's was the only vote cast against his enthronement and recognition as king *de jure* since 1927. Michael again became crown prince. With the death of Vintila Bratianu late in 1930 it appeared as though the last remnant of official opposition to Carol II had vanished.

In October 1930 Maniu surrendered his leadership of the National Peasant Party and retired from politics. The ostensible reason was illness; the probable cause was disagreement with Carol over the latter's family difficulties. Each passing month made reconciliation between Carol and Helen seem more remote, until she finally was exiled. Mme. Lupescu, on the other hand, began to spend much of her time in the kingdom, near Carol. Although the army continued loyal to the king, the National Peasant Party frowned upon his actions. In 1931, accordingly, a new government was organized under Carol's former tutor, Professor Nicolae Jorga. The latter, a prominent historian and prolific writer, ordered new elections and placed himself at the head of a National Union ticket. Thanks to violence and the electoral law of 1926, the National Union secured three-fourths of the seats in the new chamber.

During the next twelvemonth, Carol and Jorga ruled under a dictatorship thinly disguised behind the veil of a parliamentary majority. Both

men were impulsive, fond of publicity, and strongly partisan. Conditions rapidly went from bad to worse. The world economic depression added to the nation's woes, and the government deficit increased at an alarming rate. Any hope of foreign loans was blasted by the publication in 1932 of a critical report on Romanian economic conditions by the French financial expert, Charles Rist. The Jorga Ministry resigned, and eventually (1933) the ministerial leadership was entrusted to Jon G. Duca, head of the Liberal Party.

Duca followed a policy of moderation and attempted to curb the activities of a Fascist, anti-Semitic organization called the Iron Guards. In retaliation, a student assassinated Duca, and soon a Fascist plot was disclosed for the establishment of a military dictatorship. The new (1934) Liberal Government of George Tatarescu met the threat with energetic countermeasures. The Tatarescu Government then tried to concentrate on improving Romania's foreign trade, relieving her debt, and meeting the demands of her dissatisfied peasantry, but soon found itself concentrating instead on the rising tide of fascism. The anti-Semitic Romanian Fascists, who received encouragement from German Nazis, were especially angered by the government's friendship with France, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. An example of foreign encouragement came in 1937 when the German and Italian ministers to Romania took part in an Iron Guard demonstration during the funeral of two members who were killed while fighting for Franco in Spain.

World-wide interest centered on the parliamentary elections of December 1937. It was expected that a three-cornered fight would develop among the Carol-Tatarescu Liberals, the National Peasant Party under Maniu once more, and the Iron Guard of Cornelius Z. Codreanu. Great was the general astonishment when Maniu announced that his pro-French peasant party would ally itself for electoral purposes with the anti-Semitic, pro-German Iron Guard. Maniu explained that his purpose was merely to present a united front against the personal rule of Carol, and that his move involved no compromise of principles. When the returns were counted it appeared that the Tatarescu Government would not have a majority, wherefore it resigned. Shortly thereafter, in February 1938, Carol proclaimed a new constitution. Traditional politicians were dropped, political parties and secret societies were banned, and the king indicated his determination to rule as he thought best for the country.

Carol's actions were motivated by fear that if he did not establish a firm government of the type he wanted, the Fascist elements, with foreign backing, would take all power into their own hands. The absorption of

Austria by Germany increased his suspicions, and he proceeded with energy against all those who seemed a menace to his throne. Government officers raided Fascist hide-outs and seized records which, it was said, showed that Codreanu and his followers were conspiring to seize the king and overthrow the regime. The Fascist leader, charged with having treasonable dealings with German agents, was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment at hard labor.

The revolutionary movement now quieted down, and the king issued numerous decrees. Prices were regulated, corruption was curtailed, the press was censored, a government propaganda organization was established, and efforts were made to increase foreign trade. In order to improve relations with the neighboring states, a nationalities statute was issued that placed all linguistic, religious, and racial minorities on a footing of equality with the Romanians.

The autumn of 1938 saw a renewal of Fascist outbreaks. The police took quick action to check the outbursts, and Codreanu and his leading followers were shot by prison guards on the ground that they had tried to escape. Although further plots of Iron Guard sympathizers were uncovered throughout 1939, Carol seemed to have the situation under control. An election was held in June 1939, all candidates being members of a pro-Carol coalition. No meetings or posters were allowed, and the electorate comprised about one-tenth of the population. On the eve of the Second World War the Iron Guard once more became active. An attempt on Carol's life failed, but his premier was murdered.

BULGARIA AND MACEDONIA

Under King Ferdinand, Bulgaria entered the war on the side of the Central Powers and paid for the misstep in the Treaty of Neuilly. The latter deprived the country of considerable territory, limited its army to a small volunteer force, and burdened it with a heavy reparation debt. Because of the poor economic condition of the kingdom, the indemnity was several times reduced until in 1930 a "final" settlement was evolved whereby Bulgaria contracted to pay $84,000,000 in 36 annual instalments.

The population of Bulgaria in 1939 was 6,300,000; its area was 39,814 square miles. Approximately 85 per cent of the subjects were of Bulgarian origin, and in general they were a hard-working peasant class which neither wasted time complaining about defeat nor resorted to diplomatic legerdemain to obtain a reduction of obligations. Possessing relatively poor land, dependent upon crude methods of farming, hampered by community own-

ership of pasture and woodlands, and having little industrial life and no outlet to the sea, the Bulgarians yet fulfilled the treaty requirements. In 1927 the last vestiges of inter-Allied control were removed.

In 1918 Ferdinand abdicated and was succeeded by Boris III. The new ruler, more anxious to establish automobile speed records than to interfere with his ministers, was popular. Until 1934 Bulgaria continued to be governed under her constitution of 1879. This provided for a unicameral assembly *(Sobranye)* elected for four years by universal suffrage. No bill could become law without the king's consent. About four-fifths of the people belonged to the established Orthodox Church, which was controlled by a synod of archbishops. In 1870, chiefly for nationalistic reasons, the Bulgarian Church was separated from the mother church at Constantinople.

Perhaps the most remarkable postwar development in Bulgaria was the rise of the "Green" Socialists, agrarians who favored state aid to farmers and social legislation, but opposed the confiscation of private property. Prominent among the leaders of the Greens was Alexander Stambulisky, a peasant who had spent three years in prison for threatening King Ferdinand with personal violence if Bulgaria joined the Central Powers. Coming into power after the war, he signed the peace treaty and then devoted himself to the introduction of political and economic changes.

The program of Stambulisky's Agrarian Party included: (1) friendly relations with the neighboring countries; (2) punishment of the politicians who had led the kingdom to war; (3) fulfillment of treaty obligations; (4) state aid to farmers, and the expropriation, with compensation, of crown and church lands and large private estates, the soil thus acquired to be distributed chiefly among the refugees who were pouring into Bulgaria from the lost territories; (5) limitation of profits and taxation of incomes; and (6) compulsory, uncompensated labor of men and women on public works.[2]

These policies were gradually fulfilled between 1919 and 1923, but Stambulisky's methods created numerous enemies. He was interested solely in the welfare of the peasants, and in order to carry out his plans he manipulated elections, arrested opposition leaders, closed universities, defied the church, and established a censorship. The opponents of the regime

[2] A law of 1920 empowered the state to demand of all able-bodied men a maximum of eight months' and of all able-bodied women a maximum of four months' service in public work. The service might be required at any age between twenty and forty for men and sixteen and thirty for women—the government to decide whether the work should be rendered on a single occasion or in instalments. Married women and soldiers were exempt. Eventually, exemption could be purchased by the payment of a tax.

included leading representatives of the military, the bourgeoisie, and the intelligentsia, as well as some of the more moderate Agrarians. In 1923 Stambulisky was assassinated, and a government of professors, lawyers, and generals, headed by Alexander Tsankov, came into power. It was supported by a Democratic Entente of all political parties save the Agrarians and the communists. For the next two years and a half the middle-class government, employing many of the methods that had made the leader of the Greens unpopular, undid much of his work. When the peasants resorted to reprisals and assassinations, the government struck back with vigor and crushed the opposition.

A new bourgeois ministry took office in 1926, headed by Andrei Liapchev, a Macedonian leader of the Democratic Entente. This government, in power for more than five years, favored coöperation with the League, friendship with the neighboring states, financial and educational changes, extensive public works, and conciliation with the opposition. Thousands of political prisoners were released, the censorship was lifted, and exiles were permitted to return. Although political murders now ceased, much discontent remained. The moderate Agrarians adopted constitutional opposition tactics, being joined, shortly, by several other groups. Together they formed the National Bloc which, in the elections of 1931, defeated Liapchev. By previous agreement the victors divided the spoils.

Premier Nicolae Mushanov retained control from October 1931 to May 1934. He permitted the return to public life of many Agrarian leaders who had been proscribed at the time of Stambulisky's downfall. Among the peasants, meanwhile, the deflation of agricultural prices and the high tariffs of the neighboring states had caused renewed unrest. The urban workers were equally discontented and readily listened to agitators. In municipal elections of 1932, communists captured more than half of the seats in the governing council of the capital city. Thoroughly frightened, the Sobranye in 1933 declared vacant the 29 parliamentary seats held by communists. The conservative and army elements in the kingdom, dissatisfied with Mushanov's lenient policies, set up a military dictatorship in May 1934 under Colonel Kimon Gheorghiev. He abolished all political parties and apparently aimed at the abolition of royal political influence. Boris thereupon (November 1935) set up a new civil government under George Kiosseivanov.

Boris and Kiosseivanov tried to steer a middle course. Both Fascists and radicals, however, grew in numbers. Former Premier Tsankov led the Fascists in their demand that the lost portions of Macedonia be recovered from Yugoslavia and Greece, but the king preferred a policy of conciliation

with all Bulgaria's neighbors. In May 1938 a Bulgarian Parliament met for the first time in several years. The elections had been held on the king's orders and with a restricted suffrage. The candidates based their campaigns on personal issues, since they were forbidden to represent parties. And the assembly's powers by now had become mainly advisory. In 1939 an embryo Nazi movement was suppressed.

Bulgaria's foreign relations were determined chiefly by the Macedonian question. Macedonia was a fertile region of indeterminate boundaries situated partly in Greece, partly in Bulgaria, and partly in Yugoslavia. For centuries the area was under Turkish rule, but it had long been claimed on historical and linguistic grounds by the three states mentioned. Each of these carried on a vigorous campaign in Macedonia to convince the inhabitants that they really belonged to this or to that nation. The Bulgarians appeared to enjoy the greatest success in these efforts, but as a result of the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 they secured only a small northeastern corner of Macedonia. During the First World War they conquered some more of the area, but the peace conference assigned most of it to Greece and Yugoslavia. Thereafter thousands of Macedonian refugees began to pour into Bulgaria. The latter was regarded not merely as a place of refuge but as a base from which agitation for Macedonian independence might be carried on.

The unification and independence movement was directed by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, founded in 1893 and long led by Ivan Mihailov. The IMRO comprised armed bands of *comitadjis,* whose methods were terrorism and guerrilla warfare along the international frontiers. The Bulgarian army was so small that the comitadjis could act with virtual impunity while keeping the government in constant dread of unpleasant border incidents.

In 1922 Greece, Yugoslavia, and Romania warned Bulgaria to check the disorders along the Greco-Bulgarian and Yugoslav-Bulgarian frontiers. Two years later Athens complained of the mistreatment of Greeks in the Bulgaro-Macedonian village of Voden. The protest apparently had the wrong effect, for soon thereafter the Greek mayor of the village was murdered. By way of reprisal a Greek army officer ordered the shooting of seventeen Bulgarians. A crisis was reached in October 1925, when a clash between frontier outposts resulted in the dispatch of a Greek army which occupied seventy square miles of Bulgarian territory. Sofia offered no military resistance and appealed to the League for protection.

The Council ordered the Greeks to recall their troops from Bulgaria, and sent a commission to investigate the origin of the conflict and rec-

ommend action. This body reported that neither party to the dispute had appeared to act with premeditation, but that Greece had been hasty in ordering the invasion without prior investigation of the circumstances. The commissioners therefore suggested that Greece, instead of receiving the indemnity which she was demanding, pay Bulgaria $220,000 for material and moral damages. The Council accepted these decisions, as did the disputants, and Greece promptly paid the fine. The peaceable outcome of the affair was not only a victory for the League, but it paved the way for a better understanding between Bulgaria and Greece. The latter came to realize that the government of King Boris was not to blame for the border incidents, and Greco-Bulgarian treaties of commerce and friendship were signed.

Meanwhile, in 1926, some comitadjis had crossed from Bulgaria into Yugoslavia and there attacked a town. Once more Yugoslavia, Greece, and Romania jointly protested. Bulgaria expressed her regret, explained her physical inability to check the activities of the Macedonians, and invited her neighbors to coöperate in the better regulation of the frontiers. This offer was regarded favorably, but all harmony was dissipated when the comitadjis killed a Serbian general. This time Yugoslavia determined to act, especially since she was further irked by the growing friendship between the Bulgarians and her Adriatic rival, Fascist Italy. For more than a year, consequently, the Bulgarian frontier was closed, while raids and assassinations continued apace.

The royal dictatorship that was established in Yugoslavia in 1929 regarded the boundary difficulties in a less serious light and reopened the frontier. This action opened a path for further negotiations, and in 1930 the two countries regulated the control of the borders, settled some bothersome land disputes that were the heritage of the peace treaty, and provided for the settlement of future disagreements by peaceful arbitration.

The signing of Bulgarian treaties with Greece and Yugoslavia lessened the danger of international war, but the internal situation in Bulgaria was made worse when the Macedonians themselves split into two hostile groups. The followers of Mihailov and of Alexander Protogerov used such violent methods against each other that in 1933 the government proclaimed a state of siege in Sofia, and placed in concentration camps a large number of suspected Macedonian terrorists. All Macedonians were ordered to surrender their arms, and the IMRO leaders were imprisoned or removed to other parts of the land. In July 1934 the Protogerovist wing officially dissolved itself, and two months later Mihailov fled to Turkey. But Mace-

donian nationalist propaganda continued to be carried on both at home and in foreign countries.

The Sofia Government used the Macedonian situation as the basis for a request to the League to permit a larger army than was stipulated in the Treaty of Neuilly. Success in this endeavor was not achieved until 1938, when Bulgaria and the Balkan Entente (Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Romania) signed a treaty at Salonika. In the document, Bulgaria's right to rearm was recognized by the entente, and all signatories "assumed the obligation to abstain in their mutual relations from recourse to war." Soon thereafter Bulgaria got a loan for rearmament purposes from an Anglo-French banking group. The partition of Czechoslovakia reminded the Bulgarians of their own irredentist grievances with respect to their neighbors, and on the nineteenth anniversary (1938) of the signing of Neuilly, the government found it necessary to proclaim martial law in order to prevent rash acts that might lead to international complications.

GREECE

In 1917 Premier Eleutherios Venizelos, with the aid of the Allies and against the wishes of King Constantine, had led Greece into the war. At the peace conference he secured for his country numerous territorial awards. He expected a cordial reception upon his return from Paris but, for a variety of reasons, had come to be generally disliked. It was common knowledge that his advent to power in 1917 had been based on forceful Allied support, and his action in compelling the king to abdicate in favor of the young Alexander had not been popular. Venizelos' policies had already plunged the people into three wars, in 1912, 1913, and 1917–1918, and they were not desirous of waging a fourth conflict in order to make good the claims acquired in Asia Minor by the Treaty of Sèvres. To make things still worse for Venizelos, King Alexander died in 1920 (from the bite of a pet monkey), whereupon his father, Constantine, immediately announced his readiness to return from exile.

Hence the Venizelists were defeated in the elections of 1920, and a plebiscite resulted in the recall of Constantine. The premier discreetly left the country, passing on to the returned ruler a war against the Turks. Not only was Constantine forced by circumstances to continue this struggle, but his position was made precarious when the Allies refused to recognize his government and cut short the flow of supplies and ammunition that had been made available to Venizelos. Constantine was blamed for a resulting

Greek debacle at Smyrna, the threatened loss of Thrace, and the coldness of the Allies. When the military men now demanded that he quit, he abdicated a second time (1922). The throne went to his son, George II.

Venizelos was recalled to salvage what he could at the peace conference of Lausanne (1923). He had to give up Smyrna and eastern Thrace, and agreed to a compulsory exchange of populations with Turkey. Greece was left with an area of 50,257 square miles, half of which had been added since 1912. As a result of the exchange of peoples, 1,000,000 refugees were dumped into the land from Turkey, bringing the population to 6,500,000. The lot of the refugees was miserable, since Greece found it difficult to provide food, clothing, and shelter for the incoming thousands. Some relief was afforded by the League of Nations.

One of the hardest diplomatic problems arising from the enforced uprooting of so many people was the liquidation of the ensuing property disputes. This controversy between Greece and Turkey was not smoothed out until 1930, at which time the two countries reciprocally renounced the claims of their exchangeable refugees against each other and agreed to permit the Turks in western Thrace and the Greeks in Constantinople to remain where they were. There followed a treaty of naval parity and a nonaggression pact.

Although only one-fifth of the land surface of Greece was arable, the chief occupation of the people was agriculture. Beginnings were made in the exploitation of the fairly rich mineral resources. Extensive reforestation was inaugurated, and United States companies were engaged to work on reclamation projects. The public works undertaken required large funds, but little difficulty was encountered in contracting foreign loans.

The early reign of George II was marked by confusion and unrest. An extreme censorship prevailed; there were frequent military executions; and quarrels between the royalists and Venizelists, a majority of whom had republican sympathies, became more and more vindictive. In 1923, after a Venizelist victory at the polls, the king and queen were requested to leave the country while parliament decided upon the future form of government. Admiral Paul Koundouriotis was appointed regent, and in March 1924 the national legislature deposed the dynasty and declared a republic. This action was upheld in a plebiscite by a vote of more than 2 to 1, and the regent became provisional president.

Political life under the republic was no less turbulent than under the monarchy. Koundouriotis was ousted from control after a short time, but soon reasserted himself and maintained a precarious hold on the presidency until 1929. When he resigned, because of illness, he was succeeded by

Alexander Zaimis who, at the time of his election, was president of the upper chamber and had been eight times prime minister. Since the new executive was chosen by parliament, it appeared that the republic was on a tolerably firm footing. In 1934 Zaimis was reëlected by parliament for another five-year term.

Meanwhile Venizelos, who had retired to his native Crete, once more returned and in 1928 led the Liberal Party to victory in an election that was characterized by violence and the kidnaping of candidates. For the fifth time in his career the veteran became premier. He remained in power, with brief interruptions, for almost five years, until March 1933, and achieved a number of important acts. A semblance of order was restored, public works were pushed, agriculture was aided, education and public health were improved, a debt settlement was effected with the United States, and friendlier relations were established with the neighboring states. Venizelos appeared to be much in favor of a Balkan federation as a step toward the fulfilment of Briand's Pan-Europa scheme, but nationalist jealousies blocked progress in this direction.

After 1930 the economic prosperity of the republic declined rapidly. Foreign trade decreased and unemployment increased until the premier decided to suspend foreign-debt payments and utilize the money thus saved in the construction of public works. Such measures were of temporary value, and Venizelos retired without having solved the economic riddle. His successor was Panagiotis Tsaldaris, leader of the Popular Party which, though originally of royalist sympathies, accepted the republic.

Shortly before Tsaldaris celebrated his second anniversary in office, there broke out a widespread military and naval revolt. The rebels doubted the sincerity of Tsaldaris' devotion to the republic and desired to place the ministerial power back in the hands of Venizelos. After ten days of fighting, General George Kondylis, the war minister, reported victory over the insurgents. Venizelos went into exile, while the victorious government arrested the leaders of the revolt, confiscated the property of the Venizelos family, dismissed Venizelist sympathizers from office, and abolished the Greek upper house which had been controlled by Venizelos' Liberal Party. Kondylis was named a marshal and deputy-premier.

In an election of June 1935 the Tsaldaris-Kondylis government party won 287 of the 300 deputies' seats. This parliament authorized a plebiscite in which the people should choose between republicanism and monarchism. Before the vote, the premier and his deputy quarreled. Tsaldaris was willing to restore the monarchy if the people expressed such a wish through an honest plebiscite. Kondylis, irritated by Tsaldaris' determination to be

strictly neutral in the plebiscite and tired of the "uncertainty" of the situation, engineered a *coup d'état* and forced the premier to resign. In rapid order the republic was abolished, the monarchial constitution of 1911 was restored, and Kondylis was made premier and regent pending the return of former King George. The plebiscite was retained, but the voters were merely to be given the opportunity to confirm Kondylis' action.

George, in London, was informed of these events and expressed an eagerness to return to Greece; but he decided to await the result of the plebiscite. Meanwhile President Zaimis quietly passed into the political background, while Regent Kondylis ousted all leading republicans from office. The plebiscite resulted in an overwhelming endorsement of Kondylis' measures. The vote was 1,500,000 in favor of the restoration to 33,000 against it. King George II therefore returned to continue his interrupted reign (November 1935). But because the king and Kondylis found it difficult to coöperate, Professor Constantine Demerdjis became premier in the same month.

The first parliamentary elections following the restoration were held in January 1936. The issue was mainly one between the followers of Kondylis and the supporters of Venizelos, who was living in exile. The Venizelists captured two more seats than their chief opponents, but since no group had a majority Premier Demerdjis continued in office with a nonpartisan cabinet, including General John Metaxas as war minister. Within three months after the election, death removed Kondylis, Venizelos, Demerdjis, and Tsaldaris from the scene. Metaxas thereupon came to the head of the cabinet. He displayed impatience with the rise of radicalism owing to the bad economic conditions and induced the king to dissolve parliament and suspend the constitution (August 1936). Then he abolished all political parties, imposed a strict censorship, and announced that the country had been saved from communism. There were several movements during 1937 and 1938 to oust Metaxas, but he regularly bested the opposition. In July 1938 he made himself premier for life.

The foreign relations of Greece were troublous. The difficulties with Turkey and Bulgaria have been mentioned. Contacts with Italy and Yugoslavia were equally disturbing for a time. Italian control of the Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean since the close of the Turco-Italian War in 1912 gave rise to a Greek irredentist movement, since the islands were inhabited largely by Greeks. More serious was a rupture in the relations between the two countries when some Italian army officers aided in the delimitation of a boundary between Albania and Greece.

It seemed to the Greeks that most of the disputed points were being

decided in favor of Albania. In 1923 the Italian general who headed the boundary commission, three other Italians, and an Albanian interpreter were killed on Greek soil. An ultimatum was immediately forthcoming from Rome. It demanded an official apology, an indemnity of 50,000,000 lire to be paid within five days, and permission for the Italian military attaché to help in the apprehension of the assassins. The time limit for acceptance was twenty-four hours. Greece rejected a number of the demands as contravening her national sovereignty and appealed to the League for help.

Before this body could act, Italy bombarded and occupied the island of Corfu, inflicting casualties mainly upon some Armenian refugees who had been collected there. At the same time the Italians indicated their displeasure at the apparent intention of the League to interfere in the controversy. Hence the League turned the matter over to the Council of Ambassadors at Paris. These diplomats decided that Greece had been at fault in the murders, but that the ultimatum had been too harsh. It was recommended that Greece apologize, seek out and punish the murderers, and pay the indemnity of 50,000,000 lire; Italy should evacuate Corfu. The suggestions were accepted, and relations between Italy and Greece gradually underwent an improvement. In a sense the outcome was a League victory, but it also showed that that organization could not proceed so readily against a large as against a small state.

The chief Greek quarrel with Yugoslavia arose out of a treaty of 1913 between Greece and Serbia, wherein the former had promised the latter a free zone in the port of Salonika. The First World War forced the postponement of the final arrangements, but in 1923 a convention was signed whereby Yugoslavia was given a fifty-year hold on a Salonika free zone. The area was to remain under Greek police surveillance but to be under Yugoslav customs administration. The accord did not work well. The Yugoslavs complained that the zone was too small for the proper handling of cattle shipments, that the schedule of the trains on the railway between Salonika and the frontier town of Ghevgheli was so slow as to result in damage to perishable goods, and that the freight rates were prohibitively high.

The ill will between the two peoples increased perceptibly until Venizelos returned to power in 1928. He visited Belgrade and in 1929 negotiated a compromise under which the free zone remained its original size, the train service was to be regularized, the freight rates were lowered, Greece paid an indemnity for the railroad's earlier deficiencies, and future disputes were to be submitted for arbitration to the League.

Thus Greece hurdled the last serious obstacle to cordial foreign rela-

tions. Venizelos concluded treaties of friendship with Italy, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Turkey. The premiers who succeeded Venizelos generally continued this foreign policy, and in 1934 Greece became a party to the Balkan Pact which was intended to assure "the maintenance of the territorial order at present established" in the Balkans. Under Metaxas trade agreements were signed with Germany and money was borrowed from the British. In 1939 Greece seemed to have achieved relative stability.

YUGOSLAVIA

In 1917 a group of Yugo- or Southslavs from Serbia and the Southslavic provinces of Austria-Hungary signed a pact at Corfu to form a new constitutional monarchy to be known as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. These peoples had never been united in one state, and each group was anxious to reserve certain rights. It was agreed that the Serbian dynasty should rule the kingdom and that a national flag should be adopted, although the three old flags might still "be freely hoisted on all occasions." Since the Serbs were accustomed to the Cyrillic alphabet, while the Croats and Slovenes used the Latin, it was stipulated that both forms of writing be retained. Inasmuch as most Serbs were Eastern Catholic, while the Croats and Slovenes were largely Roman Catholic and there were 1,500,000 Mohammedans, the equality of all three religions was to be guaranteed. As soon as possible there was to be elected a constituent assembly by universal, secret suffrage. The pact was silent as to whether the government should be unitary or federal, and this omission later caused difficulty.

The new state was formed according to these precepts in 1918–1919 under King Peter I of Serbia. The actual ruler was Peter's son, Alexander, who had been regent since 1914 and who became sovereign in his own right in 1921. As finally constituted, the kingdom included the former Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Hercegovina, Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia, and parts of Carniola, Styria, Temesvár, and western Bulgaria, comprising 96,134 square miles. The population in 1939 numbered 15,700,000, of whom about half were Serbs and a third were Croats and Slovenes. There were several hundred thousand Romanians and half a million each of Germans and Magyars. The Croats were more westernized than the Serbs or the Slovenes, and the leading Croatian city, Zagreb, was considerably more "modern" in appearance than the Serbian capital, Belgrade.

From the beginning, the people of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom were split on the kind of central government to establish. One group, regarding the new state as a Greater Serbia, favored a centralized government

with all authority emanating from Belgrade. The leading advocate of this view was the aged but energetic Premier Nicola Pashich, who had been head of the Serbian Government when the war broke out. The chief opposition to centralized control came from the Croatian Peasant Party led by Stefan Radich, a short, stout, nervous, nearsighted man, a prodigious speaker, fiery, and ready to give up his life in the cause of Croatian autonomy.

Pashich argued that the backward state of some of the regions acquired from Hungary made local autonomy preposterous. Moreover, he said, the Serbs, by sheer weight of numbers, would dominate the government anyway, and the fact might as well be officially recognized. Finally, the problem of reconstruction was so grave as to require united action, directed from one central point, Belgrade. Radich turned a deaf ear to these pleas. He explained that the Croats had enjoyed autonomy under the Habsburgs and hence had every right to continue in control of their own affairs. He pointed out that the Croats as a group were more advanced than the Serbs and consequently should not be made subordinate to them. And he reminded Pashich that the union of the Croats with the Serbs had been voluntary, wherefore they were entitled at least to make their own local laws.

For two years the question raged, while the king refused to call elections for a constituent assembly until all boundary disputes should have been adjusted. Late in 1920 the call for elections was issued. Radich's Croatian Peasant Party elected 50 (out of 417) deputies, but in compliance with his instructions they refused to take their seats. The assembly was dominated by the moderate Democratic Party and Pashich's Serbian Radicals. In 1921 the Radicals, bitterest opponents of federation and advocates of *conservative* domestic policies, secured the adoption of a document which fulfilled their fondest hopes. The constitution provided for a centralized form of government. Old provincial frontiers were erased and local diets were abolished. They were replaced by a single national parliament, the unicameral *Skupshtina,* elected by universal suffrage. Local officials were made responsible to the central authorities.

After the adoption of the constitution, the most urgent domestic problem was revision of the document. Until 1924 the Croats refused to take part in the political life of the state. They boycotted parliament and hampered the administration wherever possible. Radich spent much of the time in jail or exile, but by 1924 he decided that obstructionist tactics might be carried on more effectively within parliament. Hence he permitted the Croatian deputies to take their seats. The Pashich Government, in conse-

quence, was forced to resign, and thereafter one short-lived ministry after another rose and fell, the monotony being enlivened by the vigorous epithets hurled by the deputies at each other across the legislative chamber. In despair the king recalled Pashich, who crushed the opposition by having Radich arrested for high treason and ordering new elections in 1925. Despite government strong-arm methods, the Croats elected 67 (out of 315) deputies. The opposition accordingly remained strong enough to defeat most of the government's bills.

After a brief stay in prison, Radich once more decided to change his methods, this time letting it be known that he would recognize the constitution of 1921 and coöperate in parliamentary activity, provided his party were given representation in the government. The cabinet accepted this offer, and Radich was released to become minister of education. But meanwhile the personal element had entered the quarrel to such an extent that Radich seemed unable to refrain from bitter verbal attacks on Pashich and other ministers. Before long the partnership was dissolved. The death of Pashich in 1926 failed to end the controversy but deprived the proponents of centralization of their ablest leader.

Confusion soon was transformed into chaos both within parliament and among the people. On several occasions the police had to end fighting among the deputies, and riots became common in the streets. A climax was reached in June 1928 when Radich in parliament launched an especially bitter attack against the government because it proposed ratification of a commercial convention with Italy. He complained that the convention was an Italo-Serbian compromise drawn up at the expense of the Croatian peasants. Angered by these denunciations, a progovernment deputy drew his pistol and fired directly into the group of Croatian deputies. Two of the latter died instantly and several, including Radich, were wounded. Radich soon succumbed to his injuries, and the dead leader became a saint and a legend.

The Croatian deputies withdrew in a body from the Skupshtina, met again at Zagreb, and there resolved to disregard any laws of the "rump" parliament at Belgrade. Then the Croats, under their new chiefs, Svetozar Pribichevich and Dr. Vlatko Machek, and joined by some Dalmatian deputies, threatened to set up their own legislature and act independently of the central authorities. In December 1928 the Croatian people refused to participate in the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the kingdom.

Unable to foresee an end to the parliamentary deadlock and fearful of the growing separatist spirit, King Alexander in January 1929 dismissed parliament, abolished the constitution, set up a censorship, suppressed all

parties and party activities, forbade the holding of political meetings, and established a royal dictatorship to function through a cabinet responsible solely to him and headed by the stern General Pera Zhivkovich. The king, now an absolute monarch, announced that the restrictions would be removed as soon as domestic order had been reëstablished and friendly relations with the outside world restored.

Alexander, an energetic man and an able military officer, appealed to his subjects to forget their local prejudices and their Serbian, Croatian, or Slovene origin, and to remember only that they were all Yugoslavs. To give emphasis to this prayer, the official name of the country was altered by royal decree to Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The old administrative divisions were wiped out and replaced by nine new districts, or banats. In six of the banats the Serbs formed a majority.

In 1931 the king promulgated a new constitution. It restricted the formation of political parties,[3] recognized the equality of the three major languages, and set up a bicameral parliament, consisting of a *Senat* in addition to the Skupshtina. Half of the Senate membership was to be appointed by the king and the other half elected. The lower-house members were to be elected by all men and women over twenty-one. The banats were to be ruled by governors appointed by and responsible to the king. An electoral law stipulated that all voting should be oral and that the party securing a plurality of the ballots cast should receive two-thirds of the seats in the lower chamber. In the first elections under the new system, the only voting list was that of Zhivkovich's Yugoslav National Party, formed through a combination of the chief former parties. But because of his unpopularity even with the Serbs, Zhivkovich was able to retain the premiership only until April 1932. In the next two years and a half he was succeeded in turn by several other leaders of the Yugoslav National Party.

The Croats steadily resisted all attempts at "Serbifying" the government and the people. Despite the strictest surveillance, their discontent was manifested on frequent occasions. A climax in the struggle was reached in 1934 when, as has been discussed, King Alexander was assassinated at Marseille, apparently as the result of a Croatian-Macedonian conspiracy. While the League Council busied itself with preventing the crisis from leading to war, since Yugoslavia accused Hungarian irredentists of connivance in the murder, Alexander's eleven-year-old son was proclaimed King Peter II. A council of regents was established, headed by Prince Paul, a cousin of Alexander.

The new ruling group favored conciliation, and an amnesty was granted

[3] Parties might not be based on regional, religious, or class divisions.

to Machek and other Croats who had been jailed under Alexander. In the parliamentary elections of 1935 the authorities permitted opposition candidates to stand for office but then adopted the customary methods for ensuring a government victory. Most of the opposition deputies who were elected were Croats, and, following the advice of Machek, they refused to enter the new parliament. It appeared as a somewhat more hopeful sign when Dr. Milan Stoyadinovich, a Serb who had never approved of the dictatorship, became premier (1935).

Stoyadinovich attempted to win the good will of the minorities by including in his cabinet several Croats, Slovenes, and Bosnian Moslems, in addition to the customary Serbs. He then organized the Yugoslav Radical Union, which advocated a gradual transition from dictatorship to democracy, but which also was pledged to maintain a strong central government. Several Croats in the cabinet thereupon resigned, and Machek insisted that Croatia favored federalism and would be satisfied only when she had acquired a status similar to that enjoyed by Hungary in the old Dual Monarchy.

In order to win more support from the Roman Catholic Croats and Slovenes, Stoyadinovich in 1937 presented to parliament for ratification a concordat granting the Roman Catholic Church a status equal to that of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The lower house agreed to ratification, but when the Orthodox Church excommunicated the cabinet and those members of the Skupshtina who had voted for ratification, Stoyadinovich announced that he would not introduce the bill in the Senate. The Vatican protested this decision, but to no avail. The ferment aroused by the incident encouraged the Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene opposition groups to unite in an Agrarian-Democratic coalition with the hope of overthrowing the dictatorship. Early in 1939, therefore, unable to effect a reconciliation with the Machek group and having aroused opposition among Serbs as well as Croats, Stoyadinovich resigned. Control over the "nation of three nations" passed to one of his former aides, Dragisha Cvetkovich.

During Cvetkovich's administration external danger succeeded in accomplishing what years of internal pressure had failed to do. Cvetkovich and Machek got together to plan a Serbo-Croat compromise. In August 1939 an agreement was signed by the premier, Machek, and Prince Paul. The document set up a self-governing banat of Croatia with autonomy in agriculture, manufacturing, forestry, health, and education, and with partial fiscal autonomy. There was to be a local parliament elected by universal, secret suffrage. The king was to be represented by a governor, or *ban*. The banat comprised 27 per cent of the kingdom's area and 29 per cent of its

population. Cvetkovich now resigned, feeling that the new government ought to rest on a broader base. He was immediately reappointed, with a cabinet that included eleven Serbs, six Croats (including Machek), one Slovene, and one Moslem Bosnian. Machek's brother-in-law was named the first ban of Croatia.

Nationalist difficulties were not the only problems confronting Yugoslavia. The peasants, who formed 80 per cent of the population, were dissatisfied with the size of their holdings despite efforts by the authorities to break up the large estates. The country lacked adequate outlets to the sea and suffered from a poor system of internal communications which made it hard to develop the mineral resources. The kingdom was heavily burdened with debt, it having assumed the pre- and postwar obligations of all its component parts.

The foreign relations of Yugoslavia have been considered in other connections. Mention has been made of her membership in the Little Entente, of her opposition to Habsburg restorations in Austria and Hungary, of her disputes with Bulgaria over the Macedonians and with Hungary over the Magyars and Croats, of her quarrels with Italy over Fiume and over control of Albania and the Adriatic, and of her complications with Greece over a free zone in Salonika. While remaining loyal to the Little Entente and to her alliance of 1927 with France, Yugoslavia from 1937 to 1939 drew ever closer to the Rome-Berlin Axis. The increasing *rapprochement* of Belgrade with Italy and Germany, especially after the Anschluss, was justified by the government as "making new friends while keeping old ones." In mid-1939, less than two years before he invaded Yugoslavia, Hitler declared that the German-Yugoslav borders were fixed "for all time."

CHAPTER 13

Turkey for the Turks

FROM SÈVRES TO LAUSANNE

Had the Treaty of Sèvres, drawn up by the Allies and signed in 1920 by representatives of Sultan Mohammed VI, gone into effect, the once resplendent Ottoman Empire would have been reduced to an insignificant region of desert and mountains in Asia Minor. But Fate, or Kismet as devout Moslems called it, decreed otherwise, and on this occasion Fate acted through the person of a young army officer named Mustapha.

This Mustapha was born at Salonika in 1880. At the Military Staff School in Constantinople, in recognition of his superiority as a student of mathematics, one of his professors bestowed upon him the name of *Kemal,* signifying Perfection. Military life appealed to Kemal, and he developed into an excellent soldier; but he also became an inspired reader of French Revolutionary literature and an antagonist of the autocratic Turkish Government. Kemal's revolutionary tendencies were known to the agents of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, but the police did not arrest him until his graduation. Then he was temporarily banished by being assigned to a cavalry regiment in far-off Damascus. There the young officer found time to muse over the evils of misgovernment and to organize a secret political society called "Fatherland."

During the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 Kemal acted as chief of staff to the commander of the army that marched on Constantinople and forced Abdul Hamid to grant a constitution. The muddled tactics and political intrigues of the Young Turk ruling body induced Kemal to devote

his attention entirely to military affairs, and in 1910 he went to France to study Western army maneuvers. Stopping for a while in Paris, he was deeply struck by the contrasts of West and East. He seemed to have been especially impressed by the relatively free position of women, the progressive civil and commercial life, and the general prevalence of literacy.

Kemal fought in Tripolitania during the Turco-Italian War of 1911–1912 and was one of Turkey's best generals in the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. Although he opposed as premature his country's entry into the First World War in 1914 and openly avowed misgivings as to Germany's eventual victory, Kemal played a conspicuous part in the defeat of the Allies at Gallipoli in 1915. In the circumstances it was not strange that Kemal was chagrined when the Allies imposed on Turkey the Armistice of Mudros (October 1918). The terms of this document were so drastic that the Young Turk leaders, who were popularly held responsible for the disasters of the war, fled from the capital. Kemal in anger laid down his command in Palestine and hastened to Constantinople, only to be ordered into Anatolia by the sultan, to supervise demobilization in an out-of-the-way area. He went, but used his commission to gather around him the nucleus of a new party, the Turkish Nationalist Party, and a makeshift nationalistic military force.

Meanwhile, following a decision of Great Britain and France to forestall Italian imperialist enterprises in Anatolia, Greece was encouraged to land troops at Smyrna. The pillaging of this port so aroused patriotic Turks that Kemal seized the opportunity to attempt to unite nationalists throughout the country. He called a congress at Erzurum in July 1919 to discuss the future policy of the Nationalist Party. Two months later a second and more representative congress was convened at Sivas, which endorsed the resolutions of the Erzurum assemblage. At these meetings the basis was laid for the Turkish National Pact, a statement of principles adopted in January 1920 by a Constantinople Parliament which, elected late in 1919, contained a Nationalist majority.

The pact listed six conditions without which "the continued existence of a stable Ottoman sultanate and society" was declared impossible. The first three articles dealt with the application of the principle of self-determination to all those areas of the old Ottoman Empire which contained large numbers of Turks. The fourth article demanded the security of Constantinople. Article 5 "confirmed and assured" the rights of minorities in Turkey, and the last article demanded the abolition of foreign extraterritorial rights.

The Nationalists were expecting too much if they thought that the Allies

would permit them to follow the principles outlined in the pact. Soon after the latter's adoption, an army commanded by the British General Sir Archibald Milne marched into Constantinople, proclaimed martial law, and deported some of the Nationalist deputies. Most of the Nationalist delegates who had escaped arrest hastened to Angora in north-central Anatolia, there to set up a "rump" parliament called Grand National Assembly. When the sultan now convened another parliament at Constantinople, the country had two governing bodies: one, subordinate to the sultan and maintained by Allied troops; the other, supported by Turkish national sentiment and protected by the desert and mountains separating Angora from the Allied forces.

The Angora Assembly in April 1920 elected Mustapha Kemal to be its president as well as commander-in-chief of the Nationalist Army. Then, determined to "preside over the present and future destiny of Turkey, as long as her caliph-sultan and her Eternal City should remain under the dominion and occupation of foreigners," the body undertook to draw up a new instrument of government. In January 1921 such a document, called Law of Fundamental Organization, was adopted. As amended and later written into the regular constitution, this law vested the sovereignty of Turkey in the people and in their representatives sitting as a Grand National Assembly at Angora. The deputies were to be elected for four years by vote of all males over 18 (changed in 1931 to 21). The executive powers were vested in the assembly president and a responsible cabinet. The document also outlined an elaborate program of social change.

While the assembly was engaged in lawmaking, Kemal, at the head of the Nationalist forces, launched a campaign to clear the country of foreign soldiers. In this undertaking he so covered himself with glory as to win the title of *Ghazi* or Conqueror. In September 1920, after having come to a friendly agreement with Russia, Kemal invaded the recently established Armenian Republic of Erivan and soon reunited the provinces of Kars and Ardahan with Turkey.

Meanwhile Greek armies, with British naval support, had driven the Nationalists out of Thrace and pushed eastward into Anatolia. These victories, however, were counteracted by some unexpected diplomatic developments. The Greek Premier, Venizelos, who was chiefly responsible for these attempts by Greece to take the territories assigned to her by the unratified Treaty of Sèvres, was defeated in the parliamentary elections of November 1920. British support was becoming less enthusiastic. The French began openly to favor the Turks out of dislike for the Greek King, quarrels with British policy, and discouragement over the defeat of French

forces by Turkish Nationalists in Cilicia, northwest of Syria. Italy, finally, who herself coveted Smyrna, had never sympathized with the Greek venture. Accordingly an attempt was made at London to revise the Sèvres Treaty, chiefly at the expense of Greece. When it appeared that the demands of the Turks and Greeks could not be reconciled, Athens, against the advice of the Allied Supreme Council, determined to enforce the original treaty on its own account. In May 1921 the Allies proclaimed their neutrality in the ensuing Greco-Turkish War.

The Greeks opened an offensive which in a few weeks brought them to the Sakharia River, fifty miles from Angora. Then the drive was spent, and they were unable to make any further advance. For three weeks the ill-equipped but inspired Turks held in check an enemy that greatly outnumbered them. After the Battle of the Sakharia the Greeks, in September 1921, began a general retreat. They remained in occupation of a large section of Asia Minor for a whole year, but in September 1922 they were forced to evacuate even Smyrna. Physical exhaustion, poor leadership, and uncertainty of the situation at home so weakened the morale of the Greeks that they found it impossible to withstand the Turkish Nationalists, who somehow managed to secure better equipment and whose enthusiasm increased as the campaign progressed.

When Kemal, in the flush of victory, proposed to cross the Straits and drive the Greeks out of eastern Thrace, he once more came into conflict with the British. At the time of the Allied proclamation of neutrality it had been stipulated that a specified area on each side of the Straits was to be considered as a neutral zone in which no fighting would be permitted. Now, fearing for control of the Dardanelles, Lloyd George announced his determination to enforce this provision and prevent the Turks from fighting the Greeks in Thrace. Neither the French nor the Italians, however, cared to back the British Premier. France had come (1921) to an agreement with the Kemalists whereby she withdrew from Cilicia and permitted a rectification of the northern boundary of Syria in Turkey's favor, while Kemal promised to consider favorably the requests of certain French interests for financial, railway, and mining rights. Italy had likewise concluded (1922) an agreement with Angora, under which the Turks promised to give favorable consideration to some Italian projects for public works in Asia Minor. Lloyd George therefore had to act alone, and British reënforcements were sent to prevent a Greco-Turkish clash in the zone of the Straits.

For a time war seemed imminent, but the British commander eventually induced Kemal to attempt a peaceful settlement of the controversy. In October 1922 an armistice was signed. The Greeks had to evacuate and restore

to Turkey all Thrace as far as the Maritsa River, and invitations were issued to Great Britain, France, the United States, Italy, Romania, Yugoslavia, Russia, Japan, Greece, and Turkey to meet at Lausanne for revising the Treaty of Sèvres to meet the new conditions. Shortly before the first Lausanne Conference met, the Grand National Assembly deposed (November 1922) Sultan Mohammed VI. But not until a year later, in October 1923, did the legislature declare the nation to be a republic and unanimously elect Kemal as Turkey's first president.

At the Lausanne Conference the Turkish delegates, headed by Ismet Pasha, refused to sign any treaty that restricted the economic or judicial freedom of their country. In consequence the negotiations dragged on until July 1923, and then ended only because the Turks had been able to secure virtually everything that they had demanded in their National Pact. Only the question of the boundary at Mosul between Turkey and British-controlled Iraq was shelved for later settlement.

Under the terms of the Lausanne Treaty, Turkey recovered eastern Thrace as far west as the Maritsa River, as well as the Karagach bridgehead and railway center on the west bank of the Maritsa. Constantinople was restored as an integral part of the Turkish State, but the zone of the Straits was demilitarized and opened to the ships of all nations in time of peace and, when Turkey was a neutral, in time of war. In the event of Turkey's belligerency, enemy vessels might be kept out of the Straits. In the Aegean Sea, Turkey retained Imbros, Tenedos, and the Rabbit Islands, while Dodecanesia, Rhodes, and Castellorizo were confirmed to Italy. Most of the remaining Aegean islands went to Greece. The Syrian boundary agreed upon with France in 1921 was confirmed. Sentiment dictated the granting in perpetuity to Great Britain, France, and Italy of a small Anzac Area on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Here the three powers might appoint custodians to watch over the graves of the soldiers who had died in the campaign of 1915, but the region might never be fortified.

Turkey gave up all claims to Libya, Egypt, the Sudan, Palestine, Iraq, Syria, and the Arabian kingdoms, and recognized Great Britain's annexation of Cyprus. In return for Turkey's promise to introduce judicial reforms and adhere to the same provisions regarding the rights of minorities as had the other eastern-European countries, the capitulations were recognized as abolished, all Allied claims for reparation arising out of the First World War were renounced, the foreign control of customs was lifted, and no restrictions were placed on Turkey's military, naval, and air forces. A supplementary Greco-Turkish convention provided for the compulsory exchange of Turkish subjects in Greece for Greek subjects in Turkey. Turkey

was left with an area of 295,000 square miles and a population of 13,000,-000 (21,000,000 by 1953). At peace with the world for the first time in many years, Turkey proceeded to set her house in order.

THE TURKS, THE GREEKS, AND THE KURDS

The Turkish Nationalists were eager to oust from the republic all groups of peoples who were not "Turks." Since the largest group of nonnationals in 1923 consisted of Greeks, the Angora and Athens governments had agreed at Lausanne upon a wholesale exchange of populations on the basis, primarily, of religion. The exchange occasioned untold sufferings. It frequently was difficult to decide whether a family should be considered as Turkish or Greek, particularly where the original migration had taken place long ago. Besides, there were Orthodox Christians in Anatolia who knew only Turkish, and there were Moslems residing in Greece who spoke no Turkish. Mismanagement, cruelty, and neglect were often in evidence, for the racial and religious antagonisms did not allow of humanitarian treatment in all cases. Carelessness often resulted in the transplanting of mountaineers onto plains or the transference of plainsmen and farmers to the mountains.

Altogether about 1,000,000 people were sent to Greece and 400,000 to Turkey. The misery of the Greeks was alleviated by the circumstances that the American Near East Relief concentrated particularly on Greek aid and that the Athens Government was able, as a member, to appeal for League assistance. The property disputes arising from the exchange embittered Greco-Turkish relations until 1930. Then, as we have seen, a compromise was reached, to be followed shortly by the signing of a treaty of friendship. In the meantime the Turks had passed a law forbidding the immigration of any large group of foreigners.

After the ousting of the Greeks, the chief remaining obstacle to Turkish national homogeneity was the million or more Kurds inhabiting the eastern part of the republic. These tribesmen, speaking a language more akin to Iranian than Turkish, continued to be imbued with the spirit of clan allegiance rather than that of Turkish nationalism. The Kurds long were among the most unruly of the sultan's subjects, and they continued to be restless under the new Turkey, especially since the Lausanne Treaty shattered hopes of autonomy that had been held out to them by the Treaty of Sèvres. In 1925, when the authorities arrested a few Kurds on a charge of sedition, the discontent crystallized into open revolt. The uprising was quickly put down, and the rebel leader was executed.

The incident appeared to increase the solidarity of the state as a whole.

Loyal Turks rallied to the support of the central government, and the latter seized the opportunity to strengthen its military control, to silence a critical Constantinople press, and to abolish the offices and distinctive costumes of the sheikhs, dervishes, and other religious or semireligious functionaries who still played a prominent role in Turkish life. Further Kurdish uprisings occurred in 1930 and 1937—to remind the Turks of their one remaining minority problem.

KEMAL, THE DICTATOR

As president, Mustapha Kemal determined to abolish outworn institutions and to raise his country to the level of Western civilization. In bringing about this transformation he adopted an admittedly dictatorial policy, and a number of executions accompanied the march of reform. On the other hand, one of the chief reasons for Kemal's success was the fact that he customarily took just one big step at a time. Reforms succeeded one another at moderate intervals, and in this way the opposition rarely became so formidable as to crystallize into open resistance. Nevertheless, there were some plots to assassinate the dictator and overthrow the republic. The most serious of these were in the region of Smyrna, in 1926 and 1930, and each time the leading conspirators were executed. Eventually a majority of the people appeared to endorse the dictator-president's policies.

In Turkey, as in some Western states, nationalism seemed to transcend the desire for liberty or democracy. So powerful was this spirit that there generally was only one political party, the Nationalist People's Party. Its first president-general was Kemal who, in 1927, was given the right to name all its electoral candidates for the assembly. In 1930 Kemal permitted Ali Fethi Bey, a prominent liberal, to organize an opposition party. Fethi Bey formed the Liberal Republican Party, which advocated a less nationalistic administration, a lessening of state interference in business, and greater freedom of speech and press. In the fall of 1930 the Liberal Republicans in the assembly were able to muster only twelve votes on a motion of no confidence in the government, and Fethi Bey dissolved his party. His little band of followers, however, continued in association as Independents.

Kemal was unanimously elected president four times, the last occasion being in 1935. But in 1938, after several months of illness, he died, aged fifty-eight. It was a tribute to the skill and success with which he had welded the Turkish Republic that, on the day after his death, the National Assembly unanimously, and apparently with popular approval, chose as his

successor General Ismet Inönü. The new president had won fame as a general in the Turkish "wars of freedom," had proved his diplomatic ability in the negotiations at Lausanne and on later occasions, and had been premier during the major part of the republic's existence.

Inasmuch as Inönü had been chosen only to finish Atatürk's unexpired term, it was necessary to hold another presidential election in 1939. Inönü again was selected; his conduct of office had won general acclaim. Turkey's second president used his powers not merely to continue along the path that his predecessor had outlined, but to reconcile some of the elements in the country that had been more or less disregarded by Kemal.[1] In domestic as in foreign affairs, the Turkish Government pursued one straightforward policy: a pro-Turkish policy. Thus it happened that by 1939 the once "sick man of Europe" was being courted by all the great powers that, a quarter century earlier, had been eagerly anticipating his early demise.

RELIGIOUS, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL CHANGES

When the Grand National Assembly abolished the sultanate in 1922, it did not abolish the caliphate—that is, the sultan's spiritual leadership of the Mohammedan world. Mohammed VI continued to be caliph for some days after his deposition as sultan. Then, upon his flight from the country, the assembly elected his cousin, Abdul Mejid, to be caliph in his place. The new Commander of the Faithful had no direct political power, but, since he was a leading member of the Osman dynasty and since the assembly had declared the Turkish State to be "the emplacement on which the caliphate stands," it was virtually impossible for devout Moslems to dissociate his office from its traditional political implications. An Osman Caliph, therefore, was an incongruity in the new Turkey. Accordingly, in 1924, the assembly abolished the Turkish caliphate and exiled the former ruling family.

The abolition of the caliphate had a wide significance in the Moslem world. By depriving themselves of a caliph, the Turks at the same time deprived most Mohammedans of a spiritual leader. It was true that even before the war many non-Ottoman Mohammedans, such as the Shiites in Persia, had ceased to recognize the caliphate; yet the office and its prerogatives were not shadows. Indeed, it was evident soon after the Turkish pronouncement that there was no lack of aspirants for the vacated honor. The king of Hejaz, the king of Egypt, the sultan of Morocco, and the aga khan

[1] Inönü was again reëlected in 1943 and 1946.

of Bombay, all indicated their willingness to assume the title. But despite, or perhaps because of, this general scramble, the caliphate remained an unappropriated dignity.

In conformity with Kemal's policy of enacting only one major reform at a time, the constitution of 1924 still assigned to Mohammedanism the place of a state religion. Then, in 1928, the assembly unanimously deleted from the constitution the article which declared Islam to be the state religion. Thenceforth Mohammedanism was tolerated in Turkey in the same way that any other religion was tolerated. Officials, upon assuming office, no longer swore by Allah, but on their honor and by the republic. No special privileges were to be derived from confessing the Moslem faith, although the fact that most officials were Moslems did lend special prestige to that creed.

Minor changes in the religious ritual followed. It no longer was necessary to remove one's shoes prior to entering a mosque. Many of the mosques received pews, and music was permitted at services. When it was recalled that only a few years earlier such things had been capital offenses, it became evident how strong a hold Kemal had over the minds of his people and how ardently the Turks desired to become "modernized." However, a serious religious outbreak did occur in the winter of 1930–1931 near Smyrna, where a group of dervishes unsuccessfully attempted to restore the caliphate.

Second in importance only to the changed attitude toward religion, and really but a phase of this modified outlook, was the altered status accorded Turkish women. Laws of 1925 abolished legal polygamy, required the registration of marriages, and gave the president the power to grant divorces. Actually, except on farms, where most of the work was done by women, the economics of the situation had made polygamy much less general an institution in even the old Ottoman Empire than was usually imagined. But the practice found sanction in the Koran and was widely followed. Formerly, too, a Turk could divorce his wife by repeating three times the formula, "I divorce you;" but now Turkish women were given marriage rights similar to those of women in most Western countries. Kemal almost immediately made use of a newly granted official divorce power to dissolve his own marriage with Latifé Hanoum—a wealthy, cultivated, and European-educated feminist.

In 1926 civil marriages were made obligatory, though these might be supplemented by religious ceremonies. The wearing of the veil was made optional, and Western clothing was introduced, so that Turkish ladies, unless they themselves so wished, no longer needed to resemble "coffin-

shaped bundles of white linen." A demand arose for education for women and girls, and the foreign schools soon found it difficult to accommodate all the new seekers after knowledge. Women were permitted to engage in all the occupations that were open to their sisters in the West, and women's clubs and societies became popular. The right to vote in municipal elections and hold municipal office was extended to women in 1929. The following year witnessed the appointment of women as judges, and in 1933 several women were made professors in the University of Istanbul. In 1934 the constitution was amended so as to permit women to vote in national elections and become parliamentary delegates.

An outstanding example of the new Turkish woman was Halidé Edib, the first Turkish lady to receive a university degree, a distinguished writer and novelist, professor of Western literature at the University of Istanbul, aide-de-camp to Kemal in several military campaigns, and a Turkish Jane Addams in the matter of social work. Following some differences with Kemal over political policy, she left Turkey and became a popular lecturer in foreign countries. Her *Memoirs* and other written works formed excellent records of Turkey's struggles during those trying years when the republic was in process of formation.

The changed conditions of life in Turkey made imperative the scrapping of the old law codes, the *Sheriat* or Holy Law included. Parliament therefore adopted new civil, penal, and commercial codes, based on Western models. The adoption of these Western legal systems was of international importance in view of the abolition of the capitulations when Turkey entered the war in 1914 and the confirmation of this action in the Lausanne Treaty.

One of the most difficult problems confronting the Turkish Government was that of educating the people. School attendance was made compulsory for children from seven to sixteen, but the shortage of money, teachers, and school buildings prevented the full enforcement of the law. Nevertheless, by 1932 the national illiteracy was said to have fallen from 85 per cent to 42 per cent. The Gregorian calendar and the twenty-four-hour clock were adopted, and in 1928 a law was passed providing for the introduction of the Latin alphabet over a period of fifteen years. Newspapers were ordered to abandon the old Arabic type, and the publication of books printed in Arabic characters was forbidden. An official dictionary was published in 1929, containing only words (about 24,000) that were Turkish in origin, not Iranian or Arabic. The employment of the metric system became compulsory in 1934.

Government officials and the heads of banks and business houses were

ordered to attend special schools for several hours a day, there to study from the new "abc" books. By the end of 1932 virtually all official correspondence and educational materials were in the Latin script. All Turks under forty years of age were made to take lessons in reading and writing, and after May 1931 certificates of literacy were in general required for the enjoyment of "the rights of citizenship."

Severe restrictions were placed on the teaching of religion in public and private elementary schools, and in 1928 a United States girls' school at Brusa was closed for disregarding the law prohibiting attempts at religious conversion. As a "symbol of intellectual liberation" the wearing of the fez or turban—the distinguishing mark of pious Moslems—was prohibited. During 1934, Turkish families generally were occupied with the task of providing themselves with family names, which had to be registered with the authorities by the end of the year. Mustapha Kemal accepted the surname suggested to him by the assembly, namely, Atatürk or Father of the Turks. Such honorary titles as pasha, effendi, and hanoum were abolished and replaced by the old Turkish forms of bey and beyin for men and women, respectively. The government radio station was used to encourage all these changes.

"EFFICIENT TURKS FOR TURKEY"

Asked his opinion of the leaders of the Turkish Republic, a Bulgarian diplomat was reported to have said: "They are working as we never thought Turks could work." During the days of the sultans, relatively few Turks concerned themselves with trade, commerce, or industry. The masses, when not in military service, generally labored in the fields. Hence "business," as such, came to be almost a monopoly of the resident Greeks, Jews, and Armenians. But with the advent of the republic a new spirit became evident. The Nationalists wanted to have in Turkey nothing but Turkish labor, capital, ownership, and production. The obstacles to the fulfilment of such a program were enormous, but the pressure of circumstances soon led to the rise of a commercial middle class whose nucleus was a group of the refugees from Greece, some of whom had there been engaged in trade. By 1950, one-fourth of the population lived in cities. Since, however, a majority of the people continued to be engaged in agriculture, the government also took pains to make efficient farmers of the Anatolian peasants.

Commercial treaties were signed with many countries. Vast farm areas were settled with governmental aid in Anatolia. State departments were created to study agriculture, commerce, shipping, and industry. The govern-

ment subsidized agriculture by the free grant of cattle, plows, and even houses to deserving families. Like Mussolini, Kemal had his own model farm on which he worked with rolled-up shirt sleeves, driving his own tractor. Agricultural production was further encouraged by the exemption from taxation of all grain used by the peasant families for their own needs.

In 1929 the National Assembly voted a public-works program to extend over twelve years and to include railway, port, irrigation, reclamation, and highway-construction projects. Swedish engineers were employed to supervise the completion of these works. Infant industries were stimulated by means of a protective-tariff system—the leading industrial developments being textile factories, cotton gins, sugar refineries, and sawmills. A considerable amount of the necessary machinery had to be imported. The leading Turkish exports were tobacco, fruit, cereals, and cotton, but the gradual development of transportation facilities made increasingly profitable the exploitation of enormous reserves of chrome ore, zinc, coal, copper, antimony, and petroleum.

There was a tendency in Turkey, in the interest of efficiency, to establish state control over important industries. The government secured ownership of the railways and a large portion of the mercantile marine. It possessed tobacco, salt, gunpowder, and alcoholic-beverage monopolies, and established factories to supply the clothing needs of the army and navy. Concessions were granted to foreigners, chiefly for the sake of additional capital and expert advice, but the authorities were careful in each case to safeguard Turkey's political and economic independence. In 1934 a five-year plan was adopted for the building of state and private factories, hydroelectric development, and the exploitation of mines.

A number of Turkish cities rapidly increased in size. Angora, for example, whose name was changed in 1929 to Ankara, had a population of 5000 in 1918; in 1932 its population was 80,000, and in 1940 it was 157,000. Naturally the increase in this instance was stimulated by the new political importance which the city assumed. Kemal connected the capital with the sea by rail, tried to annihilate the mosquitoes in the surrounding swamps, instituted reforms in sanitation, roads, and police protection, and in general supervised the beautification of the city. Even statues, hitherto considered idolatrous, were erected—chiefly of Kemal. The building of movie houses and amusement palaces kept pace with the construction of trolley lines and sewer systems.

Despite these advances, Turkey by 1939 had not yet learned to know the meaning of prosperity. A succession of poor crops, the inertia of some of the people, and the hesitancy of the government to borrow from foreign

bankers retarded material progress. When the harvests improved, the decline in the price of agricultural products in the world market had an equally unfortunate influence. From 1931 on, civil service staffs and salaries were cut, and drastic import quotas were fixed on foreign products. Attempts were made to mobilize the whole nation for a campaign of thrift, and all citizens were urged to eschew imported goods. Kemal himself set an example by wearing Turkish homespun clothes and drinking linden tea instead of coffee.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The harsh treatment meted out to Turkey after the First World War, and an adverse decision of the League in a Turco-Iraqi boundary dispute, made the Nationalists highly suspicious of the West. This was in part responsible for the close relations that early developed between Turkey and the U.S.S.R., the latter being the only power with which Turkey had a treaty of friendship prior to 1928. But the communistic activities of the Russians eventually caused an unfavorable reaction in Turkey. In 1929 some Turks were sentenced to prison for having carried on communistic propaganda, and Kemal threatened "destruction" to all persons engaged in subversive enterprises.

The resulting estrangement from the U.S.S.R., combined with the friendly attitude now adopted by some of the Western powers that were eager to weaken Bolshevik influence in Turkey, gradually induced Ankara to look with increasing favor upon membership in the League. In 1927 the Permanent Court rendered a favorable award to Turkey in a dispute with France over responsibility for the collision of a French steamer with a Turkish ship. In the following year a treaty of friendship was signed with Italy, and in 1929 a new agreement with France was reached whereby the Turco-Syrian frontier was once more revised to the advantage of Turkey. Her suspicions at last removed by these and other incidents, the Turkish Republic, in 1932, accepted an invitation to join the League.

Under the terms of the Lausanne Treaty, the prewar debt of the Ottoman Empire was to be distributed among the various areas that had been part of this empire in 1912 but that had been detached as a result of the Balkan Wars and the First World War. By an agreement of 1928 with its bondholders, the Turkish Republic offered to pay 62.25 per cent of the Ottoman debt as of October 1912 and 76.54 per cent of the debt incurred by the governments of the sultans after that date.

The relations between the United States and Turkey after the war were

peculiar. Although the two countries had never declared war upon one another, diplomatic and commercial relations had been severed, and a new treaty arrangement had to be effected. A Turco-United States Treaty of Amity and Commerce of 1923 was debated for several years in the Washington Senate and finally rejected. The opponents of ratification mustered a number of doubtful arguments, claiming that the treaty did not fulfill Wilson's award to Armenia (an arrangement which had been part of the defunct Treaty of Sèvres), that it failed to confirm the extraterritorial rights which had been granted to the United States in the previous century (all other powers had recognized the abolition of the capitulations), and that it did not uphold the United States nationality of certain naturalized former Turkish subjects (a stand which Turkey under international law was at liberty to take).

In the meantime, Turkey had placed an especially high tariff on imports from all countries with which she had no treaty agreements. Economic interests eventually outweighed diplomatic considerations, and a Turco-United States *modus vivendi,* providing for the restoration of diplomatic and consular relations, was concluded in 1927. Soon thereafter the high commissioner who had represented United States interests in Turkey since 1919 was replaced by an ambassador. Commercial treaties, providing for "most-favored-nation" treatment, followed in due course.

During the early 1930's Turkey became anxious to refortify the region of the Straits, demilitarized under the terms of the Lausanne Treaty. Finally, in 1936, Ankara did lay before the Lausanne signatories and the League a request for the revision of the appropriate treaty terms. Owing partly to the general feeling against Italy's Ethiopian venture and her apparent aims in the eastern Mediterranean, and partly to gratification over the legal rather than unilateral method employed by Turkey to gain her ends, the powers promptly agreed to consider her wishes. The result was the Montreux Straits Convention, permitting the refortification of the zone in question. In time of peace the Straits were to be open equally to all commercial ships and to a limited tonnage of war vessels. In war, Turkey might close the Straits to belligerents unless these were acting under League authority. The Ankara Government now lost no time in refortifying the strategic area connecting (and separating) the Black and Mediterranean seas.

Meanwhile Turkey had continued her policy of cementing friendships with all her neighbors, north, south, east, and west. Especially interesting was an Eastern Pact signed in 1937 among Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan. The four states therein reaffirmed their obligations under the League Covenant and the Paris Pact, promised not to interfere in one another's

internal affairs, undertook to prevent the formation within their respective borders of associations likely to disturb the peace among them, and agreed to consult on matters of common international concern. In 1939 Turkey, occupying a strategic international position, signed treaties with Great Britain and France providing for mutual assistance in case of attack. A few weeks later came the Second World War.

CHAPTER 14

The Arousing of Asia and Africa

THE TWAIN DID MEET

The huge, conservative Asiatic mass, containing one-half of the population of the world; tied to age-old cultures; weighed down by autocratic administrations, by caste systems, and by ancient traditions and methods; torn between a rising young nationalism and a vigorous imperialism in some sections, but never yet visited by white men in other sections; with little linguistic unity, and full of conflicting and often fanatical religious beliefs—this Asia was profoundly stirred by its contact with the West, especially during the twentieth century. The very fact that Europeans and Americans, alien peoples, strove to impose a foreign culture upon the Asiatics drove many of these into a greater veneration for their own traditions and customs. They held to their accustomed ways with a fervent tenacity—often to their own woe. And into such an environment the Westerners tried posthaste to introduce steam railroads, electric current, modern factories, industrial machinery, and efficiency methods.

Before Europe reached its 1914 civilization it passed through a Renaissance, a Protestant Revolt, a century of religious wars, a Commercial Revolution, a French Revolutionary epoch, and an Industrial Revolution; but in Asia the aim was to remake a much vaster continent at one fell

swoop. Asia was made to suffer all the pangs of a tenfold revolution at one and the same time.[1]

The attempted hasty industrialization of his continent was not the only bewildering phenomenon that the Asiatic was forced to witness. He was made to look out upon a confusing and terrifying series of contrasts. How startling it must have been to him on occasion to hear almost simultaneously the pacific words of a missionary and the sputtering of a machine gun; to hear about self-determination and at the same time to see foreign gunboats on Chinese rivers, foreign battle planes over Afghan villages, or foreign troops in Indian towns. He must have been amazed by the facility with which so many Westerners mixed idealism and materialism, by the incongruity of charitable right hands and grasping left hands. He heard his autocratic systems of government denounced, and he witnessed the setting up of even more autocratic regimes. Still more was he puzzled, after the war, to hear from some Europeans about the wonders of industrialism and the advantages of the capitalist order, and from others about the evils of capitalism and imperialism and the supposed glories of an international communist system. With his own condition, moreover, he was dissatisfied. What was he to do?

It was one of the unfortunate aspects of the situation that most of the people in Asia did not know exactly what they wanted. They were often discontented, poor, and oppressed. They groped in the dark and sometimes were hysterical when they were not phlegmatic. Their great stumbling block appeared to be the paucity of adequate leadership. Frequently such leaders as did arise were inexperienced, unpractical visionaries with grandiose but mystical schemes and dreams. Interested groups generally found little difficulty in counteracting the influence of these leaders by holding them up to ridicule or else throwing them into prison. Generally, it was oratory and curse against blast furnace and armored tank. To this rule, however, there were a few conspicuous exceptions, notably the "Chinese George Washington," Dr. Sun Yat-Sen.

The hundreds of millions of people who comprise the mass population of Asia found their course of life little altered as a consequence of the military aspects of the First World War. Even India and China were only

[1] One is reminded, in this connection, of Rudyard Kipling's lines:

Now it is not good for the Christian's health to hustle the Aryan brown,
For the Christian riles and the Aryan smiles and he weareth the Christian down;
And the end of the fight is a tombstone white with the name of the late deceased,
And the epitaph drear: "A fool lies here who tried to hustle the East."

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slightly affected by the actual fighting. In the case of India more than a million men fought on the side of the British; but upwards of 300,000,000 people remained at home, and of these many perhaps were unaware that a world struggle was in progress. In the case of China the official declaration of war resulted in little more than the confiscation of a number of German merchant vessels in Chinese harbors and the drafting of coolies to labor behind the lines.

More important were the economic and psychological effects of the war. Many moderate Indian leaders who hoped that a loyal India would be rewarded after the conflict with political autonomy became radical and bitter in their eventual disappointment. At the same time a few of these leaders added considerably to their experience and prestige by participating in the Paris Peace Conference and in some of the postwar British Imperial Conferences. During the war, moreover, India's iron and steel industries were stimulated, and new commercial contacts were established with Japan.

In China, the passing of Kiaochow from German to Japanese control caused a renewed flaring up of a young nationalism that strove to assert the right of the Chinese to their fatherland. Interested foreign groups, however, soon brought pressure to bear on the nationalists, and local chieftains were encouraged to set themselves up as war lords in various parts of China. It thus appeared to many Chinese that, whereas nationalism was praised as the worship of the soul of nations in the West, this same spirit, when it appeared in so-called backward countries, was to be crushed under the heels of Western and Japanese imperialists.

In Persia, whose sovereignty had been impaired by Anglo-Russian agreements of 1907 and 1915 and on whose neutral soil Russians, Britishers, and Turks had fought some of their battles during the First World War, national resentment was strong enough in the postwar years to accomplish unexpected things. An Anglo-Persian treaty of 1919, that would have converted Persia into a British protectorate, was denounced because of an aroused nationalist opinion. The government that had consented to the treaty was overthrown in 1921 by Riza Khan, an able soldier who, having risen from the ranks, became successively commander-in-chief, minister of war, premier, and, after the ousting of the weak sovereign, hereditary ruler as Riza Shah Pahlevi (1925).

Under its nationalistic government Persia made rapid political and economic headway. Foreign military and gendarmerie officers were dismissed, the army was converted into a well-drilled unit, and most of the hitherto autonomous desert tribes were brought under the central authority. Able foreign financial advisers were employed to straighten out the mon-

archy's fiscal difficulties and to improve the conditions of health and education. Public works were undertaken, railroad construction was begun, the capitulatory rights of foreigners were abolished, and women were placed on a social level more nearly that of men. Then the Persian Government forced the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, a majority of whose stock was owned by the British Government, to accept a revised lease-concession (1933) canceling an earlier document of 1901. The new agreement gave Persia better financial terms than she had previously received and curtailed the company's sphere of interest. The outcome of this incident, which for a time threatened to precipitate a dangerous quarrel, constituted a triumph for a state that only a dozen years previously had generally been regarded as a legitimate field for aggressive exploitation. In 1935 the official name of Persia became Iran.[2]

Although the two main aspects of the Asiatic revolt—resentment at European domination and discontent over the changes resulting from the "Westernization" of Asia—expressed themselves in a variety of ways, the most effective weapon that the natives for a time were able to use against Western machinery and arms was the economic boycott. Uprisings could be crushed, bombs were more destructive than lances, tanks more deadly than fanaticism—but the only way to beat an Oriental boycott seemed to be to make concessions. More than once Japan was forced to give way, when her demands on China were too unpopular, by the power of a Chinese boycott that threatened to cripple Japanese trade and commerce. Great Britain several times felt the force of Indian boycotts and preferred not to have to deal with the unpleasant phenomenon. But here again the absence of effective native leadership precluded the unity necessary to support a successful demand for equality.

For a time after the First World War the universality of unrest in Asia gave rise to talk of a Pan-Asia movement. It was feared in some quarters that the Asiatics might attempt to set up a counterpoise to the League of Nations and thereby definitely divide East and West into two powerful, hostile combinations. Yet remote as a Pan-Europa seemed, a Pan-Asia appeared to be even more distant. It was said that the psychological differences between India and China, for example, were greater than the corresponding differences between Western Europe and China. The groups so loosely termed "Asiatics" by the Europeans and Americans really were widely separated from one another by political, economic, social, and re-

[2] Somewhat similar events occurred in neighboring Afghanistan, whose able ruler, Amanullah Khan, secured British recognition of independence in 1922.

ligious gaps that were far greater than those among the various European peoples.

Of more immediate importance were the relations of Asia with the League of Nations. Japan for a time was a leading member, with a permanent seat in the Council and an influential voice in affairs. China was elected to a temporary seat in the Council. Iran, India, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Siam all were admitted to membership and took active part in the workings of the League. These relationships appeared the more remarkable because the League was conceived fundamentally to deal with antagonisms arising out of the developments of European, not Asiatic, life. But since much of Asia's future confidence in the League depended upon the latter's help to such countries as China—countries which were striving to absorb the shock of the clash of West and East and to reach a working compromise between the two—it was unfortunate that the Geneva body failed to intervene more actively in the Sino-Japanese dispute of 1931 and after.

From a material standpoint much of Asia continued to require friendly assistance and needed to learn about Western advances. Millions of people needed to be educated, stable governments had to be set up, machines more generally utilized, agricultural methods modernized, certain religious rites modified, wider viewpoints introduced, and the economic systems brought into harmony with a general world economy. But this could not be achieved overnight nor by forceful imposition upon unwilling recipients. All Asiatic traditions did not need to be discarded and replaced by European traditions. Instead, Asiatic traditions required gradual modification to fit modern world conditions. First the new viewpoints and attitudes, then the new methods—that seemed to be the most effective approach in a region where custom played so important a role.

Let us now turn to a more detailed study of developments from 1919 to 1939 in certain specific Asiatic countries.

PALESTINE (ISRAEL) AND SYRIA

In 1922 the League approved the assignment of Palestine to Great Britain as a Class A mandate. At that time the Holy Land had a population of 756,000, including 600,000 Moslem Arabs, 83,000 Jews, and 73,000 Christian Arabs. The Moslems were disappointed that the terms of the mandate confirmed the Balfour Declaration of 1917 wherein Great Britain had promised to establish in Palestine "a national home for the Jewish people." The Arabs found little consolation in the parallel promise that

"nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities." They failed to see how the arrangement fitted in with Great Britain's wartime promises of Arabian independence or with the right of self-determination.

The first British High Commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel, promptly promulgated a constitution (1922). It provided for a high commissioner, an appointive executive council, and a legislative council consisting of the high commissioner and twenty-two deputies. Ten deputies were to be appointed by the commissioner and the remaining twelve (eight Moslems, two Christians, and two Jews) were to be elected. The Moslems refused to vote at elections for this council, and Samuel was obliged to govern with an appointed advisory council. In 1940 the legislative process still consisted in the publication of draft ordinances which might be criticized by the several elements of the population; the government then promulgated the decrees, with such amendments as it had decided to adopt.

The discontent of the Arabs with political, economic, and religious conditions crystallized in a violent anti-Jewish outbreak in 1929, during which many Jews were killed. The MacDonald Government rushed armed forces to the scene and soon restored order. A British commission established as the cause for the rioting "the Arab feeling of animosity and hostility toward the Jews, consequent upon the disappointment of their political and national aspirations, and fear for their economic future." The League Mandates Commission, however, claimed that the outburst was directed as much against Great Britain as against the Jews and blamed the British for failure to provide adequate military and police protection.

The Arabs did enumerate specific grievances against both the authorities and the Jews. They complained that the land legislation enabled the Jews to buy up large portions of the none-too-plentiful arable soil and threatened the existence of thousands of Arabs. They objected to the government's favorable attitude towards Jewish immigration, for by 1930 the number of Jews had almost doubled. And they did not like the type of immigrant who entered Palestine. Most of the entering Jews, coming from Poland, Russia, and Romania, were poor and, so claimed the Arabs, frequently radical.

A further Arabian-Jewish dispute involved the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem. At this wall, supposedly a relic of Solomon's Temple, the Jews had been accustomed to worship and to mourn. Since the wall adjoined a sacred Mohammedan shrine, the Mosque of Omar, there was opportunity for strife whenever religiously excited Jews and Moslems appeared for worship simultaneously at the neighboring holy spots. So serious did this Wailing

Wall situation become that the British Government in 1930 appointed a neutral commission to find a solution for the problem. The commission reported that the wall and its adjoining pavement were Moslem property, but that, with certain restrictions, the Jews should be granted free access to it. The report was promptly implemented by the high commissioner.

Meanwhile the British Government had come into conflict with the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency for Palestine. In May 1930 the authorities had indefinitely suspended immigration permits already issued to more than 2000 prospective Jewish immigrants. The ban was imposed pending a study of Palestinian economic conditions by a commission under Sir John Hope Simpson. The commission issued its report in October 1930, and simultaneously the British Colonial Office published a White Paper which announced a new official policy in the future administration of the mandate.

The White Paper maintained that too much haste had been shown in the upbuilding of the Jewish homeland and that, as a result, the future welfare of the Arabs had been jeopardized.

The condition of the Arab fellah [said the paper] leaves much to be desired, and a policy of land development is called for if an improvement in his conditions of life is to be effected. The sole agencies which have pursued a consistent policy of land development have been the Jewish colonisation organisations, . . . The Jewish settlers have had every advantage that capital, science and organisation could give them. To these and to the energy of the settlers themselves their remarkable progress is due. On the other hand, the Arab population, while lacking the advantages enjoyed by the Jewish settlers, has, by the excess of births over deaths, increased with great rapidity, while the land available for its sustenance has decreased by about 250,000 acres. This area has passed into Jewish hands. . . . It can now be definitely stated that at the present time and with the present methods of Arab cultivation there remains no margin of land available for agricultural settlement by new immigrants, with the exception of such undeveloped land as the various Jewish agencies hold in reserve. . . . It is only the closest coöperation between the government and the leaders of the Arab and Jewish communities that can prevent Palestine from drifting into a situation that would imperil, on the one hand, the devoted work of those who have sought to build up a Jewish National Home, and, on the other, the interests of the majority of the population who at present possess few resources of their own with which to sustain the struggle for existence.

Obviously, close coöperation between Arabs and Jews was impossible so long as the Arabs felt that Jewish immigration was depriving them of land, work, and political power. For, as the Simpson Report pointed out, the Jewish Foundation Fund, which leased land to Jewish colonies, had forbidden Arabian labor on its soil, and the General Federation of Jewish

Labor had adopted a policy of importing Jewish workmen rather than employing landless Arabs. In these circumstances Great Britain felt justified in continuing the suspension of immigrations.

The declaration of this new British policy was gratifying to the Arabs. But the Jews, both within and without Palestine, were angry. Dr. Chaim Weizmann resigned as president of the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency. The British Government was accused of the "cruel and unfair betrayal" of a "harassed people." The MacDonald Government, however, insisted that it was simply striving to carry out the threefold task of giving the Jews a national home in Palestine (not of making Palestine a Jewish national home), of dealing fairly with the large Moslem majority, and of preparing the land for self-government.

In 1932 the government of Palestine eased its restrictions against further immigration and permitted free entry to any farmer, merchant, or businessman who possessed a minimum capital of $2500. Each month, also, a quota of Jewish laborers was admitted, for the economic progress of the land was remarkable. Jewish capital to the extent of many million dollars flowed into the Holy Land, and scientific methods were applied to agriculture and industry. Electrification proceeded rapidly through the efforts of the Palestine Electric Corporation. A large hydroelectric plant was constructed, utilizing the waters of the Jordan and Yarmuk rivers. A well-backed corporation was formed to extract the salts dissolved in the Dead Sea. A Hebrew University was opened in Jerusalem in 1925. Harbor facilities were improved at Jaffa and Haifa. There was little unemployment, and the Palestinian budget showed a surplus. The rise to power of the National Socialists in Germany brought a new wave of Jewish migration to Palestine and additional worry to Arabian leaders. By 1937 the Jews numbered 400,000 out of a population of 1,400,000. Their proportion in the population had risen from 11 per cent in 1922 to 28 per cent in 1937.

In 1936 the triple conflict among Arabian nationalism, Zionism, and British imperial interests once more became violent. The Arabian leaders late in 1935 had presented a list of demands asking for democratic government, the cessation of land sales to Jews, a law to protect small cultivators against loss of land through debts, suspension of Jewish immigration, and strict watch over illegal entry. The refusal of the authorities to adopt this program led to renewed anti-Jewish riots in 1936. London thereupon appointed a commission under Earl Peel to ascertain the underlying causes of the disturbances, find out whether anyone had legitimate grievances against the way in which the mandate was functioning, and make any pertinent recommendations.

The Peel Commission conducted hearings and listened to Jews, Moslem Arabs, and Christian Arabs. It then returned to London to prepare its report on the basis of "a small mountain" of evidence, plus the knowledge of Palestine's importance to Great Britain as an air and military base, as containing the terminus of an oil pipe line from Mosul, and as one of a number of strategic points from which to dispute Mussolini's claim to "our sea." The British had also to consider the effect of any decision upon the attitude of the Jews in the event of another war and upon the numerous Moslems scattered throughout the British Empire.

The report was approved by the British Cabinet and made public in 1937. The commissioners declared that "the obligations Britain undertook towards the Arabs and the Jews some twenty years ago . . . have proved irreconcilable, and as far ahead as we can see, they must continue to conflict. . . . We cannot—in Palestine as it now is—both concede the Arab claim to self-government and secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home." Inasmuch as "neither race can fairly rule all Palestine, each race might justly rule part of it. . . . Partition offers a chance of ultimate peace. No other plan does."

It was therefore proposed to end the mandate and divide the country into three parts: a new Jewish state occupying about one-fourth of the area of Palestine, an Arabian section including most of the remainder of Palestine in union with Trans-Jordan, and an area under British administration including Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and other holy places. The Jewish and Arabian states were to be proposed for League membership but were to retain an alliance relationship with Great Britain.

The plan aroused protests from all sides. The Jews once more raised the cry of betrayal. The Arabs claimed that "the richest zone is to be given to the Jews, the holiest to the British, and the most barren to the Arabs." Some Arabs again became violent, stimulated by Italian encouragement. Italian radio sets were distributed among the Arabs, and anti-British broadcasts emanated from the Italian sender at Bari.[3] Moderate Arabs who pointed to advantages in the Peel Plan were the victims of murderous attacks, and a British district commissioner was assassinated. Scores of Arabian leaders, some of them non-Palestinians, were jailed or deported. Meanwhile the unrest reacted to the disadvantage of economic life, with much attendant suffering for the population.

The British Government had declared its purpose to carry out the plan, but in the face of so much criticism the House of Commons ordered the

[3] In 1938 the British Broadcasting Company inaugurated Arabic programs to counteract the Italian broadcasts.

submission of the whole matter to the League for further consideration. The League recommended another study of the entire Palestinian affair. Hence, in 1938, another commission, headed by Sir John Woodhead, was directed to draw up a "more precise and detailed scheme" than the Peel Plan for solving the Palestine riddle. The Woodhead Commission unanimously opposed the partition proposals because it appeared impossible to recommend boundaries for the suggested areas that would afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment of self-supporting Arab and Jewish states. The British Government thereupon decided that "the surest foundation for peace and progress in Palestine would be an understanding between the Arabs and Jews" and hence invited to a conference at London representatives of the Palestinian Arabs, the Arabs of neighboring states, and delegates from the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

This news came at a time when Great Britain had found it necessary to send many more soldiers to Palestine. For months Palestine had now been the scene of bomb outrages, attacks from ambush, and guerrilla warfare. Leader of the "rebel" Arabs was Haj Amin el-Husseini, Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and president of the Arab Higher Committee. Although the mufti had fled to Syria, he remained in contact with his followers. The latter attacked moderate Arabs who were willing to seek a compromise solution as fiercely as they attacked Jews or British guards. During the period of the European crisis over Czechoslovakia the rebel campaign was intensified, and the misery of the masses became worse. At last, in February 1939, the London conference on Palestine was opened by Premier Chamberlain. But because the Arab delegates refused to sit in the same room with the Jews, Chamberlain had to extend his official greetings in two sections.

The Arabs demanded the formation of an independent Arab state tied to Great Britain by treaty only, proportionate representation for Arabs and Jews in the parliament of the new state, denunciation of the Balfour Declaration, prohibition of Jewish immigration, and stoppage of land sales to Jews. The Jews took an opposite stand on each point. The British, negotiating separately with the two groups, tried to find a compromise position, but to no avail. The conference soon closed in failure. In the midst of further violence came the news of the outbreak of the Second World War.

The experiences of France in her Syrian mandate, an important silk-producing area, were almost as troublous as those of Great Britain in Palestine. For convenience and perhaps to prevent the development of any strong national feeling, the land was divided into five (later four) administrative areas, each with a different name and law system, but all subordi-

nate to one high commissioner. Martial law and censorship were established and French became the language of the law courts. Much of the gold in Syria was drained away, and a paper currency was introduced which fluctuated with the depreciated French paper francs. The Moslems, who comprised a majority of the population, believed that the French were favoring the Christian minority.

In 1924 High Commissioner General Maxim Weygand, a conservative Catholic, was removed at the insistence of the anticlericals in the Chamber of Deputies. He was replaced by General Maurice Sarrail, who antagonized the Christians as well as the Moslems and who crowned his administrative efforts in 1925 by inviting the leaders of some discontented Druse tribes to Damascus for a parley and then putting them in prison when they accepted the call. Thereupon the Druse tribesmen broke into open revolt. The French captured some of the rebels and, as a warning to others, displayed in the public square of Damascus the corpses of 24 persons whom they had shot. When the city populace thereupon became enraged and attacked some French troops, the latter were withdrawn from Damascus and the city was shot at by artillery and airplanes. Part of the city was destroyed, and many people were killed. The Damascenes were required to pay a fine of $440,000 and surrender 3000 rifles.

Sarrail was recalled, and late in 1925 Senator Henri de Jouvenel was appointed to succeed him. Before de Jouvenel arrived in Syria the French subordinate officials had permitted the arming of Christians and thus paved the way for additional trouble. The new governor tried to negotiate with the Druses but refused their demand for a "peace conference," since this would have implied recognition of their status as belligerents rather than insurgents. Early in 1926 hostilities were resumed. Damascus was again bombarded. The Mandates Commission thereupon criticized French policy and condemned recourse in mandates to such expedients as air bombardments, incendiaries, destruction of villages, and collective fines except "in cases of absolute necessity." De Jouvenel was replaced by Henri Ponsot, who crushed all remaining armed outbreaks. But the discontent, particularly in the rural districts, and the demand for autonomy did not abate.

In 1928 Ponsot convened a Syrian Constituent Assembly to draw up an instrument of government. When the nationalist delegates, who were in a majority, insisted on the establishment of an independent republic, the gathering was suspended *sine die*. In 1930 the commissioner himself issued a constitution, setting up a republic restricted only by the mandatory powers of France and by French control of its foreign affairs. The document provided for a parliament and for a president who was always to be a Moslem

and was to be chosen by the parliament for five years.[4] The first elections under this constitution were held amid great disorder in 1932. Owing, the nationalists asserted, to the interference of the French, the elected deputies included 54 members of the Moderate Party and only 15 representatives of the Nationalist Party, the latter being opposed to the continuance of the mandate. To the accompaniment of further violence, the parliament elected the wealthy Ahmed Ali Bey el-Abed president of the republic.

Ponsot was succeeded as high commissioner in 1933 by Damien de Martel, who with the Syrian Premier signed a treaty which provided that, after four years, France would recommend Syrian membership in the League of Nations. For 25 years, however, France would continue to supervise Syrian foreign, military, and financial matters. When it became clear that the Syrian Parliament would not approve the document, the high commissioner withdrew it and suspended the legislature. (The disaffection of the Syrians was not entirely owing to political reasons. The economic situation of the mandate had become increasingly bad during the depression years, as evinced by an alarming drop in its foreign trade.)

In September 1936 France and Syria signed another treaty, this one providing for the latter's independence after three years. Turkey thereupon requested that an autonomous regime be set up in the new Syria for the sanjak (district) of Alexandretta, including the city of Antioch and inhabited by a large proportion of Turks. The matter was referred to the League Council, which proposed that Alexandretta should remain under the sovereignty of Syria, with the latter controlling its foreign relations and customs. The district was, however, to have its own local legislature, with Turkish as the official language. These principles were incorporated in a statute, and a League commission was dispatched to Alexandretta to prepare for elections in 1938.

The Turks objected to the commission's methods, which, it was claimed, would give them a minority in the local assembly. Rioting occurred, and the League commission was forced to retire from the area. The critical situation in Europe in 1938 induced Paris and Ankara promptly to sign an agreement in the Turkish capital. The document provided that Alexandretta should become "an autonomous State under Franco-Turkish administration, with French and Turkish troops as a joint defense force." Thereupon Turkish soldiers equal in number to the French entered the sanjak, and

[4] This constitution did not apply to the administrative unit called Lebanon, which in 1926 had been given a republican charter of its own. The population of Syria in 1939 was about 2,250,000 and the area 58,500 square miles. Lebanon had an area of 3800 square miles and about 860,000 inhabitants.

new preparations were begun for an assembly election. In September 1938 the first assembly convened. Its members, a majority of whom were Turks, adopted for their constituency the name of Republic of Hatay.[5]

The new state had a short life. As the European situation became more critical in 1939, both Great Britain and France became more interested in gaining assurances of Turkish friendship in the event of trouble in the eastern Mediterranean. The British negotiated an accord with Turkey providing for mutual assistance in case of attack. A similar treaty was signed by Turkey with France, but the latter had to pay a price: she ceded to Turkey most of the republic of Hatay. A small section, inhabited largely by Armenians, was returned to Syria, and Turkey promised in future to remain aloof from Syrian questions. The Hatay Parliament accepted the transfer and voted itself out of existence.

Syria protested against the cession, claiming that France had no right to give away mandated territory. Germany and Italy joined in the protest (on the ground that the treaty violated the League Covenant!), and the Permanent Mandates Commission censured France. But Paris remained firm. The Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936, moreover, was not ratified by the French Parliament, owing to France's desire to remain entrenched in the eastern Mediterranean area. When renewed rioting broke out in Syria, the mandate's constitution was suspended and the French High Commissioner assumed full control. Such was the situation when the Second World War began.

INDIA

Within three months after the outbreak of the First World War, Indian troops were fighting on the western front. Altogether, India supplied 1,300,000 soldiers and laborers who were utilized in Egypt, China, Africa, Arabia, and the Balkans, as well as in France. The government of India presented Great Britain with a gift of $500,000,000. A donation of $25,000,000 was contributed by the princes of the quasi-independent Native Indian States. But the circumstance that she did not make it necessary for Great Britain to quell serious native revolts was India's greatest contribution to the Allied cause.

The political life of India had long been characterized by unrest. Conditions had been troubled under the regime of the British East India Company (1600–1857), and there had been only slight improvement under the

[5] Hatay, the Turkish name for the district, bore an obvious relation to Hittites, whom the Turks looked upon as their ancestors.

administration of the British Government from 1858. A number of native leaders, through their travels and studies in the West, had come to look upon representative government as an urgent goal. During the war, therefore, Indian leaders made it clear that they hoped to win concessions as a reward for their loyalty. Their hands were strengthened by a *rapprochement* which the war brought about between the Moslems and Hindus in India. The Mohammedans refused to heed the Ottoman Sultan's call for a Holy War against Great Britain and instead united with the Hindus in aiding the British and demanding political change. In 1916 the Indian National Congress, organized in 1885, and the All-India Moslem League, founded in 1906, met together for the first time. Prominent at the gathering were the newspaper editor, Bāl Gangadhar Tilak, and a remarkably active Irishwoman, Mrs. Annie Besant.[6] The fraternization of Moslems and Hindus resulted in the presentation to Great Britain (1916) of a political plan known as the Congress-League Scheme.

With their attention centered upon the war, the British at first paid little heed to the scheme. Eventually, however, the growing unrest made some action imperative. In 1917 the secretary of state for India, Edwin Montagu, determined to introduce reforms leading ultimately to self-government. Careful to stress that the steps toward self-government would be "gradual," Montagu went to India and, with Viceroy Lord Chelmsford, held numerous interviews. The consensus of British officials in India was that any diminution of British power would lead to disorder, repression, and caste warfare. This view was upheld by the European merchants in India and by some Moslems who feared Brahmin rule. Nationalist spokesmen, on the other hand, heaped up charges of extravagance and waste against British rule. They complained of the laxity of famine control, the cost of the army, and the haughty attitude adopted by Britishers toward natives. They also demanded a protective tariff against certain British products.

Following these interviews, a Montagu-Chelmsford Report was published in 1918. For several months parliamentary committees framed legislation based upon the principles in the document. Meanwhile an increasing discontent in India, manifested by strikes and agitation, led to the decreeing of the Rowlatt Acts. These laws empowered the government to suspend jury trial, curtail the right of appeal, and inflict severe penalties. Later all public meetings were forbidden. In 1919 the conflict between the authorities and the natives reached a climax at Amritsar.

[6] Mrs. Besant was president of the Theosophical Society and was so strenuous an advocate of Indian nationalism that she was several times imprisoned and deported. The slogan of her paper, *The New India*, was "Home Rule for India."

Here the rioting had cost the lives of some British persons. Brigadier Reginald E. Dyer was called upon to restore order. On one occasion (April 13) the brigadier discovered that a mass meeting was being illegally held in an enclosed public square. Dyer marched some troops to the meeting place and gave the command to fire into the crowd. About 400 people were killed and three times as many wounded. Popular indignation was so great that Parliament appointed a commission to investigate the "massacre." The report of this commission whitewashed the affair, though it did censure Dyer for shooting without notice and for continuing to fire after he had the situation in hand. The Indians were indignant over the report, and their anger was not appeased when Dyer, though recalled from India, lost neither rank nor pension.

The Indians, therefore, were in no happy mood when Parliament passed the Government of India Act (1919), based upon the Montagu-Chelmsford Report. This act, which applied only to the provinces comprising British India and not to the 600 Indian States, increased the number of voters in *provincial* elections from 30,000 to 5,300,000, thus enfranchising 2.2 per cent of the population.[7] In central affairs the viceroy was to be assisted, as before, by a Council of State and a Legislative Assembly. The membership of the council was placed at 60. Thirty-four of the councilors were to be elected by a restricted body of voters numbering about 18,000; the remaining 26 were to be nominated by the viceroy. In the assembly provision was made for 144 seats, 103 of them elective. Fewer than 1,000,000 persons were entitled to vote for members of the lower house. Laws generally required the consent of the assembly, although in some instances the assent of the council was sufficient. In case of emergency the viceroy might issue decrees with the force of law, and to him was left full control of the budget, defense, and foreign affairs. Further change, it was provided, would be considered after ten years.

The most remarkable feature of the law created a dyarchy or double government in provincial matters. In each province such matters as police, law, and administration were "reserved" to the provincial governor. The governor was appointed by the viceroy, himself an appointee of the emperor of India. Affairs such as sanitation, education, agriculture, and health were "transferred" to the supervision of the provincial councils, a majority of whose members were elected.

The Indian Nationalists, now organized as a party, were not content with these concessions. They complained that the viceroy still would be

[7] The census of 1941 gave British India 295,800,000 inhabitants and the Indian States 93,000,000, making an all-India total of 388,800,000.

supreme through his control of the purse strings; that the act, which in effect was India's constitution, ought to be subject to revision in less than the prescribed decade; that the franchise was too restricted; and that the provincial councils would not be able to appropriate sufficiently large sums for educational and agricultural projects. A movement to secure further concessions from the British was at once inaugurated, the leading agitator now being a fifty-year-old lawyer named Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi.

Gandhi was born in 1869 of a prominent family. After a morbid and unhappy youth, which included a marriage at thirteen, he went to England to study law, under the threefold vow of celibacy, vegetarianism, and abstention from alcohol. "Shy, retiring, lonesome, awkward, uncouth in dress and speech, bewildered by strange manners, and nearly starving in a country where people took little pains to provide for vegetarians, he suffered pitiably. In time, however, he located a vegetarian restaurant; and with regular and ample meals his health improved." Following his admission to the bar, Gandhi returned to India to practice law. He was not particularly successful and was delighted when an opportunity came in 1893 to handle a case in South Africa.

For the next twenty years Gandhi remained in South Africa, upholding the rights of immigrant Indian laborers. He rose to eminence as a pleader, and the British Government usually supported his endeavors to establish the equality of Indians with other subjects of the empire. For this aid Gandhi was grateful, and from 1914 to 1918 he was active in securing Indian military enlistments. After the return of peace, however, the Rowlatt Acts and the Amritsar incident turned him against British policy.

Personally Gandhi seemed an enigma, being labeled in turn a prophet, a madman, and a politician. A small, wizened ascetic, he spent much time fasting and praying and appeared little interested in riches or pleasure. His followers called him *Mahatma,* the Great Soul or the Holy One. Like many other Indians, he came to the conclusion that the "gigantic sordidness" of Western industrialism was incompatible with the soul-communing spirit of Orientalism.

Gandhi strove fervently to secure *swaraj* or home rule for India and was the leading advocate of the wearing of homespun cloth. He abhorred violence, and when Great Britain hesitated to grant autonomy began preaching passive resistance. His followers were urged to adopt a policy of material and spiritual noncoöperation (*satyagraha*). Before long the Hindus effectively boycotted British schools, courts, receptions, and products; remained away from the polls; and disregarded the Rowlatt Laws. The natives hoped that by thus proving the British reforms a farce and by

injuring British pocketbooks they would secure an early grant of home rule. During 1920 and 1921 several incidents aided Gandhi's movement. Moslems flocked to his standard because of the harsh Allied treatment of Turkey in the peace negotiations at Sèvres. Additional recruits were gained when the British Parliament restricted the area in the African colony of Kenya in which Hindus might settle. The harshness of the police in dealing with Indian crowds also reacted to the Mahatma's advantage.

But the Indians displayed more zeal in burning British cloth than in producing homespun. Gandhi attributed too much power to the spinning wheel, and he frequently talked over the heads of his listeners. Sometimes, after inflaming them with his eloquent speeches, he found it impossible to restrain them from rash action. A visit of the Prince of Wales to India was made the occasion for serious strikes and riots, and in 1922 Gandhi was sentenced to six years' imprisonment for inciting the populace to violence.

With Gandhi in prison the anti-British agitation subsided, and the Moslems and Hindus fell to quarreling again. Noncoöperation had apparently proved a failure. Some Nationalists decided to abandon the boycott and run candidates for election to the Legislative Assembly. Here, as members of a newly formed Swarajist Party, they could at least air their views in public debate. From 1922 to 1927 the home-rule agitation was confined chiefly to the legislative chambers. In these circumstances the government considered it safe to free Gandhi in 1924 after he had had an operation for appendicitis. Following his release, Gandhi remained in retirement for five years.

Meanwhile a committee of the assembly had voted the dyarchic system a failure. Both the British and the Indian committee members were in agreement on this point. In 1925 Pandit Motilal Nehru, leader of the Swarajists, asked for full responsible government in the provinces and responsible government in all national spheres save defense and foreign affairs. It soon became obvious that consideration of a revision of the Montagu reforms ought not to be deferred until 1929. Accordingly a commission, representing all three British parties and headed by Sir John Simon, was appointed in 1927. There were no Indians on this body, but Simon invited the leading native statesmen to work with the group "in joint conference." The Nationalists, however, resented their official exclusion and boycotted the delegation when it arrived in India. Several attempts were made to dynamite the commission's special train. The investigation ended in 1929, and a two-volume report was published in June 1930.

While the Simon Commission was at work, the tide of Indian nation-

alism rose once more. Gandhi emerged from retirement and was supported by an energetic group of leaders, among them the poetess, Mme. Sarojini Naidu, the well-liked Pandit Motilal Nehru, and the latter's fiery son, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. At an All-India National Congress of 1929, which represented Moslems as well as Hindus, a resolution was passed demanding dominion status for India. There was a strong movement for independence, but this was opposed by Gandhi. The mahatma felt that dominion status was the only platform on which India could stand with a solid front. In March 1930 Gandhi issued an ultimatum to the viceroy for immediate dominion status.

When his demand was rejected, Gandhi launched a new civil-disobedience campaign. Choosing as the target for his passive resistance the government salt monopoly, he determined to violate a law that forbade natives to make salt from sea water. He and a band of volunteers marched 170 miles to Dandi on the Gulf of Cambay to make salt. His first violation of the law was the signal for a general defiance of laws throughout India. Hindu officials resigned, and the collection of taxes was resisted. In the cities, natives obstructed railway and street traffic by lying down on the tracks or in the path of vehicles. Gandhi again cautioned his followers to abstain from violence, but they were not all so gentle as he, and much blood was shed. The authorities for a time refrained from arresting the Holy One lest he be regarded as a martyr; but eventually the situation became so bad that he and other prominent Nationalists were jailed.

The resulting anger of the people was heightened when the recommendations of the Simon Commission became known. The report aimed at increasing the powers of the governor-general and the provincial governors. It avoided even a reference to dominion status or independence, and it hurt educated Indians by the curt manner in which it proposed making the provincial legislatures a school wherein the natives might secure "primary instruction and training in government." Now more and more members of the National Congress began to demand independence, but the incarceration of the leaders and the approach of the rainy season checked the outbursts as 1930 drew to a close. The bond of unity among the various groups had been frail; and now, as in previous instances, the Moslems and Hindus, the high and low castes, found in union more strain than strength.

Meanwhile the British Government had called a Round-Table Conference in London as a possible means of arriving at some Indian compromise. The gathering assembled in November 1930 and consisted of 13 British members—Premier MacDonald and four members from each of the three political parties—and 76 Indians. The latter represented the Native States

and all political groups in British India save the Congress Nationalists, including Gandhi, who preferred to remain in jail rather than coöperate. The Indian delegation included Moslems and Hindus as well as women deputies and even a pariah or member of the "untouchable" caste.

The Round Table achieved a number of results. The Native Princes announced their willingness to enter a federation with British India. It was agreed that Burma should be separated from India. The high-caste members approved political equality for the untouchables in the projected constitution. The greatest quandary that faced the conference was the Moslem-Hindu controversy. The Moslems feared for their treatment under an autonomous government since they formed only 22 per cent of the population. They insisted upon separate communal (religious) electorates and a share in the government services wherever sizable Moslem minorities existed. This problem was not settled by the conference.

When the Indian conferees returned from London to explain their accomplishments, the extremists at home, many of whom now were released from confinement, denounced the gains as no more than "a cup of milk for a hungry lion." Gandhi renewed his civil-disobedience campaign until March 1931, when a truce was reached. The Nationalists promised to refrain from civil disobedience, while the government granted some amnesties and consented to peaceful picketing and boycotting. Neither side fully observed the terms of the truce, and disorder was rife all through the summer. London therefore proposed a reassembling of the Round-Table Conference in September 1931. Gandhi, after much hesitation, accepted an invitation to attend.

The second Round-Table Conference was a disappointing affair. Not only were the proceedings made difficult by the conflicting views of the Indians and Britishers on the extent of self-government to be accorded, but the delegates from the Native States and from British India could not agree on a form of federation, the Moslems and Hindus were farther apart than ever on the question of political safeguards for the former, and there were differences of opinion regarding the status to be assigned to the untouchables. Much to the annoyance of Gandhi, Premier MacDonald informed the Indians that a new constitution would have to wait until they themselves could reach a compromise on communal electorates and minority safeguards. After several months spent in fruitless wrangling, the British Premier adjourned the conference, appointed committees to work out details, and promised to reconvene the Round Table when their reports were ready. Most of the Indian delegates went home feeling that the gathering had been a failure.

Throughout 1931 [8] the anti-British manifestations had repeatedly taken the form of attempts on the lives of officials. Now the unsuccessful conclusion of the Round Table spurred the natives to further violence. Conditions became so bad that the viceroy issued strict ordinances. Gandhi, upon his return from Great Britain, sought to induce the viceroy to rescind the decrees, but when his request was disregarded the civil-disobedience campaign was renewed. Thereupon the mahatma was once more jailed. President Mme. Naidu and 400 other members of the National Congress also were arrested when they defied a viceregal injunction against meeting. The arrests for violation of special ordinances multiplied rapidly, and each passing week saw an increase in the ranks of those who demanded independence.

Such incidents were not conducive to a settlement of the controversies laid bare at the Round-Table Conference. Not only did Anglo-Indian relations become bitterer than at any previous time, but the Moslem-Hindu rift widened rapidly. Bloody religious outbreaks occurred in several large cities. Eventually the Moslem League repudiated the violence of the Hindu Nationalists and denounced the extreme demands of the All-India National Congress. The Moslems and Hindus agreed on only one important point, and that for different reasons: they both decided to boycott a third Round Table.

The impasse sorely tried the patience of the British, and eventually Sir Samuel Hoare, secretary of state for India, announced that the British Government itself would devise a solution for the minorities question, would then recall the Round-Table Conference to draw up a constitution, and would finally submit all decisions to Parliament. This news was greeted in India with more riots, but London proceeded according to plan. A third Round Table met in London late in 1932, but Gandhi, whom the viceroy refused to release so long as the civil-disobedience campaign lasted, was not a member. Before its adjournment, the conference drafted a constitution to replace the instrument of 1919. The document, after some amendment, became law as the Government of India Act in 1935—despite violent denunciation by British liberals and Indian Nationalists.

The document provided for a central government and eleven provincial governments, the latter to carry the chief burden of domestic administration in British India. In the Native States the princes were to make whatever internal administrative arrangements they wished. The electorate for the provincial assemblies was to be increased to 35,000,000 men and women,

[8] In this year British exports to India were one-third less than in 1930. The economic depression added greatly to unrest and turmoil in the land.

while the right to vote directly for the national legislature was entirely withdrawn from the Indian people. The Council of State was to contain 150 members chosen by an electorate of 100,000 with a high property qualification, 104 appointed by the Native Princes, and 6 selected by the viceroy. The Legislative Assembly was to have 250 members chosen for five years by the provincial lower houses and 125 appointed by the princes. The viceroy was to continue in control of foreign relations and defense measures and was to have emergency powers to deal with domestic crises.



THE ELEVEN PROVINCES OF BRITISH INDIA

From Tschan, F. J., Grimm, H. J., and Squires, J. D. *Western Civilization,* 1942. Courtesy, J. B. Lippincott Co.

India's new constitution was inaugurated in 1937, although not all provisions were made effective at once. Many of the vocal groups in India expressed bitter opposition to the document. Some wanted independence. Others had hoped for dominion status. There was general discontent over

the "reserved powers" that left the viceroy in control of foreign affairs, defense, and finance.[9] Many objected because the franchise in provincial elections had not been further extended and because the minority safeguards reacted to the disadvantage of the Hindu majority.

The lead in opposition was taken by the Indian National Congress, whose members now had a choice of two leaders. Gandhi still retained his influence with the moderate elements, who, though dissatisfied, were ready to take every advantage offered by the constitution in a campaign for further reform. The more impatient group followed the young Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, who believed in independence to be obtained through obstructionist tactics. Nehru, the president of the congress, had also come to be politically radical. In 1936 he informed his colleagues that he regarded socialism as the only solution for India's ills. This stand resulted in a further split among the Indians, for Nehru's attitude appealed to many among the masses, but alienated the sympathies of others who hitherto had actively supported anti-British campaigns.

In the voting of 1937 the National Congress Party gained control of six of the eleven provincial assemblies. This apparently induced Gandhi to take a more radical view. He endorsed the Delhi Resolution, which bound members not to accept ministerial posts in provincial assemblies in which they had a majority unless the governors gave advance assurance that they would not set aside any legislative decisions. It was obviously illegal for the governors to make such promises, a fact which the Nationalists eventually admitted when they authorized their deputies to accept ministerial office. The governors, for their part, with the viceroy's approval, agreed not to intervene in "day to day" administration.

The first rupture over the interpretation of "day to day" administration came in 1938, when the ministries of Bihar and the United Provinces resigned because the respective governors had refused to permit the release of some political prisoners. A few days later the Indian Congress met, and both Gandhi and Subhas C. Bose, the newly chosen president, threatened further resignations and renewed civil disobedience. Eventually it was agreed that the two governors in question would accept the advice of their ministries concerning the fate of these political prisoners, but only after an individual examination of each case.

In 1939 India witnessed increasing tension among three contending elements. The viceroy favored the gradual application of the India Act of 1935. Gandhi's followers advocated continued negotiation with the British

[9] When the Legislative Assembly in 1936 voted one rupee to maintain the army, the viceroy merely proclaimed the government's original bill.

for dominion status. The adherents of Bose demanded a radical independent state. The stalemate among the three groups persisted until, following the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, the viceroy announced that the final settlement of India's status must await the outcome of the war. Once again the provincial assemblies under congress control (now numbering eight) resigned (October 1939), and Gandhi threatened civil disobedience until an "acceptable" British declaration of war aims respecting India was forthcoming.

CHINA AND JAPAN

a. THE COURSE OF REVOLUTION IN CHINA

In 1912 the Western world received the startling news of a successful revolution in the largest and perhaps most conservative of Asiatic empires: China. The Manchu dynasty which had ruled China since 1644 was ousted from power, and the empire was converted into a republic, bearing, at least outwardly, the earmarks of a European parliamentary system.

China had long been in a state of "backwardness," while the West had been advancing towards world supremacy. China's government under the emperors had been corrupt; her social development, retarded. Education had been confined to the few and had been out of tune with the requirements of a modern age. Famines, pestilence, and floods had wreaked havoc. Foreign "barbarians" had been exploiting China's natural resources. Instead of guarding the land, many officials had coöperated with the invaders, granting them concessions, tariff control, and leaseholds, and permitting them to set up their own courts on Chinese soil.

Between 1898 and 1900 there had occurred two unsuccessful movements to remedy the abuses of the Manchu regime and curtail the activities of foreigners. In 1898 a group of patriotic intellectuals influenced the young Emperor Kwang Hsü to launch a sweeping reform program. But because of their very radicalness the reforms were foredoomed to failure. China was too backward to be modernized overnight by a bundle of edicts, and turmoil and reaction followed the sudden attempt at widespread reform. Then, during the period of reaction, the authorities, inspired by the Dowager Empress Tsu Hsi, turned the popular dislike of "foreignism" into a concerted move to oust the "barbarians." The resulting Boxer Rebellion brought on an international punitive expedition and the exaction of a heavy indemnity.

As the twentieth century wore on and the Chinese became aware of the remarkable transformation wrought by the Westernization of Japan,

an increasing number of Chinese students went abroad to study. Especially was this true of many of the youth who lived in southern China, the region which had been last subdued by the Manchus and which had most frequently come in contact with the Westerners. At first, thousands of students went to Japan, which was relatively close and had a language similar to Chinese. But eventually many students preferred to seek education elsewhere. Some of them came to the United States, particularly after Washington remitted part of the Boxer indemnity and the money was applied towards scholarship funds. The number of Chinese university students in the United States rose from 6 in 1898 to 1500 in 1918.

Their foreign contacts and observations inspired these young people with a fervent national spirit. China's defeat by Japan in the war of 1894–1895 and the aggression of the foreigners helped to disseminate this spirit among the business classes and the professionals. The Manchus had never entirely lost their foreign aspect in the eyes of the Chinese intelligentsia, and from the late 1890's a powerful secret agitation had for its object the overthrow of the conquerors.

Sensing this widespread discontent and spurred by the example of Japan, who in 1904–1905 astonished the world by her stand against Russia, the Manchu Government inaugurated another reform program (1905). The literary examinations for governmental posts were replaced by tests in political science, economics, and history. A plan of constitutional reform was outlined, and provision was made for the calling of a national assembly. Before much progress in this direction was registered, the throne fell (1908) to Pu Yi, a boy not yet three years old. The regent was a conservative politician who attempted to halt the reform movement and who dismissed from the emperor's council Yuan Shih-kai, China's ablest military organizer.

The reformers now renewed their activities, and a national assembly was convened at Peking in 1910. It was soon dismissed, and the year 1911 witnessed troop mutinies, movements for local autonomy, and violent reactions to the continued granting of foreign concessions. In despair, the regent recalled Yuan, who advised the abdication of the Manchus. In February 1912 this suggestion was adopted, and Manchu control came to an end after almost 270 years of rule. Pu Yi, however, whose reign-name was Hsuan Tung, was allowed to retain the title of emperor, and until 1924 he resided in one of the imperial palaces.

Meanwhile, on January 1, 1912, a revolutionary assembly at Nanking had elected Dr. Sun Yat-sen president of a provisional republican government Dr. Sun was a patriotic and capable scholar who had been forced

to spend a considerable portion of his life in exile. As one of the founders of the *Kuomintang,* or Nationalist Party, he had spent most of the period since 1895 organizing Young China into an energetic association bent on achieving political and economic change. Sun believed that his country, with one-fourth of the world's population and abundant mineral and agricultural resources, was destined to play a leading part in human affairs. He wanted to arouse the Chinese people from the national lethargy into which they had fallen under Manchu control, and to allow no new oppression to take the place of the old. In 1924 he summed up his ideas in a series of lectures entitled *The Three Principles of the People (San Min Chu I).* These principles, for which the new China was to strive, were Nationalism, Democracy, and Livelihood (economic equality).

At the time of his election Sun agreed that, for the sake of unifying the country, he would soon retire in favor of Yuan Shih-kai, who had come into control of northern China. This arrangement was completed in February 1912, and Yuan thus became the first president of a united Chinese Republic. Friction soon developed between the northerners led by Yuan and the southerners under Sun. The former favored a strong executive and a weak parliament or no parliament at all. Sun and the Kuomintang preferred a democratic system with a broad franchise, a restricted executive, and a powerful parliament.

The Kuomintang deputies in the parliament convened in 1913 persistently voted against Yuan and his policies. The mutual ill will increased steadily, and eventually an attempt was made to oust Yuan. This "second revolution" was easily crushed, and Yuan expelled from parliament all members of the Kuomintang. Early in 1914 the whole parliament was dissolved, and Yuan commenced a dictatorial rule. After an unsuccessful effort to found a new imperial dynasty in his own person, he died (June 1916). Yuan was succeeded by Vice-President Li Yuan-hung, who supported the republic and reassembled the parliament, but who was unable to establish his dominance. The country was split over the questions of participation in the First World War and the further granting of foreign concessions. The central authorities found it virtually impossible to collect taxes, and hence China's mineral and industrial resources were being given outright to foreigners in return for loans which were promptly squandered.

Late in 1917 the Kuomintang set up a southern government at Canton in opposition to a northern government at Peking. The confusion was increased by the activities of a dozen military governors (*tuchuns*) who did most of the tax collecting, and who used their armies to further private ambitions that ranged from brigandage to attempts at controlling all China.

The Canton Government claimed to be the legitimate representative of the people, but Peking obtained both recognition and funds from the foreign powers that were seeking further privileges.

b. THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

Japan declared war on Germany in August 1914 and soon thereafter captured the area about Kiaochow, which Germany in 1898 had leased from China. To carry out this project, Japan had landed troops on neutral territory more than 100 miles from the German leasehold. Not only had China's neutrality thus been violated, but the Japanese soldiers had been billeted upon the native peasants. When, after the fall of the German strongholds, the Chinese asked the Japanese to retire, the latter presented to President Yuan a list of twenty-one demands (1915). These demands were calculated to make of China a Japanese protectorate. The preoccupation of Europe with the war afforded Japan, in the words of one of her publicists, "the opportunity of a thousand years" with respect to China.

The demands were handed to the Chinese President on Japanese War Office stationery, watermarked with machine guns and dreadnoughts. Yuan was warned to maintain secrecy, but the transaction soon was discussed in Peking newspapers. Upon inquiries from abroad, the Tokyo Foreign Office denied that any demands impairing China's sovereignty had been formulated and published an expurgated list which contained only an outline of eleven of the points. When, thereupon, the Chinese Government revealed a full list of the demands, Japan announced that the omitted demands had been only "wishes." No such distinction, however, had been made to China.[10]

The United States and other powers protested that they would not recognize any Sino-Japanese arrangement that violated their own treaty rights, but in May 1915, after a threat of war by Japan, China signed two treaties. The documents embodied a modified version of the original demands and contained clauses which provided for their going into force on the date of signature. Since the Chinese Parliament never ratified them, the treaties were consistently regarded as invalid by the Kuomintang. Japan was given options on all loans and on the construction of all railroads in southern Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia, ninety-nine-year leases of the South Manchuria and Kirin-Changchun railways, the right to develop coal and iron projects, and other economic concessions.

[10] The parallel texts of the demands as originally handed to China and as furnished by Japan to foreign governments may be found on pages 307–311 of Hornbeck, S. K. *Contemporary Politics in the Far East*, 1916.

c. CHINA, THE WAR, AND THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

From the outset of the European conflict, China had feared that Japan would take advantage of the situation to establish her control in China. The Peking Government therefore thrice attempted to join the Allies, but each time the Japanese prevented such action. Japan had no desire to see China recruit an army, mobilize her resources, and participate in a peace conference. Only in 1917 did Japan reverse her policy. The military position of the Allied Powers in 1917 was critical. Hence special efforts were made to secure additional help, from the United States and from the Far East. Japan thus far had confined her activities to the capture of the German leasehold and the sale of war materials. It was hoped that Japan might help convoy vessels through the Mediterranean, and that China might turn over to the Allies the German ships that were interned in her harbors and supply coolies to labor behind the lines.

In 1917, then, a secret treaty was signed between Japan and Great Britain. The former promised to dispatch some war vessels to the Mediterranean, and the latter agreed to support the claim of Japan to Shantung and the German Pacific islands north of the equator at the peace conference. France undertook similar obligations to Japan in return for Japan's promise to encourage China's participation in the war. Russia subscribed to an agreement of the same type, and Italy "had no objections regarding the matter." Upon the conclusion of these bargains, Japan urged China to break off relations with Germany. The United States, after her entry into the war, likewise suggested to China that relations with Germany be severed. Peking, moreover, was annoyed at the unrestricted submarine warfare and the drowning of several hundred coolies through the sinking of a French ship that was transporting them to France to work in war-material factories. In August 1917 Peking declared war on Germany and Austria-Hungary. Thereupon the Canton Government also declared war.

China's participation had little effect on the outcome of the war. After the struggle, however, China was entitled to representation at the Paris Conference. President Hsu Shih-chang, elected by a group of northern military leaders, chose an able delegation drawn from southern as well as northern China. There was a fair degree of unanimity against foreigners among the Chinese plenipotentiaries at Paris. Sino-Japanese difficulties developed as soon as Japan presented her claims to all former German rights in Shantung. To this the Chinese delegation strenuously objected. President Wilson for a time upheld the Chinese view, but Lloyd George and Clemenceau insisted that they were bound by the secret treaties to back Japan.

Eventually the Japanese had their way, acquiring Shantung and mandatory rights over all former German colonies north of the equator. Thereupon China withheld her signature from the Versailles Treaty, later concluding a separate peace agreement with Germany. China became a member of the League of Nations by adhering to the Treaty of St. Germain with Austria.

When news of these events reached China, it was greeted with violent demonstrations. Student unions were formed in north and south, protest parades were held, and Japanophil members of the government at Peking were attacked as traitors. The merchants and bankers subscribed to the agitation, and resort was had to China's most powerful weapon—the economic boycott. The resulting decline in her foreign trade seriously worried Japan, and she started negotiations for the return of Shantung to China. The latter rejected the offers that were made and appealed to the world for financial and diplomatic help. Foreign loans, however, seemed out of the question, for China had no credit standing. At this point (1921) President Harding invited eight powers to attend a conference at Washington on the limitation of naval armaments and the settlement of international problems in the Pacific and Far East.

There were several motives for calling this gathering. The Department of State was anxious to check a race in naval armaments with Great Britain and to end the quarrel between China and Japan. In addition, the United States was aware that in 1921 there would come up for renewal the Anglo-Japanese Alliance that had been extended in 1911 for a decade. Washington had also noticed with inquietude that the Far Eastern policies of Great Britain and Japan were harmonious, and that the British were tending to overlook the principles of the Open Door. It was hoped that the conference might forestall any united Anglo-Japanese action injurious to the interests of the United States.

Invitations were extended to all states, except Russia, that had interests in the Far East: Belgium, China, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Portugal. All governments accepted the call, although Japan agreed to participate only on condition that there be no discussion of matters that were "of sole concern to certain particular powers" or that might "be regarded as accomplished facts." The conference sat from November 1921 to February 1922 and concluded seven treaties. Two of these dealt with naval disarmament; the remaining five, with Pacific and Far Eastern questions.[11] Two additional treaties, one each dealing with Shan-

[11] The naval treaties provided for a limitation of armaments and for restrictions on fortifications in the Pacific. The United States, Great Britain, and Japan agreed

tung and Yap, were signed outside the conference but by powers represented therein.

Two Four-Power Treaties were signed among Great Britain, France, Japan, and the United States. In one, the states pledged themselves "to respect their rights in . . . their insular possessions . . . in the . . . Pacific Ocean." If these rights should be threatened by any other power, the contracting parties agreed "to communicate with one another . . . in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient methods to be taken . . . to meet the exigencies of the . . . situation." The treaty was to remain in force for ten years, subject to automatic renewal unless terminated by any signatory on twelve months' notice. The guarantees did not oblige the signatories to protect one another's holdings in the Far East, but they did bring about a lapse of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The second Four-Power Treaty merely defined certain terms.

All the powers signed a Nine-Power Treaty that guaranteed the territorial integrity and independence of China and reiterated the principle of the Open Door. China pledged herself not to "permit unfair discrimination of any kind" on Chinese railways. The powers undertook to respect China's rights as a neutral in time of war. The treaty registered an advance in China's international status, but it applied only to the future and did not check the activities of established interests. A second Nine-Power Treaty granted China greater control of her customs tariff than she had enjoyed in the past, and a Six-Power Treaty allocated the cable lines in the Pacific which had formerly belonged to Germany among the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, Italy, and China. The remaining documents signed at the conference were negotiated separately between China and Japan and the United States and Japan.

The Sino-Japanese agreement provided for the release of Shantung and all former German property rights therein to China in return for a monetary compensation reimbursing Japan for the improvements which she had fostered since 1914. In 1923 the Shantung Peninsula was restored to China. Because of a series of unfortunate international "incidents," however, Japanese soldiers were again stationed in Shantung Province from 1927 to 1929.

The treaty between Japan and the United States concerned Yap, a former German possession which, over the protests of Wilson, had been assigned as a mandate to Japan. The oceanic cables that converged at Yap formed one of the two American channels of communication with China

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to maintain the *status quo* in the defenses on a number of their insular possessions. In some regions, such as the Aleutian Islands, fortifications were banned.

and the only one with Netherlands India. The treaty guaranteed the economic rights of United States citizens in all the Japanese mandates and guaranteed them free access to Yap "in all that relates to the landing and operation of the existing Yap-Guam cable, or of any cable which may hereafter be laid or operated by the United States or by its nationals connecting with the island of Yap."

It was difficult to evaluate the work of the Washington Conference. Regarding China, the principle of the Open Door was once more subscribed to by the great powers, no new disabilities were imposed, and a certain amount of lost autonomy was restored to the republic. Shantung was reacquired, and China was given a breathing spell during which, if she had the capacity, she might rebuild her weak national structure. The signing of the Sino-Japanese conventions was followed by the adoption in Japan of a so-called friendship policy towards China which lasted until the spring of 1927. (The moderate Japanese under the leadership of Kijuro Shidehara attempted to harmonize the interests of China and Japan without force. However, when this group was replaced in power at Tokyo by the expansionists under Giichi Tanaka, recourse was once more had to aggressive imperialistic methods.) The naval arrangements concluded at the conference temporarily eased the tension among the United States, Great Britain, and Japan.

d. EDUCATION AND NATIONALISM IN CHINA, 1919–1931

The internal history of China from 1919 to 1927 was conspicuous chiefly for administrative confusion in every province. Scores of generals ravaged country and town and laid waste much of the natural wealth of the republic. There were catastrophic floods and famines, fanatical antiforeign outbursts, and political quarrels between republicans and communists. Out of the turmoil, however, there emerged two definite phenomena: progress in education and an organized nationalist movement.

Under the old regime, education had been reserved for a small minority. The written language contained thousands of ideographs and was difficult to learn. After the revolution numerous efforts were made to increase literacy. Dr. Hu Shih, a philosopher trained in the United States, launched a movement to substitute in literature the colloquial language of the country for the ancient literary forms. In order to popularize the vernacular *(Pai Hua)* as a literary medium, Hu Shih and others utilized it in the composition of poems, essays, novels, histories, and general works of high literary merit. In 1920 Peking ordered the use of Pai Hua textbooks in primary schools.

Later it was provided that all government documents be written in this popular form.

Another student trained in the United States, James Y. C. Yen, inaugurated (1922) a Mass Education Movement that aimed at familiarizing the masses with 1000 of the most commonly used Chinese ideographs. To teach these ideographs to the peasants and laborers, easy readers were devised, and the lessons were so arranged that the information could be mastered by spending on them one hour a day for four months. The volumes were cheap, and by 1928 fourteen editions had been printed. Thanks to this project, millions of persons learned to read. Increasing attention was devoted to foreign works on history, politics, government, economics, philosophy, and literature. The Commercial Press of Shanghai published cheaply a library containing vernacular translations of 2000 of the world's masterpieces. Despite the enthusiasm for education, the inadequacy of funds was responsible for a shortage of school facilities. Only gradually could this deficiency be remedied, but in the process the Chinese authorities extended their control over foreign as well as native schools.

The advances in education were accompanied by the emergence of the students as an important factor in the agitation for liberation from foreign restrictions and the shackles of tradition. In 1919 the most serious attacks on the Versailles Treaty and on the officials who proposed to endorse it were led by students. The same was true of many of the later patriotic demonstrations. Yet, although these activities heralded an awakening China, the Westernization of the land could not be brought about solely by the clamorings of an earnest but impatient youth. The spirit displayed by the emancipated young people was encouraging, but it required mature leadership. Some direction was given to the students' movements by the Kuomintang.

Now, we have seen that in 1917 the Kuomintang and a group of nationalistic southerners had established a government at Canton. This administration opposed most of the moves undertaken by the government at Peking, which continued to function under the guidance of interested foreigners. Led by Dr. Sun, the Nationalists worked for several years to bring the north under the sway of the Kuomintang and unify the country, through the use of force and propaganda. Support for this endeavor was forthcoming from Soviet Russia, which meanwhile had surrendered most of the privileges acquired in China in tsarist days. An able diplomat, Michael Borodin, was dispatched to China to win the confidence of Sun and his associates—a mission he fulfilled with eminent success. Simultaneously Moscow had an ambassador at Peking.

In 1924 a Kuomintang Congress at Canton extended party membership to all Chinese communists who were ready to accept the Kuomintang principles. Soon thereafter Peking signed an agreement with Moscow whereby the latter gave up its extraterritorial rights in China, remitted the unpaid balance of the Boxer indemnity, promised not to spread communist propaganda in Chinese territory, and pledged the restoration of Mongolia (occupied since the Boxer Rebellion) to the republic. Another treaty provided that the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria, a Sino-Russian enterprise conceived in 1896, should remain under the joint control of the two states until China could redeem it "with Chinese capital." In 1924, also, Sun established the Whampoa Military Academy, along lines devised by Borodin. Soviet military officers were invited to train the Nationalist forces. The ablest of these soldiers was General Vassily Blücher, alias Galen.

With the approach of 1925 there became evident a rift in Kuomintang ranks. The right-wing members of the party were out of sympathy with the aims of the communist left wing and wanted to end the close relationship with the Soviet Union. Dr. Sun was able to hold the two camps together, but after his death in March 1925 the breach widened. In 1927 Chiang Kai-shek, who had succeeded Sun as leader of the Nationalists, broke off relations with the Russian communists and discriminated against the communist members of the Kuomintang. Relations also became strained between the Moscow and Peking governments because of the propagandist activities of Bolshevik agents in China.

Just prior to the break with the U.S.S.R., the Nationalists had succeeded in extending their control over nearly all China. This achievement, though of only temporary duration, was accomplished in part through the military ability of Chiang, in part because of Russian aid, and in part through a well-organized propaganda campaign. The fruits of the victory, however, were spoiled by the fierce struggle which had developed among factions in the Kuomintang.

The communists tried to discredit Chiang by committing excesses, the most serious instance being the Nanking Affair of March 1927. After the capture of the city by the Nationalists, the left-wing elements attacked the foreign residents. The powers demanded restitution, and Japan sent soldiers to protect her extensive interests. In the end, the doings of the communists reacted to the advantage of Chiang, whose support came increasingly from the commercial and industrial groups.

Chiang was born in 1887, the son of a merchant. He obtained a military education and attended the Tokyo Military College. During 1911 and 1912

he commanded revolutionary soldiers and from 1913 to 1920 was secretary to Dr. Sun. After acquiring financial experience in a stock exchange, he went to Russia to study military advances. In 1924 he became director of the Whampoa Military Academy and soon thereafter succeeded Sun as leader of the Nationalists. As a result of his successes, Chiang was able in 1928 to establish a Nationalist Government at Nanking. The northern government was abolished, the name of Peking (Northern Capital) was changed to Peiping (Northern Peace), and Nanking became the new national capital.

In October 1928 the Kuomintang promulgated an Organic Law for the National Government of China. The law was to be executed under the supervision of the party's executive committee, which thus virtually became the government of the republic. The highest administrative unit was to be a State Council, and the committee elected Chiang to be chairman of the first such council, an office equivalent to that of president of China. Having undertaken to satisfy the claims of the powers regarding the Nanking Affair, the Nationalist Government promptly secured recognition from most of the Western states and Japan.[12]

Chiang faced a difficult task as chief executive of China. He invited United States and German experts to assist in the reorganization of the country and strove to weld the Chinese nation into a powerful state. However, the continuing need to lead troops in battle interfered with Chiang's plans. The constant disorder and the ravages of floods and famines had enabled the Chinese communists greatly to increase their numbers, and now they massed all their strength against the Nanking regime in an attempt to replace it by a soviet system. Chiang waged almost uninterrupted warfare against the communists, who had established some control on a soviet basis south of the Yangtse River, and in addition had to deal with rival military leaders who hoped in the confusion to acquire control of individual Chinese provinces.

Besides its domestic difficulties, the Nationalist Government in 1929 had a quarrel with the Soviet Union. The dispute grew out of Bolshevik propagandist activities in northern China and an attempt by the governor of Manchuria, Chang Hsueh-liang, to gain control of the Chinese Eastern Railway and to oust the subjects of the U.S.S.R. from the territory under his jurisdiction. Soviet consular offices in Manchurian cities were raided,

12 The organic law, with some revisions, remained in force to the end of 1946. From 1931 on there was a regular President of the National Government, who had little power; more important was the president of the Executive Yüan or cabinet, and this post went to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

and hundreds of Soviet officials and employees of the Chinese Eastern Railway were arrested. The U.S.S.R. retaliated by arresting Chinese merchants who happened to be in the Soviet Union. Diplomatic relations were severed, troop movements were begun, and some minor battles occurred which the Bolsheviks won with ease.

At the height of the crisis, 42 cosignatories with the U.S.S.R. and China of the Kellogg Pact reminded the disputants of their obligation to settle the quarrel by peaceful means. Eventually the parties concerned did reach agreement. By the Khabarovsk Protocol (1929) the *status quo ante* was reëstablished, and provision was made for a conference to settle all causes of dispute. There the matter still rested when a Sino-Japanese conflict occurred over Manchuria in 1931.

e. ECONOMICS IN MANCHURIA AND IN JAPAN

China was a tempting field for Western and Japanese investments and business enterprises. Billions of dollars were poured into the land through the purchase of government bonds, the construction of railways, and the erection of factories, warehouses, and missionary establishments. It was estimated that, of the total value ($3,500,000,000) of foreign monetary stakes in China at the end of 1930, Great Britain and Japan each controlled more than a third, and the United States and the U.S.S.R. each about one-fourteenth. The average annual value of China's sales and purchases abroad from 1926 to 1930 was $1,500,000,000.

Among the most promising economic sections of China was Manchuria. Situated in the northeast, this region, with an area in 1931 of 380,000 square miles, a population of 29,000,000, and 4000 miles of railways, came to assume a tremendous importance in international affairs. The land grew numerous crops in abundance, and the subsoil resources included coal, iron, gold, silver, lead, copper, and asbestos. In 1928 Manchuria was responsible for almost one-third of the commodity exports of China and about one-fifth of the imports. Governor Chang Hsueh-liang, one of the richest men in China, was virtually autonomous, but he maintained a benevolent front towards the authorities at Nanking.

The Kuomintang Government regarded Manchuria as a vital outpost of Chinese culture. Between 1923 and 1929, 4,000,000 Chinese were reported to have entered Manchuria to take advantage of the fertile land and the relative freedom from domestic turmoil. Many of these immigrants returned southward after they had accumulated savings, but perhaps half of them became permanent settlers. Nanking encouraged this latest of "people's

wanderings" and was anxious to restrict the encroachments of foreigners in the area.

Most of the world's industrial powers, however, had interests in Manchuria. The U.S.S.R. and Japan felt that they had special rights. The Soviet Government was half-owner of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which offered the most direct route from the west to the Siberian port of Vladivostok. The Bolsheviks, moreover, exercised considerable authority in Outer Mongolia, a wild region just west of Manchuria. The Japanese had control of the South Manchuria Railway, which terminated at the Japanese-controlled port of Dairen through which passed more than half of the foreign trade of Manchuria. The foreign banking business of Manchuria was almost a monopoly of Japanese firms, and early in 1932 Japanese investments in the area totaled $1,000,000,000. Large as were her financial holdings in Manchuria, Japan advanced additional reasons for desiring recognition of her paramount interests in the territory. For an understanding of these it is necessary to survey the economic position of the empire.

In the mid-nineteenth century Japan was a medieval country, cherishing feudal traditions and anxious to avoid contact with the West. Before the close of the century Japan had been "opened" by importunate Westerners seeking new trade outlets, and the Nipponese were imitating the intruders' methods and adopting their business views. With the coming of modern industry to the islands, there soon developed the same pressing needs that earlier had induced the Western powers to seek overseas expansion. Industrialized Japan wanted sources of cheap raw materials, markets for surplus manufactures, fields for investment of accumulated capital, food for workers, and outlets for surplus population.

During the First World War economic conditions in Japan took an unusually favorable turn. The Allies bought enormous quantities of war materials; new trade contacts were established in Asia, Africa, and the Americas; and Japanese ships were chartered to handle a considerable portion of the world's ocean commerce. Between 1913 and 1918 the aggregate horsepower employed in Japanese industry doubled, and the number of factory workers increased by half. Japan enjoyed a total favorable trade balance from 1914 to 1918 of more than $2,000,000,000.

After the war there came a gradual slump. The former belligerents reëngaged in the manufacture of peacetime goods and competed once more for foreign markets. Since foreign trade by this time had come to be the backbone of Japanese prosperity, normally accounting for one-third [13] of the

[13] In the United States the postwar ratio normally was about 1 to 10.

total commerce by value, any appreciable decline in exports was sure to have a serious effect on the economic condition of the country.

For some years after the armistice, Japan's export figures remained at a relatively high level because the United States, in her new-found prosperity, became a heavy purchaser of silk. In an average postwar year silk yarn comprised 40 per cent of the value of Japanese exports, and more than 85 per cent of this was shipped to the United States. With the increasing popularity of rayon and other silk substitutes, however, and then the appearance of the world depression, there was a decline in the demand for silk and other products of Japanese manufacture. Compared with 1929, Japanese raw-silk exports in 1930 suffered a loss of 18 per cent in quantity and 45 per cent in value. To lower relative production costs, Japan abandoned the gold standard in 1931, but the results were disappointing in so far as they concerned any enlargement of foreign sales.

In 1930 the area of the Japanese Empire, including Korea (Chosen), was 265,000 square miles, or about that of Texas. Its population was estimated at 92,000,000. In Japan proper (area, 148,700 square miles; population, 65,000,000), more than 40 per cent of the people derived a meager existence directly from the soil, only one-sixth of which could be cultivated. The unemployed numbered 1,000,000, and the national debt stood at $3,000,000,000. Hence Manchuria, with its plentiful resources, undeveloped opportunities, geographic nearness, and strategic location, tempted Japan. The work which was begun in 1915 with the presentation of the Twenty-one Demands, it seemed to her statesmen, must now be completed. The year 1931 appeared favorable for this undertaking.

f. CHINA, MANCHOUKUO, JAPAN

Conditions in China in 1931 were turbulent. The right- and left-wing members of the Kuomintang exchanged accusations of self-interest and treachery, and sent military forces against each other. Famines and floods deprived millions of food and shelter. Communist propaganda was rife, and local chieftains revived their bandit activities. Foreign interference added to the confusion, particularly in Manchuria, where Chang Hsueh-liang strove to resist further penetration by the U.S.S.R. and Japan.

Elsewhere in the world the governments were preoccupied with equally numerous problems. Unemployment, agrarian difficulties, tariff barriers, radical movements, taxes, debt moratoria, security, disarmaments, elections —these were the matters which demanded the attention of the Westerners. Japan, therefore, pressed by many of the same problems, felt the moment

ripe for the realization of her dreams in Manchuria. There seemed little likelihood that the Western powers would interpose forcefully even if they disapproved of Tokyo's plans. For a variety of reasons, the Japanese army took the lead in the Manchurian venture.

In Japan the army and navy departments were virtually independent of the civil authorities. Their leaders might approach the emperor directly, without the regard for cabinet procedure which was mandatory upon other ministers. The defenders of the land enjoyed by tradition considerable influence over the ruler. Suffering only a few casualties during the First World War, the Japanese army emerged after the armistice as one of the leading military units in the world.

The army had long been suspicious of the civil government. It saw little good in the custom of ministerial responsibility which dated from 1918, or in the universal manhood suffrage that had been proclaimed in 1925. The military men regarded many of the politicians as selfish individuals who were interested solely in the welfare of certain businessmen, bankers, and bondholders. They, on the other hand, professed to be interested in the well-being of the farming and laboring classes from which came most of the recruits, and they believed that the country's difficulties might easily be alleviated by the conversion of Manchuria into a great agricultural colony and industrial development. Actually, the army worked hand in hand with another group of bankers and industrialists—those who had financial stakes in Manchuria. Indeed, the head of the South Manchuria Railway was a member of the Japanese military command.

During the years 1930 to 1932 the military wrested much political control from the civil government. A section of big business feared possible Western economic retaliation against Japanese aggression, but millions of the people were induced by national pride and personal poverty to side with the army. Numerous fascist societies were organized, political murders became frequent occurrences, and there was a popular demand for the achievement of economic security through the use of force rather than treaties.

Unfortunately for China, there occurred in 1931 two incidents that provided the Japanese army with a pretext for moving the Manchurian question to the sphere of armed hostilities. First the "honor" of the army was "violated" by the murder in Inner Mongolia of a Japanese captain, and then a short stretch of the South Manchuria Railway line was damaged by explosives. The Japanese troops who guarded the railway accused Chinese soldiers of the deed. Without prior notification to the Tokyo Foreign Office, the Japanese military machine was set in motion, and a wide area of Manchuria was occupied.

The Chinese withdrew before the advancing Japanese, and the Nanking Government appealed to the world for help. The diplomats at Tokyo supported the military by pointing out that the governor of Manchuria had violated an old Sino-Japanese treaty by building a railroad paralleling the South Manchuria Railway. Japan had said nothing about this while the line was being built, but now complained that the road constituted a military threat to Japanese interests and would deflect considerable Sino-Manchurian traffic from the South Manchuria Railway and the port of Dairen to the Chinese-controlled railway and ports.

While China appealed her case to the League, the Japanese rapidly extended the area of occupation. In September 1931 Japan had been in direct control of 1400 square miles of territory and 800 miles of railways in Manchuria. By January 1932 the area of control included 200,000 square miles of land and 2000 miles of railways. Efforts were made to undermine the power of Governor Chang Hsueh-liang and to encourage local separatism. Loyal Chinese officials were replaced by friends of Japan.

In February 1932 some Manchurian leaders at Mukden (which was in Japanese hands) issued a declaration of independence. The new state was named Manchoukuo. Changchun, renamed Hsinking, was designated as the seat of government. Henry Pu Yi, the same who had been forced to abdicate the Chinese imperial throne, was inaugurated as "Chief Executive" of Manchoukuo. Virtually all governmental power was vested in his hands, but the government was patently under Japanese tutelage.

Japan's activities, as was to be expected, exerted a unifying influence upon Chinese politics. In December 1931 a reconciliation was effected between the Nanking authorities and a rival government that had been set up at Canton by left-wing members of the Kuomintang. Anti-Japanese outbreaks became frequent occurrences, and Chinese residents in foreign lands sent home money to bolster the nation's defense against the invaders. The Chinese people once more resorted to their most powerful weapon, a nation-wide economic boycott. Since China normally took one-fourth of Japan's exports, the boycott caused havoc to Japanese industry. Japanese sales to China in January 1932 were 68 per cent lower than in January 1931. Most Japanese textile mills in northern China closed their doors, while Chinese managers and employees gave up their jobs in Japanese firms. Japanese shipping concerns on the China coast either suspended business or operated at a loss. The Japanese banks in China found their services spurned, and small Japanese shopkeepers were ruined.

In January 1932 the Japanese residents of Shanghai, the chief foreign-trade center of China, called upon Tokyo to suppress the anti-Japanese

movement by naval force. The navy welcomed this opportunity to follow the example of the army in the pursuit of glory and, incidentally, to retrieve some of the domestic prestige that had been lost at the time (1930) of Japan's adherence to the London Naval Treaty. War vessels and marines were dispatched to Shanghai as a means of forcing the Chinese to buy Japanese goods. Economic warfare was to be combated with naval warfare. The marines clashed with the local Chinese garrison, and the Battle of Shanghai was precipitated. The resistance of the Chinese to the invaders was labeled "aggression" by Tokyo. The rainy season put a stop to the battle, and in May 1932 negotiations were completed for the withdrawal of the Japanese forces and the ending of the boycott.

Meanwhile, in December 1931, the League Council had appointed an international commission, under the chairmanship of Lord Lytton, to investigate the Sino-Japanese situation and recommend possible solutions.[14] While the commission (one member each from Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and the United States) was at work, Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson announced that the United States henceforth would refuse to recognize the legality of any situation or treaty resulting from action taken in violation of the Kellogg Pact. This Stimson Doctrine, as it came to be known, failed to elicit endorsements from the European powers.

In September 1932, shortly before the report of the Lytton Commission was made public, Japan affronted the League by recognizing the "State of Manchoukuo." The motive presumably was to confront the League with a *fait accompli,* and the procedure called forth a sharp rebuke from the president of the Council, who happened to be Eamon de Valera. Recognition was accorded through a Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol wherein the former Chinese domain, in return for an endorsement of its "independent" status, promised Japan a long series of favors, including the right to station troops at any desired point in Manchoukuo. The Japanese yen dropped during these months to less than half of its par value.

The Lytton Report expressed doubts whether a government-inspired boycott was a "legitimate weapon of defense against military aggression by a stronger country"; suggested that China set up in Manchuria an autonomous government which would acknowledge Chinese suzerainty; and proposed widespread internal Chinese reforms. The League Council referred the report to the Assembly, which referred it to another committee.

[14] At one stage it was proposed that the Western powers boycott Japan since the latter was violating the spirit of the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922 and the Kellogg Pact. Nothing came of this suggestion. The conflict resulted in the placing of large Japanese orders for cotton and munitions, and Chinese orders for textiles, in several Western countries.


UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
Lake Baikal
Irkutsk
Chita
TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY
MARITIME PROVINCE
SAKHALIN I.
OUTER MONGOLIA
Urga
Manchouli
Taheiho
Blagovestchensk
Khabarovsk
NORTH MANCHURIA
Tsitsihar
Harbin
"MANCHOUKUO"
Hsinking
Kirin
Vladivostok
INNER MONGOLIA
CHAHAR
JEHOL
Paotowchen
Mukden
SOUTH MANCHURIA RY.
SEA OF JAPAN
Peiping
Tientsin
KWAN-TUNG (Leased Territory)
Dairen
Port Arthur
Keijo (Seoul)
CHOSEN
Tokyo
Kobe
Osaka
Fusan
Tsinan
Tsingtao
Hwang Ho (Yellow R.)
YELLOW SEA
CHINA
PACIFIC OCEAN
Yangtze R.
Hankow
Nanking
Shanghai
THE FAR EAST
1935
MANHATTAN DRAFTING CO., INC., N.Y.

During 1933 Japan suffered diplomatic defeats at Geneva and won military victories in China. The Japanese pushed into the rich province of Jehol and into the regions south of the Great Wall. Jehol, rich in oil and potentially in opium poppies, was claimed as part of Manchuria and therefore of Manchoukuo. The penetration south of the Great Wall was justified as preventing further Chinese "raids" into Manchoukuo territory. Since Japan paid no heed to the pleas of various League committees, China finally accepted an armistice. Under this agreement the Japanese were to return north of the Great Wall, and China consented to the creation of a demilitarized zone south of the wall, to be administered by Chinese officials friendly to Japan.[15]

Meanwhile (March 1933) Japan had informed the League of her intention to withdraw from membership. Two years later, when Japan officially ceased to be a member of the League, Manchoukuo had been legally recognized by only her protector and El Salvador.[16] Undaunted by this foreign coldness, Chief Executive Pu Yi, in 1934, "in compliance with the will of Heaven" and with the consent of Japan, had taken the title of emperor as Kang Teh. The change in no way diminished Japanese influence in Manchoukuo, for behind every key political position stood a Japanese adviser.

The U.S.S.R. offered to sell its half-interest in the Chinese Eastern Railway to Manchoukuo, which had appropriated the half-interest of China. Negotiations among representatives of Moscow, Tokyo, and Hsinking were concluded in 1935, transferring all Russian rights to Manchoukuo in return for $52,000,000. Japan guaranteed the payments, "in view of the close relations existing between Japan and Manchoukuo." The name of the line was changed to the North Manchuria Railway; it was to be operated for Manchoukuo by the Japanese-controlled South Manchuria Railway.

Renewed friction had meanwhile developed between Japan and other states over the assignment of a Manchoukuo oil-sales monopoly to a firm under Japanese control. The United States, British, and Netherlands Governments protested this action as a violation of the Open Door policy guaranteed in the Washington Nine-Power Treaty and confirmed by Kang Teh at the time of his elevation to the imperial throne. Tokyo replied by saying (1) that the monopoly in no way violated the principle of the Open Door; (2) that the emperor's promise could not be invoked since his gov-

[15] Though its political efforts on behalf of China proved ineffective, the League gave China technical aid. Help was rendered in the spheres of public health, finance, education, and economic reconstruction.

[16] Later Germany, Italy, Spain, Hungary, and Romania followed suit. Japan simply retained her mandates upon quitting the League.

ernment was not recognized by the complaining powers; and (3) that Japan could do nothing about the matter anyway since Manchoukuo was an independent state. The Western nationals thereupon prepared to withdraw from the oil business in Manchoukuo.

g. TOWARD A "NEW ORDER" IN EASTERN ASIA

Japan specifically enunciated the doctrine of a "new order" in eastern Asia in 1938, but the trend in this direction was foreshadowed in a declaration of 1934 by the Tokyo Foreign Office. Having broken with the West by withdrawing from the League, having declared herself to be "the principal protector" of stability in the Far East, and desirous of finding work and food for her rapidly increasing population, Nippon announced that she would continue to foster Sino-Japanese "friendship" while opposing "any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence [even financial influence] of any other country in order to resist Japan." And then Tokyo promoted "friendship" with her neighbor by encouraging separatists in northern China to set up an autonomous Hopei-Chahar state under Japanese tutelage (1935) and by disarming the customs guards along the Great Wall so that Japanese goods might readily be smuggled into China (1936).

The increasing aggression of Japan on the Asiatic mainland for a time led to more serious difficulty with the Soviet Union than with any other third power. During the winter of 1935–1936 there were several border incidents along the Soviet-Manchoukuo, and the Manchoukuo and Outer Mongolian, frontiers. Outer Mongolia, or the Mongolian People's Republic, declared its independence of China after the First World War and gradually came under the influence of the Soviet Union. U.S.S.R. advisers guided the policies of the Mongolian People's Republic (which itself had a soviet form of government); nearly all Outer Mongolia's foreign trade was with the Soviet Union; and Westerners wishing to visit Outer Mongolia had to have their passports visaed in Moscow. A commission appointed to demarcate a boundary between Manchoukuo and Outer Mongolia soon abandoned its efforts, and in 1936 the U.S.S.R. and Outer Mongolia signed a pact for mutual assistance in case of attack.

Meanwhile several clashes occurred along the Manchoukuo-Siberian border. In 1937 Japanese artillery shelled Soviet gunboats in the Amur River, and one year later there was waged a Soviet-Japanese battle over the border heights of Changkufeng. The incident had its origin in the occupation of the heights by Soviet soldiers for the construction of defense

works. Tokyo protested that the area was in Manchoukuo territory. A map appended to a Russo-Chinese frontier agreement of 1886 and now produced by the Soviets failed to impress the Nipponese, and a Japanese force unsuccessfully attacked Changkufeng. The two governments then agreed to appoint a commission to demark the correct boundary. There was delay in setting up the border commission, and in 1939 fighting was renewed.

While the fighting continued, a new dispute arose, this time concerning Japanese fishing rights in Soviet Pacific waters. After acrimonious exchanges, the two countries signed an agreement providing for limited Japanese participation in the exploitation of Soviet fishing grounds. This problem settled, energies were once more concentrated on the fighting along the Mongolian-Manchoukuo border, the Soviets backing Mongolia and the Japanese supporting Manchoukuo. Simultaneously Japan charged that the empire's coal and oil concessionaires in the northern (Soviet) half of the island of Sakhalin were being subjected to unfair treatment, and the Bolsheviks replied that the Japanese concessionaires were violating both their contracts and the laws. Then the signing of a Soviet-Nazi pact in August 1939 worried the Japanese, who feared that Moscow might now feel free to send large forces to the Far East. At last, in 1941, Moscow and Tokyo signed a neutrality pact, and the Mongolian-Manchoukuo border was defined. The Siberian-Manchoukuo frontier, on the other hand, remained vague.

In China itself, meanwhile (1936), certain nationalistic leaders had warned the Nanking Government to resist further Japanese aggression lest there be a civil war. For in that year Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was the only outstanding military leader who still hesitated to adopt a strong anti-Japanese policy—probably because he felt that China must wait until she was more thoroughly unified and better prepared for war before risking an all-out conflict with Nippon. Chiang disregarded the warning, continued to order the suppression of anti-Japanese demonstrations, and proceeded to Shensi in the north. There General Chang Hsueh-liang, bitter foe of Japan who had been ousted from Manchuria in 1931, was supposedly acting under the orders of Nanking; but he was lukewarm in his campaign against the Chinese communists. The commander-in-chief wanted more energetic action against the Reds.

Suddenly (December 1936) Chiang Kai-shek was seized by some of Chang Hsueh-liang's generals and held prisoner for two weeks. A growing number of northern soldiers had become reluctant to fight their own countrymen, even though these were Reds, while the Japanese were penetrating farther and farther into China. Chang Hsueh-liang made his superior's

release conditional upon the latter's promise to readmit the communists into the Kuomintang and thus make possible a united Chinese front in a war against Japan. Chiang refused to make any commitments until released, and eventually he returned to Nanking with Chang Hsueh-liang in the role of voluntary prisoner. There the offending general received a full pardon. Thereafter prolonged negotiations between the national and communist leaders took place. The latter agreed to modify their social program and fight under Chiang Kai-shek in return for a promise of political reform and a war of resistance against Japan.

Meanwhile, in Japan, following an electoral victory by the Liberal Party, there occurred a military rebellion. Early one morning in February 1936 a group of young officers led about a thousand soldiers from their barracks to the center of Tokyo. While the troops seized a number of official buildings, designated officers murdered several of the nation's outstanding liberal statesmen. The rebels held their position for three days, disregarding even the emperor's command to surrender. Then they yielded, and some of the officers were condemned to death. The population remained relatively calm in the face of the army's seeming inability to control its younger officers—who were determined to set up a dictatorship.

The conflict between the civil and military branches of the government was continuously manifested in the difficulties of the cabinet throughout 1936. It was aired in public when several parliamentary deputies bitterly attacked the army and its policies. The military, evidently unable to reply convincingly, precipitated additional cabinet crises until a new election was ordered for April 1937. The moderate elements won an overwhelming victory—which was promptly disregarded by the advocates of force. In July the advance into China was begun in earnest. The excuse was an exchange of shots between Chinese and Japanese troops at Lukouchiao (Marco Polo Bridge), west of Peiping.

The Nanking Government now announced its readiness to fight "to the death." The fighting spread, and Japan declared a blockade of Chinese shipping. Thousands of civilians and refugees were killed by Japanese bombs in areas far removed from the fronts, while the Japanese army advanced steadily against the stubborn opposition of the Chinese soldiers. There were rays of hope for China in September 1937 when the communist armies in the north finally prepared to march against the Japanese invaders and when the League of Nations referred a Chinese appeal to its Far Eastern advisory committee. This committee, on which the United States was represented, unanimously condemned Japan's tactics and urged a meeting of the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaties of 1922. Fifty League mem-

bers endorsed the committee's findings, expressed moral support of China, and called a parley of the interested parties to meet at Brussels. The Brussels Conference sat for three weeks, condemned Japan, and then adjourned indefinitely.

In the meantime the Chinese Government had moved to the inland city of Chungking because of the Japanese advance on Nanking. As the mechanized Japanese forces pushed on, Chinese sympathizers in many Western countries organized boycotts against Japanese goods. Except in so far as they expressed the widespread moral disapproval of Japan's methods, these boycotts had no influence. Tokyo successfully floated domestic loans and seemed not to fear any economic crisis. Chinese customs arrangements, moreover, were revised by the Japanese to suit themselves, despite repeated protests from the United States and Great Britain. And in December 1937 Japanese soldiers poured into Nanking, celebrating their victory with a reign of terror against the hapless population.

On the day preceding the fall of China's ex-capital, Japanese planes sank the United States gunboat *Panay* and some Standard Oil Company ships in the Yangtse Kiang. Several Americans were killed and many wounded, the survivors getting to safety under the greatest difficulty. The Japanese Government at once apologized, promised to punish those responsible for the crime, and gave a guarantee against future attacks. Washington was not satisfied, and Japan presented a second apology. The attack was called "entirely unintentional," assurance was given of full indemnity, and it was pointed out that the responsible officers had been severely disciplined. The United States accepted this explanation, and the incident was officially closed.

In 1938 Japanese military victories in China continued, with occasional setbacks. Despite their defeats, despite air bombardments on their densely populated cities, despite the creation at Nanking of a Japanese-controlled Reformed Government of the Republic of China, and despite the loss of the services of the German General Alexander von Falkenhausen and his staff—recalled by Hitler, presumably at the request of Tokyo—the Chinese continued to resist the invasion of the Japanese. Foreign sympathy China appeared to have in abundance, but little foreign aid. Supplies did reach the Chinese, chiefly from the Soviet Union and through Indo-China, but not in the desired quantities.

The domestic situation in Japan was not improved during 1938. There were frequent clashes between the government and the parliament, for many members of the latter, like the public at large, wanted to know the ultimate purpose of the costly campaign in China. There were also fre-

quent reorganizations of the cabinet, but always in the interest of a more vigorous prosecution of the undeclared war. Leftist movements were effectively suppressed. The electric industry was placed under state control. Restrictions were placed on the private use of cotton and pig iron, and gradually the entire raw-material economy was regulated.

During her advance in China, Japan frequently performed acts which aroused the protests of the Western powers. Damage was done to foreign property, the Yangtse River was virtually closed to foreign shipping, foreign trading rights were ignored, and the Nine-Power Treaties were violated. To these charges the Japanese replied by declaring their purpose to extend to all China the status "enjoyed" by Manchoukuo, for the "ideas and principles of the past" were no longer applicable to the "new situation" in the Far East.

Throughout 1939 the Japanese continued the struggle in China, extending their occupation, further impairing their own diplomatic relations with the West, bombing more open cities, striving to set up a puppet government for China corresponding to that in Manchoukuo, and failing in their efforts to break down the morale and the resistance of the Chinese. While the Japanese stripped, insulted, and slapped British subjects in the presence of Chinese (to impress the latter with the new importance of Japan) and advanced challengingly close to Hong Kong, the British enlarged their credit advances to China and warned Tokyo of the future consequences of its acts. While United States property was being destroyed through Japanese air attacks in various parts of China, Washington gave the required six months' notice of its intention to terminate the United States and Japanese Treaty of Amity and Commerce which had provided Japan with its much-needed United States market and supplies. And while in Japan itself prices rose steadily, consumers' goods began to run short, and casualty lists mounted, the military leaders ordered a further tightening of the people's belts and persisted in their conviction that the new order in Asia was close at hand.

BLACK AND WHITE IN AFRICA

Shortly after the outbreak of the First World War, Germany proposed to the Allies that the neutrality of the African colonies be maintained during the conflict, on the ground that the preservation of Europe's ascendancy in Africa depended upon the solidarity of the white race on that continent. Perhaps the knowledge that she could not defend her overseas possessions against Allied attack stimulated Germany to advance this thesis. At any

rate the suggestion was disregarded, and the war was carried into Africa. Then, after the war, the general disorganization following a long period of armed conflict combined with other factors to produce great unrest from Morocco to the Cape of Good Hope. Among the most provocative of these factors were: the reaction against a long period of subjection; the influence of some of the religious teaching; the increasing competition for work between Blacks and Whites in such relatively well-developed regions as South Africa; and the effect on the Blacks of Western education.

When the Western peoples in the nineteenth century contemplated the partitioning of Africa, they were aware of their moral obligations towards the Africans. In 1885, in the General Act of the Berlin Conference, the representatives of the leading Western countries had agreed for the sake of humanity "to protect the natives in their moral and material well-being; to coöperate in the suppression of slavery and the slave trade; to further the education and civilization of the natives; to protect missionaries, scientists, and explorers"; and to preserve the freedom of religion. An attempt to persuade the conference to restrict the sale of liquor and firearms had brought only the expression of a general wish in favor of the control of these traffics.

Neither the agreements nor the wishes of the conference were fully observed, and for years there was carried on a thriving trade in whisky, arms, and slaves. While there was considerable talk about what soon came to be known as the "white man's burden," relatively little was done before 1914 towards shouldering this burden. Indeed, in order to earn sizable dividends on their investments, white concessionaires, from King Leopold II of Belgium to Barney Isaacs of London, frequently employed questionable tactics. The natural wealth of Africa and the physical powers of the inhabitants were exploited until some natives were driven in despair to rebel against the "black man's burden."

In Kenya, the former British East Africa, for example, the unrest reached a climax in 1921 when, as a result of economic depression, the white employers announced a reduction of wages for all black workers. The Negroes at first were helpless, but eventually a native government clerk named Harry Thuku founded an East Africa Native Association and organized protest meetings. Thuku's speeches assumed an increasingly violent and anti-European tenor, and his meetings sometimes were attended by several thousand natives. In 1922 he was arrested for sedition, and, when crowds tried to interfere with the police at the jail where he was being held, the guards discharged their rifles and killed some of the rioters. Thuku was deported, and the now leaderless natives consoled themselves by form-

ing a harmless sort of trade-union which they hoped would protect their common interests.

Although the religious doctrines disseminated by the missionaries in Africa frequently tended to make the natives satisfied with a position of inferiority relative to their white masters, some of the teachings had an opposite effect. The Blacks were stirred by the recital of such incidents as David's victory over Goliath, by assurances that all human beings were God's children, and by the sentiments expressed in songs like "Onward, Christian soldiers, marching as to war!" Gradually there appeared so-called prophets and performers of miracles who attracted large native followings. Frequently such movements became violently anti-European.

The most threatening of these manifestations occurred in 1921 in the Belgian Congo. There the carpenter, Simon Kimbangu, who had become a Baptist, dreamed that he was divinely directed to go forth and heal the sick. He obeyed this injunction and possibly did effect some cures, since his following increased tremendously. The Kimbangists established their own native chapels, churches, and schools, and eventually stopped working in the fields in order to be near their Prophet. The latter volubly quoted passages from the Bible and boasted that his enemies were powerless to harm him. Gradually the movement grew more revolutionary, and the white inhabitants of the Congo became alarmed. Kimbangu was arrested, tried, and sentenced to death, though he had never advocated violence against the Whites. His sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. As a result of this and similar occurrences, a district commissioner forbade any native to teach or preach without a certificate from some Christian missionary organization.

In the Union of South Africa it was the increasing labor competition between Blacks and Whites that led to unrest. Here the Negroes, who outnumbered the Whites three or four to one, gradually were becoming more and more skilled in the various occupations which previously had been monopolized by the latter. So active did the challenge to white supremacy become that in 1918 the white trade-unions threatened to call a strike unless the colored engineers were dismissed from a particular job.

The supreme court of South Africa took a hostile attitude towards regulations tending to discriminate between equally competent persons solely on the ground of color. But the trade-unions agitated strenuously until the South African Labor Party came into power. Then, in 1926, a Color-Bar Bill was passed, definitely excluding Blacks from certain occupations. Because Whites were paid from five to ten times as much as were Blacks for identical services, some employing groups preferred Negro labor.

The danger of a drastically lowered general standard of living, however, was serious enough to enable the more costly white labor to maintain its preëminence.

The modicum of education that had fallen to the Africans eventually led to the perception among a few leading natives that African conditions were in need of improvement, and that a determined stand must be made for fairer treatment. In 1919 Negro delegates from Africa and America met in Paris, under the auspices of a Pan-African Congress, and drew up a charter of liberties for the black men. Among the demands were those for political, economic, and educational equality; the restoration of confiscated native lands; the checking of industrial and concessionary exploitation; and the appointment by the League of Nations of direct representatives with powers of investigation in the mandated areas. Similar African conferences were later held in other large cities, generally biennially.

These meetings, though they failed to lead to any immediate improvement in conditions, laid the basis for a growing race consciousness and served notice that the Blacks were cognizant of the economic value of their continent. Certainly, with its population of about 140,000,000 and with an area approximately equal to that of Europe and North America combined, Africa's value was destined to increase with the passing of years. Gold, diamonds, vegetable oils, cocoa, coffee, timber, copper, tin, rubber, sugar, cotton—all were found or could be raised in Africa in large quantities, to say nothing of ivory, cattle, meat, coal, fruits, and pepper. Intelligent natives naturally considered such a prize worth a struggle. An increasing number came to express the cry of "Africa for the Africans."

But it was not only the Blacks in Africa who adopted a new attitude in the postwar years. The Whites, too, changed their views on several aspects of the native situation. During the war the traditional policies had been reflected in the secret wartime dispositions made by the Allied powers of the German colonial possessions. But at the Paris Peace Conference, as has been noted, President Wilson's idealism clashed with these imperialistic aspirations. A compromise was effected, and in the Covenant of the League the "well-being and development" of peoples "not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world" were designated as "a sacred trust of civilization." Hence, instead of becoming outright owners of the lands that were taken from Germany ostensibly on the ground of her mistreating the natives, the Allied countries became trustees or stewards of the League in the administration of affairs in these territories.

Although a cynical view of this arrangement was often taken, partic-

ularly since the assignment of the mandates followed almost exactly the lines of the secret agreements, the written reminder of trusteeship and the creation of a Permanent Mandates Commission continuously recalled to the white administrators their moral obligations to educate the colonials and develop the overseas areas for the benefit of the natives as well as the Europeans. This realization was responsible for the introduction of a number of colonial reforms, and on occasion the policies of the mandatory powers towards their nonmandatory possessions also seemed to be influenced by the spirit of trusteeship.

Eventually the Whites came to realize that the continued abuse of native labor and the decimation of the population were out of accord with their own economic interests. The concessionaires began to realize that rubber plantations were worthless without the necessary people to work them. The same condition held with respect to diamond and gold mines and fruit plantations. Thus the fear of economic loss was responsible for the better treatment of the natives in some sections.

From 1920 on, France made special efforts to stimulate the economic development of her overseas areas. She hoped to derive a larger proportion of her imports, particularly raw materials, from the colonies. Progress was slow, however, and after more than a decade of effort, which included an impressive colonial exposition in Paris (1931), most of France's colonial imports continued to come from other countries' possessions. The French authorities also began to pay more attention to the spread of vocational and professional education in their African territories. By way of encouraging assimilation, French citizenship was offered to all natives who had served with distinction either in a civil capacity or in the armies during the war. But military conscription was introduced into all French African colonies, and the beneficent influences of education and economic improvement sometimes were overshadowed by the harsh tactics of punitive expeditions.

A British Parliamentary Commission which visited East Africa in 1925 declared its conviction that "the status of trusteeship involves an ethical conception, that is to say, it imposes upon the trustee a moral duty and a moral attitude." Although the British authorities failed to abide wholly by the spirit of this report, the punishments for minor infractions of rules were made less severe in a number of the British-controlled areas. Educational opportunities for the Negroes were increased, and the government liberally assisted in the upkeep of native churches. Yet the Whites usually were careful to retain the upper hand whenever the interests of the natives came into conflict with their own.

In other regions the doings of callous exploiters frequently reached the ears of groups that were able to force reform measures. Thus, a report published by the United States Professor Frank A. Ross upon conditions which he witnessed during a trip through Portuguese Africa in 1925 was brought to the notice of the League, and in 1926 the Portuguese Government was constrained to set up a committee of protection in each colonial district. Similar improvements took place elsewhere on the continent.

The problems of Africa, and of Europe in Africa, after the First World War, appeared, in short, to be these: given a certain amount of education and economic opportunity, the more intelligent natives came to desire autonomy, if not independence; kept in subjection, without education and without the opportunity to better themselves, the natives were considerably less useful in the development of the natural resources. While renewed humanitarian and altruistic considerations served as stimuli to the extension of both spiritual and practical schooling, the limited amount of enlightenment actually spread was responsible for the appearance of an unmistakable clamor for more equitable treatment. Obviously, the Western world soon would have to seek a workable solution for the African dilemma. Africa would continue to learn from Europe, and it would be the white man's duty to teach Africa in as friendly a way as possible.

In the chapter on Italy there was some discussion of events in Ethiopia. Let us now also consider the specific course of happenings in Egypt from 1914 to 1939.

EGYPT

When Turkey and Great Britain went to war in 1914, Egypt was placed in a unique position. Though occupied by the British since 1882, Egypt still was under the technical sovereignty of the Ottoman Sultan. In December 1914, however, Great Britain announced that "the suzerainty of Turkey over Egypt is terminated." On the same occasion Great Britain extended a protectorate over Egypt, deposed the khedive (who happened to be in Constantinople), and elevated his nephew, Hussein Kamel, to the throne as sultan of Egypt. Great Britain promised to take "upon herself the sole burden of the present war without calling on the Egyptian people for aid therein."

This pledge was soon modified, and Egypt began to seethe with discontent. The British organized an Egyptian Labor and Camel Corps to provide transportation for their armies in Palestine and Syria. Service in the corps at first was voluntary, and good wages were paid; but as the war

continued the treatment of the men became poor, and in the end resort was had to forced recruiting. Because of the bad accommodations, some Egyptians froze to death during the cold Palestine winters, and some of the conscripts were made to fight. The British also requisitioned Egyptian livestock and grain at their own prices. In addition to these material grievances, the Egyptians experienced the general hatred of patriots for foreign rule and the traditional dislike of Moslems for Christians. The desire for independence, too, was quickened by Wilson's talk about self-determination. Yet open revolt did not occur during the war years, probably because British troops were quartered in the land.

After the armistice, Egyptian leaders were amazed to find that, although Indian rajahs and Arabian sheikhs had been invited to attend the peace conference, no such privilege was accorded them. The leader of the Nationalist Party (*Wafd*), Saad Zaghlul Pasha, placed himself at the head of a delegation which prepared to embark for Paris to present Egypt's case for independence. The British arrested the delegation and shipped it to Malta. This act precipitated an insurrection (1919). An army under General Edmund Allenby was required to restore order. Eventually the imprisoned delegates were released, and a mission of investigation under Lord Milner was dispatched to Egypt. The mission investigated and then returned to London. Here Milner also interviewed Zaghlul, who had meanwhile gone to Great Britain. In its report the Milner Mission recommended that Egypt be given independence with restrictions. When the proposals were incorporated in a treaty and offered to Egypt in 1921, the Nationalists rejected them.

Rioting broke out anew, Zaghlul was again arrested and this time sent to Gibraltar, and Allenby once more utilized his troops. The general also suggested that Great Britain proclaim the treaty terms as a unilateral declaration. This was done, early in 1922, and Egypt was proclaimed "an independent sovereign state." The following points, however, were "absolutely reserved to the discretion of His Majesty's Government": the defense of Suez, the defense of Egypt, the protection of foreigners and their interests in Egypt, and the control of the Sudan—important as a source of cotton and as the area from which Egypt's water supply could be controlled. Coincident with this termination of the British protectorate, Sultan Ahmed Fuad, who had succeeded Hussein in 1917, changed his title to that of king. The new arrangement irked the Nationalists, but they were powerless to resist it. A constitution was promulgated in 1923, and parliamentary elections were held. The Wafdists were overwhelmingly victorious at the polls, and Zaghlul, who had come home again, became premier.

Another crisis occurred late in 1924 when Sir Lee Stack, governor-general of the Sudan and *sirdar* or commander-in-chief of the Egyptian army, was murdered in Cairo. Both Fuad and Zaghlul expressed their horror at the crime and promised swift prosecution of the assassins. But, inasmuch as this was merely the worst in a series of outrages, the British demanded an official apology, the punishment of the criminals, the suppression of political demonstrations, a cash indemnity, and the immediate withdrawal of all Egyptian soldiers from the Sudan. They further announced the indefinite extension for cotton cultivation of the Gezireh irrigation area in the Sudan, thus threatening Egypt's water supply.

Zaghlul accepted all terms save those relating to the Sudan. The British thereupon occupied the customs house at Alexandria, and Zaghlul resigned. He was succeeded by a more tractable premier, who agreed to the British demands. Subsequently London promised to use only the Blue Nile for Sudanese irrigation projects and to leave the White Nile for Egypt, but the Egyptians continued to be alarmed by successive British dam projects. The Egyptian Parliament appealed to the League of Nations for redress; but Great Britain maintained that the affair was not international, and hence no League member brought it up for discussion.

The next few years witnessed a virtual stalemate in Egyptian politics. Several parliaments were convened and dismissed, and the Nationalist majorities persistently voted down the measures of ministers who were friendly to Great Britain. Zaghlul, as Wafdist leader, ruled the parliament until his death in 1927. Although the Nationalist Party remained intact after the death of Zaghlul, it was able to accomplish little since the king and many of his aides, who owed their positions to the existing regime, displayed pro-British sympathies. Fuad, moreover, disliked the institution of parliamentary responsibility.

The return to power of a Labor Government in Great Britain in 1929 raised Egyptian hopes for independence. There was joy when the liberal Sir Percy Loraine became high commissioner and when Foreign Secretary Henderson announced the draft of a new treaty to be presented to the parliaments at London and Cairo. Although acceptance of this treaty would have been a further step in the direction of independence, it did not satisfy the new Wafdist leader, Mustapha Nahas Pasha, and was rejected. The people became restless again, and parliament was suspended for the fourth time in five years. Ismail Sidky Pasha thereupon became dictator and in 1930 promulgated a new constitution.

This document reflected an attempt to reduce the power of the Wafdists, but owing to careful governmental supervision the reactions of the people

were relatively moderate. In an endeavor to regain the constitution of 1923, however, and to oust Sidky from office, the Wafdists under Nahas now were joined by a liberal party led by former Premier Mohammed Mahmoud Pasha. Nahas and Mahmoud, though claiming to control 90 per cent of the vote, threatened to boycott the election promised for 1931. Sidky's government thereupon forbade Wafdist meetings and prohibited the publication of boycott propaganda. Before the balloting, the opposition leaders were prevented from leaving Cairo lest they induce the people to abstain from voting. The election resulted in an overwhelming victory for the government; because of the boycott, there were no Nationalists in the new parliament.

Sidky retained dictatorial control of the land for several years. Parliament was convened and prorogued at his will, and repressive measures were taken against overenthusiastic Wafdists and communists. Considerable economic distress was experienced in these years, largely because of a decline in the price of cotton. In 1933 there began a series of anti-Christian outbursts, precipitated by the alleged attempt of a British schoolmistress at Port Said to coerce a Moslem girl into accepting Christianity. The latent anti-Christian sentiment grew into an organized Moslem campaign against missionaries and mission schools. There was some violence, and the government was petitioned to withdraw all subsidies from the missions, to tax missionary institutions, and to establish Moslem orphanages, schools, and clinics so that poor Egyptians might not be dependent upon Christians for education and medical attention. Only the last of these requests was acted upon. The violent outbursts eventually subsided, but the campaign to uphold Islam against the "lure" of Christianity continued.

Because of illness and the interference of the king in administrative affairs, Sidky resigned in September 1933. After fourteen troubled months, Mohammed Tewfik Nessim Pasha, a popular and patriotic man of independent political views, came to the helm. He persuaded King Fuad to abolish the undemocratic constitution of 1930. The sovereign was to govern by decree until a new instrument could be promulgated. The Nationalists expected that the constitution of 1923 would be restored, but month after month went by without such action. The situation became dangerous in the autumn of 1935 because of the Mediterranean crisis precipitated by Italy's Ethiopian venture.

When Great Britain took special military and naval precautions in the Egyptian zone, sensitive natives were hurt at the apparent disregard for the views of the Egyptian Government. Some natives feared lest they be drawn into an Anglo-Italian conflict, while others regarded the time as

opportune for exerting pressure on London. Nahas, the Wafdist leader, warned Great Britain to expect no help from Egypt except on a basis of "coöperation between equals." Britain promised that Cairo would be informed of every development that affected Egypt but indicated that the time was not ripe for renewing treaty negotiations. Anti-British riots broke out in several cities, and late in 1935 all Egyptian political parties save one formed a United Front under Nahas.

Thereupon the high commissioner announced Britain's readiness to negotiate as soon as Egypt had a government representing all parties. Nessim now prevailed upon the king to restore the constitution of 1923, and new elections were held in 1936. The returns gave the Wafdists almost 80 per cent of the seats in the chamber, and Nahas again became premier. Meanwhile King Fuad had died (1936) and had been succeeded by his sixteen-year-old son, Farouk I.

The treaty negotiations lasted for months and several times appeared on the verge of breaking down. But Italy's aggressive tactics in eastern Africa had a sobering effect on both parties and made them more willing to coöperate lest a common enemy be the gainer. At last an Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance was signed in London, and ratifications were exchanged just before Christmas 1936.

The treaty, of indefinite duration, provided that each signatory would aid the other in case of war. Great Britain was given the right, in the event of war, to utilize all Egyptian facilities. The British promised to support Egypt's candidacy for admission to the League of Nations, agreed to an exchange of ambassadors (with permanent precedence for the British Ambassador at Cairo), and undertook to confine their troops in Egypt to a zone at the northern end of the Suez Canal. These troops, in peacetime, were not to exceed 10,000 soldiers and 400 pilots. Joint rule over the Sudan was to be reëstablished, with the right of unrestricted immigration for Egyptians. Great Britain also promised to use her influence to induce the powers with extraterritorial rights in Egypt to surrender their privileged position, leaving the full protection of the lives and property of foreigners to the Cairo Government.

In accordance with her promise, Great Britain helped arrange for a meeting of the capitulatory powers at Montreux in 1937. There the Montreux Convention was signed, providing for the complete abolition of extraterritoriality by 1949, with certain steps to be taken at once. Shortly thereafter Egypt became a member of the League, and Farouk was invested as the first king of independent Egypt.

The Nahas Government, which had negotiated the treaty of 1936,

soon found itself at odds with the young king. There was trouble when Farouk insisted upon a traditional religious investiture ceremony. There was disagreement regarding the king's role under the constitution. There was a quarrel when Farouk demanded the disbanding of the Wafdist Blue Shirts, young Fascists who broke up the meetings of those not in sympathy with Nahas. Eventually, at the end of 1937, the king dismissed the cabinet and appointed the moderate Mohammed Mahmoud to the premiership. When the latter dissolved the blue-shirt organization, there were more riots, and Great Britain dispatched additional troops to Egypt.

The spring of 1938 witnessed an exciting election campaign. Premier Mahmoud upheld the principles of liberal government and warned of the autocratic temper of the Wafdist leader, Nahas. The latter stood on his record of diplomatic achievement, but had to face a split within his own ranks when certain dissidents demanded a return to the original and democratic Wafdist principles as enunciated by Saad Zaghlul. The poll represented an easy victory for the government coalition under Mahmoud. The reasons for this included Nahas' differences with the increasingly popular king, the control of the election machinery by the premier, and the split in Wafdist ranks. Mahmoud therefore continued at the head of the Egyptian Government until August 1939. Then illness made him relinquish his post to Aly Maher, an Independent supporter of the government. Upon the outbreak of war in 1939, Aly Maher became military governor with wide powers.

During 1938 and 1939 Egypt—Mediterranean power and neighbor to Libya—felt the need to increase her armed strength. The king therefore urged relatively heavy arms expenditures upon his parliament. Legislation was introduced looking toward the creation of a small fleet and the gradual introduction of conscription. The increasing gravity of the Palestinian situation also interested the Egyptians, who in 1939 joined Iraq and Saudi Arabia in the expression of sympathy with the cause of the Arabs in that mandate.

CHAPTER 15

Latin America[1]

THE WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH

The Latin American nations took little active part in the First World War;[2] but the conflict worked significant changes in them all, and they found in the war an opportunity for expansion of trade and industry. Latin America's part in the struggle was primarily that of a supplier of materials. In supplying demands for foodstuffs and minerals, Latin America saw new industries arise, new commercial and industrial centers spring up or old ones revive, a shift in population to the industrialized and commercialized areas, an expansion of wealth, an increase of foreign investments, and a more active participation of the middle and laboring classes in politics.

At the outbreak of the war, Latin America suffered a temporary reduction in foreign trade because of the unsettled world conditions. From 1916 on, however, Europe's need for foods and minerals brought about a swift expansion. The total export-import trade more than doubled from 1913 to 1920. Then, after falling by more than a third in 1922, it rose again until 1929; in 1932 it dropped to one-fourth of the 1920 figure and then recovered gradually, so that the trade in 1935 about equaled

[1] This chapter originally was contributed by Dr. Bailey W. Diffie.

[2] Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama joined the Allies. Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay severed diplomatic relations with Germany. Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, El Salvador, and Venezuela remained neutral.



LATIN AMERICA

Courtesy, Foreign Policy Association, *Headline Series.*

that of 1913 (*c.* $3,000,000,000). This figure remained the annual average for the period 1938–1940.

In the years from 1913 to 1940 there were significant changes in the direction of Latin American trade. Exports to the United States in 1939 totaled as much as in 1913, comprising about one-third of Latin America's

foreign sales; but imports from the United States increased in the same period from one-fourth to one-third of all foreign purchases. During these years France, Italy, and Great Britain all lost trade in Latin America, while Japan and Germany made the greatest proportionate gains.

Even a short list of the export products of Latin America in 1940 will make clear the importance of that region as a supplier of the materials of civilization. Mexico profited from her deposits of petroleum, silver, copper, and other minerals, and from such export crops as henequen—used for rope fiber and bags. Cuba became one of the world's leading sugar producers and raised large amounts of tobacco. The Central American states grew bananas and coffee, among a variety of tropical crops. Venezuela was one of the world's main sources of petroleum, while Peru exported oil, copper, sugar, and cotton in sizable quantities. Bolivia in 1939 produced one-fourth of the world's tin, while Chile had a virtual monopoly of natural nitrates and long ranked second in the world as a producer of copper. Argentina's production of cereals, meats, wool, linseed, and other agricultural products helped to make her the wealthiest nation per capita in Latin America. Uruguay became a busy exporter of livestock, and Brazil excelled in coffee-growing and cotton-raising.

Latin American economic development was greatly aided by foreign capital. This was not a new phenomenon—European capital had flowed freely into Latin America during the nineteenth century—but the rate of capital imports increased rapidly. The United States supplied the bulk of the credits, partly displacing Great Britain, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. United States direct investments in all Latin America were valued at $3,500,000,000 in 1929 and at $2,800,000,000 in 1940.

Following the outbreak of the Second World War, Latin America, as in the previous conflict, was again cut off from some of her best markets. If anything, her position was more critical than on the earlier occasion, since her foreign commercial ties now were more numerous. The United States and Great Britain, however, took steps to lessen the economic stringency. Great Britain needed all the food and raw materials she could get. The United States needed raw materials, was anxious to prevent purchases by the axis powers, and was ready to put into effect a policy of inter-American trade coöperation that had been carefully worked out by her economic experts. This policy included three instruments: loans, bilateral trade treaties, and commodity-purchasing agreements.

Owing to defaults on many loans during the depression of the early 'thirties, some Latin American nations found it difficult to borrow when the time came for renewed expansion. To meet this situation and to pro-

mote inter-American commerce, Washington in 1934 organized an Export-Import Bank. This bank "created $560,000,000 worth of American trade" between 1934 and 1941. Further stimulus was provided by a number of reciprocal trade treaties, whereby each signatory made special concessions regarding the importation of certain products of the other. Finally, the United States negotiated agreements to take all the exportable surpluses of specified products from a number of Latin American states, notably Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia, and Peru.

Latin America had made little progress in manufacturing prior to the First World War. But eventually, and particularly after 1932, the high tariffs, the difficulty in getting certain finished goods from abroad, widespread currency depreciation, and the presence of some nationally owned capital stimulated industry. By raising their tariffs still higher and in other ways favoring native enterprise, the Latin American countries forced many foreign firms to establish local branches. And while the value of raw materials in 1940 still was greater than that of manufactured products for Latin America as a whole, there had appeared a firmly established industry supplying consumer goods to the domestic markets. Argentina, for example, manufactured most of her own silk and woolen goods; Brazil manufactured virtually all her shoes and hats; Mexico had three times as many textile workers in 1940 as in 1910. The processing of ores for shipment abroad also made great strides, particularly in Chile, Bolivia, Peru, and Mexico. And some manufactured goods, especially chemicals, glasswares, and textiles, were shipped to overseas markets.

In many parts of Latin America the most important industries were those connected with raw materials partly processed in the areas of production. Oil, for example, was often refined at the fields, before shipment, and thus important local industries grew up. Many of the mining regions presented similar phenomena, while in some agricultural areas, either because of processing or concentrated development, there developed considerable industrialization. This was true particularly of sugar production in the Caribbean area and of fruit raising in Colombia and Central America. Hence, in time of distress, the people faced the same problems of low wages and unemployment that were to be found in the more highly industrialized states.

Of particular significance in recent social and political developments was the fact that so much of Latin America became strongly urbanized. Although there was a distinct tendency, as far back as colonial times, to form cities at the administrative seats of the provinces and in the mining districts, the recent rapid growth of cities gave rise to the same problems

of a mixed urban and rural society found in many other parts of the world. Buenos Aires, for example, came to hold about one-fifth of Argentina's population. Santiago contained one-sixth of the people of Chile, and Montevideo boasted more than one-third of the total Uruguayan population. Not infrequently one large city dominated a vast rural area, with important social and economic results.

In the light of Latin America's industrial advances, the importance of communication and transportation facilities was obvious. The topography presented enormous international barriers and made even internal communication difficult: the mountain passes of the Andes were from 9000 to 15,000 feet above sea level. There was continuing need for more railway mileage and hard-surfaced roads. Shipping by way of the rivers and oceans offered only a partial solution, although the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914 shortened the trip from some of the west-coast ports to eastern United States and Europe by 8000 miles. The introduction of regular air services proved to be of immeasurable commercial importance.

Among the important results of the modern economic development in Latin America was the rise of the middle and laboring classes. A merchant class and unattached laborers had existed throughout colonial times, but even in the nineteenth century their political influence was much inferior to that of the landed aristocrats. A gradual change became evident when an increasing dependence of Latin America on world markets shifted farming little by little to a capitalistic basis and stimulated the growth of cities. In many of the countries the peasant thereupon became a hired laborer with no right to the soil. Or he migrated to the cities and mining districts to become, if fortunate, a member of the middle class; or, if less fortunate (and this was the rule), a worker. A distinction must be made, moreover, between the relatively small group of well-to-do middle-class people and the relatively large number of petty merchants, professionals, and white-collar workers.

The upper middle class came to be composed largely of landed aristocrats who were forced by competition to manage their farms as capitalistic enterprises. Often they also invested in commerce, industry, and mining, and acquired new economic concepts to fit their new interests. In some of the countries, where no strong local middle class appeared, the influx of foreign capital created interests that affected political developments as much as, and often more than, local forces. As the traditional political policies of the landed group changed, the middle class, by virtue of its increasing numerical and financial strength, its congregation in the cities, and its educational advantages, came to wield political power. The illiterate

masses, on the other hand, until recently exerted little positive force on political happenings. In these circumstances the growth of a professional and white-collar group and a small-merchant class assumed special importance.

Argentina furnished a good illustration of middle-class and labor growth in an agricultural and commercial country. The characteristic land-holding unit in 1940 still was the large *estancia,* including from 25,000 to 500,000 acres. Before the First World War nearly a third of the province of Buenos Aires was owned by 93 proprietors, and the situation did not change materially in the next quarter-century. The large estates were worked by tenants and hired laborers, often immigrants from Europe. On the industrial side, the city of Buenos Aires in 1913 contained 400,000 workers, an increase of 240 per cent since 1895, but only half as many as in 1935.

Chile, on the eve of the Second World War, presented a similar picture. Almost 50 per cent of the Chilean population was urban. One-half of 1 per cent of the people owned about three-fifths of the land, and farms of 500 acres or more took up 90 per cent of the land. In 1931, about 500 large estates occupied half of the country's agricultural area. These estates were farmed as industrial enterprises and were worked by hired laborers and tenants "who were closely attached to the estate and could not leave it if they had any debts due to the owner."

In Uruguay, where the principal industry was stock raising, the great ranches were owned by a few individuals—but Montevideo contained a numerous proletariat. The great cattle- and sheep-raising sections of Argentina, southern Chile, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Paraguay, and Venezuela offered a similar view. The land was customarily held in enormous blocks, and the packing plants were generally controlled by United States or British packers. The coffee plantations of Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela; the sugar estates in Peru, Brazil, Mexico, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic; the cotton fields of Mexico, Brazil, and Peru; and the banana groves of Venezuela, Colombia, Central America, and the Caribbean states were nearly all in large holdings. Some of the owners were local inhabitants, but many were foreign absentee owners. The wageworkers formed an Indian, Negro, or white proletariat.

The industrialized areas of Latin America further illustrated the simultaneous rise of the middle and working classes in the decades before 1940. A numerous laboring class had existed even in pre-1914 days in the copper-mining regions of Chile and Peru, the tin-mining areas of Bolivia, and the silver- and lead-mining districts of Mexico. The mines were usually

located in otherwise barren areas to which food to sustain the miners had to be brought from hundreds of miles away. The agricultural regions, in turn, depended upon these industrial areas to furnish markets for their food products. The economic structure was further complicated by the fact that most of the mineral output had to be marketed abroad; and, if the foreign market failed, unemployment, depression, and social disturbances often followed. A parallel situation obtained in the petroleum-producing regions of Peru, Venezuela, Colombia, and Mexico.

Latin America between the two world wars thus offered a scene in which the comparatively recent rise of an upper middle class of industrialists, a lower middle class of white-collar workers, and a landless proletariat, was a dynamic factor. About three-fourths of the Latin Americans lived under conditions characteristic of the Western economic structure. At the same time there still existed among the large Indian populations of Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil, a semibarter economy.

The accumulation of local and foreign capital and the rise of the middle and laboring classes furnished the background for important political, educational, and social changes. The middle class demanded and received a greater voice in political affairs and brought about a revision of the educational system. Out of the universities, now attended by many students of middle-class origin, came new currents of thought and agitation for change of the social structure. The laboring class obtained partial recognition of its demands through political action or revolution. A few examples will demonstrate the trend of these events.

The discontent aroused by the domination of the *estancieros* in Argentina led to the organization of the *Unión Cívica Radical* late in the nineteenth century and the eventual passage (1912) of franchise reforms that made possible the election of this party's candidate, Hipólito Irigoyen (1916–1922), to the presidency. Since the election of Irigoyen was a triumph of the middle class in coöperation with the workers, the new executive faced the problem of satisfying both supporting groups. The socialists and the maritime-workers' union, in particular, voiced demands for sweeping changes, and their strength was manifested in a strike of stevedores soon after the First World War.

Although the strike was broken by force, the radicals still controlled sufficient followers to induce Irigoyen and his successor, Marcelino T. de Alvear (1922–1928), to enact some social legislation. A Sunday rest law was passed, children were forbidden to work in factories, and a maximum work week of 48 hours was set for minors under sixteen. Seats were re-

quired for women employees, a compulsory maternity-rest law was enacted, workers were insured against accidents, and pensions were granted to civil servants of thirty years' standing. No serious attempt was made to bring about a broader division of the land.

Irigoyen was again elected to the presidency in 1928, but a revolution by conservatives, anti-Irigoyen radicals, and army men unseated him in 1930. Thenceforth Argentina was governed by a conservative coalition that enjoyed army support. The international policies of this government seemed at times to favor the axis powers, especially under the administration of President Ramón S. Castillo.

In Chile, where the upper middle class had shared power with the landed aristocracy since 1891, the post-1920 depression effected a change comparable to the election of Irigoyen in Argentina. A coalition of middle-class and labor votes brought the liberal-minded Arturo Alessandri into power in 1920. He was responsible for a limited amount of labor and social legislation and the adoption, in 1925, of a new constitution. This document increased the powers of the president, gave greater autonomy to the provinces, widened the suffrage, and separated state and church. Many changes suggested by Alessandri were held up until General Carlos Ibáñez became dictator-president in 1927. Supported by the army, Ibáñez levied an income tax, published additional social-welfare laws, and reformed the educational system. At the same time he fought his political enemies in a manner to win him the reputation of a tyrant.

When Chile began to feel the effects of the depression of 1930, Ibáñez tried to solve his problems by borrowing and by stringent economy measures, but this failed to stem a rising tide of opposition, and his regime collapsed in 1931. Chile's economic position became desperate and her politics chaotic. Several ephemeral administrations held power before an election in 1932 again brought Alessandri into the presidency for a six-year term. His administration saw the rise of a strong Communist Party, a further growth of the socialists, and a general shift to the left in politics. Eventually a coalition of communists, socialists, and Radicals formed a Popular Front and elected Pedro Aguirre Cerda to the presidency in 1938. When the new executive died in 1941, after a prolonged illness, Juan Antonio Ríos was elected president.

The influence on social legislation of the middle and working classes was exceptionally strong in Uruguay. The executive power there came into the hands of the liberal Colorado Party in 1872 and was still there seventy years later. Traditionally progressive, this party was reorganized at the

beginning of the twentieth century and became an instrument of middle-class and workmen's interests. The chief opposition group represented the large-estate owners and the Catholic Church. To retain the support of the laborers and to limit the growth of the socialists, who over the years gained an increasing number of seats in the legislature, the Colorados consistently fathered social legislation and democratic governmental reform.

Among the more important of these reforms was the constitution of 1919, which gave broad powers to the lower house and lessened the prerogatives of the chief executive. The constitution also abolished noble titles, hereditary honors, primogeniture, and entails. The church was disestablished, the franchise was extended, and provision was made for the right of habeas corpus, equality before the law, trial by jury, freedom of speech and press, and liberty of religious belief. The government established a national labor office and assumed ownership of a number of public services. Laws were passed instituting an eight-hour working day, old-age pensions, factory inspection, compensation for accidents, income and inheritance taxes, and a minimum wage in agriculture. The state acquired ownership of the electric-power industry, and a national refrigeration plant was built to handle shipments of frozen meat.

The depression precipitated a crisis in 1933 which Uruguay found it peculiarly difficult to meet because of the division of administrative powers. The framers of the constitution of 1919 had hoped to prevent dictatorship by creating an executive council with powers independent of the president, but the system was unwieldy. In 1933 President Gabriel Terra assumed dictatorial authority on the ground that the economic dilemma made strong action imperative. A new constitution in 1934 strengthened the hands of the president. But special prerogatives granted the minority were later to cause difficulty, since it was made possible for the minority to control at least one-third of the legislature regardless of the vote it had polled. When the Nationalist Party prevented legislation which Terra's successor, President Alfredo Baldomir, deemed vital for national defense, the executive dissolved the congress early in 1942 and created a Council of State.

Colombia, too, made notable progress after the opening of the twentieth century in education, sanitation, penal reform, law codification, labor legislation, and political stability. After many years of Conservative rule, the Liberals elected Enrique Olaya Herrera president in 1928. Under him and his successors, Alfonso López (1934–1938), Eduardo Santos (1938–1942), and López again in 1942, Colombia achieved the reputation of one

of the stablest states in the Americas. Among the chief acts of the government, though one not widely publicized, was the quiet but efficient redistribution of Colombia's agricultural wealth.

Peru wrote much social legislation into her constitution during the dictatorship of President Augusto B. Leguía (1919–1930), and continued this tendency under President Oscar R. Benavides (1933–1939). Much of Benavides' reform work coincided with what his political opponents advocated, but his dictatorial policies and harsh treatment of those who opposed him, plus a proaxis leaning in international affairs, turned many liberals against him. He was succeeded by Manuel Prado, who freed most of the political prisoners and adopted a policy of definite friendship with the United States.

Bolivia, Ecuador, the Central American and Caribbean countries, and the other nations of Latin America also enacted extensive codes of social legislation. The Andean states outlined programs to improve the living conditions of the Indians who comprised large portions of their respective populations, but no marked success was achieved in this connection by 1940. Several Indian congresses were held under the auspices of the Pan-American Union, but, except in Mexico, the lot of the Indians remained backward.

During the colonial period and until recently, education was confined principally to a small upper class and the clergy. The curricula were usually based on classical studies and were ill suited to either the new scientific and social developments or the needs of the classes born of industrialization and urbanization. The task of setting up a modern educational structure was complicated by a variety of factors. The rural communities were hampered by bad transportation facilities. Governmental funds, never plentiful, tended to be spent on soldiers rather than school children. The leaders of Latin America were slow to adjust themselves to the idea of education for the masses rather than for the classes. While the percentage of illiteracy in some regions remained high, others presented a creditable record in schoolwork. Argentina, for example, had 14.4 per cent of her total population in school by 1940, compared with 17 per cent for the United States. Chile had 12.4 per cent of her people in school, Panama, 11.5 per cent, and Brazil, 7 per cent. Many Latin American educators went to the United States or Europe for training, and educators from foreign countries were invited to Latin America to aid in the reorganization of old, and the founding of new, systems of instruction. An increasing amount of attention was given to the formal education of girls.

In the universities, the progress after 1918 was characterized by broad-

ening curricula, an improvement in the quality of instruction, a lessening of outside political influences, and the greater participation of students in the government of the schools through seats on the university councils. To the students themselves belonged much of the credit for these changes. A revolt against the antiquated system started at Córdoba, Argentina, in 1918, and thereafter the demand for university reform spread rapidly.

In 1940 Latin America had 67 universities, 17 of them privately controlled. The students soon discovered that reform in the government-controlled universities depended first upon certain general political changes. Accordingly the students of more and more states began to participate wholeheartedly in political upheavals against the old regimes. By way of example, a word may be said of the student agitation in Peru.

In the midst of Peru's first postwar depression, President Leguía inaugurated reforms that improved the material condition of the country. His eleven-year dictatorship, from 1919 to 1930, however, was marked by political corruption and persecution, and the students who sought educational changes beyond those which the government was willing to concede were among the chief sufferers. Under the leadership of Carlos Mariátegui and, after his death, under Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, the students eventually founded the radical *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (APRA), which became especially active after the downfall of Leguía. Within a few years it became one of the best-organized parties in Peru, with a nationalistic program that called for closer coöperation with the neighboring states, the division of the large landed holdings, liberal educational reforms, and a general reorganization of the national economy.

Because it was the local situations in all these countries which produced the issues that were taken up by the students, there was no one Latin American student policy or attitude. Allied with the workers in some states and with the middle class in others, the students on occasion furnished the intellectual leadership in radical labor movements, arrayed themselves against the landlords and the clericals, and fought against the continued domination of foreign economic groups. But, whether they were democrats, communists, or fascists, the students became an important influence in the life and development of Latin America.

BRAZIL

Brazil was colonized by Portugal, not Spain, as were the other nations; hence Portuguese became the official language. Brazil was about three times the size of the next largest Latin American country, Argentina,

and larger than the United States with an extra Texas. The population increased from 22,000,000 in 1914 to 44,000,000 in 1940. Railway mileage, owned largely by the federal and state governments, grew from 13,000 in 1912 to 21,000 in 1937. The annual value of exports rose from an average of $293,000,000 for the years 1911–1915 to $462,000,000 for the years 1925–1929; after a decided drop during the early 1930's, the annual average rose again to $300,000,000 from 1938–1941. Meanwhile all but 7 per cent of the inhabitants had come to live along the seaboard, the regions of greatest concentration and wealth-production being the states of Bahía and Pernambuco in the north and Río de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Minas Geraes in the south.

Political developments in Brazil were strongly influenced by economic factors and the grouping of the people in a few areas. Prior to 1912, when rubber was a highly important Brazilian product, the northern states exercised some political power; but with the decline of the rubber industry (from exports valued at $78,000,000 in 191[illegible] to less than $1,000,000 in 1932) political influence became almost a monopoly of the coffee-growing and industrial southern states. The struggle for the control of the federal government came to be largely among São Paulo, Minas Geraes, and Río Grande do Sul—the chief producers of coffee and cattle and the centers of trade and manufacturing. The key to Brazilian politics, until recently, could be found in the rivalries of these states and especially in the efforts of São Paulo to control the national government in order to protect her coffee interests. National political parties did not exist. There were, instead, separate state parties, such as the Minas Geraes Republican Party and the São Paulo Republican Party.

The scene was further complicated by the extensive autonomy of the individual states, their independence of the federal government being far greater than that of the commonwealths in the United States. They could levy tariffs, and their police forces were in effect armies, which on occasion opposed the federal government itself. The political machines in the states nominated the candidates for national office and then formed combinations in their support. Of the fourteen presidents chosen between the establishment of the republic in 1889 and 1940, ten were from the three southern states named in the previous paragraph.

To speak of the political control exercised by these states meant, in reality, to speak of the influence of the great coffee- and cattle-raisers plus the middle class that had grown up in the industrial centers. The "people" of Brazil had little voice in politics, since three-fourths of them were illiterate and only the literate could vote. President Getulio Vargas

stated in 1934 that of every 1000 Brazilians who should receive elementary education, 513 did not enter school and only 30 completed the work of the elementary grades. The situation thereafter improved somewhat, but not sufficiently to alter the political significance of illiteracy. The practical working of the state political-machine system could be seen in the events that transpired after 1930.

In 1930 Julio Prestes, then governor of São Paulo, was elected president in a manner which his opponent, Getulio Vargas, then governor of Río Grande do Sul, alleged to be fraudulent. Vargas was the candidate of a coalition composed of the old political machines and a variety of liberal and left-wing forces. His program promised wide social changes, including effective suffrage, constitutional reform, creation of a labor department, agrarian improvements, and guarantees that the states would not be interfered with by the central government. When it became evident that Prestes would be credited with a majority of the votes cast, the coalition, with the aid of part of the army, placed Vargas in power. He derived further support from the mere fact that Río Grande do Sul believed it was the turn of one of its own men to be president. Vargas thus was supported by a heterogeneous group, and Brazil was plunged into prolonged unrest.

Out of industrial growth had come labor unions on the one hand and capitalists on the other. Both had supported Vargas, and both expected rewards. The army men wanted domestic order and respect for the military corps, an aristocracy all its own. Vargas moved slowly and skilfully through the conflicting political currents. When the state of São Paulo rose in revolt in 1932, using Vargas' earlier promise to grant a new constitution as a pretext, he was able to crush its forces. He kept his promise to appoint a minister of labor, but deprived the unions of their autonomy by placing them under federal control. He broadened the system of social insurance and framed minimum wage laws; but the minimum wages were so low that the standard of living was only slightly affected.

In 1934 a new constitution was promulgated which incorporated many of the campaign promises, but the government in reality appeared to be moving in a rightist direction in both domestic and international affairs. The position of the president and the army as arbiters of a very delicate situation became clearly apparent. In 1935 Vargas' opponents again revolted, the rebels this time including elements of every political color, from communists to capitalists and disgruntled politicians. After the revolt was put down, Vargas ruled through martial law for almost two years. Then, by 1937, the political situation was again at the breaking point. Although many of the communists and left-wing leaders were in jail, their

followings still were numerous. Since, under the constitution, new presidential elections were to be held in 1938, opposing candidates were nominated, and an intensive campaign was in full swing by midsummer of 1937.

In the meantime a new factor, Fascism, had entered the scene. In 1932 there was organized a Fascist *Integralist Action* under the headship of Plinio Salgado. Taking the Guaraní Indian greeting "Anaue" as their equivalent of "Heil," the Greek letter sigma (Σ) as their substitute for a swastika, and the green color of the Brazilian flag for their shirts, the Integralists grew rapidly. No Brazilian village was too small to have an Integralist center. The Salgado program was frankly based on the Nazi-Fascist pattern. Adopting the motto "God, Country, and Family," the Fascists boasted that through their "control of the teaching staffs of schools throughout the nation" they held in their hands "the future of Brazil."

Simultaneously, the German Nazis and Italian Fascists had formed strong organizations in Brazil. They owned newspapers, carried on a vigorous propaganda, were directed and financed from abroad, and had the support of many Brazilians. They also maintained close contact with the Integralists and participated with them in parades and demonstrations. By the summer of 1937 street fighting between the Fascists and their opponents became a frequent occurrence. Salgado became a candidate for the presidency, and on several occasions the Integralists held "practice mobilizations," in preparation, they said, for the day when they would take over the country.

But President Vargas had other plans. Using the disorders as an excuse for canceling the forthcoming elections, he staged another coup late in 1937 and issued a previously prepared constitution of a more authoritarian character than had been the one of 1934. Among other things, the new document extended the presidential term from four to six years, and in the specific case of Vargas continued his incumbency until such time as a plebiscite might determine otherwise. In 1938 all political parties were abolished. For some time thereafter Vargas assumed an attitude in international affairs that to many foreign observers seemed to be of a proaxis nature; but in 1942 he brought his country into the Second World War on the side of the United Nations.

MEXICO

During the long dictatorship (1877–1911) of Porfirio Díaz, economic progress came to Mexico. Foreign trade increased from $63,000,000 in

1885 to $239,000,000 in 1907. Internal peace was maintained. The credit of the country was reëstablished, and foreign capital was attracted. The production of petroleum was developed, and railway mileage increased from 450 in 1867 to 16,000 in 1911. But some of these improvements occurred under conditions that were destined to cause trouble. The petroleum fields and the mines were largely foreign owned. The land was in the hands of relatively few people. Labor was meagrely paid, and thousands of peons were "debt slaves," while the Indians in many cases had been driven from their lands. The governor of Chihuahua, Luis Terrazas, owned 6,000,000 acres of land—a possession more than seven times the size of Rhode Island. Almost 25 per cent of the privately owned land belonged to 114 proprietors.

In 1910–1911 a political revolution led to the overthrow and flight of Díaz. Then the demand for land by the rural workers, and for better working conditions by the urban laborers, gradually converted political revolution into social revolution. During the ten years to 1920 the fighting was almost continuous, but in 1917 a new constitution was adopted. It aimed at securing a "Mexico for the Mexicans." The document was nationalistic, antiforeign, anticlerical, prolabor, and pro-Indian. It provided for a minimum wage, an eight-hour day, profit sharing, the protection of women and children in industry, housing reform, social insurance, the right to strike, arbitration of labor disputes, agrarian reforms, nationalization of subsoil wealth, and the curbing of foreign landownership. The realization of this constitutional program began during the administrations of Álvaro Obregón (1920–1924) and Plutarco E. Calles (1924–1928) and continued thereafter at a steady pace, despite the opposition of large landowners, clericals, and foreign investors.

The government, by the end of 1934, had reclaimed 34,000,000 acres of land from the control of private individuals. The redistribution of this land proceeded rapidly, and by 1935 more than 700,000 heads of families (representing 3,000,000 people), who had hitherto been landless, were settled on about 20,000,000 acres. Then, during the administration of General Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–1940), the amount of land redistributed (44,000,000 acres) was greater than the total distribution from 1911 to 1934. Nevertheless some large landholdings remained.

Industrial working conditions were likewise bettered after 1910. Minimum-wage laws were put into effect, the government on occasion coöperated with strikers and aided them in securing the fulfilment of their demands, and the living conditions of millions were improved. The Mexican unemployment figure remained comparatively small. Much of

this was accomplished through the efforts of the *Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana* (CROM), formed in 1918. The CROM had 2,000,000 members in 1927, but thereafter lost a large share of its following to newer labor organizations. The most important of these new unions was the *Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos* (CTM), whose leader, Vicente Lombardo Toledano, played a prominent role in the Cárdenas Administration. The CTM leadership advocated socialization of Mexico, and by 1940 had organized numerous coöperatives and was managing or participating in the management of railroads, street railways, petroleum companies, bus lines, and sugar mills.

Cárdenas was succeeded in 1940 by General Manuel Ávila Camacho. Generally regarded as more conservative than Cárdenas, Camacho transferred the railroads from CTM control to government management, made a compromise settlement of the petroleum controversy with the United States, and inaugurated a new landownership policy. The agrarian revolution of Mexico had long been based on a program of restoring the *ejidos,* or communal village landholdings, characteristic of pre-Cortesian and colonial times; the tendency under Camacho was to substitute individual farm ownership.

THE CHURCH IN LATIN AMERICA

In all stages of Latin American history, the position occupied by the Catholic Church and its relations with the state were of paramount importance. During the colonial period and the first years of Latin American independence, the Roman Catholic Church was everywhere the established church. Religious toleration did not exist except in Argentina, the remaining nations having forbidden the public exercise of any but the Catholic religion. Education, charity, and hospitalization were monopolies of the church, whose wealth comprised half of the real estate of Latin America. The clergy, in general, seemed opposed to liberty of religion, press, speech, and assembly. The church claimed the right to maintain its own courts and to keep numerous *fueros* or privileges.

Gradually, however, the position of the church was weakened, sometimes, as in Ecuador, Colombia, and Mexico, to the accompaniment of civil war. A specific, though varying, state-church relationship existed in 1940 in Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, Argentina, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. In Cuba and Panama the status of the church resembled that in the United States, while in Brazil the Catholic Church was accorded a preferred but not an established

position. Uruguay completed the separation of church and state in 1917, as did Chile eight years later.

In Mexico the conflict over religion was especially fierce. There the constitution of 1857 deprived the church of many privileges enjoyed in the first years of Mexico's republican existence. Díaz, however, had allowed it to regain most of the former rights, in practice if not in theory, by 1910. Hence the church opposed the revolt against Díaz; and hence, in turn, the constitution of 1917 contained anticlerical provisions.

Education was secularized,[3] and monastic orders were outlawed. Religious liberty was guaranteed, and the church was forbidden to hold property. The constitution also denied the church juridical personality, excluded foreign clergymen, limited the number of the clergy, and required clergymen to register with the civil authorities. Up to 1925 the federal government made little effort to enforce these provisions. Then, however, several state legislatures moved to carry out the constitutional terms.

In February 1926 an open conflict between the church and the civil authorities was precipitated by a clerical denunciation of the disputed constitutional articles. President Calles answered this protest by urging their immediate strict enforcement. The church property was nationalized, foreign priests were deported, and all schools, asylums, and convents where religious instruction was given were closed. Private schools were required to register with the minister of public instruction. The teaching of religious subjects in primary schools was prohibited, clergymen of any creed and members of religious orders were forbidden to teach, and schools were warned against the use of holy pictures for the inculcation of religious ideas.

These measures encountered strong opposition. A boycott was launched by faithful Catholics "to create in the nation a state of intense economic crisis." All priests were withdrawn from the churches, and religious services were suspended. The civil authorities thereupon took over the churches and kept them open for worship. When it became apparent that the economic and religious boycott would fail, various organizations resorted to armed violence. Using the battle cry: "*Viva Cristo, rey!*" ("Long live Christ, the King!"), the *Cristeros* or Church Party participated in serious disturbances from 1926 to 1929.

A truce was reached in 1929 when the government agreed to register only those priests who were duly appointed by their superiors; that religion might be taught within church confines; and that the church was entitled to the constitutional right of petition. Amid popular rejoicing, church services were resumed for the first time in three years. But the agreement

[3] Illiteracy in Mexico decreased from 70 per cent in 1910 to 60 per cent in 1930.

satisfied neither side, and the conflict was reopened in 1931 when the state of Vera Cruz limited the number of priests to one for each 100,000 of the population. Similar action soon was taken by other states, while some forbade any clergy to officiate. A federal law restricted the number of priests in Mexico, D.F., and in 1932 the papal legate was deported.

The struggle became particularly bitter when the government proposed to make socialistic instruction compulsory in all schools and universities. It was the avowed aim of the authorities to imbue the children with "a love for the exploited masses" and to analyze religions for them "in the light of reason and science." When Catholics were ordered not to permit their children to attend school under pain of excommunication, the attorney-general of the republic was instructed to take action against all Catholic clerics who were "fomenting rebellion." Eventually, however, in 1936, state-church relations began to improve. The Cárdenas regime permitted the Catholic Church gradually to regain some of its lost privileges. Camacho continued this policy after 1940, thereby establishing another uneasy truce during which the church continued to press its claims.

CHAPTER 16

The United States

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TROUBLOUS TIMES, 1918–1921

In the election of 1916 Woodrow Wilson defeated Charles E. Hughes for the Presidency of the United States. The victorious candidate polled only 600,000 more votes than his rival. On the same occasion, the Democratic majority in the Senate was reduced, and in the House of Representatives the balance of power fell to a small group of independents. With the close of the war came a further decline in the popular appeal of the Democratic Party. There was a reaction, on the one hand against the domestic policies fostered by the first Wilson Administration—policies expressed in such legislation as the Clayton Anti-Trust Law, the Federal Reserve Act, and the Underwood Tariff—and on the other against the wide powers which the government had exercised during the war. In the congressional election of 1918 the Republicans obtained control of both houses.

The blame for the high cost of living that followed the war was placed upon the Democratic Administration. The end of the conflict and the cancelation of government contracts running into billions of dollars partially disrupted the economic system of the country. Yet many manufacturers, accustomed to large profits, refused in the early postwar years to be satisfied with moderate returns. Profiteering continued and, for a time, became worse. Labor was equally insistent upon keeping wages up to and above the inflated war level. The consumer was the loser, for the purchasing power of the dollar was 52 per cent lower in 1920 than in 1913. The class that suffered most from these circumstances was the salaried group—the professionals and clerks whose pay was fixed for long periods in advance.

The truce under which the government had persuaded capital and labor to operate during the war now came to an end, and the pent-up energies of the opposing groups broke loose with astonishing force. While certain branches of business were willing to let "the public be damned," the coal-miners, for example, were ready to let it freeze. The year 1919 witnessed approximately 3000 major strikes, participated in by 4,000,000 workers. Attorney-General A. Mitchell Palmer evinced great zeal in tracking down members of various radical organizations, and even staid citizens were gripped by a "Red scare."

Many citizens, in addition, were dissatisfied with the Paris Peace Conference. Some felt that the treatment accorded Germany was too severe. Others believed that Great Britain was reaping most of the benefits of the war. Irish sympathizers thought Wilson negligent of the aspirations of Erin, while friends of Italy and Greece were dissatisfied with the gains of these states. There was opposition to the League of Nations, and some Republicans resented their exclusion from the Paris Conference. Hence, when Wilson placed the Versailles Treaty before the Senate (1919) for its consent to ratification, the prospects for acquiescence were slight.

The Senate split into four groups over the question of the treaty, in particular of the League. Wilson's followers favored ratification without amendments. Other Democrats proposed acceptance with mild reservations. The majority of the Republicans, led by Henry Cabot Lodge, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, insisted upon more sweeping amendments. The "irreconcilable" Republicans, led by William E. Borah of Idaho, opposed America's entering a league in any form.

The main public attacks on the treaty were directed against the League Covenant, especially against the article that made possible League membership for Great Britain's dominions and against Article 10, which guaranteed the territorial integrity and political independence of the member states. The President tried to make clear that nothing could happen in the League Council without United States assent since the vote had to be unanimous, and that all League obligations were "moral" rather than "legal." His antagonists, however, stigmatized Article 10 as an infringement on the right of Congress to declare war. In the circumstances, the treaty twice failed of acceptance when brought up for vote, with and without reservations, in 1919 and 1920.

In June 1920 the Republican National Convention met at Chicago. When it became evident that a deadlock among several leading candidates could not be broken, a "dark horse" was selected. The choice fell on

Warren Gamaliel Harding of Ohio, a "genial standpatter" who had no national enemies. The platform censured the Wilson Administration and proposed the reaching of a world peace agreement "without the compromise of national independence." The Democrats met at San Francisco. Governor James M. Cox of Ohio eventually secured the nomination. The party platform advocated "the immediate ratification of the treaty without reservations which would impair its essential integrity." The Socialist Party for the fifth time nominated Eugene V. Debs, who then was serving a sentence in the Atlanta Penitentiary for pacifistic activities during the war.

The outcome of the campaign of 1920 was influenced by all the political and economic factors already mentioned, and by some additional elements. The voting was affected, in one way or another, by (1) the return of the railways to private ownership under favorable conditions through the Esch-Cummins Act of 1920; (2) the fact that millions of dollars' worth of national property was visibly going to waste through the rotting, in the Hudson River and elsewhere, of hundreds of ships that had been built to meet war emergencies; (3) the ratification of the Eighteenth or Prohibition Amendment and the passage (1919) of the Volstead Act, which defined as "intoxicating" any liquor containing more than one-half of 1 per cent of alcohol; and (4) the ratification of the Nineteenth or Woman Suffrage Amendment.

Neither major candidate was well known to the people. Cox was owner of the *Dayton Daily News* and had three times been elected governor of Ohio. Harding owned the *Marion Star,* had been lieutenant-governor of Ohio, and was a United States Senator. Harding had considerable popular appeal as a candidate, being plain, kind-hearted, and religious. In his slogan, "A return to normalcy," he well expressed the sentiment of many people who were tired of crusades and who "wanted a rest from ideas that might develop into causes."

The League seemingly played a relatively minor part in the campaign, being overshadowed by a general feeling that "our own yard is enough to worry about." Wilson recommended that the election be made "a great and solemn referendum" on the League, but Harding straddled the issue, saying, in effect, that he opposed *the* League but favored *a* league, a "free association of nations." The Republican candidate won by a plurality of 7,000,000 votes. For the first time since the War between the States, a commonwealth that had seceded, Tennessee, "went Republican." Four months after the election Woodrow Wilson left the White House, tired, ill, repudiated.

HARDING AND THE "RETURN TO NORMALCY"

President Harding entrusted the State Department to the experienced Charles E. Hughes. One of the new secretary's first tasks was to bring to a close the technical state of war that still existed between the United States on the one side, and Germany, Austria, and Hungary on the other. Wilson had vetoed a joint resolution to end hostilities without the formality of a treaty agreement. In July 1921 Congress repassed and Harding signed this resolution, which declared the war "to be at an end" and reserved to the United States all the rights and privileges accruing to her under the unratified Peace of Paris. A few months later the treaties of Berlin, Vienna, and Budapest were signed and ratified, the United States in each case being guaranteed "all the rights and advantages stipulated" for her benefit in the German, Austrian, and Hungarian treaties with the Allies.

Once in office, Harding, realizing that the members of the League of Nations would hardly disband that organization and form a new one, dropped all talk of his "free association of nations." So completely did the administration try to forget the League that for almost six months no reply was sent to the communications which its secretary-general forwarded to Washington. The American Ambassador in London was "instructed to inform the League's authorities that as the United States had not joined the League she was not in a position to answer letters from it." Not until the situation was exposed in the *New York Times* did the State Department send even formal acknowledgment of League notes.

Beginning in 1922, the government sent "unofficial observers" to conferences "where matters of concern to the United States were under consideration." Such conferences were those on the opium traffic, customs formalities, and communications and transit. Despite his indifference to the League, Harding urged membership in the World Court on condition that the United States be given an equal voice with other countries in the selection of judges. This proviso was necessary since the United States had no representation in the League bodies which elected the judges. The President died before the Senate acted on his suggestion.

Equally frigid during these years were Washington's relations with Russia. Secretary of Commerce Hoover held that under the Bolshevik economic system Russia could expect "no real return to production." Hence she would "have no considerable commodities to export and, consequently, no great ability to obtain imports." In these circumstances it was felt that there existed no motive for making diplomatic arrangements to facilitate the exchange of goods with Russia.

There were two spheres, however, in which the United States did not remain aloof: naval construction and Pacific and Far Eastern relations. The naval rivalry between Great Britain and the United States, inaugurated by a National Defense Act passed by Congress in 1916, threatened harmonious relations between the two peoples. The matter was made more serious and broader in scope by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which, it was feared, might become a menace to United States Pacific interests. The status of all Far Eastern territories might therefore profitably be discussed. Accordingly a nine-power conference was held at Washington in 1921–1922 and, as we have seen, agreements were reached on the limitation of naval armaments and on Pacific and Far Eastern problems.[1]

In domestic matters, President Harding by "a return to normalcy" understood a return to policies favoring good business. In 1921 Congress repealed a wartime excess-profits tax and lowered the surtax maximum on the largest incomes to 50 per cent. In 1922 it passed a Bouns Bill for the war veterans. Harding vetoed this measure on the grounds that it contained no provision for raising the necessary money; that the soldiers had never expected a bonus until the American Legion, founded in 1919, had proposed the idea; and that the government had been sufficiently liberal in the allotments and in the compensations made for disabilities. In the same session Congress passed the high Fordney-McCumber Tariff to supersede the moderate Underwood Act of 1913. The law authorized the President to increase or decrease the scheduled rates up to 50 per cent if the existing duties did not equalize the cost of production in the United States and the competing foreign countries.

In 1922 the road back to normalcy was partially blocked by the strikes of 600,000 coal-miners and 300,000 railway shopmen. There was violence in both instances, and Attorney-General Harry M. Daugherty secured a sweeping court injunction against the railwaymen that virtually forbade all the activities of trade-union officials. Much of the disorder was charged to radicals and professional agitators, and hence the public was not sympathetic to the cause of the workers.

Meanwhile Congress was becoming acutely aware of the economic plight of the farmers. During the war the process of farm industrialization had advanced at an unprecedented rate. The wartime food needs had made it profitable to devote every available acre to cultivation, and the farmers consequently had borrowed heavily in order to buy more land and more

[1] See pp. 85 and 418. The United States in 1921 made it plain to Great Britain and France that United States oil companies were not to be excluded from a share in the oil concessions of the Near Eastern mandates.

machines. In 1919 the farm crop of the United States was valued at $16,000,000,000, as compared with $6,000,000,000 ten years earlier. After the war, however, the farmers found themselves saddled with a mortgage debt of $4,000,000,000.

Even in the heyday of war prosperity the average farmer had realized little more than 6 per cent on his total investment. Hence, when the prices of wheat, corn, cotton, and cattle declined in the business slump that followed 1919, the farmers were in a desperate situation. Though they had developed marketing and purchasing coöperatives, they had no organization for regulating production or fighting deflation. Wheat toppled from $2.14 a bushel in 1919 to $0.93 a bushel in 1923. The situation was similar with respect to other farm products. Freight rates, on the contrary, continued to be high, and local tax rates remained at a level almost two and a half times that of 1912. And the interest payments had to be met, or the mortgages would be foreclosed.

In despair, the farmers turned to the government for relief. A congressional Farm Bloc was created (1921) to represent the interests of the western farmers who cared little about the tax revision, shipping subsidies, or immigration bills which were the chief worry of the eastern legislators. Several farm-relief measures were passed between 1921 and 1923, designed chiefly to cut speculation in grain, make available additional agricultural-credit facilities, and tax agricultural imports. In the face of increasing competition from Canadian, Australian, and, eventually, Russian grain, these measures failed to solve the country's agricultural problem.

In 1923 the Hardings started on an ill-fated tour across the country and a visit to Alaska. The President was not well when the trip began, and he fell seriously ill in Alaska. He was returning home when death overtook him in San Francisco, on August 2. Probably his mind had been troubled and his illness aggravated by certain deeds of official corruption in the years 1921 to 1923.

One of the first scandals to be uncovered grew out of the practices of Charles R. Forbes, director of the Veterans' Bureau. According to a Senate Investigating Committee, the record of Forbes' activities was one of "almost unparalleled waste, recklessness, and misconduct," costing the government $200,000,000. For his misdeeds Forbes was sentenced to a term in Leavenworth Prison. Another investigating committee discovered that Attorney-General Daugherty had surrounded himself in the Department of Justice with disreputable characters, and had failed to prosecute grafters and leading bootleggers. When Daugherty denied the committee

permission to search his department files for further evidence, President Coolidge dismissed him (1924).

The greatest scandal involved the leasing of some government oil reserves. It appeared that President Harding had signed an order permitting Secretary of the Navy Edwin Denby to transfer to Secretary of the Interior Albert B. Fall the administration of the petroleum reserves earlier set aside at Elk Hills in California and Teapot Dome in Wyoming for the use of the navy. Fall was prominent as an opponent of Mexico and as a man "who affected a cowboy pose and a fine contempt for reformers and conservationists." In 1922, without calling for competitive bids, he leased the Teapot Dome reserves to Harry F. Sinclair and the Elk Hills reserves to Edward L. Doheny. In each case the government was to obtain a small royalty on the oil secured.

Soon the smell of oil was detected on official garments, and a senatorial committee of investigation discovered a trail of corruption. It developed that Doheny had "loaned" Fall $100,000 without security and without interest in 1921; that Fall also had received a loan of $25,000 from Sinclair; and that he had accepted valuable gifts from other oilmen. Then he had resigned early in 1923 before the scandals were made public and had retired to a large ranch purchased with the "loans."

In 1924 the government instituted judicial proceedings against Fall, Doheny, and Sinclair. It asked for the cancelation of the leases and the conviction of the defendants for bribery and conspiracy. The government won its first point in 1927 when the Supreme Court voided the leases and ordered the return of the reserves. Both Doheny and Sinclair were able to convince juries that they had acted out of patriotic motives. They maintained that the oil was being drained away by people who had sunk wells near by, that the terms were favorable to the government, and that, after all, undeveloped oil reserves were not much good to the navy. Sinclair, however, blundered by hiring private detectives to shadow his jurors and by refusing to answer certain questions of the Senate committee. For this contempt he had to serve a three months' jail term. Fall was convicted in 1929 and sentenced to one year's imprisonment and a fine of $100,000. The jail term was served but the fine remained unpaid.

This crime wave in the years following the war was not confined to officialdom. Private crimes came to be everyday topics of conversation, and the official misdeeds merely reflected on a large scale what happened privately on a smaller scale. In 1921 there was said to have been one major bank robbery per day throughout the country, while one automobile of

every 22 in Chicago and every 30 in New York was stolen. "Burglary-insurance rates in American cities were from fifteen to twenty times as high as in England," and "the homicide rate of the United States was sixteen times that of England and Wales." Machine guns and sawed-off shotguns were among the weapons employed by postwar criminals. The custom of levying tribute under threat of violence was revived as a widespread source of illegal income under the name of "racketeering."

COOLIDGE AND "SAFE AND SANE" POLITICS

Calvin Coolidge, who took the oath of office as Harding's successor, was born in Vermont. A graduate of Amherst College, he studied law and then, having entered politics, gradually rose from one office to the next, finally becoming governor of Massachusetts. Quiet, thrifty, industrious, and staid, Coolidge never held back when he saw the majority moving in a definite direction. He first attracted national attention when, as governor, he had to cope with the Boston policemen's strike of 1919. He called out the state militia and informed the policemen that "there is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, anytime." Hailing him as "the silent man of iron," his party bestowed the vice-presidential nomination upon him in the following year. Though a favorite subject with cartoonists and jokesters, Coolidge maintained an unruffled calm in the face of both lavish praise and unvarnished abuse. He believed that "the business of America is business," and he "thoroughly approved of the Ten Commandments."

President Coolidge retained his predecessor's cabinet and made economy his goal. He vetoed a second Bonus Bill that was passed by Congress in 1924, and that provided for a system of prepaid insurance policies with the principal going to the holder at the expiration of twenty years. This time the bill was passed over the President's veto. In the same year the income tax was further reduced, and a highly restrictive immigration law, the Johnson Act, was adopted. This measure, which became fully effective in 1929, discriminated in favor of immigrants from the countries of northern Europe, limited the total number of annual entrants to about 150,000, and excluded entirely immigrants who were ineligible for citizenship, that is, Asiatics. The last provision gave rise to much foreign, particularly Japanese, ill will.

Coolidge easily secured the Republican nomination for the presidency in 1924. General Charles G. Dawes, of reparation fame and first director of the national budget bureau established in 1921, was selected as his

running mate. The Democratic candidate was John W. Davis, a "dark horse" conservative from West Virginia who had achieved success as a corporation lawyer in New York. He received the nomination after 102 ballots had failed to break a deadlock between William G. McAdoo, "dry" and Protestant, and Governor Alfred E. Smith of New York, "wet" and Roman Catholic.

A third group, the Progressive Party, headed by Senator Robert M. ("Fighting Bob") La Follette of Wisconsin, also entered the lists in 1924. It attracted some "insurgent" Republicans and discontented progressives and intellectuals who wanted to protest against the conservative stand of both the large parties. The Progressive Party, however, polled fewer than 5,000,000 votes and died with the election. Aided by such slogans as "Keep Cool with Cal," "Coolidge or Chaos," and "Coolidge and Economy," the President won a plurality of more than 7,000,000 ballots.[2]

In the second Coolidge Administration the national debt was reduced, the surtax was lowered to 20 per cent, and slight reductions were made in the tax on lower incomes. A few laws to aid agricultural production and marketing were passed, and a sum was voted for Mississippi flood control. The McNary-Haugen Bill, which proposed a fixed domestic price for grain, was vetoed as being economically unsound. The enforcement of Prohibition continued to be one of the government's most difficult tasks. Much profit was derived from violations of the law by bootleggers and smugglers, and a leading racketeer boasted that in one year his organization had spent $30,000,000 to check law-enforcement activities. Although such criminals operated in many fields, they were interested chiefly in the profits to be gained from the illegal manufacture and sale of intoxicating drinks.

In the summer of 1928 the customary Presidential nominating conventions assembled. When the President made it clear that he was not to be considered a possible candidate for a third term, it soon appeared that Herbert Clark Hoover would be selected. A successful mining engineer, with experience and contacts in several continents, Hoover had been head of the American Commission for Relief in Belgium, United States Food Administrator, Secretary of Commerce for two terms, and chairman of the Mississippi Flood Relief Commission. His public record was clear and commendable, and he had won respect abroad. He was nominated on the first ballot. Senator Charles Curtis of Kansas, Republican leader in the Senate,

[2] The years from 1924 to 1926 witnessed a clearing of the political stage through the deaths of several of the older leaders. Theodore Roosevelt had died in 1919. Wilson, Lodge, and Samuel Gompers died in 1924. Death claimed LaFollette and W. J. Bryan in 1925, and Eugene V. Debs and "Uncle Joe" Cannon, long the leading conservative in the House of Representatives, in 1926.

was chosen as vice-presidential candidate. The platform promised strict enforcement of Prohibition, farm relief, friendly international relations, and railroad, mercantile, and flood-control legislation. The usual praise of the previous administration's accomplishments was included. Economy and prosperity were held up as shining lights of Republican achievement.

The Democratic nominators adopted a platform that stressed the corruption under Harding, denounced the Republican taxation policy, and complained that in recent years the antitrust laws had been "thwarted, ignored, and violated." All this would be different under Democratic rule, it was stated, while water-power sites would be protected, labor receive fairer treatment, and a constructive foreign policy be adopted. In this convention, too, the nomination was decided on the first ballot. Alfred E. Smith, four times governor of New York and well known as an able politician and administrator, was the ready choice. Senator Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas was selected for the vice-presidency.

The campaign was exciting and attracted a large vote. The extensive use of radio for speech-making and the presence of the religious and Prohibition issues roused millions from their normal political apathy. Hoover, a Quaker who considered Prohibition a "noble experiment," was backed by the Protestant and temperance organizations of the country. Such bodies as the Ku Klux Klan—which had come into renewed prominence after the war as an association for upholding the supremacy of white Protestants —aligned themselves against the Democratic candidate. The Catholic "Al" Smith's lack of higher education, his close connection with Tammany Hall, and his limited knowledge of foreign affairs militated against him. On the other hand, he was supported by the "wet" organizations and by a large number of liberals.

Hoover was victorious by a plurality of more than 6,000,000 votes over the man from "the sidewalks of New York." The Socialist candidate, Norman Thomas, a Princeton graduate and at the time of the campaign a minister, received 267,800 votes. Smith carried only six southern states, along with Massachusetts and Rhode Island. He lost his own state, New York, although the Democratic candidate for governor, Franklin D. Roosevelt, won easily.

HOOVER: "THE ENGINEER IN POLITICS"

The new President was a hard worker and a man with a high sense of duty. During his occupancy of the White House he gave ample evidence of his abilities as a planner and organizer, but he soon showed himself to be

less apt as a leader. It was said that "he could run a department or set of departments with great skill; he could organize forces to meet an emergency; but he could not direct a party . . . or guide public opinion." Impatient of criticism, he placed his chief trust in expert commissions, appointing more such bodies than any of his predecessors. In politics he was conservative, and in economic theory a neo-mercantilist, favoring high tariffs and big business.

At the outset it appeared as though the Hoover Administration might be highly successful. Both houses of Congress contained substantial Republican majorities, the cabinet was able, the political appointments were generally acceptable, and the country seemed to enjoy prosperity. Yet the President was immediately confronted with some problems of overwhelming magnitude and was induced to call Congress in special session without allowing himself sufficient time to formulate legislative recommendations of his own. In his inaugural address Hoover had pointed out the need for "limited changes" in the tariff, early farm relief, and stricter enforcement of the laws. The first two of these problems were referred directly to Congress for action (April 1929). As a preliminary step in dealing with the question of law and order, the chief executive appointed a Law Enforcement Commission, under the chairmanship of former Attorney-General George W. Wickersham, to make a thorough survey of the crime situation.

By 1929 the "crime industry" had become so well organized that municipalities and even states confessed inability to cope with it. The annual cost of crime to the nation in 1931 was estimated at $100 per capita. A major portion of the crimes were connected with violations of the Volstead Act, but the racketeers, able to "buy protection," extended their activities to numberless other fields. Relatively few criminals ever suffered arrest, and fewer still, conviction. Eventually the federal government itself found it easier to imprison racketeers for falsifications of their income-tax returns than for violations of the alcohol or homicide laws.

The Wickersham Report, therefore, was eagerly awaited, but when it was published (1931), the document was vague on some of its most important revelations. The net result of the labors of the commission was disappointing, although two definite gains were made: it was clearly established that some sort of Prohibition reform was desirable; and, upon the advice of the commission, Congress transferred the enforcement of the liquor laws from the Department of the Treasury to the Department of Justice.

In the matter of the tariff, Congress disregarded the President's advice concerning limited changes and quickly engaged in logrolling. The Fordney-

McCumber Act was replaced by the Hawley-Smoot Tariff which lowered the rates on about 250 items, but raised them on about 900 items. Against the advice of more than 1000 economists and of numerous experts representing both political parties, Hoover signed the bill (1930), trusting to the tariff commission to uncover any injustices in the act. There was a storm of opposition to the President's decision, and foreign countries generally resorted to one form or another of retaliation. The foreign-trade situation became worse instead of better.[3]

The method adopted by the administration to provide farm relief was equally unsuccessful. Congress rejected several plans whereby the farmers were to be aided by a kind of subsidy on agricultural staples. Instead, there was created (1929) a Federal Farm Board, equipped with a revolving fund of $500,000,000. The board was to fight overproduction, encourage the formation of farmers' coöperatives, and form stabilization corporations for the several crops with power to buy and sell surpluses in these grains. The measure, based on the hope that the surpluses would be temporary, was expensive and in reality fostered rather than discouraged overproduction.

Meanwhile, in October 1929, the stock market in Wall Street had crashed. On the twenty-fourth of that month uneasy speculators dumped almost 13,000,000 stock shares on the exchange market. The origins of the crash would seem to be traceable, at least in part, to the economic upheaval wrought by the First World War. During the period of hostilities there had been a great inflation of prices. Except for a brief depression soon after the war, the United States continued to prosper in the 1920's chiefly because of the wartime depletion of goods and the readiness of Europe and Latin America to place orders there as long as credits were available and the people in the United States were willing to invest in foreign bonds. In consequence there developed a speculative mania during which prices remained artificially inflated and paper fortunes were made. Prices rose, industry expanded, and production increased with little plan or precaution.

Yet, at the same time, tariff walls were raised still higher, nations every-

[3] The high rates on manufactures tended to raise the price of home-made products, especially those needed by the farmer. Simultaneously, in consequence of a succession of good crops, the farmer continued to receive low prices for his produce even though the tariff also was designed to protect agriculture. Foreign countries retaliated by raising their import duties on United States manufactures and cutting their purchases of American grain in favor of that from other producers. The net result of the tariff appeared to be a loss of foreign markets and a decrease in domestic buying power.

where placed obstacles in the way of world commerce, and the questions of reparation and war debts continued to embitter international relations. It was inevitable that postwar deflation should eventually set in, and a financial break was almost certain to come as soon as United States investors should become uneasy about their holdings and foreign purchases should be checked. After the crash in the United States, disaster quickly attacked Europe's weak financial structure. First, as has been shown, came collapse in Austria, then elsewhere, and finally the economic depression became world-wide.

The President's first public comment on the stock-market situation characterized it as merely the result of a wave of uncontrolled speculation in securities. Hence the difficulty was temporary and recovery was close at hand. But when conditions became worse, Hoover explained that the crisis was of global magnitude and was caused by factors beyond the control of the United States. In order to speed economic revival, the President, as we have seen, proposed an international moratorium from mid-1931 to mid-1932. This action only emphasized the seriousness of the world's predicament and did little to restore confidence.

Energetic measures were taken to deal with the situation at home, for unemployment figures rose rapidly and by 1932 were estimated at 7,000,000.[4] Congress appropriated large sums for the construction of public buildings and highways. Unemployment-relief committees were appointed by cities, states, and the nation, and funds were collected from charitably inclined persons throughout the land. Employed citizens were encouraged to "share their work" with less fortunate neighbors, and there was an increasing demand for the five-day week. National and local tax rates were raised, but the national budgetary deficit at the end of 1932 passed $2,000,000,000.

To ease the financial stringency that resulted from foreign gold withdrawals and private hoarding, Congress in 1932 passed a bill which amended the eligibility provision of the Federal Reserve Law so as to permit the use of certain government bonds as coverage for the issue of federal notes. Thus a portion of the banks' gold stock was released for business purposes. Groups of member banks, moreover, which had exhausted their collateral eligible for discount by Federal Reserve banks and yet were in a solvent condition, were permitted to borrow from the Federal Reserve System on joint promissory notes.

[4] The national wage bill dropped from $55,000,000,000 in 1929 to $33,000,000,000 in 1931.

Another act created a Reconstruction Finance Corporation with a capital of $500,000,000 subscribed by the United States Government, and with power to issue obligations to three times that amount. The corporation was authorized to lend money for three years to institutions for purposes of "financing agriculture, commerce, and industry, including facilitating the exportation of agricultural and other products." With the consent of the Interstate Commerce Commission, money might be advanced to railroads. Later the resources of the corporation were increased to $3,800,000,000. Its lending powers eventually were extended to include relief loans to states, for by this time financial breakdown threatened not only thousands of small companies but municipalities, counties, and states.

Among other incidents of the depression was a march on Washington (1932) by unemployed war veterans from all over the United States. They demanded that Congress provide for the immediate redemption in cash of the bonus certificates. Congress disregarded the plea, since payment of a cash bonus would place an enormous strain on the already weakened financial system of the country. The Bonus Expeditionary Force (B.E.F.), as it came to be called, threatened to remain camped in Washington until its demands were met. The government eventually used troops to clear the city of the petitioners. Public opinion generally condemned the procedure.

In this atmosphere the country prepared for the election of 1932. The Republicans renominated President Hoover and Vice-President Curtis. The Democrats eventually chose Governor Roosevelt of New York over Alfred E. Smith. John N. Garner of Texas, Speaker of the House (which had come under Democratic control after the elections of 1930), was selected for the vice-presidency. The chief plank in each platform dealt with Prohibition. The Republicans advocated a referendum on a proposed amendment providing for limited state option, to be enforced with the coöperation of the federal authorities. The Democrats were for repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. The Socialist Party once more nominated Norman Thomas who, it was expected, would poll a sizable vote through the support of persons who were dissatisfied alike with Hoover's conservatism and Roosevelt's vagueness.

The Democratic candidate carried 42 states and secured a plurality of more than 7,000,000 votes. About 880,000 ballots were cast for the Socialist candidate, and William Z. Foster, nominee of the Communist Party, polled 102,000 votes. Both branches of Congress also went to the Democrats, the House of Representatives by more than a two-thirds majority.

BROADENING POPULAR INTERESTS

One of the most important phenomena in post-1919 United States was the growing popular interest in travel. Whereas in 1880 a total of 50,000 United States travelers visited foreign parts, the figure in 1930 was 500,000. The expenditures of United States tourists abroad in 1930 were estimated at $800,000,000. There was an even greater increase in the amount of traveling and sight-seeing within the United States, a circumstance for which improved railway service, the development of the automobile and good roads, and the organization of air traffic, all shared credit. In 1930 one person of every five in the land owned an automobile.

The sales of radio sets in 1937 totaled 8,000,000; by the end of that year, there were 33,000,000 sets in United States homes, offices, and automobiles. The 3715 miles of airplane passenger routes in 1926 rose by 1936 to 60,451 miles. The number of airplane passengers rose from 6000 in 1926 to 1,500,000 in 1939. The United States led the world in number of business and private telephones and in the installation of most other types of modern conveniences. In many cases, however, families were enabled to purchase such objects only because of the deferred-payment system. Persons frequently were tempted to buy luxuries which they could ill afford, lured by attractive advertisements and skilful salesmen. The consumption-credit movement artificially stimulated production and left a large surplus of goods on the market when the depression curtailed the buying power of the public.

There was an increasing interest in all fields of sport, and millions of dollars were spent in the development of public and private playgrounds. Spectators' sports, such as boxing and football, became especially popular. On occasion as many as 100,000 persons attended a single intercollegiate football contest, and in 1927 the gate receipts in the second Tunney-Dempsey championship prize fight were $2,650,000. Enthusiasm over the Olympic Games of 1932 in Los Angeles was unprecedented, and the athletes of the United States again captured a larger share of individual and team honors than those of any other nation. During the depression years there was an increasing amount of rank-and-file participation in sports, partly because that was cheaper than buying seats to watch others and partly because of the New Deal policy of employing idle people by setting them to work building public parks, pools, playgrounds, and athletic fields.

Education came to occupy a more important place in United States life. The total expenditures of public elementary and secondary schools

rose from $462,250,000 in 1910 to $2,316,800,000 in 1930. The college population grew rapidly after 1918, and in 1930 the total registration of students of all classes at Columbia University alone, then the largest in the country, was 33,144. By 1940, partly through the aid of a National Youth Administration (NYA) which helped needy students, one person of every five in the country was registered in a full-time day school of one kind or another. But while the registration in institutions of secondary and collegiate rank increased, the population in elementary schools declined, largely as the result of a falling birth rate. (There were fewer children under five in the United States in 1940 than there had been in 1920.) Meanwhile extension and home-study courses also had become popular.

While the influence of jazz made itself felt in many phases of public and private life, the people showed an increasingly discriminating interest in art, music, literature, and the theater. By 1939 there were 16,000 moving-picture houses with an estimated weekly attendance of 90,000,000. Technicolor films and mass animated cartoons produced by Walt Disney became especially popular. The number of legitimate theaters, however, suffered a corresponding decline, falling from about 5000 in 1890 to fewer than 200 in 1939, not counting small summer theaters. There were crazes for cross-word puzzles, slot machines, and the old-fashioned lotto under the name of bingo; but there was a simultaneous growth in the number of civic music associations and book clubs. A wide market appeared for historical and biographical works, for lengthy adventure stories, for reprints of the classics, and for illustrated news magazines and "digests." Through the organization of community chests the citizens made private contributions of $100,000,000 a year to help their less fortunate fellows.

There developed also a keen appreciation of scientific developments and discoveries. The newspapers found it profitable to carry science sections as well as supplements on art, music, theatricals, and sports. More and more frequently was the Nobel Prize for scientific achievements won by citizens of the United States. And a triumph of the enterprisers', designers', and builders' art was the completion of the Empire State Building in New York in 1931. Rising 102 stories and measuring 1248 feet in height, this structure appeared a symbol of American confidence in the future.

FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AND AFFAIRS, 1923–1933

During the Harding Administration the foreign policies of the United States were concerned chiefly with a liquidation of the immediate political

problems raised by the country's participation in the First World War and rejection of the Versailles Treaty. After 1923 the trend of foreign affairs was shaped by a realization among Americans of certain recent and vital changes in their national financial position in the world.

Up to 1914 Europe had been the world's banker. The foreign investments of Great Britain, Germany, and France on the eve of the war had totaled $35,000,000,000, while those of the United States had amounted to $2,600,000,000. As a consequence of the war and its aftermath, the situation underwent a striking transformation. In 1930 the value of United States private loans in foreign countries was $16,000,000,000, of which $5,000,000,000 was invested in Europe. The European war debts to the Washington Government amounted to an additional $11,000,000,000. In 1927 the interest payments to United States citizens on private loans to foreign governments, municipalities, or companies reached $740,000,000. United States foreign trade in the five-year period 1924–1928 averaged $9,000,000,000 annually. The gross tonnage of the merchant fleet in 1928 was 14,540,000. The citizens expected their government to protect these vast foreign interests, and Washington, in general, was ready to assume the obligation.[5]

In 1927, during political disturbances in Nicaragua, several thousand sailors and marines and some airplanes were dispatched to the republic to protect United States lives and property, and, it appeared, to protect the Conservative Party regime of President Adolfo Díaz. The sympathies of the State Department were with the Conservatives, for these had been friendly to the United States since 1912, granting her a naval base; control of the Nicaraguan customs, bank, and railways; and the right to build a Nicaraguan canal. Coolidge was criticized for his methods by liberal opinion throughout the United States and Latin America, and eventually he sent Colonel Henry L. Stimson to Nicaragua to strive for a peaceful settlement.

Stimson effected an agreement between one group of the dissident Liberal Party and the Conservatives; but another section of the Liberals, led by General Augusto Sandino, continued to wage guerrilla warfare against the Conservatives and against United States property and lives. Sandino became particularly active in 1931, after an earthquake in the capital of Nicaragua, and successfully eluded capture by United States marines and the Nicaraguan National Guard. Finally, in January 1933, the last United States marines were withdrawn from Nicaragua in accordance with a recent

[5] The government looked with disfavor on three types of loans: those for armament expenditures, those to countries that had not funded their war debts, and those that might be used to develop foreign-owned raw-material monopolies to the disadvantage of American consumers. At the end of 1940 total investments abroad aggregated $10,600,000,000.

announcement of the State Department that it could not undertake the general protection of United States citizens in the troubled republic. Thereupon Sandino came to an agreement with the recently inaugurated Liberal President Juan Sacasa providing for the demobilization of all but 100 of the rebels.[6]

Simultaneously with intervention in Nicaragua came a Mexican imbroglio, which arose out of the interpretation and possible retroactive force of Mexican land laws passed under authority of the constitution of 1917. This document vested ownership of land and subsoil resources in the Mexican nation but permitted the latter to transfer its rights to private Mexican citizens or to foreigners if these agreed not to call on their governments for protection in any dispute over such rights. In 1926 the president of Mexico decreed that all owners of land who had secured their titles prior to the promulgation of the constitution of 1917 must exchange these titles for new fifty-year "concessions." A number of United States oil companies, fearing for their interests, organized an Association for the Protection of American Rights in Mexico to carry on propaganda against the land decrees. The passage of some Mexican anticlerical laws, aimed at nationalizing the property of the Catholic Church, made the propaganda work easier.[7]

The State Department denounced the decrees as infringements of United States property rights, and the Senate voted by 79 to 0 to arbitrate the questions in dispute. Coolidge maintained that United States property rights required no arbitration, and Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg, who had succeeded Hughes in 1925, accused Mexico of spreading Bolshevik propaganda in the United States and Central America, and of aiding the Nicaraguan revolutionists. But no overt action was resorted to, and the administration appointed the tactful Dwight W. Morrow to be ambassador to Mexico. Some time later Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh, hero of the first nonstop flight from New York to Paris (May 1927), and Will Rogers, Oklahoma cowboy-humorist, went to Mexico on successful good-will tours.

Morrow tried to see the viewpoint of the Mexican officials and as a result was able to convince them that the United States had no desire to disrupt the amicable relations that had been established between the two governments after the settlement of the foreign-debt question in 1923.

[6] Later in 1933 conflicts arose between Sandino's men and the Nicaraguan National Guard. To end such disputes, Sandino visited Sacasa in February 1934. Following a dinner in his honor at the national palace, Sandino was seized at the palace gate by guardsmen and shot.

[7] In 1925 the holdings of United States citizens in Mexico were estimated at $1,280,000,000.

Both sides compromised. The companies agreed to lay their cases before the Mexican Supreme Court, and the latter declared unconstitutional (1927) some of the most obnoxious land and oil laws.

In 1927 Washington became worried over the safety of American lives and property in China. The activities of both the Chinese nationalists and the communists were a source of danger to foreigners, and the United States, following the example of other countries, dispatched armed forces to Nanking. When the nationalists appeared to have established control and promised adequate protection, the United States forces were withdrawn.

In this period, Pan-American Conferences were held at Santiago, Chile, in 1923 and at Havana in 1928. At the former conference the United States rejected the offer of the Latin American states to assist in the interpretation and application of the Monroe Doctrine. At the latter, a resolution proposing that "no state has the right to intervene in the internal affairs of another" was withdrawn owing largely to the opposition of the United States. The Havana Conference provided for another gathering to be held at Washington for taking steps to adjust international disputes peaceably. The Washington assemblage in 1929 accepted two conventions for the arbitration of all disputes except those "not controlled by international law."

In the relations between the United States and Europe, the question of the Allied war debts has already been discussed. Pending final settlement of this problem, the United States was faced with the dilemma of whether or not to collaborate with Europe along general political lines. In 1923 Coolidge, following the example of Harding, asked the Senate for its consent to ratification of the World Court Protocol. After considerable executive persuasion, the Senate, in 1926, agreed, but with five reservations. The most sweeping condition was in the fifth reservation. The court should not, it ran, "without the consent of the United States, entertain any request for an advisory opinion touching any dispute or question in which the United States has or claims an interest." The members of the court substantially accepted all reservations except this one, which would have given the United States a privileged position. The Senate disregarded the suggested counterreservations. Here the matter rested until, in 1929, the League Council charged a committee of jurists, which had been appointed to revise the court statute and of which Elihu Root was a member, simultaneously to consider the question of United States accession to the tribunal. Out of these beginnings there was evolved a Root Plan that appeared acceptable to the members of the court and to the State Department.

The plan provided for the acceptance of the Senate's fifth reservation,

and stipulated that the United States might withdraw from the court "without any imputation of unfriendliness" if ever the court should persist in entertaining a request for an advisory opinion even though the United States was "not prepared to forego its objection" to such procedure. Upon this basis a protocol for American adherence was signed by fifty-four states, including the United States. By the end of the Hoover Administration, however, the necessary ratifications were still lacking from nine countries, including the United States. In the Hoover-Roosevelt campaign of 1932 both main-party programs declared for adherence to the court.

In spheres other than that of the court, the United States, during the Coolidge and Hoover administrations, coöperated increasingly with the League. All the League's disarmament and economic conferences were attended by United States delegates. Usually, unofficial observers were sent to take part in the discussions and make suggestions, but the United States never bound herself to accept any of the decisions reached. Hundreds of private United States citizens worked for the League as salaried officials, while many headed boundary, railway, and river commissions, and some were chosen as judges of the World Court. Beginning in 1926, the United States deposited with the League Secretariat copies of newly signed treaties.

The United States during these years also collaborated with Europe in efforts to establish world harmony. In 1924 and 1929 United States financial experts played a leading, though unofficial, part in the formulation of new reparation arrangements. In 1927 the Geneva Conference on the limitation of naval armaments was held at the suggestion of President Coolidge. In 1928 Washington adhered to the Paris Pact for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy. In 1930 the United States became a party to the London Naval Treaty. Efforts were made to aid disarmament at the Geneva Conference of 1932. There was, finally, a steady exchange of notes with the League on Manchuria, although Geneva failed to applaud Stimson's announcement that the United States would not recognize any territorial changes brought about in violation of the Kellogg Pact or other treaties.

ROOSEVELT AND "NIRA"

On March 4, 1933, when Franklin D. Roosevelt took the oath of office as President, the United States had for two years and a half been sinking lower and lower into economic depression. The unemployed numbered 13,000,000, the national income had fallen to half that of 1929, approximately 40 per cent of the farms were mortgaged, strikes and violence had

become common occurrences, and virtually every state had found it necessary to place some restriction on banking operations. The President, however, seemed optimistic. He prophesied that the nation would "revive and prosper," promised a "New Deal," and declared his intention to ask Congress for "broad executive powers to wage a war against the emergency."

The people rallied to the President's support. Roosevelt's cheerful informality, his cordial attitude towards the press, and his "heart-to-heart" talks with the citizenry over the radio, won him much confidence. Congress, too, backed the executive, passing important bills in record time and making the President one of the most powerful rulers in the world. In fourteen weeks the Seventy-third Congress passed acts to aid farmers, regulate industry, coördinate the railways, and provide unemployment relief. On occasion Congress did demur and show jealousy of the growing executive power, but the President so skilfully won over public opinion and withheld political patronage that he generally had his way. Since much of the "Presidential planning" had been done in the months between Roosevelt's election and his inauguration, he could inform the people that the proposals so quickly adopted were not haphazard schemes, but the carefully thought-out parts of "a connected, logical whole."

On March 5, 1933, Roosevelt declared a nation-wide bank holiday and called for a special session of Congress on the ninth. On the very day of its meeting, Congress passed an act giving the President power to regulate currency and credit transactions, penalize the hoarding of gold, appoint conservators to assist the national banks whose assets were endangered, and issue Federal Reserve notes against government obligations. Then Congress passed an Economy Bill; a Beer Bill, modifying the Volstead Act so as to legalize the sale of beverages with an alcoholic content of 4 per cent by volume; [8] and a bill establishing a Civilian Conservation Corps to provide employment for several hundred thousand young men on public works, especially in forests and national parks. Federal salaries were cut, the Federal Farm Bureau was abolished, all agricultural-credit matters were placed in the hands of a Farm Credit Administration, and most of the banks were reopened.

The drive of administrative action continued with equal vigor in April and May. An executive order reduced the pension and benefit payments

[8] This law was adopted pending state action on a proposed constitutional amendment, passed in February 1933, repealing the Eighteenth Amendment and forbidding the transportation or importation of intoxicating liquor only in those areas which retained dry laws of their own. Ratification proceeded swiftly, and on December 5, 1933, the Twenty-First Amendment, repealing the Eighteenth, became effective.

to war veterans by $400,000,000 yearly. Another forbade the hoarding of gold or gold certificates. A third placed an embargo on the export of gold, thus taking the United States off the international gold standard.[9] The Agricultural Adjustment Act empowered the government to compensate farmers who curtailed the production of wheat, cotton, and sugar; to tax the processing of basic farm products; to conclude marketing agreements with producers and processors; and to embark upon a scheme of "controlled inflation." The inflation proposal authorized the President to expand Federal Reserve credits by $3,000,000,000, issue Treasury notes up to an additional $3,000,000,000, reduce the gold content of the dollar by 50 per cent, and accept war-debt payments up to $200,000,000 in silver. There was considerable opposition to some of these items, but the powers were only permissive, and administration officials emphasized that inflation would be "kept under control."

The Wagner-Lewis Emergency Relief Act appropriated $500,000,000 for direct relief. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) or Muscle Shoals Act gave the government authority to develop power and natural resources. This was advocated by Roosevelt to stimulate industry, relieve unemployment, and check the waste of resources resulting from lack of planning. The Securities Law gave the government regulatory powers over the sale of stocks and securities.

This sweep of legislative accomplishments was eclipsed by the lawmaking of June 1933. A Home Owners' Refinancing Act extended federal credit to save small-home owners from eviction by foreclosure. The Glass-Steagall Act established a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation with capital subscribed by the United States Treasury, the Federal Reserve banks, and the member banks. Railroad holding companies were placed under a federal railway coördinator, and workers were protected against loss of employment as a result of coördination. On June 16 the President signed the National Industrial Recovery Act.

The NIRA, in effect, empowered the President to set up machinery for "a great coöperative movement throughout all industry in order to obtain wide reëmployment, to shorten the work week, . . . and to prevent unfair competition and disastrous overproduction." The act permitted the suspension of the antitrust laws, provided for codes of fair competition in industry, contained protective clauses for labor, and outlined a public-works program involving an expenditure by a Public Works Administra-

[9] Later the gold clause in public and private contracts was abrogated, and contracts and debts were made payable in legal tender. The constitutionality of this action was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1935.

tion (PWA) of $3,300,000,000, the money to be raised through taxes on corporations and on gasoline.

To integrate the recovery measures the President created an executive council composed of the cabinet and the heads of the agencies recently established by Congress, including General Hugh S. Johnson, administrator of the National Recovery Administration (NRA), the agency responsible for the preparation and enforcement of the codes. When it became evident that considerable time would elapse before codes could be drawn up for all industries, the administration provided a "blanket code" which business was asked to adopt pending the formulation of individual codes.

The blanket code was in the form of an agreement between the President and each employer. It did away with child labor under fourteen and established a work week of 35 hours for industrial laborers and 40 hours for white-collar groups. The minimum wage for industry was $0.40 per hour; for white-collar workers it varied from $12 to $15 weekly depending on the size of the community. The blanket code was to remain in effect until the approval of a specific code for the particular industry. Employers who conformed to the code were permitted to display a "Blue Eagle." Within a few weeks about 2,000,000 persons were thus returned to work, while many others benefited by a shorter work week or increased pay.

The first code of fair competition to be approved and adopted related to the cotton-textile industry. It provided for the abandonment of child labor, a forty-hour week, and minimum wages of $12 weekly in the South and $13 in the North. Other codes followed, but criticisms of the NRA system soon were advanced. It was sometimes difficult to get the employers and workers to agree on the proper length of working hours. The American Federation of Labor took the opportunity to appear as a champion of labor, to increase its efforts to unionize all industry, and to fight the formation of company unions. Often the employers themselves in an industry found it impossible to agree, as in the soft-coal and oil businesses, and then the government acted as arbitrator. Strikes continued and made the problem still more complex. Thus there was opposition to the NRA from both capital and labor, but for the time being popular sentiment again backed the Administration.

To the London Economic Conference of 1933, Roosevelt made it plain that, in his opinion, the immediate removal of trade barriers was far more urgent than any immediate stabilization of currencies (as proposed by France). In view of this fundamental difference, the conference achieved little or nothing. Meanwhile prices, especially on farm products, had once

again begun to fall, with consequent farm strikes and violence in many parts of the West. There was a growing demand for inflation, and the President authorized the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to purchase freshly mined domestic and foreign gold at prices to be fixed from time to time. Thus the dollar might be progressively cheapened and price levels "restored." The RFC began buying gold until the value of the latter rose to $35 an ounce as against less than $21 under the old law. But the increase in commodity prices did not keep pace with the drop of the dollar. Roosevelt therefore ordered the treasury during the next four years to purchase all silver mined in the United States (about 24,000,000 ounces annually) at 50 per cent above the then (December 1933) market price.

In the meantime a Civil Works Administration had been organized, with an appropriation of $400,000,000 from the PWA, to finance public-works (and then "made-work") projects and thus remove names from the relief rolls. In some cases surplus food, clothing, and fuel were directly allotted to distressed families—thus reducing some of the commodity surpluses that had forced down prices. Another PWA allotment went to an Emergency Housing Corporation, organized to purchase slum sections in the larger cities and erect on the sites low-cost apartment buildings.

Another avalanche of New Deal legislation was started when Congress met in January 1934.[10] Government loans to farmers were facilitated. The production of additional crops was placed under official control. Time extensions were granted to bankrupt farmers during which they might retain possession of their land (Frazier-Lemke Farm Bankruptcy Act). State banks and trust companies unaffiliated with the Federal Reserve System were given borrowing privileges similar to those of the member banks. The reorganization of bankrupt corporations was made easier. Money was made available for home-repair loans, and protection was offered to building and loan associations. A national board was created to mediate labor disputes growing out of the NIRA. Direct loans to industry were authorized, the maximum being $500,000 to any one organization. An additional sum was appropriated to continue the CWA projects, and the lending functions of the RFC were extended. The President was empowered, for three years, to negotiate foreign-trade agreements without the advice and consent of the Senate.

The President was authorized by a Gold Reserve Act to call into the

[10] The Twentieth Amendment, effective in February 1933, provided that "Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the third day of January, unless they shall by law appoint a different day." The terms of the President and Vice-President were made to end at noon of January 20.

treasury all gold money, to revalue the dollar at some point between 50 per cent and 60 per cent of its existing gold content, and to use part of the resulting "profit" from the increase in the value of gold to set up a $2,000,000,000 stabilization fund. Roosevelt promptly fixed the value of the dollar at 59.06 cents in terms of its former gold value. But it soon became evident that the act was a failure as a price-raising device. In percentages, the wholesale-price index in a year rose only half as much as the gold content of the dollar was reduced.

Additional legislation included revision of air-mail contracts; creation of a Federal Communications Commission to regulate interstate and foreign communication services by telegraph, telephone, cable, and radio; stricter crime control; and removal of discrimination against women in the nationality laws. All this and more was done between January and June 1934. In the mid-term elections held later in the year, the Democrats gained seats not only in the congressional, but in most of the state elections. In the Seventy-fourth Congress, Roosevelt's party had a two-thirds majority in each house.

By the beginning of 1935 it was possible to estimate some of the effects of the New Deal legislation. Almost 550 codes, covering 95 per cent of the nation's industry, had been adopted. Industrial production had reached 90 per cent of the average for the period from 1923 to 1925. About 4,000,000 persons had been reëmployed. The banking system had been somewhat improved, and unfair practices in business had been curtailed. The full effect on labor and on agriculture it was not possible to gage. In the case of labor, there was brought to a head a conflict with employers over the closed shop and collective bargaining. The dispute was marked by strikes, lockouts, picketing, court injunctions, and violence. In agriculture, a terrible drought in 1934 made it impossible to determine the effects of the official crop-reduction measures.

Certain results were on the debit side. The number of unemployed was still about 10,000,000. The imbalance between agricultural and industrial prices had not been adjusted. The cost of living had gone up without a commensurate rise in wages. The net income of the chief railways for October 1934 was less than half of that for October 1933 and less than one-third of that for October 1932; and the government found itself in possession of increasingly large blocks of railroad securities. The national debt had risen from $19,500,000,000 in June 1932 to $29,800,000,000 in March 1935.

Nothing daunted, Roosevelt informed Congress of his conviction that "the fundamental purposes and principles of the (NIRA) were sound"

and that their abandonment was "unthinkable." He then asked for a two-year extension (until June 1937) of the act in somewhat modified form. While this proposal was being discussed, Congress voted and Roosevelt signed (1935) a new work-relief bill which appropriated $4,880,000,000 to be spent by the President for recovery and made-work projects. Roosevelt dispensed the money to existing organs of administration and to newly created instruments, such as the Works Progress Administration (WPA). The most far-reaching new projects were concerned with the elimination of grade crossings, the electrification of rural areas, and rural rehabilitation or the transference of farming families from unprofitable marginal lands to more fertile regions. This last task was entrusted to the undersecretary of agriculture, Rexford G. Tugwell.

Three additional legislative efforts of 1935 must be given mention. Congress passed the Patman Bonus Bill, providing for the printing of $2,000,000,000 worth of greenbacks with which to cash immediately, at their 1945 face value, the adjusted service certificates held by more than 3,000,000 veterans. Roosevelt vetoed the bill lest it set a precedent of legislation in favor of a particular class. Eventually, in 1936, a slightly modified Soldiers' Bonus Bill was passed over another Presidential veto. This law exchanged the certificates for bonds which were redeemable in cash on demand. By mid-1938 the redemptions totaled $1,500,000,000.

July 1935 saw the passage of the Wagner or National Labor Relations Act. This law required employers to bargain collectively with their workers and forbade them to do anything which might interfere with the full realization of the objectives of trade-unionism. A National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was created to enforce the provisions of the act, "which was frankly class legislation, in that it spoke only of industry's duty to labor."

In August 1935, finally, there was adopted a Social Security Act. This provided federal participation in insurance measures covering old age, unemployment, needy dependent children, and the destitute blind; it also ordained federal aid, on a matching basis, to state public-welfare and vocational-rehabilitation services. The arrangements for unemployment and old-age retirement were not applied to public employees, domestic servants, farm laborers, marine workers, or the employees of religious, charitable, and educational institutions. By mid-1938 about 26,000,000 persons were insured against unemployment and 36,000,000 were assured old-age benefits.

Meanwhile, in 1935, the Supreme Court shocked the government and delighted the opposition by declaring unconstitutional the whole NIRA

setup. The judges handed down three unanimous decisions affecting the New Deal. One declared that the President had acted illegally in removing an unsympathetic federal trade commissioner who had been reappointed in 1931 for a seven-year term by Hoover. Another held unconstitutional the Frazier-Lemke Farm Bankruptcy Act on the ground that it confiscated the private property of mortgagors.[11] And the third, growing out of an accusation of unfair trade practices by a wholesale poultry concern in Brooklyn, New York, declared that Congress had no right to delegate to the code authorities the power to enact what in effect were laws for the regulation of their respective industries; that Congress could not delegate to the President the legislative power of prescribing or approving codes; and that the interstate-commerce clause of the Constitution, on which much of the new legislation was based, could not be construed "to reach all enterprises and transactions which could be said to have an indirect effect upon interstate commerce," for then, "for all practical purposes, we should have a completely centralized government."

The President was angry and declared that the decisions took the country back to the "horse-and-buggy days of 1789," but opponents of the New Deal held that the Constitution and country, after narrow escapes, had at last been saved. While the administration busied itself with plans for continuing certain features of the NIRA without contravening the Constitution, spokesmen for capital and labor issued contradictory statements on nearly every phase of past and proposed recovery legislation. Neither the leading employers nor the labor leaders seemed agreed among themselves as to the actual benefits or dangers of NIRA. Hence the electoral campaign of 1936 gave promise of excitement.

A SECOND TERM, AND A THIRD

The Republican Party shelved its older leaders in 1936 and nominated Governor Alfred M. Landon of Kansas and newspaper publisher Frank Knox of Chicago for the country's two highest offices. Landon had no national enemies and was expected to attract a large Western vote. The platform accused the Democrats of waste and of prolonging the depression, but it was vague on substitute proposals for recovery. The Democrats unanimously renominated Roosevelt and Garner and pledged a continuance of New Deal policies. The Socialist Party renominated Norman Thomas, and the Communist Party named Earl Browder, while a new Union Party selected Congressman William O. Lemke of North Dakota. The Union

[11] A modified Frazier-Lemke Act of 1935 was later upheld by the court.

Party made its appeal to all sorts of malcontents. These included the followers of Governor Huey Long of Louisiana, with his "Share-Our-Wealth-Society"; of Dr. Francis E. Townsend, who wanted the federal government to pay $200 monthly to all unemployed needy over sixty on condition only that they spend the money promptly; and of a Catholic priest, Charles E. Coughlin of Detroit, who built up a following through vigorous radio attacks on the administration.

Much name-calling and bitterness characterized the campaign. The Roosevelt ticket was called communistic, while the followers of Landon were labeled economic royalists—to mention only the mildest epithets that were current. An American Liberty League, founded by Republican industrialists but supported by former Democratic Presidential candidates Smith and Davis, backed Landon, and a newly organized American Labor Party, functioning only in the state of New York, gave its support to Roosevelt. In the end, the Democratic leader captured the electoral votes of every state except Maine and Vermont. His popular vote was 27,700,000 to 16,800,000 for Landon. The minor parties together were able to win only 3 per cent of all votes cast.

Following the election, Roosevelt determined to reap advantage of his popular endorsement. He believed himself in position to demand that Congress consolidate the changes of the New Deal. For this purpose he wanted further change in three fields: in the judicial (where the Supreme Court had nullified important New Deal laws), in the administrative (where there was much waste, duplication, and inefficiency among government bureaus), and in the legislative (where, in Congress, there were still many anti-administration senators and congressmen).

Claiming that he was consistently opposed by five conservatives in the Supreme Court and supported only by four liberals, the President in 1937 asked Congress to make possible an increase in the number of judges to fifteen. Such action was not without precedent, but Roosevelt's request aroused a storm of opposition, both within and without Congress. The national legislature refused the President's bidding and merely permitted judges to retire at seventy at full pay. Though he was defeated in Congress, Roosevelt soon won a practical victory. One after another of the "nine old men" retired or died until, by 1941, the executive had been given opportunity to make seven appointments. The judicial verdicts, meanwhile, had come to be much more frequently favorable to the Administration.

During the mid-term elections of 1938, Roosevelt tried, through promise of further changes, to get the solid backing of labor, agriculture, the unemployed, and the more leftist section of the middle class. He specifically

asked these voters to rid Congress of the "Bourbons" who opposed his policies; but this attempted purge of his political antagonists was almost a complete failure. Indeed, although the Democrats still controlled the national legislature, they lost a number of seats in both houses and several governorships. The voting doubtless was affected by an economic recession that had begun in 1937—perhaps because federal outlays were curtailed faster than private industry picked up—and by a growing feeling that the President was not in favor of maintaining what many citizens regarded as basic property rights. As a result of the trend in the balloting, the country enjoyed a brief legislative pause.

During the Roosevelt administrations labor came to play an increasingly large part in national affairs. The membership of the American Federation of Labor, which had fallen from 4,000,000 in 1920 to 2,000,000 in 1933, rose once more to 3,500,000 by 1936. At this point, however, an internal dispute split labor asunder. Under the headship of John L. Lewis, president of the United Mine Workers of America, some union leaders began to advocate the organization of *all* workers throughout the land in industrial or vertical unions to replace the horizontal or craft-union system that included only a limited number of *skilled* workers.

In the face of opposition from President William Green and the executive committee of the A.F. of L., Lewis in 1935 had gathered around him several prominent labor leaders and formed the Committee for Industrial Organization. This C.I.O. sent organizers into numerous fields which were as yet "only slightly touched by the trade union ideology." By the end of 1936 ten large unions belonged to the C.I.O.—and all ten were suspended by the A.F. of L. Since the latter had meanwhile launched a new organization campaign of its own, there were frequent clashes between the two labor groups. In consequence of this intralabor strife there were twice as many strikes, involving twice as many workers, in 1937 as in 1936. Furthermore, the National Labor Relations Board was kept busy settling strikes and supervising workers' elections to determine which of the two labor agencies was to be dominant in one or another of hundreds of plants throughout the land.

In 1938 the followers of Lewis, particularly successful in the coal, steel, automobile, and textile fields, quit the A.F. of L. and reconstituted themselves as the Congress of Industrial Organizations. Because the congress made widespread use of the sit-down strike, and because communists rose to influential posts within its organization, public opinion gradually turned against the C.I.O. under Lewis' leadership. By the end of 1940, however, the C.I.O. and the A.F. of L. each claimed 4,000,000 members.

Organized labor in the United States thus had doubled its membership in the score of years since 1920.

It was to be expected that the farm tenants and laborers, especially in the South, also would demand federal assistance. To further their interests, a Southern Tenant Farmers' Union was founded in 1934, which came to include black as well as white members. Although conservative Southern sentiment was outraged by the aims and methods of the union, Congress acted on its pleas. In 1937 there was created the Farm Security Administration (FSA) to assist sharecroppers and other tenant farmers. The agency was empowered to lend money to such individuals so that they might acquire ownership of farms or move from bad land to good. In the first three years of its existence the FSA started 13,000 families on the road to landownership, chiefly in the South. In addition, it made grants to thousands of families in the Dust Bowl (about 100 counties in Kansas, Oklahoma, Colorado, Texas, and New Mexico) to keep them from becoming migratory workers; and it built camps in California for 30,000 families of "Okies" (from Oklahoma) who had gone west in search of work.[12]

Perhaps the most far-reaching law of the second Roosevelt Administration was the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, which was intended by the President to put "a floor under wages and a ceiling over hours." The ultimate objective of the law was the universal establishment of a forty-hour work week at a minimum pay of $0.40 per hour (with time-and-a-half for overtime) in businesses of an interstate nature. The products of firms employing children under sixteen were excluded from interstate commerce. Lest undue hardships be caused to small concerns, the provisions of the act were to be enforced gradually. Farm and marine workers, retail-store employees, and professionals were not covered by the law.

The political sphere also witnessed legislative changes in these years. Laws of 1938 and 1940 vastly extended the civil service lists. In 1939 the Hatch Act was passed, forbidding federal appointees below policy-making rank to use official favors to influence national elections, to solicit or accept contributions from recipients of relief payments, and to take an "active part" in election campaigns. A second Hatch Act (1940) extended these prohibitions to state and local employees whose remuneration was met wholly or partly out of federal funds. The law also limited the annual expenditures of any one political party to $3,000,000 and restricted individual contributions to a maximum of $5000.

The government's efforts notwithstanding, the number of unemployed

[12] The plight of the Okies was called to popular attention by John Steinbeck in his novel *The Grapes of Wrath*, 1939.

still was 10,000,000 in mid-1939. At that time, however, in view of the growing number of foreign and domestic armament orders, Congress provided for the gradual reduction of relief rolls. Simultaneously the name of the Works Progress Administration was changed to Work Projects Administration; but in initials the agency still remained the WPA. By the time of the Second World War, Congress had voted $13,000,000,000 for relief, a sizable proportion of which was for defense measures.[13]

The volume of relief expenditures, the increasing cost of administration owing to the many new agencies, and the added outlays occasioned by the numerous new federal functions, all combined to bring about a steady increase in the national deficit—and in taxes. The central government, moreover, had come to exert an increasingly direct influence over the lives of all people in the land. These circumstances, plus the disturbing events of the Second World War, entered into that brisk contest which was the Presidential election of 1940.

The Republican delegates in 1940 sidetracked the preconvention favorites and nominated a "dark horse": Wendell L. Willkie of New York and Indiana. Willkie was a former Democrat who, as president of the Commonwealth and Southern Corporation, had become an outstanding foe of New Deal policies, particularly as these concerned rural electrification under the TVA. A corporation lawyer by profession, he had never held public office. In foreign affairs he advocated maximum aid to Great Britain. From the time the balloting for candidates began, the gallery sitters chanted and shouted "We want Willkie" until, on the sixth ballot, they got him. To please the more orthodox Republicans and appeal to the farmers, the convention chose Senator Charles L. McNary of Oregon as Willkie's running mate.

President Roosevelt refrained from commenting on a number of preconvention moves to draft him for a third term. But when the delegates gathered, he won renomination on the first ballot—partly because of the well-oiled state of the New Deal machinery and partly out of a fear that no other candidate would beat Willkie. Inasmuch as Vice-President Garner and Roosevelt were no longer on good terms, the convention nominated Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace to complete the ticket.

The platforms of the two parties bore many resemblances. Both advocated keeping the United States out of the war and rendering all possible aid short of war to Great Britain. Both promised to build up national defense, provide further economic relief, and pass legislation favorable to

[13] The last PWA program was authorized in 1938 for continuance until mid-1942. The WPA was abolished at the end of 1942.

agriculture and labor. The Republicans condemned the extravagance of the New Deal, promised friendliness to business, and expressed a determination to lessen rather than encourage class hatred.

Both candidates were able, courageous, and popular. Each "put on a good show." The third-term issue engendered heated discussions. In view of the situation in Europe, there was much talk about the advantage of keeping an experienced man in the White House. Party lines were widely crossed, so that there were Democrats-for-Willkie and Republicans-for-Roosevelt. Frequent reference was made to the evident upswing of business, though this was largely the result of arms contracts growing out of the war. John L. Lewis threatened to resign his headship of the C.I.O. if Roosevelt were reëlected.[14]

In the end, Roosevelt won. He captured the electoral votes of 38 states to Willkie's 10; but in popular votes the count was 27,200,000 to 22,300,000. The socialist and communist candidates together polled 164,000 votes. Willkie congratulated the winner and coöperated with him in seeking solutions for the problems facing the country. Having once more proved itself at home, United States democracy soon found itself forced to fight for its existence against foreign enemies.

FOREIGN RELATIONS UNDER ROOSEVELT

The pressure of domestic affairs for a time absorbed most of the government's energies, but foreign questions soon demanded their share of official attention. To supplement domestic recovery efforts, the government by 1939 had negotiated reciprocal trade treaties with 21 foreign countries. To ease tariff bargaining, the President was authorized to lower or raise by not more than 50 per cent any existing duties on imports. The importance of these items became apparent when it was realized that "by 1938 some 380 bilateral, special agreements were known to exist which excluded United States products." The secretary of state headed a delegation to the ill-fated London Economic Conference of 1933, and diplomatic relations with the Russians were reëstablished in the same year—partly for business reasons. To stimulate the lagging remissions of war-debt instalments, Roosevelt approved the Johnson Debt Default Act (1934) which declared token payments unsatisfactory and forbade defaulting na-

[14] After the election Lewis kept his promise, though he retained the presidency of the miners' union. Under its new chief, Philip Murray, the C.I.O. purged itself of some communists and curbed its readiness to strike. Public opinion therefore became friendlier to the organization. In 1942 the United Mine Workers of America, on Lewis' recommendation, withdrew from the C.I.O.

tions to float loans in the United States. On the next due date a payment arrived only from Finland.

In 1934 the United States became a member of the International Labor Organization. Four years later Washington ratified its first international labor convention. Like his predecessor, moreover, Roosevelt brought up the question of adherence to the World Court under the Root Plan. The time seemed propitious since the Senate contained a large Democratic majority. But after a heated debate the Senate in 1935 refused its consent to ratification.

The first Roosevelt Administration witnessed the collapse of the Geneva Disarmament Conference in 1934 and the expiration of the Washington and London naval-limitation agreements. A Japanese demand for naval parity with the United States and Great Britain was rejected by both of these powers, and Tokyo renounced the restrictive treaties. The congressional appropriations for the War and Navy Departments rose rapidly with each passing year, and additional sums for defense were forthcoming from work-relief funds. A committee headed by Senator Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota investigated (1934–1936) the munitions industry with a view to diminishing the possible influence of munition makers on international disharmony and on the defeat of armament-limitation proposals. The reports of this committee, combined with the appearance of a large number of war novels of disillusionment and the stoppage of war-debt payments from the former Allies, all helped to spread a spirit of isolationism. This made it hard for Roosevelt to get public opinion aroused over the dangers which threatened the American way of life from the side of totalitarianism.

Roosevelt urged Congress to revive in amended form the Hawes-Cutting Act for Philippine independence. This measure earlier had become law over Hoover's veto but had been rejected by the Manila Legislature. It had provided as follows: (1) the islands were to become independent after a transitional period of twelve years, during which they would be governed by their own legislature and executive; (2) the United States reserved the right to maintain military and naval stations in the islands; (3) Philippine exports to the United States were, in general, to remain duty-free only within fixed quotas, and thereafter to be subject to the regular tariff rates; (4) Manila was to service the public debt out of an excise tax on duty-free articles sent to the United States; (5) United States goods might enter the islands duty-free during the transitional period; and (6) Philippine immigrants to the United States were limited to fifty per year. Congress quickly acted upon Roosevelt's suggestion and passed (1934) the Tydings-McDuffie Bill, which merely eliminated the military

and naval clauses of the previous law. The Philippine Legislature promptly accepted the arrangement.

The change in Latin American policy which had appeared during the Hoover Administration was carried further under Roosevelt. In his first inaugural address Roosevelt declared that he "would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor." Later, affirming that "the definite policy of the United States from now on is opposed to armed intervention," he said: "The maintenance of law and the orderly processes of government in this hemisphere is the concern of each individual nation within its borders first of all. It is only if and when the failure of orderly processes affects the other nations of the continent that it becomes their concern; and . . . in such an event it becomes the joint concern of the whole continent in which we are all neighbors."

The new official policy was promptly implemented. The last United States marines were withdrawn from Haiti. A more liberal recognition policy as applied to Central America was inaugurated with the recognition of a *de facto* government in El Salvador. The Platt Amendment to the United States and Cuban treaty of 1903 was abrogated. It was by authority of this amendment that Washington had exercised certain controls over Cuban internal affairs for more than three decades. Now (1934) the treaty was virtually set aside except for United States maintenance of a naval base at Guantánamo. In 1936 the United States relinquished the interventionist rights accorded her by a treaty of 1903 with Panama.

Friendly relations were maintained with Nicaragua, and in 1938 a new accord was reached with Mexico. It was agreed that a joint commission should decide how much compensation was due United States owners for agricultural lands taken from them since 1927. From 1939 on, Mexico paid the United States $1,000,000 per year on this account, while the troublesome oil claims remained to be settled. In 1940 Roosevelt ended the customs receivership that had been functioning in the Dominican Republic since 1905. Meanwhile effort had been made to coöperate in the settlement of the Chaco boundary dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay. Late in 1936, when Roosevelt visited Buenos Aires and Río de Janeiro, he was received with ovations.

Out of these things grew closer general relations among all the American republics. In 1936 they signed at Buenos Aires an American Collective Security Convention, which provided for the obligatory arbitration of disputes and consultation in the event of a threat to the peace of the Western Hemisphere. The Eighth Pan-American Conference at Lima in 1938 re-

affirmed these principles in a Declaration of the Solidarity of America. Thus twenty-one nations, not the United States alone, became the interpreters and executors of the Monroe Doctrine.

For some time after 1933 the international affairs of Europe filled United States citizens more with "distaste than alarm." Hence many were confirmed in the isolationist views that they had built up on the foundations mentioned above. One result of this widespread feeling was a change in the traditional neutrality policy of the United States—that is, in the historic contention that there must be freedom of the seas and no interference with neutral trade in noncontraband goods with warring countries. The change was expressed in joint resolutions of Congress in 1935, 1936, and 1937.

These Neutrality Acts required the President, whenever he found that a state of war existed between foreign states, to proclaim such fact. Thereupon he also had to declare it unlawful to sell or transport war materials to any belligerent, purchase the securities of a belligerent, travel on belligerent ships, or arm United States merchantmen. Then, at his discretion, he might forbid (1) the transportation on United States ships of *any* commodities to belligerents, (2) the shipment of goods until after they had been paid for and unless they were carried away in foreign bottoms (this cash-and-carry provision might be applied only until 1939), and (3) the use of United States ports to armed belligerent vessels. None of this applied to American republics if they were engaged in war with non-American states.

The President wanted the right to apply these restrictions only against the belligerent whom he might regard as the aggressor, but this concession Congress refused to make. Thus it happened that during the Ethiopian War and the Spanish Civil War the restrictions had to be applied to both sides, regardless of United States sentiment in favor of one or the other. This reacted to the advantage of Mussolini in the one case and to that of Franco in the second. In the Far East, on the other hand, the President was able to refrain from declaring the existence of a state of war, and merely forbade government-owned ships to carry arms to either combatant while warning private shipowners that they transported war materials at their own risk. Thus it was possible to extend credits to China; but enormous quantities of scrap iron went to Japan.

Through this legislation Congress hoped to prevent a repetition of such incidents as the *Lusitania* sinking, which had helped to bring the United States into the First World War. But the exigencies of the Second World War soon led to further revision of the neutrality laws. Meanwhile,

as has been indicated, the war played an important part in the Presidential campaign of 1940. After the electoral contest was over, there followed a general and quiet acceptance of the results—but basic unity did not come to the nation until after the disaster at Pearl Harbor.

PART THREE

THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND AFTER

CHAPTER 17

Return to War

HOW WAR CAME AGAIN

The delegates of the Allied and Associated Powers who met at Paris in 1918–1919 to frame a peace settlement theoretically had a choice among several alternatives. They might have made the treaty with Germany so crushing that an early and powerful comeback would have been out of the question. Or, had they possessed a superhuman detachment, they might have drafted a settlement so conciliatory as to provide little basis for the future growth in Germany of a movement aimed at violent treaty nullification. As it happened, the Allied leaders adopted a middle course and drew up an instrument that was severe enough to make the Germans vengeful and moderate enough to enable the Reich to experience a great military revival within twenty years.

The Germans' efforts to nullify the Versailles Treaty—on which they placed the blame for many difficulties that grew out of the war itself—were made easier by the circumstance that France and Great Britain, both desirous of maintaining the *status quo* that they had helped to arrange, pursued the same end along divergent paths. As the former allies drifted ever farther apart diplomatically, it became the easier and safer for Germany to revise the treaty terms unilaterally—especially since the peace settlement had largely surrounded her with relatively weak neighbors. Instead of practical and effective Anglo-French coöperation in the enforcement of most treaty terms and the legal revision of others, there was an individualistic pursuit of diverse foreign policies conditioned by the disparate

international needs and developments of the ex-allies. As a consequence, many of the worst postwar Franco-German quarrels developed into Franco-British quarrels, to the obvious advantage of Germany.

The French, no matter whether the Right bloc was in power or the Left, sought with few exceptions to uphold the settlement of 1919. The Versailles Treaty became for them an object of high esteem. It represented to a harassed nation the only tangible guarantee of security. Each concession from its terms was looked upon as weakening the whole structure. Its general maintenance came to be regarded as the strongest protection against renewed evil from without—especially since the Guarantee Treaties which had been signed in 1919 by the representatives of the United States and Great Britain never came into force. To prevent, or at least minimize, treaty revision, the French until 1935 gave active and directional support to the League of Nations and simultaneously sought military security according to a formula of their own making.

At League and disarmament-conference meetings, the French repeatedly proposed the creation of an international police force and regularly maintained that their existing state of armament was the minimum permissible vis-à-vis Germany's existing state of disarmament. Great Britain and other states did not agree with these views, and so it happened that successive gatherings were devoted chiefly to quibbling. Paris therefore drew tight lines of alliance with Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. But in cementing friendships with these countries through political treaties and financial advances, France apparently did not realize that each of her allies also represented a strategic liability. Every one of these allies was relatively weak and surrounded by numerous past and potential enemies. And when the test at last came, when Czechoslovakia needed French help in 1938, France found it inadvisable to fulfill her alliance pledges. For by that time France had decided to follow the lead of Great Britain in appeasing Germany.

Great Britain had steadfastly refused, from 1919 to 1935, to assume any universal commitments for the preservation of peace. Believing that imperial considerations imposed special duties on them, the British, at least up to the Italian venture in Ethiopia, preferred to retain freedom of action in defense matters. And without the support of Great Britain such potentially effective plans of collective security as the Geneva Protocol of 1924 had little chance of success.

The British, feeling safe in the possession of a large fleet and content to rely on French armed might to shield them from any land attack, were

interested chiefly in the revival of the world trade to which their economy was geared. With the passing of years, British businessmen came to realize that, whereas Germany had been Great Britain's chief commercial and naval rival before 1914, she had also been one of Britain's best customers. Great Britain therefore not only tolerated but welcomed steps that might assist German economic recovery. Because the continuing quarrels over reparation, war debts, Rhineland occupation, armaments, and boundaries were harmful to the revival of trade, they were irritating to London. And so the British, feeling relatively secure and anxious to foster world trade, and the French, feeling worried over the warlike activities east of the Rhine and preferring to see Germany weak and disorganized, failed to agree in their foreign relations and often acted at cross purposes.

It was only after the axis had demonstrated its nuisance value and after Italy had precipitated the Ethiopian crisis that Britishers in official circles seemed to recognize the dangers inherent in Britannia's unprepared position. And now that Nazi Germany was vigorously nullifying treaty terms, the British found that they simply dared not interpose what could only be inadequate armed resistance. The Chamberlain Government temporized and made concessions until such time as armament could be procured in sufficient quantity to implement injunctions with the necessary force. And the French, unwilling to injure Italian *amour-propre* in the absence of outright British guarantees of help against German aggression, and torn by internal dissension occasioned by recent legislation, followed where the British led. The Paris Government, retiring behind the imagined impregnability of the Maginot Line, joined the British in appeasing an aggressive Germany.

Meanwhile, in Germany, the Weimar Republic had lost its fight for existence. From its birth to its death, the German Republic had to meet the opposition, often armed, of extremists from both the Right and the Left. Because it depended on the conservative army to do its fighting and because of its own nationalistic bent, the republic dealt more severely with radicals than with reactionaries. Because it upheld democratic forms, the republic extended legal protection to political extremists who themselves were not bothered by legal niceties. Because of its system of proportional representation, with the consequent presence of more than a score of wrangling parties in the Reichstag, the republic found it difficult to act with dispatch in time of emergency. The task of the republic was made the harder, finally, by its inability to achieve thorough treaty revision; thus it was unable to meet the challenge of the extreme nationalists who clamored for ever more

international concessions. All these things paved the way for the onward march of nazism, a march whose tempo was accelerated by the great depression.

Once in power, the Nazis first concentrated on the "coördination" of Germany's internal life and then embarked upon a vigorous foreign policy. A self-styled "master race" that wished to live on a high level had to have inferior races to work for it. And, in Nazi opinion, Europe was filled with decrepit peoples who must be harnessed to serve the supposedly young master race. For the sake of the nuisance value involved, the Nazis flattered the Italians to the extent of admitting them temporarily into the company of master peoples.

At first the Nazis proceeded with relative caution, taking only one forceful step at a time and following each accomplishment with some form of pledge to make this achievement the last of its type. But as success followed success, with only verbal interference from the defenders of the *status quo,* the Nazis became bolder. They saw no point in stopping when it was so easy to go on. Only then, when the ultimate European aims of the Nazis became clear beyond a doubt, did the British and French realize that danger threatened not merely the little states of Central and Eastern Europe but the entire Western way of life.

Although it remained for Hitler to translate the challenge between the totalitarian and democratic ways of life into military action, it was Mussolini who first formulated that challenge. "The struggle between two worlds," he exclaimed, "can permit no compromise. Either we or they!" Basically, the distinction between the two ideologies lay in their differing conceptions of the position of the individual in the state. Under the democratic conception, as it was understood in the Western democracies, the individual was regarded as the creator and the rightful beneficiary of all state activity; he might be interfered with only when his doings reacted to the harm of his fellow individuals. The totalitarian conception was wholly anti-individualistic.

The dominant powers of the two camps were divided along economic and territorial as well as spiritual lines. The nations which upheld the political and territorial *status quo* were sometimes, in oversimplification, labeled the "Haves." The axis states were the "Have-nots." For reasons of economics, strategy, and prestige they demanded additional territory, old and new. In Germany and Japan, moreover, there were the additional incentives of political or religious philosophies which contemplated a world revolution culminating in the final hegemony of the respective "master race." Those who advocated totalitarian control had confidence in the

power of a disciplined will to overcome the "spiritually weak" democracies. By the end of 1938, however, following wholesale German treaty repudiations, the democracies, if spiritually weak, had begun to show a determination to be militarily strong.

The British, for example, had outlined an arms program to cost $1,500,000,000 per year, had replaced most members of the Army Council with younger men, had completed a naval base at Singapore, and had drafted a plan of conscription to go into effect immediately upon the outbreak of war. The French had oversubscribed successive defense loans and strengthened the ties among the members of the French Empire. In the United States the Administration's campaign for increased armament was so energetically fostered that it evoked shrill protests in the overseas totalitarian press.

Meanwhile, in 1936, Germany had startlingly denounced the Locarno Pact of 1925. The Germans claimed that a new Franco-Soviet Pact, presented to the French Parliament for ratification early in 1936, had deprived the Locarno agreement of its "inner meaning." On the very day of Hitler's announcement, German soldiers reëntered the hitherto demilitarized Rhineland. The action was denounced in the Western press, but no official effort was made to apply sanctions or take reprisals.

The Belgians thereupon showed worry over the self-confidence of the Nazis and the disinclination of London and Paris to coöperate strongly in the face of German and Italian challenges to the *status quo*. In 1936, therefore, Brussels announced that henceforth Belgium would pursue an exclusively Belgian policy, would join no alliances, and would remain neutral in any dispute among her neighbors. Britain and France endorsed this stand and bound themselves to preserve Belgium's integrity while releasing her from all obligations under the Locarno treaties.

The faith of the small states in the promises of their powerful allies was, however, severely shaken in 1938 and 1939 by the events accompanying Germany's absorption of Austria, the Sudeten areas, Czechia, Slovakia, and Memelland, and Italy's occupation of Albania. It was only after all these things had happened that Great Britain and France discarded the policy of appeasement. Germany's next aggression precipitated war.

In summary, then, the war of 1939 was caused by these circumstances: The disillusionment and humiliation following military defeat in the First World War filled many Germans with a desire for revenge. Then, the awkward tactics of the republic, an unhappy policy of alternating intransigeance and concession on the part of the former Allies, and the effects of the world depression brought to power in Germany a group whose impelling

philosophy it was to establish its hegemony over the continent and eventually beyond the confines of Europe. Meanwhile the British and the French, both intent on maintaining conditions as they were, followed divergent international policies. They drifted apart diplomatically at a time when, from a realistic point of view, they should have coöperated to implement by force of arms the system which they had set up by force of arms. As time went on, there developed a great game of diplomatic bluff, with Germany and Italy on one side and Great Britain and France on the other. The Soviet Union sat by as an interested observer, leaning now to one side and then the other, determined not to be drawn in no matter how the game progressed. And when at last one side called the other's bluff, the consequence was war. Poland was the unhappy victim of the critical move in the ghastly game played in the spring and summer of 1939.

1939: THE END OF TWENTY YEARS' ARMISTICE

Success having followed success in their unilateral revision of Versailles, the Germans in March 1939 centered their attention on Danzig and the Polish Corridor. By way of psychological preparation, they launched a press campaign against alleged anti-German excesses in Poland. This time the British were quick to grasp the Nazi strategy: stirring up minorities within neighboring states to disorder and then intervening to restore order. Hence Prime Minister Chamberlain announced that Great Britain and France would aid the Poles if their independence were threatened. Hitler defied the British warning and threatened the Poles with dire consequences if they remained "obstinate." In April Germany denounced her naval agreement of 1935 with Great Britain and her nonaggression pact of 1934 with Poland. Simultaneously she demanded the return of Danzig and the right to maintain a rail and motor road across the Polish Corridor to East Prussia. Poland denied the German demands early in May, shortly after Maxim Litvinov had left the Soviet Foreign Office and shortly before the conclusion of an Italo-German alliance.

The Italo-German alliance presented interesting material for reflection. Italy had emerged in 1928 as the leader of a revisionist bloc which demanded a modification of the *status quo* in a direction more acceptable to the dissatisfied signatories of the peace settlement of 1919–1920. The rise to power of Hitler had made it appear for a while that conflicting Italo-German views on Austria might estrange Rome from Berlin, but there were enough congruent elements in the Nazi and Fascist patterns and aims so that even the sudden liquidation of the Austrian problem in 1938 had

little outward effect on German-Italian relations. Thereafter, indeed, Italy was content to cede first place among the revisionists to the stronger Reich, and to follow where once she had led. The resulting partnership seemed more beneficial to Germany than to Italy. The nuisance value of the axis arrangement brought territorial gains to both partners, but Berlin's share greatly exceeded Rome's. At any rate, in May 1939 Foreign Ministers von Ribbentrop and Ciano signed a ten-year alliance at Berlin, which provided for diplomatic coöperation, collaboration in the "field of war economy," and immediate military aid in case either signatory became involved in hostilities. In the event of war, neither power would conclude a separate armistice or peace.

Then, while Great Britain and France agreed on mutual assistance with Turkey, Germany signed nonaggression pacts with Denmark, Estonia, and Latvia. In June Hitler began to speak of a new British plan to "encircle" Germany, and in July Chamberlain indicated that any unilateral effort to reunite Danzig with the Reich would bring into operation the British guarantee of Polish independence. At this time Germany and Italy agreed on the transfer to Germany of those Tirolese who preferred not to be Italianized; but in the case of the German minority in Poland, Hitler insisted on territorial cession.

While military conversations were being held in Moscow among Soviet, British, and French officers, the German and Polish press began to carry atrocity stories, and there were clashes bringing death to both Germans and Poles. Hitler acted infuriated at the reports brought to him concerning the alleged mistreatment of his "racial comrades" in Poland. Some of his advisers, confident that London and Paris would not fight to save Warsaw, convinced him of the soundness of their analysis.

In August 1939 Germany and the Soviet Union, through Foreign Ministers von Ribbentrop and Molotov, signed a nonaggression pact. The ten-year agreement provided that the two parties would not resort to war against each other, would not support any third power in the event that it attacked either signatory, would consult on all matters of common interest, and would each refrain from associating with any grouping of powers aimed at the other. A secret protocol, made public in 1948, divided Eastern Europe into eventual German and Russian spheres.

The announcement of the Nazi-Soviet Pact struck many persons like the proverbial bolt from the blue. It seemed incredible that after all the Nazi attacks on bolshevism and the Soviet charges against nazism, Stalin and Hitler should have become diplomatic partners. Yet, viewed from the vantage point of hindsight, the signing of the treaty was not so astonishing.

Germany did not want to have to worry about an immediate eastern front in the event that Britain and France really came to Poland's support. Later, when the western states had been defeated, it would be easy to trump up charges of broken faith against Moscow—preferably after the invasion of the Soviet Union had begun. And the U.S.S.R., weakened by military purges and uncertain of the intentions of Britain and France, wanted all the time she could get to carry forward the military industrialization contemplated in the Third Five-Year Plan. The Nazi-Soviet Pact represented *Realpolitik* as much for one signatory as the other.

After the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Treaty, events moved swiftly to a violent conclusion. On August 29 Germany demanded from Great Britain, who hoped that direct discussions might yet preserve peace, that she arrange to have a Polish delegate with full powers reach Berlin on the thirtieth. On the latter date the British explained that such a procedure was unreasonable and the time limit impracticable; London therefore urged that Germany follow the usual diplomatic procedure of transmitting her demands on Poland through the Polish Ambassador. When Ribbentrop received these advices from the British Ambassador at midnight, he replied by reading in German "at top speed" a sixteen-point proposal for the settlement of all German-Polish differences. But when Sir Nevile Henderson asked for a copy of the proposals, Ribbentrop "asserted that it was now too late as (the) Polish representative had not arrived in Berlin by midnight."

On the next day, August 31, the German Government broadcast the sixteen points; but when the Polish Ambassador tried to communicate the terms officially to his foreign minister, he was unable to do so because Berlin had cut all communications between the two countries. The Nazis then interpreted as a rejection of their overtures the Polish Government's inability to send a plenipotentiary on twenty-four hours' notice to accept a quasi-ultimatum which had not yet been communicated to Warsaw. About five o'clock in the morning of September 1, Germany, without declaring war, sent its planes to rain bombs on Polish cities and its soldiers to invade the Polish countryside.

Fifty hours later, on September 3, after Germany refused to withdraw from the territory it already had occupied and attend an international conference, Chamberlain informed the House of Commons that "this country is at war with Germany." The French Government adopted a similar view of the situation. Italy, as in 1914, declared her intention to remain neutral. And thus, twenty-five years and one month after the outbreak of the First World War, Europe entered the Second World War.

The Polish army had little opportunity to prove its worth. It was overwhelmed in less than a month by the mechanized might of Germany. Because Warsaw hesitated to order general mobilization until the last stage of political negotiations with Berlin; because Poland had few natural defenses on her western border; because Germany was informed by sympathizers of the day-by-day state of Polish preparations; because the Nazis disregarded the customary legal formalities preceding the opening of armed combat; and because the Germans had for some time been preparing for a drive on Poland, the Nazis were able to overwhelm the Polish defenders before the republic's armies were fully mobilized or properly concentrated.

The German forces, commanded by Colonel General Walther von Brauchitsch, were equipped with heavy tanks, armored cars, motorcycle squadrons, heavy and light artillery, and antitank and antiaircraft guns. Preceded and accompanied by bombers and other warplanes, the mechanized units and infantry entered Poland simultaneously at four points. The suddenness of the onslaught enabled the invaders to destroy most of the Polish air force on the ground. The *Panzerdivisionen* or armored divisions traversed even the muddiest roads and cut-up fields of the Polish plain with relative ease. The loss of her air arm deprived Poland of necessary reconnaissance, while the Germans, aware of Poland's military dispositions, disrupted communications, interfered with formations, and terrorized the municipal populations and the refugees on the cluttered roads. On the first day of the fighting, the Nazi leader of Danzig, Albert Forster, proclaimed the reunion of the Free City with the Reich.

Poland hoped for aid from her allies in two forms: aerial assistance and a major attack on the Reich's western border. But aid in neither form was forthcoming. German air superiority and the destruction of Poland's air fields made it little short of impossible to send French or British planes to Poland's support. And the French army, with its psychology of supposed security behind the Maginot Line and its belief in the equal impregnability of the German West Wall, did not launch any large-scale attack.[1]

Meanwhile the partially mobilized Polish infantry and cavalry retreated steadily before the advancing enemy. Within two weeks, most of Poland's western provinces were occupied and Warsaw was virtually surrounded. Then, while the capital gallantly defied bombings and bombardments for

[1] On September 4 the British steamship *Athenia*, en route from Liverpool to Canada and carrying several hundred citizens of the United States as well as about a thousand others, was sunk by torpedo without warning 250 miles off the coast of Ireland. Unrestricted submarine warfare thus got off to an early start in the Second World War.

three weeks, several Polish armies withdrew to the south and east, hoping to establish a new line along the Dniester River and there await Anglo-French aid through Romania. But then soldiers of the Soviet Union poured into eastern Poland, ostensibly to protect the resident Ukrainian and White Russian minorities. President Mościcki, Foreign Minister Beck, and Marshal Śmigly-Rydz thereupon fled to Romania, where they were interned. When battered Warsaw surrendered the fighting virtually came to an end.

Late in September 1939 Foreign Ministers von Ribbentrop and Molotov signed another German-Soviet Treaty. This partitioned Poland, with its area of 150,000 square miles and its 35,000,000 inhabitants, between the republic's two powerful neighbors. The Soviet Union acquired slightly more than half the territory but only 14,000,000 of the people. Both conquerors gained large agricultural stretches. Germany secured much of the Polish mineral and manufacturing wealth, while the Soviet Union established control over the bulk of the oil resources. Moscow now ceded to Lithuania the province of Vilnius, long a bone of contention between that Baltic state and Poland. Thus was completed the fifth partition of Poland, following those of 1772, 1793, 1795, and 1815.

President Mościcki, in Romania, resigned his office and, as was his constitutional right, named Wladislaw Raczkiewicz as his successor. The latter then appointed a cabinet, headed by General Wladislaw Sikorski. This Polish Government, having been accorded British and French recognition, set itself up at Angers in France, where it received extraterritorial privileges and the right to receive foreign representatives. After the defeat of France, the government moved to Great Britain, where sizable Polish forces were reorganized to continue the fight against Germany.

In the provinces annexed by the Soviet Union, a majority of the inhabitants were peasants, racially akin to their neighbors in the U.S.S.R. (There were, however, large Polish and Jewish minorities, comprising the bulk of the manorial, professional, and commercial classes.) Moscow therefore claimed that, by sending its soldiers into Poland, it had "liberated" millions of oppressed comrades. With the Red Army looking on, provincial assemblies were chosen which voted almost unanimously for union with the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union complied with the requests, and the territories were incorporated (November 1939) in the Ukrainian and White Russian constituent republics of the U.S.S.R. The subsequent fate of the clergy, nonpeasant groups, and others whose political views were at variance with those of Stalin was unpleasant.[2]

[2] After the Nazi invasion of the U.S.S.R., the Polish Government-in-Exile and the Soviet Government signed a treaty (1941) declaring the partition void.





POLAND: RECREATED AND REPARTITIONED

From MacFadden, C. H. *An Atlas of World Review*, New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1940. Reprinted by permission.

About 36,000 square miles of Poland were directly incorporated by Germany. The place names were Germanized so that Gdynia, for example, was renamed Gotenhafen, and Lodz, the center of the Polish textile industry, became Litzmannstadt. Industrial Teschen, which Poland had acquired from Czechoslovakia in 1938, was allotted to "independent" Slovakia. The remaining 36,000 square miles of western Poland were converted into a "Gouvernement-Général" with its capital at Cracow and Dr. Hans Frank as its administrative head.

The territory was used as a depository for Poles and Jews who had been or were to be removed from their original domiciles into this one crowded area. The lands thus vacated were to be converted into homesteads for the 1,500,000 "Germans" still living in the Tirol, the Baltic states, and former eastern Poland. The task of organizing these transfers of population was placed in the hands of the much-feared head of the secret police (*Gestapo*), Heinrich Himmler. He planned to exterminate the Jews and many Poles and force the remainder of the latter to act as servants for the Germans.

The lot of the German-speaking people compulsorily transferred from the Tirol and the Baltic regions, where their families had lived for centuries, was bad; official sentiment towards them, however, was summarized by a Nazi paper in the words: "Baltic Germans will not have the leisure to look backwards, but will be put straight into their new surroundings." But the lot of the non-Germanic victims of this policy was terrible. Western Poles, for example, were either forced into the Gouvernement-Général, where the cities rapidly became overcrowded, or were carried off by the thousands to work in German fields, or, at best, were ordered to raise on their own farms specified crops and then to surrender portions thereof to the conquerors.

The usage of Polish peasants was the least cruel of any; the harshest treatment was reserved for the clerical, professional, and commercial classes. The Germans regarded these as the leaders and the ones most likely to keep the flame of Polish nationalism alight; hence they marked them for annihilation. Polish participation in the trades and professions was reduced to a minimum, and intermarriage or even "comradeship" between Poles and Germans was forbidden. The cruelties perpetrated on the Jews were beyond belief. Jews from all German-controlled territories in Europe were forced into one huge Polish ghetto. There several million were gassed or burned to death at such extermination camps as that at Auschwitz (Oswiecim).

SOVIET AGGRESSION, 1939–1940

The occupation of eastern Poland marked only the beginning of the Soviet Union's policy of erecting buffers between herself and Germany. Shortly after Germany and the U.S.S.R. partitioned Poland, Moscow signed pacts of mutual assistance with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The Soviet Government had summoned each foreign minister to Moscow and convinced him of the desirability of acquiescence. The Soviet Union acquired naval bases and aerodromes in each of the Baltic republics but promised not to interfere with their political, economic, or social systems. Soviet garrisons were promptly dispatched to all three states, and the Nazi Government began the repatriation of Baltic citizens of German descent. Apparently Berlin had given prior approval to the Soviet Union's tactics.

Keeping pace with German victories and gains, the Soviet Union in 1940, on the day on which Nazi soldiers entered Paris, presented an ultimatum to Lithuania. The document complained of the violation by Lithuania of the pact of mutual assistance and demanded the replacement of the government by one which would "enjoy the confidence" of Moscow. Two days later similar ultimata were sent to Latvia and Estonia. In all three cases the governments resigned, the territories were occupied by the Red Army, and newly-chosen leftist governments requested admission into the U.S.S.R. Moscow obliged in August 1940.

In June 1940 Moscow also had presented an ultimatum to Romania, demanding the immediate "return" of Bessarabia and the cession of northern Bukovina, whose inhabitants were said to be "connected" with the Soviet Union through a "community of historic destinies." Bucharest appealed to Berlin and Rome for advice—and was told to meet the Soviet demands. This time the gain to the U.S.S.R. was 21,000 square miles and 4,000,000 people. Romania's loss, moreover, was even greater, for now Bulgaria and Hungary also presented demands; but this story must be left for later (see p. 547). Meanwhile the Soviet Union had made further territorial gains in the north, but for these she had had to fight against Finland.

The Soviet Government professed uneasiness over the circumstance that the land and sea approaches to Leningrad (via Finland and the Gulf of Finland) were in foreign hands. Moscow therefore adopted the same tactics vis-à-vis Finland that she so successfully pursued with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In October 1939 the Soviet Government invited Helsinki to send a negotiator to the Kremlin.



RUSSIA'S WESTERN BORDER 1914–1941

Courtesy, Foreign Policy Association, *Headline Series.*

The Bolsheviks presented a specific set of demands: (1) the cession of some islands in the Gulf of Finland; (2) the surrender of part of the Karelian Isthmus so as to put Leningrad outside effective artillery range from foreign-controlled soil; (3) the cession of some land in the extreme north so as to ensure Soviet dominance of the Finnish Arctic outlet at Petsamo; (4) the demilitarization of the Soviet-Finnish frontier; and (5) a thirty-year lease of the port of Hangö for a Soviet naval base. In return, Moscow offered to give Finland some Soviet territory on the east-central border of the republic.

Finland was prepared to acquiesce in most of the demands, but firmly refused to lease a site for a foreign military base. The negotiations broke down in the middle of November, and the Red press began to heap abuse on Helsinki. Ignoring a proposal to renew negotiations, the Soviet Government on November 30, 1939, ordered its airplanes and soldiers to cross the frontier for war. And on the next day Moscow recognized a puppet "People's Government," set up near the Soviet border by Otto Kuusinen—who had been living as an exile, mostly in the U.S.S.R., for twenty years. While the legal government moved to defend Finland's borders and appealed to the League of Nations for help, the Kuusinen Cabinet granted the Soviet territorial demands.

The League acted with unwonted speed. Within two weeks the Soviet Union was declared the aggressor and expelled from the League. The Secretariat was authorized to coördinate whatever assistance the individual League members might lend Finland. Thus left to their own devices, many League members sent foodstuffs, medical supplies, and implements of war. Volunteers flocked to the Finnish colors, and even Italy sent some airplanes. But any really effective accretion of fighting power was denied Finland by the stand of her neighbors, Norway and Sweden. Permitting almost unlimited private help, the two Scandinavian kingdoms denied the right of passage to the soldiers whom France and Great Britain were willing to send to Finland's aid. Thus Finland, with her population of 4,000,000, was left to fight it out with the Soviet Union and her 180,000,000.

Soviet strategy called for a five-fold invasion of Finland, from Petsamo in the north to the Karelian Isthmus in the south. The Finnish defense was entrusted to the experienced anti-Bolshevik fighter, General Baron Karl Gustav von Mannerheim. For weeks, the Finns fought stubbornly, while the Soviet Command made several mistakes. It launched its offensives with inadequately trained men; neglected to provide transportation security for supplies; and failed to ensure coördination among the armies.

Eventually the Reds decided to take firmer hold of the situation. They brought into the battle more and better troops and placed the energetic General Gregory Stern in charge of operations. Artillery with a greater range than that of the Finnish guns was brought into action, and Finnish cities were subjected to frequent bombings. At last, on March 12, 1940, the Treaty of Moscow brought a stilling of the guns. It was reported that 16,000 Finns and 49,000 Russians had been killed in the war.

The terms of the treaty were more exacting than the original demands of the U.S.S.R. Finland ceded considerable territory north and west of Lake Ladoga so as to place this largest lake in Europe wholly within Soviet borders; most of the islands in the Gulf of Finland; a triangle of land to the northeast, in the Salla region; and enough of the Rybachi Peninsula to give the Soviet Union dominance over the Arctic port of Petsamo and the nearby nickel mines. No Finnish war vessels or military aircraft might be stationed in or adjacent to the republic's Arctic waters. The U.S.S.R. was permitted for thirty years to lease Hangö for conversion into a Soviet naval base.

The Soviet Union organized the new territories into the Karelian-Finnish Socialist Federated Soviet Republic and thus added another to the constituent republics of the U.S.S.R. But most of the 400,000 former inhabitants of this area packed their movable belongings and wandered back across the new border into Finland. It was not the least difficult reconstruction problem of the Helsinki Government to find new homes for these loyal subjects. And the Kuusinen Government? Moscow simply reported that it had "dissolved itself." Thus did the military preoccupation of the other great powers of Europe make easy the path of Soviet aggrandizement from the Arctic Circle to the Black Sea.

CHAPTER 18

The First Year of War in the West

FROM SEPTEMBER 1939 TO MARCH 1940

Following the close of the campaign in Poland, Hitler addressed the Reichstag, saying: "Why should this war in the west be fought? . . . Poland of the Versailles Treaty will never rise again." Following the technique used in earlier speeches, he then declared that Germany had no further "demands" save that "for the return of German colonies." If this peace offer were refused, "then we shall fight." Understandably, France and Great Britain decided to carry on until more effective guarantees against aggression were forthcoming than Hitler's "unsupported word."

Benefiting by some costly lessons of the First World War, the Allies [1] in 1939 quickly created unified military, naval, and air commands. British officers were placed in charge of the Allied sea and air forces, and General Gamelin became commander of the Allied armies. In the first five weeks of the war 158,000 British soldiers were transported to France.

For a time there was little military activity on the western front. Neither side cared to risk the disproportionate casualties that presumably would accompany an offensive against "impregnable" defenses. Certain French leaders, in particular, were so steeped in a "Maginot psychology" that they vowed the enemy could be worn down in a war of attrition. Hence, while the Germans conquered Poland, the Allies were content to

[1] All British Dominions save Ireland quickly joined the mother country in the war. Australia and New Zealand entered on September 3; the Union of South Africa on September 6; and Canada on September 10.

capture a few advance posts inside the western German border. Then, when thousands upon thousands of Germans, freed from duty in the east, were sent to the West Wall, the Allied soldiers were withdrawn from German soil and put to work improving French defensive positions. The Germans, too, temporarily confined their land activities to bringing more troops up to the French border, and to those of Belgium and the Netherlands. There were several "scares" in both monarchies lest the Germans invade them in an effort to outflank the Maginot Line; but the threat did not materialize until the spring. And so it happened that the only *Blitz* or lightning of the winter of 1939–1940 was that provided by the weather —the severest in half a century.

The war in the air also was of casual nature during the first six months. Civilians were equipped with gas masks; some city children were evacuated to presumably safer country districts; nightly blackouts were imposed on coastal and industrial regions; and numerous air-raid shelters were constructed. But deadly combat was confined largely to clashing patrols. To many observers, indeed, it appeared as a joke that British planes for months dropped only leaflets on Germany. But many British pilots acquired on these apparently useless flights a thorough knowledge of German geography and the location of strategic and industrial sites. Before the end of 1939, moreover, plans were completed for training British pilots in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, far from the scene of combat and from hostile interference.

The naval aspects of the war were spectacular even in 1939. The combined British and French fleets had a tonnage almost nine times that of the German. But there were tens of thousands of miles of sea lanes that had to be guarded against German raiders and submarines, for the German naval commander, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, put into immediate practice unrestricted submarine warfare. Once again it was to be British blockade versus German submarines, with the surface units of the German fleet generally remaining in the protected waters adjacent to the mainland. As in the First World War, also, Winston Churchill became Britain's First Lord of the Admiralty.

At the beginning of the war, the merchant marines of the British Empire and France had a tonnage of about 20,000,000. Of this, 800,000 tons were destroyed in the first seven months of fighting. To speed up their campaign, the Germans also torpedoed neutral ships and then resorted to the indiscriminate sowing of mines—some of them planted by airplanes and some so constructed as to function magnetically. Eventually

the British found that girding potential victims with metal cables considerably lessened the menace of these magnetic mines. Meanwhile the oceans had virtually been cleared of German merchant shipping.

To avoid competitive bidding and to strengthen their economic position, Britain and France early set up an Anglo-French Coördinating Committee. This agency was to organize the economic warfare, fix priorities, and supervise a number of intergovernmental committees established to coördinate the Allies' production and purchases of munitions, oil, aviation equipment, foodstuffs, shipping, coal, timber, and other commodities. Later an agreement was reached virtually making the British and French currencies interchangeable. There was, in consequence, an effective and efficient collaboration in shipping, purchasing, and finance. There was talk, also, of eventual educational and even parliamentary collaboration, but the events of the spring of 1940 put a sudden stop to such plans.

A final item to be noted about the first seven months of the war was a change in the French Government. Daladier, reputed to be a "strong man," seemed to enjoy general confidence in the fall of 1939. His measures against the communists in the early days of war—the suspension of communist municipal councilors and the unseating of most of the communist parliamentary deputies—were generally approved, even by the socialists, who seemed to have lost their faith in Moscow after the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. But this popularity waned as the public became increasingly dissatisfied with the leisurely prosecution of the war and with the failure to give direct aid to Finland. The unfavorable peace imposed on Finland was soon followed by the resignation of Daladier. He was succeeded (March 1940) by Paul Reynaud, until then minister of finance.

Reynaud had the confidence of French finance and was known to have been an opponent of appeasement. He was regarded as energetic and patriotic and a firm believer in democracy. But since he kept Daladier as minister of war, there was little improvement in the war effort. Weeks passed before Reynaud showed the fortitude to drop Daladier and to promote to a brigadier generalship and bring into the cabinet as undersecretary of war, Charles Joseph de Gaulle, leading, but hitherto unheeded, French advocate of mechanized warfare. Reynaud as a civilian had long shared de Gaulle's views as these were frequently expressed in writing; but the two men were not in position effectively to coöperate until it was too late. Too late, because the German mechanized advance was about to begin.

THREE MONTHS OF BLITZKRIEG, APRIL–JUNE 1940

Winston Churchill regarded Germany's free use of Norway's territorial waters as the chief obstacle to an effective blockade of the Reich. "The existence of this . . . legal covered way," he said, "has been the greatest . . . advantage which Germany possessed in her efforts to frustrate the . . . blockade." Warships and submarines "used it as they thought it convenient." And German merchant ships, "trying to get back from the outer seas," followed this 800-mile-long route in safety. Equally important was Germany's ability to get shipload after shipload of high-grade Swedish iron ore by the same route. Swedish ore was carried westward from the mines by rail to the Norwegian port of Narvik, there loaded on freighters, and then taken down in territorial waters as far as the Skagerrak. From there onward the ships were fairly well protected by German mine fields and other defenses.

During the First World War, in similar circumstances, the Allies had prevailed upon Norway to strew mines in her territorial waters; but in



THE SCANDINAVIAN REGION 1940

1939–1940 Oslo refused to take such action. Indeed, the Norwegian navy provided escorts for the iron-carrying freighters, on the ground that the kingdom had to keep her waters "open to all legitimate traffic by ships belonging to belligerent countries." Simultaneously Norway deplored Germany's illegal sinking of numerous Norwegian merchant vessels. Obviously the Scandinavian governments, relying on Britain's reasonable observance of international law, were worried by German threats of what would happen unless their actions conformed to Berlin's interpretation of neutrality. They hoped against hope that they might again be as fortunate as they were in 1914–1918; fate decreed otherwise.

On April 8, 1940, the Allied governments informed Oslo that they had "decided to prevent unhindered passage of vessels carrying contraband of war through Norwegian territorial waters." They gave notice that mines had been laid along the Norwegian coast, albeit in such a way as not to interfere with "the free access of Norwegian nationals or ships to their own ports or coastal hamlets." Oslo demanded the removal of the mines, but in the next morning German forces, acting in concert over a thousand-mile stretch, began the occupation of Denmark and Norway.

The occupation of small, poorly armed, and unsuspecting Denmark was a simple matter. Shortly before five o'clock in the morning of April 9, 1940, the Danish Government received a German note stating that Berlin had "indubitable evidence" of Allied plans to use the Scandinavian territories as a battleground. To forestall such action, Germany intended to "protect" these regions, for they obviously could not adequately defend themselves. Any and all resistance would be "crushed" by German military power. Actually, German forces entered Denmark before Copenhagen had time to reply. King Christian X and Premier Thorvald Stauning accepted the situation under protest. Denmark, with a population of 3,800,000, was a great producer of bacon, butter, and eggs.

In Norway the story developed differently. There, too, the presentation of a note demanding the surrender of the kingdom to German administration, in order to forestall supposed Allied designs, was accompanied by the landing of Nazi troops at half a dozen ports, from Oslo to Narvik. King Haakon VII and Premier Johan Nygaardsvold rejected the German offer and prepared to fight. Because the Germans readily got control of Oslo, the government had to flee; the king, indeed, had to flee from place to place, hunted by German airplanes.

The Germans met relatively little resistance in their simultaneous landings at half a dozen points because of three special weapons: "Trojan horse" tactics, fifth-column activities, and the giving of false orders. In

several Norwegian ports, at the appointed hour, the hatches of supposedly empty German coal freighters were opened and from them emerged fully equipped Nazi soldiers, ready to take over the towns in question. The fact that such soldiers were available on April 9 in Narvik, a thousand miles from Germany by sea, made the Nazi argument that the "protection" of Norway was necessary because of Britain's mining activities on the day before so silly that the Germans themselves soon stopped using it.

Of help to the Germans, also, was a small "fifth column." [2] Prominent among the fifth columnists was the military commander at Narvik, who failed to issue orders for the defense of that port. Most conspicuous, however, was Major Vidkun Quisling, head of the Norwegian Nazis (*Nasjonal Samling*), who in the parliamentary elections of 1936 had failed to elect a single member. But as minister of war for a brief period in 1932–1933, Quisling had appointed a number of the garrison commanders who now surrendered their charges to little bands of Nazi troops. And it was to him the Germans turned when they sought a native chief for a puppet government. Finally, the task of the Nazis was made easier by the simple ruse of transmitting false orders to loyal commanders. Thus, the Germans easily entered the harbor at Kristiansand by issuing false orders to the local commander and by flying French flags.

While the Germans were extending their control against the resistance of isolated Norwegian units, the Allies promised "full aid" to the Scandinavian kingdom. Some ships were sent, and 12,000 soldiers were landed, but the Allied effort was a failure. The Germans, through control of the best ports and with air superiority, were able to frustrate several Allied plans for reconquest. In June, with a German advance into France under way, the Allies left Norway and took King Haakon to London with them. The king at once issued a proclamation to his people to cease active resistance, and so another phase of the war ended in German victory. The Germans now tried to win support for their cause in Norway by turning the civil administration over to the native Quisling. The major failed to convert his countrymen to the new doctrines and eventually was removed from office, though he did stay on as head of the Nasjonal Samling, the only party permitted by the Germans. To his discomfort and the Germans' irritation, the Norwegians showed great ingenuity in their resistance, both passive and active.

Through their Scandinavian venture the Nazis gained several advan-

[2] This phrase was usually credited to General Emilio Mola, a supporter of Franco during the Spanish Civil War. He was reported to have said, on approaching Madrid, that, besides the four military columns then advancing on the Loyalist capital, a fifth column of Nationalist sympathizers already was inside the city ready to cut off the Republican retreat.

tages. They now had additional air, naval, and submarine bases, some of them closer to northern Britain than any they had had before. They no longer had to worry about the possibility of attack through the northern countries. They acquired the gold reserves of Denmark and large stores of oil, foodstuffs, and munitions. They could divert from Britain and France and steer to themselves all the surplus dairy products, fish, minerals, metal ores, and timber output of the conquered areas. Even Swedish exports, chiefly iron and food, could now be counted almost wholly for the German side.

The Allies, despite a loss of prestige, also made some gains. They got the use of about sixty Norwegian war vessels and most of the Norwegian merchant fleet, the fourth largest in the world. These thousand ocean-going vessels helped keep Britain supplied with the oil and food without which she could not have continued the war. The merchant fleet's earnings, moreover, paid for the training and upkeep of Norway's exiled air force and the interest on her foreign loans. Eventually the people in the conquered regions formed resistance movements and greatly hampered the German war effort. British and Canadian forces occupied the Faroe Islands, Iceland, and Greenland, all formerly tied to Denmark. And there was brought to a head in Great Britain a political crisis which culminated in the resignation of Chamberlain.

There had for some time been apparent a growing British dissatisfaction with the conduct of the war. As the Finnish troubles led to the resignation of Daladier in France, so in Great Britain the Norwegian invasion was "the culmination of other discontents." The people of Britain now wanted vigor and imagination in their government, and Chamberlain possessed neither of these qualities. Hence, on May 10, 1940, a few hours after German soldiers had begun to swarm into Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands, Neville Chamberlain tendered his resignation to the king. On the following day Winston Churchill crowned a long and forceful political career by becoming prime minister. Fearless, energetic, and possessed of a vivid imagination, he gave promise of infusing a new spirit not only into the cabinet but into the whole conduct of Britain's greatest war.

The Churchill Cabinet included both Chamberlain and some of the latter's outstanding critics, such as Anthony Eden. There were also several Laborite leaders, particularly Clement Attlee and Minister of Labor Ernest Bevin, who distinguished himself for his energy and organizing ability. Chamberlain at last retired in October 1940, dying shortly thereafter. But now to return to the German invasion of Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

Late in the evening of May 9 the Netherlands Intelligence Service

warned the government of impending attack. The authorities took certain precautionary measures that had earlier been agreed upon and then tensely awaited some notice of German intentions. Instead, at four o'clock in the morning of May 10, without notice of any sort, German soldiers poured into the Netherlands, as German airplanes dropped bombs on sleeping cities and German parachutists took over Netherlands airports. Only then did the Netherlands Government ask Great Britain and France for help. Even after the German occupation of Denmark and Norway, the Netherlands, relying partly on German promises and partly on its own strength, hoped to remain neutral.

Not until two hours after the attack began did the German Minister to The Hague explain the grounds for Germany's action and demand the submission of the Netherlands. Once more Berlin untruthfully claimed to have "irrefutable evidence of an immediately threatening invasion by British and French forces in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, prepared a long time beforehand with the knowledge of the Netherlands and Belgian governments." The Netherlands Government responded by accepting a state of war with Germany.

Nazi airplanes soon destroyed the small Netherlands air fleet; then other planes brought over soldiers and parachutists. Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and The Hague were subjected to terrible bombings, and mechanized forces quickly seized strategic points everywhere. Again, however, the conquest of the country was speeded by the aid of local helpers. Some of these fifth columnists were Netherlanders, followers of Anton Mussert and Rost van Tonningen. Others were Germans who had earlier entered the Netherlands as "tourists," "salesmen," or "students." Some German soldiers wore Netherlands uniforms, which earlier had been smuggled across the border. These persons kept a number of strategic bridges, waterworks, and canals in working order to make easy the passage of German soldiers.

The slaughter was so great that, after five days of fighting, General Henrik Winkelman ordered the Netherlands army to cease firing. The victorious Germans, however, were unable to achieve one major objective, namely, the capture of Queen Wilhelmina and the members of her family and government. These, after passing through many dangers, escaped to Great Britain and remained free to command the vast Netherlands colonial possessions on the side of the Allies. Meanwhile the kingdom itself, with its largest cities partially in ruins, was placed under the commissionership of Arthur Seyss-Inquart, the same who two years earlier had helped to hand his native Austria over to the Third Reich. He found his new task difficult, for the Netherlanders proved stubborn and unbending. The staunch

burghers were remarkably skillful in thinking up forms of passive resistance.

The fall of the Netherlands rendered easier the conquest of Belgium.[3] Here again, the recent policies of the government had reacted to German advantage. In 1936 King Leopold III had declared that henceforth the kingdom must pursue a policy "exclusively and entirely Belgian," without any alliances. This request for release from the obligations of the Locarno Agreements had been endorsed by Great Britain and France in 1937. Six months later Berlin had promised to respect Belgium's "inviolability," unless she took part in a military action aimed at Germany. Thereafter Belgium had resisted all efforts at military coöperation with its former allies, preferring to trust to the pledges of Germany and its own defenses.

Crossing into Belgium at the same time that they entered the Netherlands, the Germans again withheld notice until after the fighting had begun. With a larger and better-equipped army than that of the Netherlands and in better geographic position to receive Allied aid, Belgium was expected to put up stiff resistance. But once again the Nazis rushed ahead, investing cities, driving a wedge between the Belgians and their Allied reënforcements, and breaking up the opposing armies and enveloping their sections one by one. Within a week the Germans were in Brussels, and Hitler reincorporated into the Reich the districts of Eupen, Malmédy, and Moresnet, lost to Belgium by the treaty of Versailles.

Meanwhile, aware that the French had weakened the defensive system behind Sedan by moving soldiers from there to assist the Belgians, the Nazis had struck in full force across the Meuse River. The Maginot Line was weak at this northern end, for the French had counted (in vain) on a Belgian extension thereof to the Netherlands borders, and the Germans broke through with relative ease. Within four days they created a sixty-mile gap in the French defenses. A few more days, and the Germans had smashed their way westward to the coast and driven the main French forces south of the Somme River. To the north, the Britishers and Belgians were reduced to dependence for supplies and help on the Channel ports alone.

Driving along the French coast, the Nazis simultaneously pounded away at the Belgian army to the northeast of Dunkirk. Generalissimo Maxim Weygand, recently appointed to Gamelin's place, flew to the headquarters of Leopold, who had taken personal command of the Belgian forces. The king warned Weygand that only "substantial new assistance" would enable the Belgians to continue the fight. When no such aid was

[3] Luxembourg, with a population of 300,000, fell in a day. Grand Duchess Charlotte escaped first to France and then to North America.

forthcoming, Leopold, against the pleas of his entire government, asked the Germans for terms. The Nazis demanded unconditional surrender. On May 28, 1940, the king complied and ordered his soldiers to stop fighting.

The Belgian Cabinet, some members of the Belgian Parliament, and many soldiers repudiated Leopold's action and fled to France and then Great Britain, there to continue the fight against the Germans. Whatever the verdict of history on Leopold's act, the end of Belgian resistance placed approximately 400,000 British and French soldiers, who had been sent to help Belgium, in a terrible predicament. Harried by the Germans on the south, and now with their northern flank exposed, they were pushed into a corner of Flanders, in the vicinity of Dunkirk, with only the sea at their back.

Yet, successful as they had thus far been, the Germans failed in their effort of May 29–June 4 to "annihilate" the enemy. On the latter day they did enter the ruins of Dunkirk, but in the preceding six days 335,000 of the supposedly doomed Britishers and Frenchmen had been returned from there to England. Disaster had been averted through the gallant stands of a small Anglo-French force in Calais to the south of Dunkirk and of a French tank unit around Lille to the east of Dunkirk; through the tireless work of the crews of about 220 Allied war vessels and 650 other craft of every size and description; through the ability of the Royal Air Force to achieve air superiority in the limited sphere above Dunkirk; and through foggy weather, which apparently helped the Allies as much as it hampered the Germans.

On the other hand, the Germans, after 25 days of fighting, were in occupation of Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, and northern France. Indeed, from Abbeville northward to the Arctic Circle, every mile of European coast was under German domination. And the strategic basis for German victory again had been a combination of meticulous preparation, perfect coördination, surprise, the fullest use of mechanization, and the aid of persons behind the enemy lines.

In the actual fighting, the way was prepared by the dread dive-bombers (*Stukas,* from *Sturzkampfflugzeug*). Then came large tanks that made the breaches through which poured highly trained motorized units, followed in turn by engineers and repair crews, armored troop-carriers and supply cars, and the occupying infantry. The heavy tanks generally fanned out after making a breach and, accompanied by lighter armored cars, attacked areas to the rear. Thus was the defense disorganized, while the airplanes disrupted communications, and the heavy artillery softened objectives still to be stormed. The installation of mobile telephones and the giving of

false evacuation orders added to the welter of confusion in which the defenders tried unsuccessfully to re-form their positions. The roads were cluttered with refugees, who hampered the soldiers' movements and who were machine-gunned from German airplanes.

While the fighting at Dunkirk was in progress, Generalissimo Weygand tried to create a new line south of the Somme and Aisne rivers. The French worked feverishly, building defenses and making tank traps for even the heaviest of the motorized monsters. On June 5 the Germans launched a terrific attack along more than 100 miles of this hastily constructed Weygand Line. Thus began the Battle of France.

Eager to put France out of the war before the British could send another expeditionary force across the Channel, the Germans used their full might in the new campaign. The French fought courageously, but could not check the Nazi drive. Aside from man power, the greatest French deficiency was in planes, and this deficiency the British could make up only in small part. On June 10 the French Government, taking Weygand's advice, left Paris.[4] And on this same day Italy entered the war. Mussolini, "who had been becoming more and more bellicose with each advance of the Germans," informed a crowd in the Piazza Venezia that "a declaration of war already has been handed to the ambassadors of Great Britain and France."

Unable now to get replacements from the soldiers stationed on the Italian border, the tired French fighters in the north continued to fall back, and the Germans began an encirclement of Paris. Lest that city be made to suffer the fate of Warsaw and Rotterdam, the French Government decided to surrender it without a fight. German soldiers entered Paris on June 14, finding the French capital only slightly damaged, but with streets deserted and deathly still.

The fall of Paris had an adverse effect on the morale of the French leaders, the more so since Weygand informed a cabinet meeting that "all is lost." In this view he was supported by the aged vice-premier, Marshal Pétain, the "hero of Verdun." A number of highly placed Frenchmen and Frenchwomen now urged Reynaud to ask for an armistice. Some of these advisers feared that continued fighting might end in a Bolshevik revolution. Others saw a chance to get rid of the Third Republic and restore a monarchy. Still others hoped to achieve high position in a new totalitarian world order. There also came to the fore a long-latent anti-British feeling, and there were signs of bitter personal rivalries and jealousies.

Reynaud held out for a time. He could not believe that France had

[4] After four days at Tours, the government fled to Bordeaux.

collapsed, and he did not want to desert his British allies. Supported by de Gaulle and by the energetic minister of the interior, Georges Mandel, he pleaded with Churchill and Roosevelt for quick and substantial aid, especially airplanes. But these were not available. Roosevelt sent words of encouragement, and Churchill offered a constitutional Franco-British Union with common citizenship and joint ministries, but neither of these was of immediate help. On June 16, 1940, finding a majority of his cabinet and advisers in favor of "peace," Reynaud resigned. President Lebrun called on the 84-year-old Pétain to form a new government.

Pétain quickly appointed a cabinet, the most conspicuous member of which was Pierre Laval, newspaper owner, former premier, long advocate of collaboration with Italy and Germany, leader of the peace bloc, and bitter opponent of Reynaud. With equal speed the new premier requested Spain to act as intermediary in asking Germany for an armistice. He gave no satisfactory reply to the British officials who were sent to remind him that the British Government had informed Reynaud of its readiness to release France from her pledge not to conclude a separate peace only on condition that the "French fleet were dispatched to British ports and remained there while negotiations [between the French and Germans] were taking place."

The Germans, meanwhile, had easily continued their march. By June 16 they were in occupation of about one-fourth of France. Hence Hitler was in no hurry to answer the French request. He held a meeting with Mussolini to talk over prospective terms and did not receive the French armistice delegation until June 21—in the same railway coach and in the same Compiègne Forest to which German delegates had been summoned on a similar mission 22 years earlier. The Frenchmen accepted the armistice terms and then flew to Rome, there to receive the Italian armistice demands. These also were accepted, and firing ceased officially at 12:35 A.M. on June 25, 1940. At this time the Germans were in occupation of more than half of France and claimed to have taken 2,000,000 prisoners. The Italians were in occupation of a narrow strip of French territory which they had conquered in an offensive begun on the day after France had asked Italy for an armistice.

The Franco-German armistice terms were calculated to prevent a French renewal of hostilities, enable the Reich advantageously to continue the war against Britain, and establish preconditions for an eventual peace arrangement. Germany was to occupy more than half of France, including most of the industrial regions, all the Atlantic ports, and Paris. Except for a small force to maintain order, all French effectives were to be demo-

bilized. All fortifications and war materials in the occupied area were to be handed over in good condition. Military supplies in unoccupied territory were to be stored for Germany and Italy. The French fleet, except for ships needed to protect the colonial empire, was to be brought together in specified ports and disarmed under German-Italian control. Germany "solemnly declared" its intention not to use such naval units during the war, save for coast surveillance and mine sweeping. No Frenchman might serve against Germany in foreign units, and no airplanes might leave from unoccupied France. All wireless transmitters were to be silenced. France must pay the costs of the occupying forces, repatriate the inhabitants who had left the occupied area, and release all German prisoners of war. French prisoners of war would remain confined until the conclusion of peace. France must hand over any German subjects whom Berlin might want but who had fled to the unoccupied region. The armistice might be denounced "at any mo-

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ment" by Germany if France were delinquent in fulfilling her obligations.

The Franco-Italian armistice terms were similar to the German ones. Italy was to occupy that narrow strip of French territory which she had conquered. A 31-mile stretch of French land beyond the line of occupation was to be demilitarized, as was a zone on the French side of the Libyan border. France also was to demilitarize her bases at Toulon, in Tunisia, Corsica, and Algeria, and along the coast of French Somaliland. Marshal Pétain explained that the armistice saved French honor and left the government "free." In the next section the policies of this "free" government will be surveyed, but a British action which largely nullified that provision of the armistice arrangement relating to the recall of French naval units should first be considered.

The British Government had reason to believe that the French navy, some of whose highest officers were strongly anti-British, would be surrendered to axis control. London also feared that, once the ships were in French ports, the Germans might disregard their promise not to use them, on the ground that France had somehow violated the armistice agreement. Hence, on July 3, 1940, without warning, British units were sent to take over all French war vessels then in British ports. This was accomplished with relative ease and virtually no bloodshed. The crews either entered the British navy, volunteered to fight as Free French units, or were returned to France. A second sizable portion of the French fleet, at Alexandria, was demobilized by mutual consent. But the major part of the French fleet, stationed near Oran in Algeria, was not so easily won over.

On that same July 3 the French commander there, Vice-Admiral Marcel B. Gensoul, received a note from British Vice-Admiral Sir James F. Somerville, offering him several alternative courses of action. He was asked either to continue the fight against the axis; or to sail with reduced crews to a British port, where the crews would be repatriated and the ships or their equivalent in compensation restored to France after the war; or to sail with reduced crews to the French West Indies, where the ships might be demilitarized or entrusted to the United States until the end of the war; or to risk sinking of the ships after six hours. The French commander, using the intervening hours to prepare for action, decided to fight.

The British reluctantly opened fire and put most of the assembled French ships out of commission. Several, however, were able to escape and eventually reached Toulon. Meanwhile the Pétain Government had severed diplomatic relations with its former ally, which was valiantly continuing the fight against the axis powers. But before we turn to the Battle of Britain,

let us examine the changes that occurred in France under its new administration.

THE END OF THE THIRD REPUBLIC

The Third French Republic died in July 1940, when the National Assembly invested Pétain with power to promulgate a new constitution. Its epitaph might well have read: "Born and died in military defeat, inflicted by German armies." But such an epitaph, while stating a fact, would hardly explain the demise of the republic. Even the scores of books and hundreds of articles that soon appeared on the tragedy, mystery, failure, betrayal, suicide, cancer, and purge of France failed to give a clear picture of the fundamental causes of the disaster. Many of the items listed as causes were merely symptoms. Nor was the issue made clearer by a tendency among some Frenchmen to accuse one another in a hunt for scapegoats. Let us, however, survey briefly what appeared to have been contributory factors in the decline and fall of the Third Republic.

The collapse of France was not caused by the Nazi invasion alone. The very ease with which the Germans advanced offered circumstantial evidence of internal weakness. There was, indeed, a long list of corroding influences: the division of the country, ever since the Revolution, into two Frances, bitterly divided against one another; the fact that the constitutional laws of 1875, basis of the republic's political system, were intended as temporary provisions, to be replaced by a permanent charter when the question of kingship should have been settled; the circumstance that in France the parliamentary system rested, not on a two-party base as in Great Britain and the United States, but on a multiplicity of groups, thus making governments dependent on coalitions and making it difficult to achieve energetic action in time of crisis; the great effect on France of the example of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia; the development, after 1919, of a "defense psychology"; and the complacency, lowering of moral values, and corruption that seem often to accompany prolonged national economic well-being. These influences may now be considered in turn.

An excellent description of the "two Frances" was given by a sympathetic observer in these words: [5]

> The French Revolution irrevocably divided the internal politics of France; since that time there have been twin Frances, mortal enemies. The residual

[5] Helen Hill [Miller] *The Spirit of Modern France,* Foreign Policy Association, New York, 1934, 14. Reprinted by permission.

bitterness of the American Civil War is still a measurable political factor, yet in America the geographic solidarity of the two sides has been an incomparably softening influence. The French Revolution was a Civil War in which, over large areas, the lines were drawn on a social rather than a geographic basis; when it was over, no softening distance mitigated the bitterness of the ex-combatants. As the completeness of the democratic victory, with the passage of time and the coming reaction, became less complete, two Frances emerged to confront each other—authoritarian France, founded on the ideological trinity of monarchy, army and church, in later years particularly the church, and democratic France, founded on the ideological trinity of liberty, equality and fraternity between individual citizens. All through the nineteenth century these two were locked in an uncertain struggle for supremacy, with now one the victor, now the other. . . . The Third Republic has now lasted some sixty years, but its stability has more than once been highly doubtful. . . . Certain recurrent issues have never exhausted their dynamite.

This national cleavage was responsible, at least in part, for the attitude taken in 1939–1940 by some French officers. They were royalist by tradition and in sympathy, and they found it difficult to put spirit into the fight for a system which they abhorred; which, they said, had made it possible for a Jewish socialist (Léon Blum) to become premier. They, and with them a sizable portion of the privileged class, were not pro-German and not necessarily pro-Fascist, but they were anti-Red and anti-Third Republic. To this group the speeches of Hitler and the blandishments of his well-chosen male and female agents sounded much more attractive than did, for example, the demands of French labor leaders for shorter hours and more pay.

Closely related to this attitude was that of many Frenchmen who had never forgiven the republic for its separation of the church and state early in the twentieth century. It was one of the founders of the Third Republic who in 1877 had rallied republicans with the cry: "Clericalism! That is the enemy!" And as late as 1939, a leading native authority on French politics (later a Pétainist official) held that "perhaps the surest criterion" of difference between the Right and Left was the matter of opinion on the position of the church in the state and relations with the Vatican.[6] There were, then, men and women in the France of 1940 who expected more freedom to set up the church-state relation which they desired through collaboration with Hitler than under the existing regime.

A second weakness in the French political structure was the character of the constitutional laws of 1875. Under the terms of the Franco-Prussian armistice of 1871, the French people were to elect a national assembly

[6] Barthélemy, J. *Le gouvernement de la France,* 3 ed., Paris, 1939, 44.

which should decide on whether or not to continue the war begun in 1870. When the assembly met it contained about 650 deputies, including 200 republicans and 400 monarchists. This membership reflected the attitude of the voters towards the war rather than their domestic political wishes, for the monarchist candidates had promised peace and the republicans had advocated the renewal of hostilities. None the less, it would seem that a king should quickly have been chosen when the assembly turned to the question of forming a permanent new government.

As it happened, the monarchists themselves were divided into two approximately equal groups, favoring respectively a Bourbon or Legitimist and an Orleans candidate. Prolonged deadlock resulted, during which more and more liberals, tired of monarchist bickering, veered to the republican side. Finally, in 1875, because it seemed futile to wait any longer for the monarchists to resolve their difficulty, three organic laws were passed which eventually came to be the French Constitution. The first law, which defined a method for electing future presidents, was adopted by a majority of one. And it was this one vote which, in effect, established the Third Republic. In the circumstances, it is not astonishing that the republican form of government should have collapsed after 65 years. The wonder, rather, is that a sketchy and presumably temporary political instrument, despised by unreconciled opponents, should have endured as long as did the laws of 1875.

Republican France, in the third place, had only few political parties with a definite organization, party funds, and periodic conventions. But it had numerous political groups, and usually there were from ten to fifteen such groups in the lower house at one time. Hence it was virtually impossible for any one of them to get a majority, and government had to be by the bloc system. Sometimes the defection of one small group on a minor point brought the loss of a majority and the need for a reorganization of the government. This literal *ministerial* responsibility was largely to blame for the frequency of cabinet change in France. Unlike the experience of ministries in democracies operating under the two-party system, the average life of a French cabinet was about six months. Eventually, particularly in the hard years after 1930, this administrative fluctuability gave rise to a growing demand for a "disciplined," that is, authoritarian system.

A fourth contributory cause to the French overturn was the Bolshevik Revolution. When the Bolsheviks repudiated the foreign debts incurred by Russia under the tsarist regime, France was one of the heaviest losers. This circumstance, plus the Bolshevik attacks on private property and religion, aroused the implacable enmity of many influential Frenchmen.

There was implanted in them a dread of communism and a readiness to do almost anything to avert a Bolshevik upheaval in France. While the Third Republic, until 1931, was officially among the most consistent opponents of the U.S.S.R., this hate remained more or less in the background—though even then it was regularly fed by the many Russian émigrés who had found a refuge in France. But when, after the rise to power of the German Nazis in 1933, the Third Republic began to draw closer to the Soviet Union, the dissidents in France were filled with yet greater aversion to the existing government.

The formation of a Franco-Soviet Alliance in 1935, and the joint sympathy of Moscow and the Blum Government for the Spanish Loyalists after 1936, seemingly turned the fear of these groups into terror. And in this emotional state they listened willingly to the honeyed words of such German agents as Otto Abetz, who convinced them that only a totalitarian French regime coöperating with Nazi Germany could save them from the loss of all they held dear. In the end, many French army officers adopted the attitude: "If there is to be a war, then let it be against the Bolsheviki." With such a spirit, and bewildered by the new technique of the Blitzkrieg, these officers could hardly lead their men to victory.

Mention was made, next, of a French psychology of defense. The people generally had fallen under the spell of the high command's preachments regarding the supposed safety of the country behind the Maginot Line. Whereas, in neighboring states, the people constantly were kept in a state of excitement and were being imbued with a spirit of aggressiveness, the French were told by their leaders, of whatever political complexion, that they needed only to remain behind their "impregnable" defenses to be safe. The French attitude well substantiated the view of a British historian that nations tend to idolize a military technique which, revolutionary in its inception, helped them to win a previous war. Believing that during the First World War they had discovered in attrition a new way to beat Germany, the French regarded this wearing-down process as being still the latest development in modern warfare. There were, to be sure, persons who realized the delusion of this view, particularly de Gaulle the soldier and Reynaud the civilian, but they were laughed at or disregarded by the "experts" until it was too late. Hence, when the Germans advanced with their unorthodox technique, the French had little more than bravery to offer in resistance. (Some Frenchmen, on the other hand, had become so cowed by the repeated declarations of such leaders as Poincaré that France was helpless against Germany that they could see no point in putting up any sort of defense.)

Finally, the French nation, for much of the period between 1919 and 1939, enjoyed a condition of relative complacency. Least affected of any great state by the depression, enriched by lavish tourist offerings, enjoying an almost even balance of agriculture and industry, France wanted only to be left alone in a world which, at Paris, she had helped to create. Out of the despair of the First World War and the ecstasy of glorious survival and revival, there grew up a generation which measured success by financial standards, looked on political and journalistic corruption as part of the normal national life, and took a cynical attitude towards things of the spirit. Against such a setting it was possible once more for mistresses to exert influence in national affairs and for personal animosities to affect critical cabinet decisions. Such a state of things was grist to the mill of Nazi sympathizers, who spread propaganda calculated to ruin France through hypocritically singing of its glorious destiny in a new and totalitarian order. And thus French democracy, after a 65-year fight for existence, gave way to another system.

The Pétain Government, having established itself at Vichy in unoccupied France, and having concluded armistices with Germany and Italy, wished to change the republic's constitution. In July 1940, accordingly, the National Assembly, composed of both parliamentary houses, conferred on Pétain the power to draft a new constitution, which would have to be submitted to a plebiscite for approval. In no hurry to draw up such a document, the government contented itself with issuing numerous statutes and consecutively numbered "constitutional acts." Thus was the Third Republic converted into a Vichy Dictatorship.

By means of constitutional acts Pétain made himself Chief of the French State, gave himself "full governmental powers," designated Pierre Laval as his successor, and required all high officials to swear fidelity to his "person." The Chief of State was empowered to punish any dignitary who "betrayed his duties"; this punitive power, moreover, was made to cover officials who had held office at any time "within the past ten years." With a cabinet that included only persons who were acceptable to the Germans, Pétain then issued law after law, all aimed at replacing the spirit of "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" by the new one of "Labor, Family, Fatherland." The government was watched and directed in its action by Ambassador Abetz, the armistice commission at Wiesbaden, and other German agents.

In December 1940 Pétain announced that Laval no longer formed "part of the government." There were rumors that the dismissed official, who advocated closest collaboration with Germany, had arranged with the

Nazis to execute a *coup d'état*. For a time Laval was placed in confinement but, upon German representations, he was released. A new constitutional act, however, designated the anti-British Admiral Jean François Darlan as successor to Pétain in the event of the latter's incapacity. Then, in April 1942, the Nazis prevailed upon the 86-year-old Pétain to take the swarthy, proaxis Laval back into the government. This time the former delivery-wagon driver, who after achieving financial success displayed a special fondness for white ties, became Chief of the Government, leaving to Pétain the now empty title of Chief of the State. Collaboration with Germany thenceforth proceeded apace, and Laval obediently announced plans to draft French factory workers between 18 and 50 and ship them off to Germany. The Nazis promised to return one French prisoner of war for every three skilled workers received. Before this scheme could be put into effect, against the widespread opposition which it aroused, the Germans occupied all France following the United Nations' landings in French North Africa.

Meanwhile the Vichy Government had overhauled the country's legal codes. The new laws were anti-Semitic and suppressed secret societies. They made much more favorable the position of the Catholic Church with respect to education and property rights. Unions and employers' associations were abolished, and strikes and lockouts were forbidden. The administrative divisions of the country were altered, and the inheritance laws were revised so as to perpetuate the peasant basis of agriculture. Many persons were deprived of their acquired French citizenship, and refugee Jews were forced back to Germany. Every phase of the nation's economic life was regulated. Homes were sought for the thousands of refugees who were required by Germany to leave Lorraine. The press agencies were taken over by the government. In short, unoccupied France rapidly approached totalitarianism, with Nazi legislation as its model. Simultaneously, by strict border supervision and by encouraging provincial separatisms and emphasizing local linguistic differences, the Germans tried to make permanent the political, economic, and spiritual severance of industrial occupied France and agrarian unoccupied France.

So far did German influence go that legal proceedings were instituted by Vichy against such former leaders as Daladier, Blum, Gamelin, Reynaud, and Mandel. The Nazis wanted the accused convicted of causing the war, so that France actually would place upon herself the responsibility for the Second World War. But when the accused were brought to public trial at Riom in 1942, they were charged by Vichy with having failed to prepare France properly for the approaching war. The defendants, especially Daladier and Blum, were brilliant in handling their own cases, despite

unfairness in the judicial procedure. Indeed, they came so close to proving things that neither Vichy nor Berlin wanted proved that the trials soon were suspended. But the accused remained under arrest and in 1943 were transferred to German soil lest they escape.

Many Frenchmen were not in accord with the views and policies of the Pétain Government. General de Gaulle, who had gone to London after the collapse of the French army, called on all dissidents to rally behind him as leader of a Free French Force and continue the fight against Germany. A French military court tried de Gaulle *in absentia* and condemned him to death for treason and desertion, but the British Government made a formal military agreement with him. This regulated the conditions under which Free French resistance would continue, in coöperation with Britain, and excused the Frenchmen from ever having to take up arms against France itself.

When it appeared that some commanders in French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa were unwilling to follow Vichy in its submission to Germany, de Gaulle decided to go to Africa. Accompanied by French and British war vessels, he appeared in September 1940 at Dakar. It was unfortunate that he chose this point, for the local commissioner refused to allow the Free Frenchmen to land. Shots were exchanged, and the Allies withdrew when it became obvious that a major engagement would be required to take the port. Apparently de Gaulle had misjudged the temper of the local garrison, and the incident resulted mainly in more bad feeling between Great Britain and France. De Gaulle's prestige was restored when. in the succeeding weeks, he gained the adherence of French Equatorial Africa and some island possessions of France. In 1941 and 1942 his Fighting Frenchmen fought with British and United States forces in Libya, the Near East, Madagascar, and Tunisia.

Immediately after the fall of Reynaud, it had appeared that French North Africa, Syria, and Indo-China might refuse allegiance to the Pétain Government and continue the struggle. This would have been of great help to the British, particularly in the Mediterranean region, where it now was necessary to fight Italy. But through prompt action the Vichy Government was able to prevent this defection. A new governor was sent to Indo-China who observed the wishes of Pétain. Weygand flew to Syria and there persuaded the military commander to abide by the armistice conditions. In Morocco the resident-general followed suit, and then Weygand himself arrived to assume supreme command over the French African forces. By 1941, however, Weygand had become so disillusioned with the new order in France that Pétain recalled him as being "unsafe." Leaving for later

consideration the further history of the French colonies, we come now to Britain's direct contest with Germany after the collapse of France.

DAUNTLESS BRITAIN, 1940

On the eve of what came to be called the Battle of Britain, Hitler advanced a second peace proposal. Stating no terms, he merely indicated that if the war continued it could "end only with the complete annihilation of one or the other of the two adversaries." Britain's concrete response to this vague proposal was an all-time-high budget, based more on immediate taxation than on loans.[7] The public welcomed its announcement.

When the Germans turned their attention to Britain, they faced a new situation. Had Great Britain been another continental state, the problem for the Nazis presumably would have been simple: one more application of Blitzkrieg technique. And this might have been successful, for the Germans in June 1940 were far better equipped than the British.[8] With their recent aquisitions, moreover, they had acquired numerous airfields, and the conquered regions formed a geographic buffer of considerable extent between the enemy airports and the German industrial plants. Finally, Germany did have an ally in Italy, who at least made it necessary for the British to divide their strength.

These advantages lost some of their immediate utility because Great Britain, despite Hitler's dictum that there were "no more islands," *was* an island. The English Channel was a formidable barrier to mechanized land units. A second was the British navy, more powerful than those of Germany and Italy combined. Not only would the main part of this fleet risk destruction to keep an invading army from the shores of Britain, but the sea arm once more effectively blockaded the German area from the west and south. Furthermore, it made possible the delivery to the embattled kingdom of foodstuffs and supplies from the rest of the world. German submarines, surface raiders, and airplanes did considerable damage to British shipping, particularly since "neutral" Ireland refused to allow Britain to use her ports as bases, but the losses were replaced by building, seizures, and purchases.

The British also had better planes than the Germans—who built theirs hurriedly—and better pilots, some carefully trained in the dominions. Since the Germans did not begin large-scale air attacks on Great Britain until the second week of August 1940, the British had more than two months

[7] The annual net income of any one individual was limited to about $25,000.
[8] In 1943 Churchill stated that Great Britain had only 300 tanks left after Dunkirk.

in which to recover from the effects of Dunkirk, two months which were used to speed up military production, training, and defensive measures at an amazing rate. Finally, there was the astonishing spirit displayed by the Britons, from king through clerk to carter. The British citizen emerged as the outstanding hero in the first eighteen months of the war.

Since Germany could hope to invade Britain only after achieving air superiority, the Nazis in mid-June 1940 started daily air raids over Great Britain. The latter sent up fighting planes to disperse the German bombers, and Royal Air Force bombers to seek out targets on the continent. In the first few weeks neither side used many planes at a time, and both tried to limit destruction to military objectives. With the coming of July, the air warfare became more intense. The Germans, having improved the fields in the conquered regions, now sent over larger squadrons, day and night. In addition to their other objectives, they tried to establish a counter-blockade by attacking shipping and wharves, and to soften British resistance by lowering the morale of the people. The British, having to carry more fuel and therefore lighter bomb loads, similarly increased their activities, especially in night attacks. And to the evident astonishment of the Nazis, the British people did not become terror-stricken. The greater the danger, the more determined in its resistance democratic Britain seemed to become.

August ushered in mass daylight raids involving hundreds of German bombers coming over in waves. Neither side had yet devised a really effective air defense, but the British had built more and better antiaircraft guns, found effective ways of spotting enemy planes, and developed faster fighters that were relatively easy to handle and well designed to disperse enemy bombers. Large, vulnerable airfields were replaced by small, camouflaged, hidden fields with only a few planes each. Balloon barrages forced invading planes to fly high and have less opportunity for good aim. These balloons rose thousands of feet into the air and were connected by cables, from which hung long stretches of piano wire to catch low-flying planes. The Germans, in an effort to "erase" London, now dropped explosives indiscriminately and used time bombs to shatter the nerves as well as the housing of the population. Then came incendiary bombs and attacks on midlands industrial towns and coastal ports. As the air raids continued, the British worked out a skillful system of civilian defense.

While the Germans continued their fierce raids, the Royal Air Force, watching for German invasion preparations, wrecked railway lines, factories and plants; blasted French airfields and ports; ruined industrial works in the Rhineland; raided northern Italy; dumped explosives on Norwegian and Danish ports; and broke up barge concentrations. The coasts of Great

Britain simultaneously were made as inhospitable as possible for invaders. Gun emplacements were provided, tracks were laid for heavy armored trains with special cannon, barbed-wire entanglements were stretched wherever feasible, land mines were planted, and a constant lookout was kept by pilots, soldiers, and civilian volunteers. Simultaneously a large conscript army was whipped into shape and a home guard was trained in auxiliary functions. The year 1941 opened with 4,000,000 Britons under arms, ready to meet any invader.

Such were the things Churchill must have had in mind when he told the Commons, in his first speech as prime minister (May 1940): "I say to this House, as I said to the Ministers who have joined the Government, I have nothing to offer but blood and toil and tears and sweat."

CHAPTER 19

The Spread of the War—to 1943

WAR IN AFRICA, THE BALKANS, AND THE NEAR EAST

The withdrawal of France from the war left the British in a precarious position in the Mediterranean and in eastern Africa. Whereas formerly Italian East Africa and Libya had been hemmed in by Allied units on all sides, the British now found themselves with exposed flanks wherever they had relied on French support. Accordingly, in August 1940, the Italians seized British Somaliland. Italy rejoiced in this rounding out of her East African empire, but in reality she had gained little. Italian East Africa was cut off, except by air, from contact with the mother country or her other possessions. To alter this situation, and to wrest from Great Britain control of the Mediterranean, the Fascists next turned their attention to Egypt and the Suez Canal.

Before the outbreak of the war, Fascist leaders several times had proclaimed Italy's destiny to remove British influence from the Mediterranean. But when war came, the Italian navy avoided any major engagement with the British fleet. Whenever British and Italian squadrons sighted each other, the latter rushed to the protection of the nearest shore batteries. Even the Italian airplanes and submarines did relatively little damage to the British fleet, which continued to patrol the entire sea and successfully convoyed merchant vessels carrying troops and supplies. From 1941, however, German planes took off from Italian airfields. The Nazi aviators were less shy than their colleagues and did more damage to British ships, particularly through dive-bombing.

The task of approaching Suez by land was entrusted by Mussolini to Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, an experienced desert fighter. To reach Suez from Libya (Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan), it was necessary to march through the desert which was western Egypt, and this Graziani set out to do in September 1940. His opponent, with far fewer men at his command, was General Sir Archibald P. Wavell. The latter's Army of the Nile was composed mainly of Australians and a Polish contingent.

The position of Egypt in the ensuing struggle was interesting. Under the terms of an Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance (1936), Britain was permitted to use Egypt as a base in time of war and to call on her for military aid. The British were content to exercise only the first of these rights. Thus, while British imperial forces fought from Egypt as a base, the Egyptians themselves were left free to produce foodstuffs and other essential supplies. Mussolini, on the other hand, refrained from declaring war on Egypt because he wanted to continue in his self-assumed role of "protector of Islam."

In the early stages of the campaign, Graziani's men advanced rapidly, soon reaching Sidi Barrani, about sixty miles within the Egyptian border. There, however, the attack halted, while the Italians accumulated fresh supplies and developed security for transportation lines. In December, Wavell's forces began a well-planned counterattack. Aided by Free French forays from French Equatorial Africa, the British pressed their offensive into 1941. By March the last remaining Italian posts in Cyrenaica fell.

Meanwhile, in January 1941, the British, coöperating with Haile Selassie, who had earlier flown from Britain to the Sudan, renewed operations in eastern Africa. Striking from both the Sudan and Kenya, they readily penetrated Italian East Africa. Eritrea was conquered, and Italian Somaliland, and finally Ethiopia. In May 1941, five years almost to the day since he had fled, Haile Selassie reëntered his capital at Addis Ababa.[1] For the time being, Suez was safe from both west and south; but in the meantime new dangers threatened from the Balkans and the Near East.

Almost from the beginning of her unified existence, Italy displayed interest in the Balkan Peninsula as a field for the extension of her influence. This sentiment appeared in the terms of the Triple Alliance agreement into which she entered in 1882 with Germany and Austria-Hungary, in the provisions of the Secret Treaties which she signed with the other Allies during the First World War, in her difficult relations with Yugoslavia and Greece after that war, and in the history of Italian relations with Albania from the little kingdom's creation in 1913 to its absorption by the Fascists on Good

[1] In October 1942 Ethiopia joined the United Nations.

Friday of 1939. Hence it was not astonishing that Rome, dissatisfied to have gained control of only a few miles of France and French Somaliland, while Germany had extended her rule over most of Northern and Western Europe, should have cast longing eyes at Greece.

THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN AREA 1940–1941

In the late summer of 1940 Italy accused Greece of surreptitiously aiding the British navy and blamed her for terrorist activities on the Albanian frontier. Then Italy seized Greek merchant vessels, bombed Greek destroyers, and massed Italian troops on the Albano-Greek border. Athens protested these actions and hurriedly strengthened its defenses. But at three o'clock in the morning of October 28, 1940, the Italian Minister presented a three-hour ultimatum to the Athens Government.

The document resembled those which Germany had presented to *her* victims in the previous spring. It complained of terrorist activities "against the Albanian nation," and charged Athens with having promised to put naval and air bases at the disposal of Great Britain. Therefore, in order to "avoid" hostilities between Italy and Greece, Rome demanded permission

to occupy several strategic Greek areas for the duration of the war. Any resistance would be "broken." To the evident astonishment of Italy, Greece decided to resist. When Italian soldiers crossed the Greek frontier, Athens called on Britain for help, and Churchill pledged prompt assistance.

The outbreak of the Italo-Greek war astonished few; its course amazed many. The Italians, after a brief advance, were not only halted by the Greeks but were thrown back across the border. The Greeks carried the fighting into Albania and steadily pushed the Fascists back toward the Adriatic coast. By January 1941 the Greeks were driving toward Valona, chief port of entry for Italian supplies and reënforcements. The Italians had expected little resistance and were unprepared to meet determined opposition. They were not successful in their attempts to use mechanized equipment in the rugged Pindus Mountains, where poor roads were made worse by rain, snow, and ice. The military ability of Premier Metaxas and Marshal Alexander Papagos also played a large part in the Greek victories, while the Italian generals seemed unable to inspire their men with confidence or with the determination to win. The British fleet and bombers, seconded by Greek planes and submarines, hampered the shipment of Fascist supplies and men across the Adriatic, even though Italy controlled both sides of the narrow Strait of Otranto.

The entry of Greece into the war appeared of material help to Britain not only because it diverted some Italian energies, but because Britain now had several new bases, particularly on Crete, from which to undertake operations against the Fascists. Naples and other southern Italian cities were frequently bombed, and in November 1940 the air arm of the British fleet inflicted a severe blow on the Italian navy at Taranto. Soon thereafter, Marshal Badoglio resigned as chief of the Italian General Staff, and a number of generals and admirals followed suit. In January 1941 there were riots in northern Italy over the presence of increasing numbers of German soldiers in the peninsula. Jealousy of the successes of the northern axis partner and mistrust of its eventual goals were making the Italians restive. Meanwhile Romania had come to experience misadventure at the hands of the axis.

The partitioning of this kingdom in 1940 was only a bitter climax to twenty years of misfortune and unrest. Emerging from the peace settlement of 1919–1920 as the largest and presumably strongest Balkan state, Romania was almost constantly torn by internal strife growing out of her minorities problems, the poverty of her peasants, and violent personal rivalries. The acquisition by the Soviet Union of Bessarabia and northern

Bukovina in 1940 already has been discussed; the next territorial beneficiaries were Bulgaria and Hungary.

In 1913, as a result of the Second Balkan War, Bulgaria had ceded to Romania the southern part of Dobruja province. Now, in 1940, Bulgaria asked for the return of this "Quadrilateral," a majority of whose inhabitants were Bulgarians. Under axis pressure, Romania acquiesced in the demand, and the neighborhood kingdoms signed the Craiova Agreement. This permitted Bulgaria to reabsorb the southern Dobruja, provided for a partial exchange of populations, and reimbursed Romania for her permanent improvements in the ceded territory.

THE PARTITION OF ROMANIA 1940

More difficult of settlement was the Hungarian demand for the return of Transylvania. This area, acquired by Romania in 1920, had ever since been among the most troublesome of Europe's sore spots. With Magyars now insisting on the return of the entire region, and Romanians opposed to any cession, negotiations between the two countries accomplished nothing. After weeks of fruitless discussion, the Hungarian and Romanian diplomats were summoned to Vienna, where the German and Italian Foreign Ministers in August 1940 simply handed down the Vienna Award. Romania was forced to cede to Hungary the larger part of Transylvania, comprising 16,000 square miles with a population of 2,500,000. Those

inhabitants—and they formed a majority—who were of Romanian origin were permitted within six months to opt for Romanian nationality and to leave the ceded area. Germany and Italy guaranteed the "integrity" of what was left of Romania.

The Vienna Award satisfied neither disputant, but whereas the Budapest Government at least could point to an extension of Hungary's frontier to the Carpathian Mountains, the Bucharest authorities had to admit territorial loss. The Fascist Iron Guards in particular were vehement in their renewed attacks on King Carol II who, in an effort to strengthen his position, appointed the nationalistic General Jon Antonescu as premier with full powers. Antonescu then induced the king to bow to the Iron Guard's clamor for his abdication, and in September 1940 Carol passed the crown on to his son, who now for the second time became King Michael I. The ex-king fled the country with his friend, Magda Lupescu, whom the Iron Guards hated, and together they made their way first to Spain and eventually to Mexico. Antonescu then announced that Romania was entering the political sphere of the axis powers and appointed Horia Sima, Iron Guard leader, as vice-premier. The import of all this became evident when German soldiers began to pour through Hungary into Romania, there to garrison strategic zones, guard the oil fields, and train Romanian forces. Antonescu meanwhile brought Romania's internal life into harmony with Nazi principles.

In March 1941 the premier of Bulgaria signed a document in Vienna whereby his country joined the axis system. This action grew, at least in part, out of Bulgaria's desire to regain from Greece some land that she had had to cede to the Athens Government after the First World War. Within a few hours after the ceremony was completed, German forces were in occupation of the Bulgarian capital, Sofia. Since the distance from the Romanian border to Sofia is considerable, the Nazis obviously entered Bulgaria several hours before the pact was signed.

Following the occupation of Bulgaria, Nazi armies were poised all along the northern and eastern frontiers of Yugoslavia. On the northwest and southwest, moreover, Yugoslavia bordered on Italy and Italian-held Albania. This situation boded ill for the Southslavic state, whose economic life had come more and more under German domination. In the Greco-Italian war, Yugoslavia sympathized with her Balkan neighbor, but Belgrade maintained official neutrality. This attitude was inspired both by a fear of Germany and by uncertainty regarding the loyalty of the Croats and Slovenes—long dissatisfied with Serbian predominance in the triune kingdom.

Early in 1941 Berlin had demanded of Yugoslavia an alliance and permission for the passage of German soldiers to the Yugoslav-Greek border. The Regent Paul had secured a scaling down of the demands to a nonaggression pact and permission for the transit of only munitions and hospital trains. But when Paul recommended this compromise to his advisers, they warned that its acceptance would mean the collapse of the government. Simultaneously Britain and the United States promised military supplies to help stiffen potential resistance to German pressure. Paul, however, decided that the possibility of Italo-German invasion was more dangerous than that of civil war. In March he went to Vienna to conclude an agreement with the Germans. But before the document could be ratified, a military coup drove Paul into flight. King Peter II, though not yet eighteen, assumed full royal authority and chose as his premier General Dushan Simovich, popular chief of the air force and organizer of the coup. The Simovich Government offered continued friendship and economic coöperation with Germany, but refused to ratify the pact or demobilize the Yugoslav army. Thereupon the Nazi press trumpeted forth the same atrocity stories that had earlier been used against the Czechs and Poles. In April 1941 Nazi soldiers entered Yugoslavia and Greece.

The outright war in Yugoslavia lasted only twelve days—partly because Yugoslav mobilization had not been completed, partly because of aid given the invaders by discontented Croats and Slovenes, and partly because of the usual careful Nazi preparation. Peter and his government fled to London, and Yugosalvia was partitioned. Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria all were rewarded territorially. The Germans themselves held on to Belgrade and created a new puppet state of Croatia-Slavonia. This was placed under control of the terrorist Pavelich (who had helped plan the murder of King Alexander in 1934) and was given as its king Aimone, Duke of Spoleto. The latter, as King Tomislav, judiciously remained in Italy. He abdicated in 1943, after the fall of Mussolini.

The official end of the war found large units of Serbian fighters in possession of their arms and imbued with a fierce desire to continue the struggle against the Germans. Eventually, thousands of these collected under the leadership of General Draja Mikhailovich, who had for years studied the possibilities of organized mountain fighting. Now he and his *chetniks* carried on an amazingly successful mountain warfare that harassed the enemy without letup. In January 1942, when the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile was reorganized, Mikhailovich was appointed minister of war.

Meanwhile the fate of Greece also had been sealed. Three days after the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Athens Government gave up the struggle—

to avoid the useless massacre of its people. Great Britain had tried to help by sending veterans from the Libyan Front, but this move, undertaken more out of political than military considerations, proved futile. Indeed, whereas the reënforcements were too weak to keep back the Germans, their withdrawal from Africa paved the way for a new British retreat in Libya. Crete, too, fell into German hands.[2] Henceforth, until the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, Britain carried on the war without an ally or a foothold on the continent of Europe.

Thus far in the war the initiative on land had lain almost entirely with the Germans. From May to September 1941, however, the British forestalled German coups in Iraq, Vichy-controlled Syria, and Iran. The first and last of these states were of vital importance to Great Britain because of their geographic relation to the Persian Gulf and India, their oil resources, and their potential value to Germany as bases from which to drive through Trans-Jordan and Palestine into Egypt. Syria in unfriendly hands obviously was a constant threat to Britain's whole position in the eastern Mediterranean area. Its control by the Nazis would more than compensate them for their hesitancy to attack Cyprus and march through Turkey en route to Suez and India.

It happened that in April 1941 a military coup in Baghdad had brought into power as premier of Iraq the pro-Nazi Rashid Ali Beg Gailani. Axis propaganda and agents now flooded the country. Britain therefore exercised her rights under a treaty of 1932 to send additional troops to certain strategic points in Iraq. Rashid Ali resisted and appealed to Berlin for help. Germany was unable to do more than send a few planes via Syria and to induce the Vichy authorities in Syria to give Rashid Ali some war materials. None of the other Arabian states chose to intervene, and Rashid Ali was driven to flight (May). The British-friendly Regent Abdul Illah returned, and Britain now was ready—not a day too soon—to act in neighboring Syria.[3]

There Nazi penetration was far advanced. The German armistice commission and German technicians had done efficient work, and the Vichy commissioner, General Henri Dentz, had been coöperative. The direct aid given by Dentz to Rashid Ali and to the Nazi planes sent to help the Iraqi dictator made British action urgent. In June 1941 British and Free French columns entered Syria from Iraq, Trans-Jordan, and Palestine. The in-

[2] For a time the Nazis allowed Italy to occupy conquered Greece; but when this led to trouble, the Germans themselves resumed control. King George II set up a government-in-exile in London. In 1942–1943 several thousand Greek refugees found new homes in the Belgian Congo.

[3] Iraq declared war on the three chief axis powers in 1943.

vaders tried to keep casualties to a minimum despite Dentz' determination to fight, and so the campaign proceeded slowly; but in July hostilities were concluded. Those Frenchmen who preferred not to join the de Gaullists were repatriated, and Syria was safe from Nazi clutches.

Allied attention next was focused on Iran. With the German invaders of the U.S.S.R. approaching the Caucasus, it became essential to keep open feeder lines to the Russians via the Persian Gulf and Iran. There, however, Riza Shah had been receptive to German influence and had permitted the influx of numerous Nazi technicians and "tourists." London and Moscow requested the expulsion of the German agents, and when the shah evaded action, British and Russian soldiers entered Iran in August 1941. They seized the oil centers and the one strategic railway line, whereupon Tehran agreed to expel the Nazis and permit the transit of supplies across Iran to the Soviet Union. When the shah again adopted dilatory tactics, additional Allied soldiers were sent into the country. This encouraged certain tribesmen in the southwest, who had been harshly treated by Riza, to threaten revolt. The shah thereupon abdicated in favor of his son, Mohammed Riza. With the new ruler's consent, a regular transport service to carry British and United States supplies to the Bolsheviks was organized.

These Allied successes in the east occurred simultaneously with a renewal of the seesaw campaigns in northern Africa. After Wavell had driven the Italians out of Cyrenaica, the Germans shipped men and materials to Libya for another drive. The new leader of the axis forces was an experienced tank commander, General (later Field Marshal) Erwin Rommel. In March 1941, shortly before some British African units were sent to the aid of Greece, Rommel began a well-planned push. Within less than a month the Allies were ousted from Libya, except that the garrison in Tobruk, supplied by British ships, held out until relieved in November as the result of a British counteroffensive. This was launched by General Sir Claude Auchinleck, successor to Wavell, who had been sent to command the armies in India.[4]

Auchinleck's offensive regained all Cyrenaica, but the retreating *Afrika Korps* was not destroyed. Indeed, after getting reënforcements, Rommel in May 1942 embarked on a new full-scale offensive. (Meanwhile several Australian divisions had been withdrawn from Africa to the new theater of warfare in the Far East). Rommel drove ahead so furiously and with

[4] In the fight to keep the Mediterranean open for British ships and to hamper axis shipments to Africa, the British island base of Malta played an amazing role. It became the world's most bombed area, experiencing an average of three air raids per day over many months.

such skill that he now captured Tobruk in a single day's assault, and the British retreated to El Alamein, 70 miles west of Alexandria. Here they prepared to make a last stand in the Egyptian desert—a site flanked on the north by the sea and on the south by the treacherous sands of the Qattara Depression. By this time, moreover, fresh Australian and other troops had arrived, as had large numbers of planes and much mechanized equipment from the United States.

In July 1942 Rommel assaulted El Alamein and made a breach in its defenses. But British reserves closed the gap, and Rommel was checked. By the narrowest of margins he had failed to win the Battle of Egypt. For the next few months the British held against repeated assaults by Rommel, meanwhile building up strength for an offensive that should drive the axis forces not merely out of Egypt but out of northern Africa.

THE WAR AND THE FAR EAST—TO 1941

It was inevitable that the war should have strong repercussions in the Far East. There the Japanese some years earlier had embarked upon a policy designed to create a new order in eastern Asia, one that would satisfy Nippon's political, economic, and nationalistic desires. The continued resistance of the Chinese, however, spoiled the Japanese plans. Under Chiang Kai-shek the Chinese armies remained in the field, fighting well according to the tactics for which their limited equipment and the terrain best suited them. The Chinese people, expert at passive resistance, helped the cause with guerrilla warfare, boycotts, "scorching" of the earth, perseverance in the face of mass bombings, and untiring efforts in the hauling of supplies on their backs where trucks or trains were not available.

In the hope of causing a rift among the Chinese, Tokyo in March 1940 recognized a puppet "Chinese National Government" at Nanking under the nominal headship of Wang Ching-wei, who recently had been expelled from the Kuomintang. The results of this move were disappointing to Japan. The nonaxis states continued relations with only the Chungking Government, to which came material aid from the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States. The resultant Japanese loss of "face" supplemented other unpleasantnesses on the home front: the expenses and tension of prolonged war, the loss of overseas markets, exchange difficulties, United States embargoes on essential commodities, and an increasingly authoritarian orientation of domestic policies. Eventually, for consolation and compensation, Tokyo turned its attention to southeastern Asia.

After the withdrawal of France from the war, the Japanese looked with increasing concentration at the rubber, oil, tin, and rice of the French, British, and Netherlands possessions in southeastern Asia. The longing for control over this richly endowed portion of the Far East was expressed in the phrase "Greater East Asia," first used officially in August 1940 by the recently formed government of Prince Fumimaro Konoye. With France in collapse and Great Britain fighting Germany, the chief obstacles in the way of fulfilment of this ambition were, aside from China herself, the Soviet Union and the United States. As events proved, Japan was strong enough to overpower the defenses of French Indo-China, Singapore, and the Netherlands East Indies. But there also existed in Japan a traditional suspicion of Russia; hence, at least until after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, some Japanese leaders feared lest a gathering of power in southeastern Asia sufficient to conquer that region would leave Japan open to sudden attack by the U.S.S.R. Besides, the United States, through official utterances and through a concentration of naval forces in Pacific waters, made it clear that she was vitally interested in preventing any violent change in southeastern Asia.

In view of these circumstances, Japan in September 1940 concluded an alliance with Germany and Italy. In the pact, Japan "recognized and respected the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe." Similarly, "Germany and Italy recognized and respected the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia." The signatories agreed "to assist one another with all political, economic, and military means" whenever one of them might be "attacked by a power at present not involved in the European war or in the Sino-Japanese conflict." The treaty in no way was to affect the "political status which exists at present as between each of the three contracting parties and the Soviet Union." The alliance evidently was aimed at the United States.

Meanwhile Japan successfully had made demands on the authorities of Indo-China, who were loyal to the Vichy Government. In September 1940 Tokyo got the right to land some soldiers and use some airfields in that French colony, thus enabling the Japanese to strike at China from the south. Simultaneously the Indo-Chinese Government found itself embroiled with the neighboring state of Thailand, the former (and later) Siam. Thailand regarded the time as opportune for demanding from stricken France a return of some of the Siamese lands occupied by the French during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Eventually Japan,



THE FAR EAST 1937 AND 1940

Courtesy, Foreign Policy Association, *Headline Series.*

already in occupation of a sizable portion of Indo-China, took a hand in the quarrel. By a treaty signed in Tokyo in March 1941, Indo-China ceded 21,000 square miles of territory to Thailand.

It was fairly obvious, even in the spring of 1941, that Japan was seeking a foothold from which to extend her influence southward through Indo-China and Thailand to the long and narrow peninsula at whose tip lay Singapore, adjudged the strongest naval base in the world. Lying in the path of any Japanese campaign against the Netherlands East Indies or Australasia, Singapore's defenses from the land side were weaker than those facing the sea. But the big Japanese push southward did not come until after Germany had brought the U.S.S.R. into the war.

NAZI INVASION OF THE SOVIET UNION

It will be remembered that in August 1939 Germany and the Soviet Union signed an agreement of neutrality. Hitler wished to ensure Soviet neutrality until he should have disposed, in battle, of France and Great Britain. Then he would be free to enforce any demands upon the U.S.S.R. And Stalin, doubtful of the precise intentions of Paris and London, grasped at the opportunity to win time for the military industrialization that was the essence of the Third Five-Year Plan. Meanwhile, in 1939–1940, the Soviets extended their western frontiers to approximately the line of 1914, and thus placed additional mileage between the German border and Moscow.

By the spring of 1941 there were unmistakable signs of growing tension between Moscow and Berlin. The eastward march of the Nazis, particularly the occupation of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, led to outbursts in the controlled Soviet press. In April Moscow signed a neutrality pact with Tokyo, thus presumably leaving herself freer to act in the west. In May Stalin assumed the premiership of the Soviet Union, thus for the first time openly taking the political leadership into his own hands.

Meanwhile the Nazi leaders concluded that Britain could not be defeated while it was necessary to keep German planes and soldiers in the east because of uncertainty regarding Moscow's course. Hence the U.S.S.R. had to be defeated in another lightning campaign and then full attention could be centered on Britain. In addition, direct access to the raw materials of the Soviet Union would be satisfactory compensation for the aid being rendered to Britain through growing United States lend-lease activities. Finally, a German war on Bolshevism might lead to an ideological

split in both Great Britain and the United States and thus weaken the democracies' determination to smash Hitlerism.[5]

At dawn on Sunday, June 22, 1941, Nazi soldiers without warning launched an attack across the Soviet frontier. The Bolsheviks, though not fully mobilized, had far more soldiers immediately available than the Nazis had anticipated. Churchill at once pledged full aid to the U.S.S.R., and Roosevelt two days later made a similar declaration. On the other hand, Italy, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Finland all entered the war against the Soviet Union before the end of 1941. The Finns, thinking only in terms of revenge, soon found themselves closely tied up with the axis powers in their global war against the United Nations. In July, London and Moscow signed a military pact, and the Soviet Union reached agreements with the Czech and Polish Governments-in-Exile. These latter documents had little military but considerable political significance, since in them Moscow denounced the events of 1938–1939 that had culminated in the breakup of the two Slavic states.

By December 1941—after six months of the fiercest kind of warfare—the invaders were in occupation of 500,000 square miles of Soviet territory, including all the regions annexed by Moscow in 1939–1940 and most of the rich Ukraine. But, by adopting a scorched-earth policy and guerrilla tactics, the Russian people greatly curtailed the economic value of the area to the conquerors. The Germans, moreover, had failed in three prime objectives. They had surrounded, but had not captured, Leningrad. They had come within 31 miles of, but had not taken, Moscow. And they had not "annihilated" the Russian armies.

The main reason for this last failure of the Nazis was "General Space." Perhaps because they themselves had come to believe in their invincibility, the Nazis invaded the U.S.S.R. all along a 2000-mile front from the White Sea to the Black Sea. Instead of concentrating their power and striking at a few vital points, they overextended themselves. As a result, they encountered not merely the Russian armies and spirit, but Russian spaces and distance. With sufficient manpower and space for counterattacking, the Soviets often wiped out enemy motorized spearheads before the infantry could come up to occupy the intervening terrain. No matter how far back they were pushed, the Russian armies still had room to maneuver; they could always retreat before they were destroyed, offering a fluid resistance to fluid attack.

[5] In May 1941 Rudolf Hess, deputy leader of the Nazi Party, made a solo flight to Scotland, hoping to meet the British leaders and induce them to negotiate a peace, largely in Germany's favor. He was placed in confinement and later sentenced to life imprisonment as a war criminal.

Other reasons there were, too, for the determined fight put up by the Reds. Little Nazi propaganda was spread in the U.S.S.R. before the invasion began. In most countries which the Nazis overran with relative ease, they had first "softened up" the population by clever psychological warfare. This propaganda invariably stirred up internal quarrels, spread fear and terror, and created treacherous fifth columns. But in the Soviet Union the propaganda staffs of Goebbels had little opportunity to spread subversive ideas, for there the censorship was as strict as in Germany itself. There could be few psychological preliminaries of the type that had helped bring about the collapse of France. And the Nazis, for their part, knew little about the true state of Soviet preparedness or about the readiness of the Russian people to fight any invader to the death. It puzzled German soldiers that "hopelessly surrounded" Russian units refused to surrender, as had troops elsewhere, but fought all the harder and often hacked their way out of encirclements.

The Bolsheviks, in addition, had long been preparing for a war against any Western enemy. The "liquidation" of many technicians in the early days of Bolshevik control made this process an awkward one at first, but in the successive Five-Year Plans provision was made for the rapid increase of the country's military strength. More and more with each passing year did the Bolsheviks build their new plants to the eastward, first in the neighborhood of the ore-rich Ural Mountains and then in the raw-material-studded vastnesses of Siberia. A Western enemy might occupy most of European Russia, and still the mechanized war could go on. Besides, the Russians showed ingenuity in the eastward removal, piece by piece, of entire manufacturing plants, so as to keep them out of reach of the advancing Germans. Workers, too, were shifted, women and men alike, for in the Soviet Union women from the beginning of the war took a prominent part on the battlefields and in the factories.

Mechanized warfare was not novel to the Russians; they were pioneers in experimenting along such lines. They used such innovations as parachute troops, giant tanks, motorized units, tank-carrying airplanes, and the like long before the outbreak of war in 1939. They knew what to expect and how to meet it. They also found in their Cossack cavalry units an effective weapon against parachute attacks. The horsemen were of little use against tanks and armored cars, but they were effective against troops dropped from the sky. They could ride anywhere at any time, cut down the parachutists before they were free from their ropes, and dash off to the next place of danger.

The staff work and strategy of the Russians were good. The recently reported military purges had led many foreigners to believe that Stalin had

lost his best officers and would be helpless against German attack. But the Red High Command appeared to make few mistakes, and such general officers as Klimenti E. Voroshilov, Semyon Budenny, Semyon K. Timoshenko, and Gregory K. Zhukov, while they had to retreat, did so in a way to keep their main forces intact and full of fighting spirit. And when the time came they led them in well-directed counteroffensives.

With the coming of the cold winter of 1941–1942, the Soviets were better equipped to fight than were their enemies. The natives knew their winters and took the necessary precautions to keep their fuel fluid and their wheels turning despite the icy mud. The Germans, having expected the war to be over before winter set in, were much more hampered by the prolonged subzero temperatures. The Bolsheviks therefore took the offensive and drove the Germans back in a number of places. But, except for Rostov, the Reds were unable to recapture any great strongholds. These held firmly and were used as springboards by the Nazis in their new campaign of 1942.

This time the Germans did not repeat the mistake of overextension. Without straining themselves to take either Leningrad or Moscow, they concentrated their efforts in the south. The goal was to conquer the remainder of the Ukraine and to drive forward to the Volga River and the Caspian Sea. Success in this endeavor would bring tremendous advantages. The Russian forces in the Caucasus would be cut off from the main Russian armies to the north. The Soviets, already deprived of much economic wealth and with a fourth of their population in German-occupied areas, would be deprived of additional industrial and food-producing areas, of raw materials, and of railway lines. The Germans would be able to use the vast oil resources of Baku. They could check the flow of United States and British goods to Russia via Iran. They could by-pass Turkey and fan out into the Arabian Peninsula—heading on the one side for the Persian Gulf and a possible meeting with the Japanese allies in India, and on the other side for the Suez Canal. With these prizes beckoning, the Germans began a restricted offensive in May 1942 with a drive on the Crimean Peninsula. When, after two months of intensive fighting, the objective was taken, the Nazis launched a full-scale drive toward the Volga River and the Caucasus. The defensive task of the Bolsheviks was to preserve the main Russian armies while so prolonging the campaign as to leave the Nazis still short of their objectives at the beginning of the next winter.

Relentlessly the Nazi machine rolled forward. Russian resistance was stubborn, but relatively light, for the Bolshevik Command had withdrawn large forces from the Caucasus and the Ukraine in order to make a de-

termined stand near Stalingrad, on the Volga River. In late August 1942 the Nazis made the first direct attack on Stalingrad. For three months a terrible struggle raged over one city. Stalingrad seemed to become a symbol in the clash of iron wills. No sacrifice of men or materials appeared too great for the Nazis in their effort to take the city; none seemed too great for the Soviets in their effort to hold fast. Eventually the capture, not of miles but of yards, not of suburbs but of individual buildings, became headline news. And late in November the Russians began a new winter offensive of their own. Attacking in force on the central and southern fronts, they gradually pushed the Germans back to the west of Moscow and in the Ukraine and the Caucasus. Although a large Nazi army remained encamped outside Stalingrad, the Bolsheviks encircled this force and drove on beyond it. By January 1943 the Germans were in full flight along a front of many hundred miles, and in February the last of the Stalingrad besiegers were killed or captured. Meanwhile, with the attack of Japan on the United States, the war had assumed global proportions.

ENTRY OF THE UNITED STATES

The news of European war in 1939 was not nearly so startling to the public in the United States as had been the similar news in 1914. During the intervening quarter-century, the people had come to know more about world affairs than at any previous time. Thousands had acquired familiarity with Europe through travel. Hundreds of thousands read the reports of newspaper correspondents who covered every scene on the European stage. Millions saw moving pictures of outstanding events or listened to broadcasts of bulletins from overseas. Clubs regularly invited speakers on international subjects, and courses in international relations were among the most popular in the schools and colleges. Most of the larger European states had established "libraries of information" which freely dispensed printed works for the enlightenment of the United States public. If the latter was astonished in 1914 that war came, it was astonished in 1939 that the coming of war had been so long deferred.

Other contrasts there were, too, with the situation in 1914. In the early months of the First World War there appeared to be a general indifference in the United States as to who might win; and among those who *were* strongly partisan, there was no overwhelming majority on one side or the other. Probably only few envisaged the possibility of eventual entry into the conflict. Such was not the case in 1939. The people generally seemed

convinced that the war was the direct outcome of Nazi principles and technique and that Germany was the aggressor.

The chief differences of opinion in 1939 came not over the question of where to place United States sympathies but over the specific form in which the general sympathy should be manifested. Should the United States try to "isolate" herself and be content to pray for an Allied victory, or should she render all aid "short of war" to the upholders of her own preferred way of life, or should outright military aid be given to the enemies of authoritarianism? The decision became all the more urgent after the collapse of France in 1940. To some this catastrophe was a warning that full support must soon be forthcoming; to others it served as an argument for appeasement.

Meanwhile, on September 5, 1939, President Roosevelt had issued a proclamation of neutrality resembling those issued during previous international conflicts. Simultaneously, under the terms of the Neutrality Act of 1937, the President placed an embargo on the shipment of implements of war to the enumerated belligerents. Having performed his duty under the law, the President then appealed to Congress to revise the neutrality legislation. "These embargo provisions, as they exist today," he told the legislature, "prevent the sale to a belligerent by an American factory of any completed implements of war, but they allow the sale of many types of uncompleted implements of war. . . ." Brass tubing, for example, might be sold in pipe form but not in shell form; and the United States manufacturer and laborer were deprived of the profits attendant upon finishing goods. Moreover, since the British fleet in any case would make it impossible for Germany to buy United States warstuffs, the embargo was hampering only the Allies. Hence its retention would be "very nearly equivalent to presenting Germany with an Atlantic fleet." The inevitable application of the act to Canada, when that dominion entered the war, became another potent argument for its repeal.

In November Congress passed a new law called the Neutrality Act of 1939. Under its terms the President was required, in the event of international war, to enumerate the belligerent states. United States vessels and aircraft were forbidden to carry passengers or freight to any state so named. The exportation of goods to any belligerent was prohibited until title to such goods had passed to the purchasing state or one of its nationals. The President was further empowered to define specific "combat areas" and exclude from them all United States citizens, vessels, or planes. United States citizens were forbidden to travel on belligerent vessels (to prevent a repetition of the *Lusitania* incident), and her merchantmen might not be

armed. A prohibition was placed on loans or credits by any citizen to belligerent governments or their agents. Thus was instituted a cash-and-carry policy which, it was hoped, would enable the Allies to buy supplies without exposing the United States to the risk of having its public aroused to war fever by the acts of German submarines. On occasion the Administration also asked manufacturers of war supplies to place a "moral embargo" against countries which, like Japan, while not engaged in the European war, were bombing open cities.

The entrance of Italy into the war, the rapid extension of German control, and the result of the election of 1940 led Washington to concentrate on three main defensive policies: the strengthening of the military might of the United States; coöperation in hemisphere defense with the other American countries; and the provision of all possible aid "short of war" to Great Britain, combined with economic warfare against the axis.

The process of building up defenses required the coöperation of President, Congress, and people. In 1940 alone, the government authorized the expenditure of $17,690,000,000 for mechanized equipment, a "two-ocean navy," planes, antiaircraft guns, arms, and camp constructions. Fifth-column activities were searched out by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and by a House Committee on Un-American Activities under the chairmanship of Representative Martin Dies of Texas. The President took into his cabinet two Republican leaders who were energetic advocates of rapid rearmament and substantial aid to Britain: former Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, who became secretary of war, and Colonel Frank Knox, published of the *Chicago Daily News,* who became secretary of the navy.

The job of coördinating the industrial resources of the nation was eventually (December 1940) entrusted by Roosevelt to an Office of Production Management. This OPM, authorized to "formulate and execute" all measures needed to ensure efficient defense production, was headed by William S. Knudsen, a Danish immigrant and former automobile executive. Its other members were Sidney Hillman, a prominent labor leader, and the Messrs. Stimson and Knox.

To check a threatening skyrocketing of prices owing to increases in wages, housing shortages in defense-manufacturing areas, and declines in stocks of consumer goods, the President created the Office of Price Administration (OPA) under Leon Henderson. Then there came into being an Office of Civilian Defense (OCD), whose job it was to establish and coördinate protective and morale-building services throughout the country. Eventually, when the rapid multiplication of agencies, some with overlapping authority, led to a veritable scramble for priorities on goods, the

President appointed a Supply Priorities and Allocation Board under Donald M. Nelson. This SPAB was to fix priorities and allocate supplies for all defense and civilian purposes. Thereafter production of strictly civilian goods declined, while the production of war materials increased rapidly. In January 1942 Nelson became head of the War Production Board (WPB), which virtually combined the functions of the OPM and the SPAB.

Meanwhile the President had approved the Burke-Wadsworth or Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. It was the first United States law to prescribe compulsory military service in time of peace. Under its terms every male citizen (and every male alien who had filed intention to become naturalized) between the ages of 21 and 36 was made "liable for training and service in the land or naval forces of the United States." Service by "selectees" in the land forces was restricted to the Western Hemisphere, except in the case of United States territories and possessions, including the Philippine Islands. The act set an upper limit of 900,000 to the number of selectees who might be called to service at any one moment. The men were to be chosen by districts on a quota basis, and the President was empowered to prescribe rules governing deferment for certain classes of registrants. The National Guard might be called to federal service whenever the national security demanded a strengthening of the regular army, and manufacturing establishments were required to give government defense orders precedence over all other contracts. The provisions of the act were to expire in 1945.

The public appeared to favor the law, and on October 16, 1940, about 16,000,000 men registered for the "draft." The order of selection for service was determined by lot, the drawing of numbers taking place in Washington. In August 1941, four months before the United States was at war, Congress increased the period of service for selectees from one year to thirty months, but simultaneously provided for the early release or deferment of men over 28. After United States entry into the war, the Selective Service Act was amended to require the registration of all males between 18 and 64, inclusive, and to make liable for military service all those between 18 and 44, inclusive.[6]

In the matter of hemisphere, as distinct from strictly national, defense, the first outstanding development was a meeting of the foreign ministers of all American republics at Panama City in October 1939. Here the representatives of the 21 states adopted a Declaration of Panama that set

[6] Meanwhile the navy had begun a tremendous expansion program, in both ships and men, and, under the supervision of a Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA), there had been inaugurated a widespread plan of pilot training.

up a supposedly neutral zone extending southward from Canada to the tip of South America and out to sea a distance ranging from 300 to 1000 miles. No provision was made for the enforcement of this new doctrine, and it was generally disregarded.

The gradual establishment of German control over European countries that had possessions in the Western Hemisphere brought sharply to the fore the need for clarifying Washington's stand on the Monroe Doctrine. In June 1940, several days before the publication of the Franco-German armistice terms, Secretary Hull sent identical notes to Germany and Italy informing those powers that the United States "would not recognize any transfer and would not acquiesce in any attempt to transfer any geographic region of the Western Hemisphere from one non-American power to another non-American power."

The vague reply which Germany sent to this note, the evidences of increasing Nazi fifth-column activities in several Latin American states, the growing economic difficulties of many of the republics because of the British blockade of Europe, the fear that an axis victory might mean the imposition of a disadvantageous barter system on South America, and the desirability of closer economic and political ties between the United States and Latin America, all pointed to the need for one Pan-American policy on the vital issues of the day. Hence the foreign ministers of the 21 republics met once more, this time at Havana (1940). The conference adopted a Convention on the Provisional Administration of European Colonies and Possessions in the Americas. It entered into force early in 1942.

The act recommended certain measures to restrict fifth-column activities in this hemisphere. It proposed the organization of a permanent committee to help settle any disputes that might arise among the American states. It defined as aggression against all signatories any attempt on the part of a non-American state to infringe the territorial or political sovereignty of any one of the republics. Means were suggested for bringing about closer inter-American economic and financial coöperation. And a method was outlined for preventing the transfer of a colony from one non-American state to another. This "continentalization" of the Monroe Doctrine was accompanied by the setting up of a provisional coöperative administration for the governance of any foreign-owned possessions "in danger of becoming the subject of barter of territory or change of sovereignty." Eventually, any colonies temporarily administered under American auspices might be returned to their previous status or organized as autonomous states—"whichever of these alternatives shall appear the more practicable and just."

Having thus arranged for coöperation with Latin America, Washington turned to Canada. President Roosevelt and Premier Mackenzie King in August 1940 set up a Permanent Joint Board on Defense, representing the public and the military services of each country. Meanwhile a related defense "deal" was being negotiated between the United States and Great Britain. After it was consummated, in September, the President told Congress what he had done, appending to his message an opinion of the attorney-general supporting his authority to make the arrangement. "This Government," said the President, "has acquired the right to lease naval and air bases in Newfoundland, and in the islands of Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and Antigua, and in British Guiana. . . . The right to bases in Newfoundland and Bermuda are gifts—generously given and gladly received. The other bases mentioned have been acquired in exchange for fifty of our average destroyers. . . ." The leases were for 99 years, free of rent. The destroyers were promptly handed over to Britain, and the United States prepared to fortify and garrison its new outposts.

As a further step in hemisphere defense, Secretary Hull in April 1941, after German air activity had been noticed over Greenland, signed an agreement with the Danish Minister whereby that colony was placed under the temporary protection of the United States. The German-controlled Copenhagen Foreign Office declared the agreement void and recalled the minister, but Washington continued to recognize him "as the duly authorized Minister of Denmark." In July 1941, by which time the United States freighter *Robin Moor* had been sunk in the Atlantic by a German submarine, United States forces began to replace the British garrison on Iceland.[7] The move was designed to forestall German occupation and to make easier the patrolling of the Atlantic. Throughout the war, incidentally, it was a great handicap to the maritime efforts of the United States and Great Britain that Ireland refused to allow them the use of some ports as bases from which to fight the submarine menace. Thus, in the name of neutrality, Ireland rendered a considerable service to the Germans.[8]

The third aspect of Washington's policy in relation to the war concerned material aid to Britain and other opponents of totalitarian aggres-

[7] Following the German occupation of Denmark in 1940, Britain had sent men to both the Faroe Islands and Iceland (an independent state with the same sovereign as Denmark).

[8] In September 1941, after several German attacks on United States freighters and warships in the Atlantic, Roosevelt ordered the United States Navy to shoot first where Nazi attack seemed imminent. During October submarines damaged the destroyer *Kearny* and sank the destroyer *Reuben James*.

sion. The British in particular needed much more help than they were getting or than they could pay for. Hence, to make possible full assistance short of man power, an Administration bill "to promote the defense of the United States" was introduced in Congress in January 1941. It bore the interesting lower house designation H.R. 1776 and was popularly called the Lend-Lease Bill.

The bill proposed to permit the President to manufacture for, exchange with, sell, lease, lend, or in any other way make available to "the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States" any "defense article." Information on defense articles might be communicated to, or repairs of defense articles made for, any such government. Payment might be in kind or property "or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory." A foreign government so benefited would have to agree not to permit any such defense article or information to be transferred to any other government. The act would be financed through appropriations made "out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated." The President would be authorized to acquire any implements of war produced in a country benefited by the act whenever he regarded such acquisition as necessary for the national defense.

Congress plunged into lengthy debate on the bill. The public, too, hotly debated it. Opponents saw in it a ruse for getting Congress to resign all its powers into the hands of a would-be dictator who wanted war. Proponents regarded it as the only feasible way to meet and destroy the axis threat while this was still confined to continental Europe by the British fleet. The bill, with some modifications, became law in March 1941. Roosevelt immediately ordered the shipment of stores from the "arsenal of democracy" to the bulwarks against totalitarianism.[9]

While supplies in increasing quantity were dispatched to the peoples resisting axis pressure, and while relations with Germany were going from bad to worse, the disagreement between the United States and Japan over the Far Eastern situation became ever more serious. In July 1941 Japan got from Vichy France the right to set up naval and air bases in Indo-China, while Japanese assets in the United States were frozen. In August the United States announced that any Japanese action against Thailand would cause her great concern, and Roosevelt and Churchill issued a joint declara-

[9] The total value of lend-lease aid (to its end in August 1945) was $48,500,000,000, of which the British Empire and the Soviet Union were the chief beneficiaries. Lend-lease was not entirely a one-way affair, since the Allies provided United States forces with supplies and services valued at $7,800,000,000.

tion of general aims soon to become famous as the Atlantic Charter (see p. 567). Throughout September Tokyo unsuccessfully tried to induce the President to meet Premier Konoye somewhere in the Pacific, rather than on the American mainland, for an airing of the conflicting views of the two peoples.[10] In October, Konoye resigned to make way for an advocate of positive action, General Hideki Tojo.

Churchill promised, in November, that "should the United States become involved in war with Japan a British declaration will follow within the hour," and Secretary Knox warned that the United States was "faced with grim possibilities on the . . . far side of the Pacific." Mid-November saw the arrival in the United States of "trouble shooter" Saburo Kurusu, who came ostensibly to help the Japanese Ambassador iron out the differences with the Washington Government; actually, his mission was to cover up preparations for the imminent Nipponese attack on United States possessions. The Neutrality Act of 1939 was amended so as to permit vessels to be armed and to carry cargoes into any belligerent port.

On December 6 President Roosevelt addressed a personal plea to Emperor Hirohito to help him maintain peace, and on the following day Kurusu and Tokyo's Ambassador requested a conference with Secretary Hull so that they might transmit the official reply to some Washington proposals of the previous month. While the Japanese delegates were proffering the document, on Sunday, December 7, 1941, word reached the President that Japanese planes, carrier-based and therefore of necessity en route for some days, had bombed the naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, where a large portion of the United States Navy was at anchor.

A few hours after the attack, Japan declared war "on the United States of America and the British Empire." On December 8 the state of war was recognized by a vote of 82 to 0 in the Senate and 388 to 1 in the House of Representatives. On December 11 Germany and Italy also declared war on the United States. Congress immediately and unanimously made a reciprocal declaration.[11] The war had become global.

GLOBAL WARFARE, DECEMBER 1941–APRIL 1943

The military and naval commanders at Pearl Harbor were caught off guard despite recent and urgent warnings from Washington to remain con-

[10] In light of later events, it may be that the Japanese planned in this way to get Roosevelt into their power.
[11] Eventually Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand also declared war on the United States.

tinually on the alert for precisely the sort of thing that happened. Ironically, a detector's alarm of the approaching enemy aircraft was passed off by a junior officer as indicating the presence of merely friendly planes. The losses included several thousand casualties as well as destruction of or damage to 8 battleships, 10 other war vessels, a floating drydock, and about 250 planes.

Over a period of months, during which the Nipponese continued to hold the military initiative, much of the damage was repaired; and in the meantime there had emerged two developments of advantage to the Allied cause. First, Tokyo's treachery and early victories brought to the people of the United States unity of spirit and a gradual realization that total effort would be needed to win the total war. Secondly, the antiaxis states were drawn more closely together in the conviction that only global coöperation could be effective in the fighting of a global war. Among the first manifestations of this understanding was a reaffirmation of the principles of the Atlantic Charter in a Declaration by United Nations, signed by 26 powers on January 1 and 2, 1942. The charter, as announced on August 14, 1941, after a meeting of Roosevelt and Churchill aboard ship off the coast of Newfoundland, read as follows:

Joint declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;

Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;

Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;

Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security.

Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;

Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;

Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea, or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.

The declaration signed by the United Nations read:

The Governments signatory hereto,

Having subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the Joint Declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland dated August 14, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter,

Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world, *Declare:*

(1) Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such Government is at war.

(2) Each Government pledges itself to coöperate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies.

The foregoing declaration may be adhered to by other nations which are, or which may be, rendering material assistance and contributions in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism.[12]

With the passing of time, inter-Allied coöperation increased steadily. In various theaters of the war inter-Allied armed units were placed under single commanders, chosen for ability and knowledge of local fighting conditions rather than nationality. Roosevelt and Churchill met three times in the first thirteen months following the attack on Pearl Harbor—twice in Washington and once at Casablanca in Morocco. The United States and British general staffs coöperated as the Combined Chiefs of Staff, with Soviet and Chinese representatives present at their meetings. By the close of 1942 more than 1,500,000 United States fighting men had been sent

[12] The 26 original signatories of this declaration were the United States, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., China, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Poland, the Union of South Africa, and Yugoslavia. During the course of the war, 19 additional nations subscribed to the declaration!

overseas, to coöperate in every part of the globe with their colleagues from others of the United Nations.[13]

There was also an increasing preoccupation with the subject of postwar collaboration among the United Nations.[14] Aside from official activity in this connection, there were hundreds of organizations and thousands of individuals in the United States and Great Britain who busied themselves with thoughts of peace aims. The discussion of postwar goals was made the more animated and complicated by a variety of factors: by the broad nature of the official statements on the subject; by a growing popular interest in the future of China, India, and the Netherlands East Indies; by Roosevelt's enunciation in January 1941 of the "four freedoms"—"freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear"; by the rapid march of social change in wartime Britain; by the increasing weight of the United States tax program with its combined intent of raising revenue and changing the country's social structure; by uncertainty regarding the postwar intentions of the Soviet Union; by the question of whether the governments-in-exile, after years of living abroad, still represented the feelings of the peoples in the occupied areas; by perplexity as to whether action should be taken, after victory, against all people in the axis states or only against the leaders; and so on and on and on.[15] Meanwhile the fighting spread rapidly.

[13] In order to free as much personnel as possible for combat duty, the various United States services, following British example, recruited women for noncombat posts. These, in order of creation, were the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC), the Women's Reserve in the Navy (WAVES, from "Women Appointed for Voluntary Emergency Service"), the Women's Auxiliary Reserve in the Coast Guard or SPARS (from the Coast Guard motto: "Semper Paratus, Always Prepared"), and the Women's Reserve of the United States Marine Corps. Eventually the WAAC became the Women's Army Corps or WAC.

[14] In November 1942 Roosevelt appointed Governor Herbert H. Lehman of New York to be Director of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation. In this capacity Lehman was to supervise the furnishing of "relief and other assistance to the victims of war in areas reoccupied by the forces of the United Nations."

[15] The Nazi leaders deliberately identified the whole German people with their activities. This fitted in with their claim to embody the national will and tended to discourage the belief that a defeated Germany might get better treatment if the Nazi leadership were surrendered to allied justice. For this reason, and in order to force collaboration from the peoples in the occupied zones, the Nazis also pursued a policy of terrorism against civilians. The wholesale execution of "hostages" reached a horrible climax after the assassination of "Hangman" Reinhard Heydrich, who, as Himmler's chief assistant, had been sent to cow the people of Bohemia-Moravia into submission. His death was avenged by the Nazis through the massacre of hundreds of innocents and the destruction of the village of Lidice. Charging that Heydrich's killers had found refuge there, the Nazis admittedly murdered every adult male inhabitant of Lidice and dispersed the women and children throughout Central Europe (June 1942).

For some months Japan enjoyed a military success that, to her foes at least, was astonishing. Tokyo had planned a clever campaign to gain control of the Western Pacific area before the United States or Great Britain could bring any large forces to the scene of conflict. Time after time the Nipponese had superior numbers at the critical points, for "where Japan was hundreds of miles from its bases, the United States had to move its fighting forces thousands of miles." The Japanese Command regarded no sacrifice too great to achieve an objective, and over a period of years Tokyo had converted its scattered island possessions and mandates into a "fleet of anchored aircraft carriers."

The Japanese soldiers were hardened and tough, generally preferring death to surrender. Their leaders developed a skillful method of jungle fighting by dispersal and infiltration.[16] Their opponents at first underestimated their fighting qualities—partly out of a feeling of superiority to the "little yellow men" and partly out of the mistaken idea that Japan's inability to subdue China was owing to Nipponese weakness rather than Chinese inner strength. Japan also was the beneficiary of fifth-column activity, particularly in Vichy-controlled Indo-China, Thailand, and Burma. And by their successful advances, the Japanese soon deprived the Allies not only of most of the island bases they did have in the Western Pacific, but of the tin, oil, and rubber which they had been deriving from the southeastern Asiatic mainland and the Netherlands East Indies.

Simultaneously with their attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese struck at the United States island bases of Guam, Wake, and Midway. After stout resistance, the first two fell, so that by Christmas 1941 Midway remained the only United States stepping stone between battered Hawaii and the embattled Philippines. Meanwhile several British Pacific islands also were occupied, and Japanese land-based planes sank two of the largest British battleships off the eastern coast of Malaya. Their loss left the immediate naval defense of the Southwestern Pacific to cruisers and destroyers inadequately supported by aircraft.

Thereafter the Japanese swept ahead, overcoming "insuperable" obstacles, slashing through "impassable" jungles, flying "inferior" planes with "worthless" gasoline, and braving heavy seas in small river boats. By June 1942 the Nipponese had taken Hong Kong, Sarawak, Malaya, Singapore, Burma, the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, much of New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and even some of the Aleutian Islands off Alaska.

[16] Realizing the difficulty of taking Singapore from the sea side, the Japanese penetrated the "impenetrable" jungles to the north of that base and again appeared at the critical fighting point with an overwhelming superiority of men and planes.

After six months of warfare Japan had control of the Western Pacific area "between India and Hawaii, and between Siberia and Australia." In this period there did occur some episodes to bolster United States spirits—episodes such as heroic stands on Bataan and at Corregidor, the bombing of Tokyo in April 1942, the appointment of General Douglas MacArthur of Bataan fame to supreme command in the Southwestern Pacific, and a naval victory over Japan in the Battle of the Coral Sea in May—but the tide of Japanese advance was not checked until the summer of 1942.

The eventual call of halt to Japan came after arduous preparation by the United Nations. While the damage sustained at Pearl Harbor was being repaired, and while Australian defenses were being strengthened, United States forces built up bases at Palmyra and Canton islands, on Samoa and New Caledonia, and in the Fijis. United States reënforcements also were sent to New Zealand, Australia, the New Hebrides, and other Pacific regions, and United States and British supplies were poured into the Far Eastern war theater. The firm stand of the Soviet Union against Nazi armies helped give the United Nations a much-needed breathing spell, as did the continued resistance of China, another United States naval victory over Japan in the Battle of Midway Island (June), and the British occupation of Vichy-controlled Madagascar. This occupation not only forestalled a possible Japanese-Vichy bargain similar to the one whereby French Indo-China had become a Nipponese base of operations, but kept open the vital sea route from the United States and Great Britain around Africa to the Orient.

Eventually, in August 1942, the first step toward retrieving lost territories was taken when United States forces, operating from New Caledonia, seized a number of small islands commanding Tulagi harbor and a beachhead that included an almost-completed new Japanese airfield on Guadalcanal in the Solomon group. During the winter of 1942–1943 these gains were consolidated against reënforced opposition, and an Australian and United States counterattack was launched on New Guinea which gradually drove the Japanese invaders back to bare footholds in the north. In the process Japan suffered further important naval losses in a battle off the Solomon Islands during November 1942. Thus was begun the process of Allied reconquest of bases which, it was expected, would eventually become steppingstones on the route to Tokyo.[17]

[17] It was fortunate for the Allies that Japan did little commerce raiding in the Pacific, for throughout 1942 and into 1943 the German U-boat menace in the Atlantic became ever more serious. The United Nations met the danger by building ships faster than the Germans could sink them, developing additional antisubmarine bases, setting up

The Japanese occupation of Burma, meanwhile, had given renewed importance to Anglo-Indian relations. There was widespread dissatisfaction in India that Great Britain was using the war as a reason for postponing indefinitely any further step in the direction of Indian self-government. Eventually, spurred by evidences of disloyalty to Britain and aid to Japan in Burma, London in the spring of 1942 suggested that, "immediately upon the cessation of hostilities," there be created a fully self-governing Indian Dominion. Any province which preferred to remain outside the Indian union would be permitted to attain a dominion status of its own. During the war, however, India's defense would have to remain the responsibility of the viceroy and his councils.

Most Indian groups found reason to treat the proposals coolly. The largest single group, the Indian Nationalists or Congress Party, insisted on immediate self-government; when this was not forthcoming, Gandhi preached a new campaign of noncoöperation with Britain and nonresistance to Japan. The obstructionist tactics of the leaders—who advocated passive resistance against Britain's war effort and objected to the presence of United States aviators and technical troops in India, while Gandhi made speeches which must have delighted Tokyo—led to a period of violence. In August 1942 Gandhi and other leaders at last were arrested, and order was gradually restored. India continued to fight the axis with men and materials, far surpassing her contributions to the Allied cause in the First World War. The moderate natives appeared to find satisfaction in the belief that after victory the Indian demand for self-government would be supported by public opinion in all the United Nations. As the Indian situation gradually faded from the newspaper headlines in the West, North Africa surged back into the limelight.

In the summer and early fall of 1942 there was a noticeable increase in the number and intensity of British and United States air raids on the Nazi-occupied continent. Lend-lease aid was stepped up to China and the Soviet Union, the latter having received 4600 planes, 5800 tanks, and tens of thousands of trucks and other motor vehicles from the United States and Britain by the opening of 1943. Simultaneously the British were building up a powerful army behind El Alamein in Egypt, an army strengthened by United States bombers, tanks, and tank-destroyers. Meanwhile their augmented air strength in Egypt enabled the Allies to check several projected eastward drives by Rommel and partially to close his supply routes from the continent and Libya.

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air-ferry routes, and improving the convoy system. Convoys plied the North Atlantic to the U.S.S.R., the Middle Atlantic to Great Britain and Iceland, and the South Atlantic to and around Africa.

Late in October 1942 the British Eighth Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Sir (later Field Marshal Viscount) Bernard L. Montgomery, began a campaign to drive Rommel out of both Egypt and Libya. In January Montgomery's forces entered the city of Tripoli, having pushed westward 1300 miles in three months. One week later a British vanguard followed the remnants of the Afrika Korps across the border into Tunisia. Italy's African empire was no more. Meanwhile it had become clear that Montgomery's offensive was intended to be only the eastern jaw of a vise whose western jaw was a United States army driving through French North Africa, and whose closing would mean the expulsion of the axis from Africa.

The United States army in question had been landed at selected points in Vichy-controlled French North and West Africa early in November 1942. The objects of the occupation were to forestall similar German action, tighten the antiaxis blockade, make safer the South Atlantic and Mediterranean routes, and set up a possible invasion base against Southern Europe. Some British military units participated in the landings, but the entire expedition was commanded by the United States Lieutenant General (later General of the Army) Dwight D. Eisenhower, hitherto chief of the United States forces in Europe. It was anticipated that a United States army would find less opposition in the French territories than would one composed largely of Britishers.

Although there was some fighting, Morocco and Algeria soon were brought under Allied control. Pétain ordered resistance and broke off diplomatic relations with the United States, but General Henri Honoré Giraud, who some months earlier had duplicated a feat accomplished by him during the First World War by escaping from a German prison fortress, promptly appeared in Algeria and urged coöperation with the Allies. Eisenhower placed him in command of the French North African forces, an appointment soon confirmed by Admiral Darlan. The latter, who had gone to Algeria on secret orders from Pétain, was permitted by the Allies to assume authority over North Africa on November 11; he ordered all French resistance to end. By these arrangements Eisenhower hoped to avoid the casualties that might result from a protracted struggle between French and United States forces and to concentrate on the conquest of Tunisia, where German and Italian troops had begun to establish themselves. Meanwhile, also on November 11, Eisenhower appealed to the French fleet at Toulon to join the United Nations, and Hitler ordered his armies to march into hitherto unoccupied France, ostensibly "to repel an American and British landing." Italy assisted the German operation and occupied Corsica. Thus were the armistices of 1940 scrapped.

The axis troops completed the occupation of France within a day, although, for the time being, they avoided Toulon. While Darlan now announced that he would speak for Pétain since the latter no longer was free to make his sentiments known, the Fighting French proclaimed from London that they would participate in the new campaign against the axis but would not accept any political arrangement concluded between the Allies and the "Number Two traitor of France." On November 23 Darlan persuaded French West Africa, with its powerful base of Dakar, to go over to the antiaxis side, and four days later the larger part of the French fleet at Toulon was scuttled. The wholesale sinkings were carried out according to prearranged plan when Nazi soldiers entered Toulon and Nazi planes appeared over the harbor.

The difficult political situation took a turn on December 24, 1942, with the assassination of Darlan by a youthful French patriot, who was executed two days later. Thereupon Giraud, with Eisenhower's approval, assumed control. The de Gaullists preferred Giraud to Darlan, although they were disappointed when the new commissioner kept some former Vichy officials in high position.

Meanwhile, on November 15, United States troops had crossed into Tunisia, where a hard fight was in progress. The axis had the advantage of shorter supply lines, a factor which became the more important with the onset of bad weather. The Allies, moreover, still had to consolidate their gains and positions elsewhere in Africa. Hence, while Laval in France declared that German victory would save "civilization," the campaign in Tunisia was marked chiefly by local engagements, air attacks, and supply-ship sinkings in the Mediterranean. Early in 1943 the Germans withdrew what remained of the Afrika Korps from Libya into Tunisia, there to join the fresher forces recently arrived from Europe. Allied efforts to prevent a union of the two groups were unsuccessful, but by April the axis forces had been pushed into a corner of northeastern Tunisia.

While Tunisia became more and more important as a battleground, there occurred another Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, this time at Casablanca in Morocco. For ten days, from January 14 to 24, 1943, the two leaders met, each accompanied by the supreme fighting commanders of his country. Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek, though not present, were kept informed of all developments. Giraud and de Gaulle also attended the meeting and had an opportunity to agree "on the end to be achieved, which is the liberation of France." Both recognized the need for full military coöperation of all Frenchmen on the side of the Allies, but neither was prepared to accept the leadership of the other in the interest of political

unity. The major conferences laid plans for the campaigns of 1943, and at a press conference on January 24 Roosevelt declared that the United Nations would fight until the axis was ready to cry "unconditional surrender."

CHAPTER 20

Allied Victory

FROM NORTH AFRICA TO NORMANDY

At Casablanca, in January 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill not only agreed that the enemy must surrender unconditionally, but planned the next military blows to fall on Italy. First, however, it was necessary to drive the axis forces out of Africa. This objective was attained by the middle of May 1943. After some temporary setbacks, United States, British, New Zealand, French, and French Moroccan soldiers captured all that was left of the Afrika Korps in Tunisia. This victory marked the proverbial beginning of the end. The Italians were disturbed, and the Fascist structure gave signs of cracking. Nazi leaders, for their part, belittled the happenings in Tunisia as a successful delaying action during which they had been able to make Fortress Europe invincible. But this boast in reality was a sign that the "Maginot-line psychology of defensive warfare which had bedeviled the French in 1940 had in turn affected the Nazis."

The invasion of Sicily and Italy, though well planned, was not to be an "all out" effort. The Allies did not intend to dissipate the resources for a later invasion of France in an Italian "vacuum." But from Italy as a base they could more readily bomb Germany and the Balkans; and by invading Italy they would cause diversion of some German divisions from the eastern front and thus bring relief to the still hard-pressed Russians. In July 1943, following heavy air attacks on the areas concerned and the capture of the strategically important islands of Pantelleria and Lampedusa, came the assault on Sicily. The Italians offered little resistance and sur-

rendered in large numbers. The Germans fought hard; few surrendered and many were able to retire across the Strait of Messina to the Italian mainland. The conquest of the island took 39 days. Meanwhile Mussolini himself had fallen.

A few days after the initial Allied landings on Sicily, Mussolini visited Hitler and asked for more German reënforcements. The Führer denied the request and berated his friend for Italy's lagging support. Mussolini returned crestfallen, summoned a meeting of the Fascist Grand Council for July 24, 1943, and urged continuance of the war by abandoning southern Italy and establishing headquarters in the country's industrial north. The meeting was bitter. Mussolini's lieutenants pointed out that under the Duce's leadership Italy was disintegrating. Her colonies were gone. Her armies were largely destroyed or in flight. Her fleet was in hiding. Her industries were crippled by air raids, lack of fuel, and shortage of raw materials. Her people existed on meagre rations because of the blockade, and because food was being sent to Germany. For all this, blame was showered upon the Duce. At the close of the session the council passed a motion asking the king to take direct command.

On July 25, 1943, Victor Emmanuel III dismissed Mussolini. Marshal Badoglio was appointed to head a new government, and Mussolini was placed in custody; his power had lasted twenty years and nine months. It was widely believed that Badoglio would promptly take Italy out of the war. But he delayed asking for an armistice, partly because the Germans were in virtual control of the peninsula and partly because he and the king were not yet ready to cast their lot with the Allies. His hand was forced by the increasing severity of Allied air attacks and by popular peace demonstrations. Secret armistice negotiations were held in Lisbon, and on September 3, 1943, Italy surrendered unconditionally. On the same day the Germans took over Rome, and the Allies crossed from Sicily to the Italian mainland.

The Nazis had made good use of the interim to clear out the unreliable Italian forces and strongly emplace themselves in the mountainous terrain of southern Italy. Only slowly and at great cost were they pushed northward. In bitter weather, the Allies were held up for months in some of the fiercest fighting of the war at the Benedictine monastery of Cassino. Meanwhile, also, some Nazi paratroopers had freed Mussolini from prison and taken him to temporary safety behind the German lines. He set up a puppet neo-Fascist republic and rallied about him some Fascists who had all to loose and naught to gain from an Allied victory. Since the Badoglio Government in October declared war on Germany, the Italians found themselves, if not always fighting, then at least leaning, on both sides.

THE ALLIED CONQUEST OF ITALY
1943 - 1944
Scale of Miles
0 25 50 75 100
12°
16°
44°
40°
36°
Brenner Pass
AUSTRIA
SWITZERLAND
Bolzano
Udine
Milan
Brescia
Verona
Padua
Venice
Trieste
Postumia
Fiume
Zagreb
Sava R.
Mantua
Parma
Ferrara
Pola
Genoa
Modena
Bologna
Ravenna
YUGOSLAVIA
BATTLELINE SEPT. 5, 1944
La Spezia
Rimini
Zara
SAN MARINO
Pisa
Florence
Ancona
Sibenik
Split
Leghorn
Siena
Perugia
ELBA
San Benedetto
Bastia
Grosetto
Tiber R.
Dubrovnik
Terni
Viterbo
Pescara
CORSICA
BATTLELINE NOV. 2, 1943
Rome
Vatican City
Albano
Isernia
Ostia
Cisterna
Cassino
Foggia
Anzio
Formia
Nettuno
Capua
Littoria
Gaeta
Benevento
Bari
Caserta
Terranova
Naples
Potenza
Brindisi
Costellammare
Salerno
SARDINIA
Sapri
Gulf of
Leuca
Sibari
Taranto
Cagliari
Cosenza
Catanzaro
Messina
Palermo
San Giovanni
Reggio
Trapani
SICILY
Catania
ALLIES LANDED SEPT. 3, 1943
Bizerte
Agrigento
Syracuse
Ragusa
Tunis
Vittoria
PANTELLERIA
TUNISIA
MALTA (Br.)
TYRRHENIAN SEA
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
ADRIATIC SEA

At last, on June 4, 1944, Allied forces entered Rome. Thereafter, while some of the best troops were withdrawn in preparation for the invasion of France, the remainder progressed steadily up the peninsula as far as Rimini. There they came to a halt before the German Gothic Line in the mountains south of Bologna. Another winter of warfare lay ahead in the struggle for control of the rich Po Valley.

The axis defeats in Italy were paralleled on the eastern front by the liberation of Russia. Early in 1943, following the victory at Stalingrad, the Russians continued to push the Germans back to the west of Moscow, in the Ukraine, and in the Caucasus. Aided by equipment from the United States and Great Britain and by ceaseless western air attacks on German factories and materiel, the Russians gradually reconquered most of the territory lost to the axis during 1942. Eventually, in July 1943, the Germans began in central Russia what proved to be their last great offensive on the eastern front. They made some initial gains, but these were soon lost in a Russian counteroffensive. The Russians, showing skill in the use of artillery, in the encirclement of enemy spearheads, and in the development of pincers movements, pushed forward until, by March 1944, the axis forces were expelled from most of the Ukraine. Meanwhile, in the north, Leningrad had been freed after a siege of nearly two years and a half; and by mid-May 1944 the Crimea was once again in Russian hands.

If, for a time, it seemed that the resultant shorter defense lines might make things safer for the hard-pressed Nazis, this illusion was soon dispelled. Harassed by air raids from the west, south, and east; unable to keep war production at the level required for the defense of Fortress Europe; disturbed more and more by the inefficiency of forced foreign labor and by underground resistance activities; torn by strife and jealousies between civil and military authorities, especially after the failure of an attempt on July 20, 1944, against Hitler's life; dominated by the notorious Himmler who, as minister of the interior, made "the terror from within transcend the terror from without"; and fearful of the imminent invasion blow from the west, Germany could not long hope to retain control over the soil of Russia or of Russia's neighbors.

In June 1944 new Russian drives began against the Germans on the central front and against the Finns behind their Mannerheim Line. Soviet soil was cleared of German armies before the year ended. By October the Russians had reëntered Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, and Romania, were in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, and had penetrated East Prussia. Romania and Bulgaria were induced to declare war on Germany, Finland was granted an armistice, and at Lublin in


THE LIBERATION OF THE
U. S. S. R.
1942 - 1944
Farthest Axis penetration, 1942
Regained in winter, 1942-1943
Regained in summer, 1943
Regained in winter, 1943-1944
Scale of Miles
0 100 200 300
SWEDEN
FINLAND
Gulf of Bothnia
White Sea
Petrozavodsk
Lake Onega
Helsinki
Stockholm
Viborg
Lake Ladoga
Tallinn
Kronstadt
Leningrad
Narva
BALTIC SEA
ESTONIA
L. Peipus
L. Ilmen
Novgorod
Pskov
Vologda
Kirov
Riga
LATVIA
Staraya Russa
Bologoe
Velikiye Luki
Kalinin
Yaroslavl
Volga
LITHUANIA
Dvinsk
Nevel
Rzhev
Gorki
R.
Polotsk
Mostow
EAST PRUSSIA
Vilnius
Vitebsk
Kazan
Orsha
Vyasma
Smolensk
U. S. S. R.
Minsk
Tula
Warsaw
Brest-Litovsk
Zhlobin
Bryansk
Penza
Pripet R.
Orel
POLAND
Gomel
Dnieper R.
Tambov
Sarny
Kursk
Korosten
Voronezh
Saratov
Lwow
Kiev
Belgorod
Shepetovka
Kharkov
Zhmerinka
Vinnitsa
Smela
Volga R.
CARPATHIAN MTS.
Kremenchug
Dniester R.
Donets R.
Stalingrad
Dnlepropetrovsk
Don R.
Jassy
Krivoj Rog
Zaporozhe
Nikolaev
Taganrog
Rostov
ROMANIA
Odessa
Astrakhan
Sea of Azov
Elista
Kerch
CRIMEA
Krasnodar
Armavir
CASPIAN SEA
Sevastopol
Novorossiisk
Maikop
Mozdok
Bucharest
Constanta
Danube R.
Tuapse
BULGARIA
Varna
CAUCASUS MTS.
Grozny
Makhachkala
BLACK SEA
TURKEY
Istanbul
Bosporus

Poland a Soviet-sponsored government was set up in disregard of the Polish Government-in-Exile in London. Meanwhile British troops had helped the natives reconquer Greece, and Turkey had broken off diplomatic relations with Germany.[1] By the close of 1944, Eastern Europe was "liberated."

During these months there had begun the process of liberating France. From the beginning of her own invasion, and especially after the entry of the United States into the war, the Soviet Union demanded the opening of a second front in Western Europe so that the Nazis would be simultaneously engaged on two sides.[2] London and Washington early agreed in principle that the main blow must be delivered across the English Channel; but the implementation of the strategy was successively delayed by the events in North Africa and by the insufficiency of resources for a French invasion. In late 1943, however, at conferences in Cairo and Tehran, the Allied leaders gave "Operation Overlord" top priority. On December 24, 1943, General Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Allied Commander and ordered to "enter the continent of Europe."

During the next six months the search for greater resources for Overlord continued. Eventually the target date, D–Day, for an attack on Normandy was set for early June 1944. Another landing, in southern France, was planned for some time later, so that the available "landing craft could be used first in the Channel, then rushed to the Mediterranean to do double duty." Meanwhile the Channel was virtually swept of mines, the skies were cleared of the Luftwaffe, strategic bombing of the continent reached a new intensity, and an average of 150,000 men per month was transported from the United States to the British Isles. By air attacks on bridges and rail centers the invasion coast was isolated and the enemy's ability "to shift resources to the critical area was severely restricted."

V–E DAY

The invasion time, or D–Day, was early in the morning of June 6, 1944. According to the report of the United States Chief of Staff, General of the Army George Catlett Marshall, "the beaches of Normandy were chosen for the assault after long study of the strength of German coastal

[1] In February 1945 Turkey declared war on Germany and Japan. Ankara was stimulated by an Allied decision not to invite to the forthcoming San Francisco meeting on the organization of the United Nations any power that had failed to declare war on the axis by March 1, 1945.

[2] The Soviet Union itself showed no interest in opening a second front from 1939 to 1941 when the Nazis were winning in the West.

defenses and the disposition of German divisions. The absence of large ports in the area was a serious obstacle, but it was offset in some measure by the relative weakness of the German defenses and elaborate construction in Britain of two artificial harbors to be emplaced off the beaches. The selection of target dates and hours for the assault required an accurate forecast of the optimum combination of favorable weather, tide, and light conditions. Moonlight was desirable for the airborne operations. D–Day was scheduled for 5 June; this date was changed to 6 June because of unfavorable but clearing weather. . . . The final forecast for the attack day predicted high winds; the sea was still rough, but rather than accept a delay of several weeks until tide and moon provided another favorable moment, General Eisenhower made the fateful decision to go ahead."

An armada of more than 4000 ships carried the Allied men across the Channel. Aerial cover was provided by 11,000 planes. The undersea and land obstacles prepared by the Germans were ingenious and took a terrible toll of Allied lives. The resistance of the Germans was stubborn. They counterattacked fiercely and made skillful defensive use of the Norman hedgerows—"horse-high, bull-strong, hog-tight." The weather was unseasonably bad and almost destroyed one of the two artificial port installations. But the Allies controlled the air, handled an average of 30,000 tons of supplies and 30,000 additional troops every day, and by June 12 held 80 miles of the French coast between Cherbourg and Caen.

Cherbourg fell on June 27. A month later General Omar Bradley's men broke out at St. Lô. Lieutenant General George Smith Patton, Jr., and his United States Third Army, aided effectively by the French underground or French Forces of the Interior (F.F.I.), pursued the fleeing Germans without letup.[3] Paris fell to the Allies on August 25, by which time "the Germans had suffered at least 400,000 casualties, of whom more than 200,000 were prisoners of war." It was still necessary, however, to clear several enemy garrisons that had been left behind to prevent the Allies from using the harbor facilities in such critical seaports as Brest, Dieppe, and Le Havre.

Meanwhile, on August 15, 1944, the United States Seventh Army, under Lieutenant General Alexander McCarrell Patch, Jr., and including many French soldiers, had landed near Cannes in southern France. Within two weeks the beachheads were firmly established, and a rapid advance had begun up the Rhone Valley. Lyon fell on September 3, and eight days later the two Allied invasion forces effected a junction northeast of Dijon. The Germans fled to the shelter of the Siegfried Line or West Wall, while Allied

[3] The F.F.I. were also called *maquis*, after the French for underbrush.

forces, having crossed the Belgian frontier, streaked through Luxembourg and entered Germany on September 11, 1944—ninety-seven days after D–Day.



The reaction of these events on Berlin was sharp. On June 15, 1944, the Germans sent over from France to London the first of 8000 robot bombs called *Vergeltungswaffe* (V–1) or "vengeance weapon." Although they were inaccurate, these pilotless, jet-propelled bombs were independent of weather conditions and were hard to intercept or shoot down. The 2300 that got through to London interfered with its efficiency as a war center, killed or injured more than 20,000 persons, placed a great strain on the nerves of Londoners in general, and diverted Allied planes to shooting down the missiles and bombing the launching ramps in the Pas de Calais region of France. But the bombs were of no value in determining the outcome of the war and served chiefly as a vent for Hitler's personal hate

of Britain. The liberation of France involved the capture of the launching sites, and in the beginning of September 1944 the V–1's ceased to trouble London. However, the Nazis meanwhile had developed a V–2 which, launched from a greater distance, shot through the stratosphere at supersonic speed. With their explosive-filled noses, these rockets caused death and destruction in London until the spring of 1945.

A further reaction in Germany to the defeats was the development of conspiracies to kill Hitler. The one which came closest to success was a Generals' Plot to assassinate the Führer on July 20, 1944. Acting on behalf of several members of the General Staff, Count Claus Schenk von Stauffenberg placed a brief case containing a time bomb against the leg of a table in Hitler's conference hut at Rastenburg in East Prussia. The bomb exploded, but Hitler, though dazed and bruised, remained alive. Several General Staff officers thereupon were excuted, some in disgusting fashion. Others, including Rommel, apparently were induced to commit suicide. Hitler, moreover, placed Himmler, already in charge of internal affairs, in command of the Reserve Army. Soon Himmler was also given command of all prisoner-of-war camps and eventually of the Army Group Vistula, fighting against the Russians east of Berlin. "I am beginning to doubt," exclaimed the irate Führer, "whether the German people is worthy of my great ideals."

In the autumn of 1944 began a triple assault on what had shrunk to be Fortress Germany. The western Allies were poised for assaults along the Gothic Line in Italy and the West Wall in Germany; the Russians, along a line extending from East Prussia southward across Poland and Hungary. The Allied command in Italy launched an offensive against the transpeninsular Gothic Line on September 10, 1944. The weather was bad, the terrain was difficult, the fighting was bitter. Both sides utilized Italian soldiers—the Nazis using Mussolini's new Fascist Republican Army, the Allies using anti-Fascist Partisans. For several months the Allied advance was slow. The opposing ground forces were of nearly equal strength, the margin of Allied advantage being represented by air power. But in April 1945 the Po was crossed in force, and the armies of General Mark W. Clark, aided by Partisans, rushed onward. Mussolini, seeking escape to Switzerland, was caught by Partisans. On April 28 he was shot, and then hanged by the heels in Milan—scene of his first successes. Meanwhile, largely through the efforts of Allen Welsh Dulles of the United States Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.), secret negotiations had begun for the surrender of the shattered Nazi army in Italy. The negotiations ended in Nazi capitulation on May 2, 1945.

One day earlier Radio Hamburg had announced to an excited world that Adolf Hitler and his bride of three days (Eva Braun) had committed suicide on April 30 in a Berlin Chancellory bunker. He shot himself through the mouth, after having designated as his successor Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz.[4] By this time it was obvious that the coördinated Allied drives from west and east could not be checked and that Fortress Germany had fallen.

On September 17, 1944, the Allied western offensive had begun with an air-borne attack on the Netherlands flank of the Siegfried Line. The operation achieved only partial success and was followed by a frontal assault farther south. Aachen fell in October, and the Metz and Strasbourg areas were conquered by late November. With more than 3,000,000 troops on the continent, General Eisenhower now launched a "charging offensive to penetrate the Siegfried Line and place himself in position to cross the Rhine." In order to gather strength at his chosen points of attack, he decided to hold the 75 miles between Monschau and Trier with comparatively weak forces. And it was precisely here that Field Marshal Karl Rudolph Gerd von Rundstedt, acting on Hitler's personal direction, on December 16, 1944, launched a counteroffensive with the port of Antwerp as its objective.

The resulting Ardennes Counteroffensive or Battle of the Bulge made some progress. Aided by heavy fog of several days' duration and a secret-intelligence lapse on the part of the Allies, Rundstedt was able unobservedly to assemble large forces in the heavily forested area. He broke through the United States position and at the point of extreme penetration drove more than 50 miles into the Allied lines. But by the end of January 1945 this salient was again eliminated. The Nazi offensive only "imposed a delay of about six weeks on the main Allied offensive in the north," and did this at the price of irreparable damage to "the principal element of Germany's strategic reserve" and of widespread disillusionment within Fortress Germany.

It now was time for the diplomats to meet once more, and early in February 1945 President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin gathered with their chiefs of staff at Yalta in the Crimea.[5] Here the

[4] If what was said to be Hitler's testament may be believed, then the Führer, shortly before his death, expelled Göring and Himmler from all their offices and from the Nazi Party. "Göring and Himmler," he reputedly wrote, "by their secret negotiations with the enemy . . . and by their illegal attempts to seize power in the state . . . have brought irreparable shame on the country." Feeling betrayed by the army, the S.S., and the politicians, Hitler decided that his successor should be a navy man.

[5] Two months after the conference, on April 12, 1945, President Roosevelt died of a stroke. He was succeeded by Vice-President Harry S. Truman (1884–).

general plan for the destruction of Nazi Germany was approved, and the German people were warned not "to make the cost of their defeat heavier to themselves by attempting to continue a hopeless resistance."

Soon the final campaigns were launched on all fronts. In the west, Cologne fell to the United States First Army on March 7, 1945. On the same day a platoon of this army found a Rhine bridge south of Cologne intact. The platoon leader daringly exploited the windfall by crossing the Ludendorff Bridge at Remagen and developing a small, albeit the first, Allied bridgehead east of the Rhine. The army commander promptly redirected his moving columns and sent strong elements across the river. General Patton's units reached the Rhine at Coblenz soon thereafter and on March 22, 1945, crossed the Rhine at Oppenheim.

All along the front the Allies rushed forward, astounding the Germans by blithely bypassing formidably garrisoned pockets, particularly that in the Ruhr Valley. While the Canadians and British passed on through the Netherlands and northern Germany to the Baltic, and the French thrust eastward from Mülhouse into the Black Forest, the Americans drove, on the one hand, toward and into Czechoslovakia and Austria, and on the other, toward the Elbe and eastward to Torgau, near Leipzig. And here, at Torgau, the juncture with the Red Army occurred, on April 25, 1945. Meanwhile, from behind the Allied forward positions, three United States armies had taken the Ruhr—and with it, 300,000 prisoners.

While these events transpired in the west, the Russians were delivering sledgehammer blows in the east. Stripped of strategic reserves through the outcome of the Ardennes Counteroffensive and subjected to heavy strategic bombing, the Germans had neither the man power nor the resources to withstand the drives launched by Soviet forces at the start of 1945. A mass of men, reputedly 4,000,000 in number, advanced along a 750-mile front. They crashed into East Prussia, pushed through western Poland and into Silesia, and smashed their way across Hungary into Austria. Then, while some Russians met the Americans near Leipzig and in Czechoslovakia, others, under Marshal Gregory Konstantinovich Zhukov, fought their way into the outskirts of Berlin on April 22, 1945. The fighting was fiercest at the Reich Chancellory, in whose underground defenses Hitler had set up his last headquarters. When all was obviously lost, Hitler presumably committed suicide.[6] Doenitz assumed power as the Führer's designated successor, but could do nothing to avert disaster.

[6] Goebbels died in the same bunker, having himself shot by an orderly. Himmler hid in Flensburg for some days and then committed suicide by poison after walking into a British control post. Göring, as will be seen, lived to be captured and tried as a war criminal, along with Ribbentrop, Rosenberg, Seyss-Inquart, and others.


CROSSING THE RHINE
Spring 1945
Scale of Miles
0 10 20 30 40 50
Amsterdam
NETHERLANDS
Arnhem
Nijmegen
Rhine
CANADIAN FIRST ARMY
BRITISH SECOND ARMY
RUHR
Essen
Ruhr R.
Düsseldorf
München-Gladbach
Roermond
R.
U.S. NINTH ARMY
Meuse
Roer R.
Julich
Düren
Cologne
U.S. FIRST ARMY
Liège
Schmidt
Remagen
Bonn
BELGIUM
FEB 1945
Coblenz
Prüm
Weisbaden
Frankfurt
Main R.
U.S. THIRD ARMY
Our R.
Moselle R.
Bad Kreuznach
Mainz
Oppenheim
LUXEM-BOURG
Trier
Nahe R.
Worms
Mannheim
Saar R.
Kaiserslautern
SAAR
Saarbrücken
Metz
U.S. SEVENTH ARMY
Karlsruhe
Rhine R.
FEB 1945
Nancy
Strasbourg
Rhine
FRANCE
Ill R.
FRENCH FIRST ARMY
Colmar
Neufbrisach
Freiburg
Mülhouse
Basel
SWITZERLAND
GERMANY


90°
100°
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SINKIANG
GOBI DESERT
MANCHOUKUO
SEA OF JAPAN
TIBET
CHINA
INDIA
BURMA
JAPAN
YELLOW SEA
EAST CHINA SEA
PACIFIC OCEAN
BAY OF BENGAL
FRENCH INDO-CHINA
THAILAND (SIAM)
HIMALAYA MTS.
Ansi
Suchow
Paotow
Ho
Huang
Yellow R.
Lanchow
Tungkwan
Sian
Chengcho
Peiping
Tientsin
Port Arthur
CHOSEN (KOREA)
Keijo
Osaka
Fusan
Nagasaki
Tsinan
Tsingtao
Kaifeng
Haichow
Nanking
Soochow
Shanghai
Hangchow
Lhasa
Chengtu
Yangtse R.
Hankow
Wuchang
Ichang
Chungking
Changsha
Nanchang
Wenchow
Ledo
Stilwell Rd.
Kohima
Imphal
Mogaung
Myitkyina
Burma Road
Kunming
Kweiyang
Tushan
Kweilin
Hanyang
Foochow
OKINAWA
Liuchow
Amoy
Canton
Swatow
FORMOSA (TAIWAN)
Mandalay
Lashio
Mekong R.
Akyab
Salween R.
Nanning
Hong Kong
Macau
Hanoi
Haiphong
Kwangchowan
HAINAN
JAPAN
ON THE ASIATIC MAINLAND
JUNE, 1944
Held by Japan
Scale of Miles
0 100 200 300 400 500

On May 5, 1945, the commander of all German forces in northeastern Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark surrendered unconditionally. On the next day, the Nazi forces in Austria followed suit. On May 7, in a little schoolhouse in Reims, an emissary of Doenitz surrendered unconditionally "all land, sea, and air forces of the Reich." A second capitulation was signed with the Russians in Berlin on May 9. Five years and eight months after the Nazi invasion of Poland, and eleven months after the Allied invasion of Normandy, came Victory-in-Europe Day or V–E Day (May 8, 1945). In baseball parlance, the situation now was: "Two out and one to go!"

V–J DAY

Despite the intensity of the warfare in Europe, the Allies simultaneously were forging victory in the Pacific area. Here the major responsibility fell on the United States, coöperating with Australia, New Zealand, Britishers, Fighting Frenchmen, Chinese, Netherlanders, and, toward the end, Russians.

The successful attack on Guadalcanal, whose conquest was completed by February 1943, marked the inauguration of an island-hopping strategy whereby enemy island outposts were isolated, conquered, converted into Allied bases, and used as springboards for further attacks—each one striking closer to Japan proper. At the same time, efforts were made to supply China via India with the necessary materiel to keep her in the war. Otherwise the Tokyo Government might have been free to exploit the tremendous Chinese resources and, indeed, in the event of a successful Allied invasion of the Japanese homeland, to continue the war from China as a base. The process, as directed by General MacArthur, was slow but steady. As United States strength in the Pacific was gradually built up, the pressure on the Japanese was intensified until, finally, they succumbed. It was in this theatre of the war that the United States Marines and the United States Navy, in particular, added glory to their history.

Between May and August 1943 the Japanese were dislodged from their holds on the Aleutian Islands, and thus was removed a potential threat to Alaska. By November 1943 the Gilbert Islands, including Tarawa and Makin, were in Allied hands. Three months later Kwajalein in the Marshall group and Eniwetok fell. From these bases, United States planes and ships were able to neutralize the fortress island of Truk and open the way to Saipan and Tinian in the Marianas, and to Guam by July 1944. The first major strike on a Japanese home island, Honshu, came from Saipan and

Guam in November 1944. It is difficult to visualize the ferocity of combat that accompanied these advances. Generally, according to Marshall's report, "the enemy was concentrated within restricted areas, heavily fortified in pillboxes, and protected by mines and beach obstacles. Landing forces faced intense cross-fires. The enemy could be dislodged only by shattering bombardment and powerful hand-to-hand infantry assault."

The autumn of 1944 saw two great Allied campaigns launched in the Far East. The one, under Rear Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, aimed at the reconquest of Burma and the reopening of adequate communications with China. Dependent on air-borne deliveries, and thus "maintained at the end of the most precarious supply lines in history," these operations were successfully completed by May 1945. The other campaign, led by General MacArthur, involved the reconquest of the Philippine Islands between October 1944 and June 1945. For this enterprise the ocean path had been cleared largely by the naval and air victories of Admiral William Frederick Halsey and his United States Third Fleet. The first landings were cleverly made at the island of Leyte, while Japanese fleets that had hoped to intercept the landing armada were defeated in the Battle for Leyte Gulf (October 23–26, 1944). In January 1945 MacArthur made another surprise landing, this time on Luzon. Manila fell on February 23, 1945, and by the close of June organized resistance in the Philippine Islands was at an end.

The campaigns in southeastern Asia and in the Philippines did not check the island hopping of the Allies. Iwo Jima, one of the Bonin Islands and fewer than 800 miles from Tokyo, was for several months bombarded by the superfortresses (B–29's) based on Saipan. Then it was taken by storm in February–March 1945. On April 1 came the initial landing on Okinawa, and after three months of fighting this "doorstep" of Japan in the Ryukyus was won.[7] Meanwhile the Australians had landed on Borneo and completed "the chain of mutually supporting strategic bases from which Allied air and naval forces could cover the Asiatic coast from Singapore to Shanghai." By July 1945 an Anglo-American squadron was able to sail along the Japanese coast and drop shells on Honshu, while B–29's hurled destruction on the empire's cities.

The time therefore seemed propitious for another meeting of the heads of the Allied Governments, all the more since Tokyo already had extended

[7] During this campaign the Japanese made effective use of "'suicide planes" from the Kamikaze Corps. Altogether, according to Fleet Admiral Ernest Joseph King, the Japanese at Okinawa hit from the air "about 250 vessels of all classes, from battleships and cruisers down to destroyers and landing ships, . . . by far the greatest proportion of them in suicide crashes."



Courtesy, Foreign Policy Association, *Headline Series.*

peace feelers in Moscow—at this time still neutral with respect to Japan. On July 17, 1945, such a meeting was convened at Potsdam in Germany. Present were Truman; Clement R. Attlee, who during the conference succeeded Churchill as prime minister of Great Britain following a Labor Party victory at the polls; Chiang Kai-shek; and Stalin. Among other things, the Potsdam Conference confirmed an occupational division of Central Europe and called upon Tokyo "to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces. . . . The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction." Since the Soviet Union was not at war with Japan, Stalin did not participate in this declaration. But he did agree to implement his earlier promise made at the Yalta Conference (February 1945) that the U.S.S.R. would enter the war against Japan within three months after the close of armed hostilities in Europe.

Japan ignored the ultimatum and continued the losing fight. Then, on August 6, 1945, a B–29 flew over the militarily important city of Hiroshima and dropped a small bomb which, working through atomic fission, wiped out more than half of the target area. The decision to utilize the bomb, first tested in a desolate region of New Mexico, was made at the Potsdam Conference in the expectation that its employment would shorten the war and make unnecessary the employment of a two-fold invasion plan of Japan that had been prepared by MacArthur and Fleet Admiral Chester William Nimitz. Two days later, on August 8, Moscow declared war on Tokyo. Red offensives were begun into Manchuria and into the southern or Japanese half of the island of Sakhalin. The Japanese forces still in Manchuria at this time were not so strong as the London and Washington governments believed, and the progress of the Soviet troops was swift. On August 9, a second atomic or A-bomb was dropped on Japan, this time on Nagasaki.

On the tenth, Tokyo sued for peace through the Swiss and Swedish governments. Agreement was reached on Allied terms, but because of the need to take proper precautions against possible Japanese trickery and because of exceptionally bad weather conditions, the surrender document was signed only on September 2, 1945 (V–J Day) aboard the battleship *Missouri* anchored in Tokyo Bay. General of the Army MacArthur signed as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Six years and a day had elapsed since the outbreak of the bloodiest and costliest war in history. For the second time within 27 years there fell upon men, mere men, the grave responsibility of so settling conditions that the loss in lives and goods should not have been entirely in vain.

CHAPTER 21

"When There Is No Peace"

VICTORY—AND DISILLUSIONMENT

During the war, in face of mortal peril from the axis, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States maintained an outward unity that was encouraging to those who looked forward to a postwar world of peace. The Messrs. Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt seemed to like each other personally. The respective chiefs of staff appeared to be in major disagreement only over the question of the timing of the invasion of France. From the many Big Three conferences emerged communiqués which reflected seeming unanimity on all major points of discussion. Sometimes there were indications of French or Chinese displeasure over the triune assumption of world authority. But these were regarded as relatively unimportant, since the three biggest powers were so obviously dominant in the job of beating the common enemy. The optimists were certain that future peace would be assured by the continuance, after hostilities ceased, of the unity that characterized the difficult war years.

Disillusion, however, followed close upon victory. Actually, all was not harmony even during the war. There was much, albeit secret, wrangling at the top-level conferences. Often the disagreements were resolved only through the adoption of policy statements so broad and general that they could later be given widely differing interpretations. And when the time

came for implementing the policies, these widely differing interpretations led to dispute and trouble.[1]

Implementation of the announced policies meant solving the critical postwar international problems. The more important of these included: the disposition of the millions of displaced persons (DP's) moved about by the Nazis; the status of millions of refugees from both the axis countries and the Soviet Union, with its budding satellites; the economic, cultural, and social rehabilitation of Europe and Asia; the capture and trial of war criminals and the process of denazifying and "reëducating" Central Europe; the creation of an atmosphere conducive to the development of democratic institutions in Germany and the neighboring areas; the drafting of peace treaties with all former enemy states; the question of the atomic bomb and its influence on international relations; reparations; the restoration of world trade; territorial readjustments amidst continuing fear, rampant nationalistic spirits, and revived or newly aroused yearnings for hegemony; the clash of traditional rival national ambitions; the disposition of Italy's colonies and of the mandates of the defunct League of Nations; the problem of how to disarm Germany while enabling her to regain her essential position in Europe's general economy; the rising national spirits in Africa and Asia; and the rapidly diverging definitions in West and East of the concepts of freedom and democracy. If the solution of such problems was avoided, as it was, by the Big Three when, under wartime conditions, they could act in secrecy as virtual dictators, how much more difficult it would be to solve them after the war in public debate and without the restraints imposed by the life-and-death struggle against a common military enemy!

Arrival at generally accepted solutions was made harder by additional complications. There were clashes between several governments-in-exile and the respective local leaders who had emerged as heroes from the underground resistance movements. The division of Germany and Austria into occupation zones, and the requirement of unanimous agreement among the occupying powers where general decisions were involved, often resulted in stalemate and a consequent worsening of conditions needing prompt action. On-the-spot proof that the actual atrocities committed under Nazi

[1] The major conferences were these: On the Atlantic (Roosevelt and Churchill), August 1941; Washington (Roosevelt and Churchill), June 1942; Casablanca (Roosevelt, Churchill, de Gaulle, and Giraud), January 1943; Tehran (Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin), November 1943; Cairo (Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek), November 1943; Yalta in the Crimea (Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin), February 1945; and Potsdam (Truman, Churchill, Attlee, Chiang Kai-shek, and Stalin), July 1945. In his memoirs, Secretary of State Hull said of Roosevelt: ". . . he sometimes tended to commit us too far in his direct approaches to the heads of other governments and to forget the diplomatic implications of his military decisions. . . ."

sponsorship at the concentration camps of Dachau, Buchenwald, and Oxwiecim surpassed in horror many of the stories circulated during the war, often and understandably made hot blood take precedence over calm judgment. There was a terrible European shortage of coal and fertilizer and a war-bequeathed lassitude and lack of will to work. In the victorious countries there were strong reactions against rationing and other wartime prohibitions and restraints. The fiercer and stronger national spirits that emerged from the conflict made ludicrous some experts' earlier talks regarding the future unimportance of political boundaries.

Finally, the situation was made worse by ideological considerations. Almost everywhere in Europe, but especially in the areas closest to and most readily overawed by Moscow, there was a movement to the political left. Poland, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Albania, Czechoslavakia, and Finland all came within the Stalinist orbit. In France and Italy the electorate as a whole rejected communism, but the Marxist elements displayed strength and did much to hamper reconstruction. In Great Britain, the Labor Party, successful in the elections of 1945, embarked upon a lusty policy of industrial nationalization. Yet one and all, from Bolshevik Moscow to Laborite London, looked to "capitalist" United States for help on generous terms. And so there developed differences of opinion in the United States—among those who wished to help the Reds, those who wished to help only the bulwarks against Sovietism, those who wished to help entirely on the basis of human needs, and those who were disgusted with the "whole mess" and wished to retire into a new isolationism.

Some efforts to meet forseeable difficulties were, it is true, made during the war itself. Thus a United Nations conference was held at Hot Springs, Virginia, in May 1943, which established a Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). In November 1943 a Washington conference created the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) to "plan, coordinate, [and] administer . . . measures for the relief of victims of war in any area under the control of the United Nations." And at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in July 1944, an International Bank for Reconstruction and Development was set up. In all these cases the major share of financial responsibility was placed on the United States, and often the implementation of the accepted principles created more rather than less disunity.[2]

[2] This was especially evident after President Truman in August 1945, a few days after Japan asked for peace, ordered the immediate cessation of lend-lease activities.

TWO WORLDS: U.S.A. AND U.S.S.R.

Overshadowing all other postwar international considerations was a fundamental disagreement between the United States and Great Britain on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other. The disagreement went far deeper than any dispute that alienated Great Britain and France, or those countries and the United States, in the twenty years' armistice of 1919–1939.

Out of the mystery that Russia long had been to Western minds, and out of the welter of propaganda that emanated from Moscow, certain Soviet objectives emerged during and after the Second World War. The objectives in large measure were Russian rather than Bolshevik, but the proselyting character of the Soviet ideology made the situation more threatening to the West than in tsarist days.

As late as 1914, after two centuries of effort, Tsarist Russia had not yet achieved a goal set for his successors by Peter the Great (d. 1725). This goal was the securing of direct access to a number of warm-water ports. By the time of the First World War, the empire's conquests had brought access to the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Pacific Ocean. But almost ceaseless effort and costly wars had failed to bring control of the straits connecting (and separating) the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, of the Arabian and Iranian areas leading, respectively, to the eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, or of the Chinese territories bordering the Yellow Sea. Regularly, the "bear who walks like a man" had been checked in his attempts to make these gains by one or more among Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan. Then, following the Bolshevik Revolution and the Paris Peace Settlement, Russia lost even some of the territories and influence painfully acquired in the years between the reigns of Peter I and Nicholas II.

That diminished, impoverished, and strife-ridden Russia which in 1923 became the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics spent the ensuing years as a virtual outcast from the family of nations. Facing in these early years continuing internal opposition, the Soviet leaders simultaneously were keenly aware of the dislike, fear, and hatred with which they were regarded abroad. This foreign attitude was largely engendered by the Russians themselves—by their dogmatism, their refusal to honor the international commitments of their predecessors, their avowed purpose to bring about world revolution and overthrow capitalism, and their unwillingness to carry on diplomacy in the generally accepted fashion. Indeed the rise of fascism to the west and east of the U.S.S.R. was to a considerable degree in direct

reaction to communist activities and propaganda. At any rate, the aloofness of the other powers, great and small, in turn developed among Moscow's rulers a deep-seated feeling of fear and insecurity. In view of the control of the Communist Party over all Russians, it was relatively easy for the leaders to imbue the masses with a similar sense of insecurity.

Gradually, with the passing of time, the change in circumstances, and concessions on both sides, the Soviet Union was readmitted to relatively good standing in the family of nations. Meanwhile, through unyielding hardness and successive Five-Year Plans, the U.S.S.R. had become internally stronger and had experienced a revival of Russian nationalism. Indeed, for a time the Third International or Comintern appeared to have become as much an international society for the defense of Holy Russia as an international revolutionary body. Playing it cleverly, the Soviets emerged during the period of axis-democratic rivalry with virtual balance of power. Through temporary coöperation with Nazi Germany, and with the loss of blood only in Finland, they utilized the turbulent days of 1939–1940 to reacquire most of the territory lost as a consequence of the First World War.

Finally, after the Nazi invasion of 1941, the Soviet Union suddenly found itself welcomed once more as an ally by its former "arch-enemies"—Great Britain, (Free) France, and the United States. So affecting was the new happiness that, in May 1943, the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Third International dissolved the Comintern "as the directing center of the international working-class movement." The dissolving resolution explained that henceforth "in countries of the anti-Hitlerite coalition the sacred duty of the widest masses of the people . . . consists in aiding by every means the military efforts of the governments of these countries aimed at the speediest defeat of the Hitlerite bloc and the assurance of the friendship of nations based on their equality. At the same time the fact must not be lost sight of that . . . speediest victory over the enemy can be best of all and most fruitfully carried out by the vanguard of the working-class movement of each separate country, working within the framework of its own country." [3]

After the suffering of the war years 1941–1945, and after the final

[3] The joy occasioned in other countries by the dissolution of the Comintern was somewhat dimmed by an amendment of 1944 to the Soviet Constitution. This change gave the member republics of the U.S.S.R. the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states, conclude foreign agreements, and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with other governments. Acting under the new authority, two of the republics, the Ukraine and Byelorussia (White Russia), asked for and obtained membership in the United Nations. In 1946 the Soviet commissariats were renamed ministries.

almost hysterical triumph, no amount of factual proof could make the Soviet leaders (and hence the Soviet people) admit that the victory had been a coöperative affair and not won only by Russian might and sacrifices. Riding high yet filled with suspicion, pugnaciously exuberant yet cynical, stubborn and unyielding yet demanding understanding and concessions on the part of others, powerful yet insecure, carrying on wholesale espionage abroad yet loudly denouncing any foreign intelligence activities,[4] the Russians seemed to feel that the time at last had come to fulfil the desire of centuries. And what was that desire? To expand to east and west, to erect satellite buffer states on all fronts, to create a new Russian Empire out of the hoped-for ruins of the capitalist empires. But by this time Russian Empire meant Soviet Empire, with its Bolshevik ideology that advocated boring from within, subversion, and violence wherever traditional democracy prevailed.

An early concrete manifestation of the postwar Soviet attitude came in the reëstablishment of a modified Comintern.[5] This grew out of a meeting in Warsaw in 1947, attended by communist leaders from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, the U.S.S.R., France, Czechoslovakia, and Italy. The conference set up a Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) at Belgrade. The bureau, containing two representatives from the central committee of each affiliated national communist party, was to "coördinate the activity of communist parties on foundations of mutual agreement." The manifesto announcing the establishment of the Cominform blatantly informed the world that whereas the U.S.S.R. had fought the war for the "rebuilding and strengthening of democracy in Europe," the United States had fought for "the elimination of competition in the world market." Thus did Bolshevism advance the challenge of two worlds on the morrow of the costliest war in history.

Opposing the U.S.S.R. in its efforts to establish hegemony over much of Europe and Asia were Great Britain and, especially, because of her strength, the United States. Great Britain strove wherever possible to

[4] While the Soviets expanded their spy system, those persons in the United States who advocated a professional intelligence service had difficulty overcoming the traditional American dislike for espionage activities. The effective wartime Office of Strategic Services directed by Major General William Joseph Donovan was abolished in 1945. In its place was created (1946) a Central Intelligence Agency with a limited sphere of action and much publicity.

[5] The attitude also was manifested in lesser matters. Thus, Moscow forbade the emigration of the Russian women who had married Allied foreigners stationed in the U.S.S.R. during the war. Foreign Minister Molotov gave as reasons that the women would "talk too much" and that it was their duty to "bear babies for the Soviet Government," not for any foreign governments. This policy was modified in 1953, after Stalin's death.

retain such influence as she had through centuries acquired. London understandably had no more desire to relinquish authority in the Near East than did Moscow in Estonia or Finland or Hungary or Korea. Even the British socialists objected to an aggrandizement-bent Moscow's insistence on the wickedness of an ally's efforts to retain status as a first-rate power. Simultaneously the United States, with ideals and with power, found it hard to "play ball" with Bolshevism triumphant. Having twice within 25 years become involved in wars of European origin, and having been caught ill prepared in 1941 because of a traditional dislike of militarism, the United States now expressed, through President Truman, a determination to insist on the implementation of certain "fundamental principles of righteousness and justice." [6]

These principles (made public in October 1945) included a disavowal of desire for territorial expansion; disapproval of territorial changes "in any friendly part of the world" without the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned; establishment among the defeated nations of "peaceful, democratic governments of their own free choice;" refusal to "recognize any government imposed upon any nation by the force of any foreign power;" freedom of the seas; the general promotion of freedom of speech and religion; equal access to trade and raw materials; and coöperation in the United Nations with "all the peace-loving nations of the world who are willing jointly to use force if necessary to insure peace." Simultaneously, the President emphasized the power of the United States and its determination to remain strong. The military forces would be kept sizable, and the United States would retain certain strategic bases and Japanese mandates conquered during the war.

The Soviet Union, for its part, was acting in a way that ran counter to a number of the expressed United States ideals. Masters at hair-splitting, tireless in speech-making, skilful in digging out of general agreements interpretations that no one else appeared to have had in mind, the Bolsheviks delayed settlements which Europe and the world eagerly awaited. Then, with the European economic situation deteriorating rapidly, Moscow interpreted as signs of aggressive intention any indications of impatience on the part of the other major powers. Leaving for later discussion the divergence of their views regarding Germany, let us here note that the crystallization of the issue between the two former allies became especially

[6] The celerity with which selective service was ended, the difficulty encountered by the armed forces in keeping voluntary enlistments high, and a long-drawn-out Congressional battle over peacetime conscription, offered clear proof of United States unwillingness to uphold military might except in dire emergency.

marked from March 1947. At that time, when it appeared that the Bolsheviks were encouraging subversive activities in Greece and Turkey—which alone in southeastern Europe had remained outside the Soviet orbit—President Truman called on the United States Congress to lend prompt aid to the governments in Athens and Ankara.

The President's message, soon called the Truman Doctrine, pointed out that two alternate ways of life now presented themselves to the peoples of the world—wherever there was freedom of choice. One way was based on the will of the majority and characterized by free elections, representative government, and freedom of speech and conscience. The other was "based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority" and relied upon oppression, censorship, and the absence of personal freedoms. Specifically, the peoples of such countries as Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria had "recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will." The same must not be allowed to happen in Greece and Turkey, for "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." Hence, so that the United States contribution of $341,000,000,000 towards winning the Second World War might not have been in vain, the message requested help for Greece and Turkey to remove the misery, want, and strife which otherwise would bring despair and make fertile the soil for totalitarianism.

The urgency was increased because Greece's pro-Soviet neighbor governments in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania were supporting anti-Athens guerrillas and accusing Greece of aggressive frontier activities.[7] Simultaneously Great Britain, which hitherto had helped sustain the royal government in Athens, found it necessary to retrench and withdraw its forces. The President's proposal became law in May 1947, when $400,000,000 was made available for aid, three-quarters for Greece and the remainder for Turkey.

Soon the principle of extending aid to Europe was considered on a much larger scale. Secretary of State George C. Marshall proposed a general plan for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Europe on a basis of self-help plus United States financial assistance. The Marshall Plan urged the European countries to shake off their lethargy, coöperate to revive a working European economy, and report on their actual needs for outside help. The only conditions attached to the offer were that the initiative must rest with a Europe ready to go to work, that aid would not be given to finance a hostile way of life, and that there must be some guarantee that the money

[7] King George II, who had left Greece in 1941, returned in 1946 after a plebiscite.

would be used in a way which the United States regarded as productive of the goal of a strong economic Europe. In the early summer of 1947 the foreign ministers of Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union met to consider the plan. Molotov regularly disagreed with his Western colleagues and finally denounced the proposal as one which would lead to foreign interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign European countries. With obvious reluctance, Russia's satellites seconded her stand and refused to join a later general European conference to assess individual and collective resources and needs.

Thus the focus was shifted and a Soviet versus United States issue emerged once more. In the winter of 1947–1948 the Marshall Plan came to be supported in the United States not merely out of humanitarian reasons and as a means of sustaining export figures, but as the one remaining means of "containing" Russia short of war—as a weapon in a new and bitter economic conflict for the souls of millions of Western and Central Europeans whose traditions were alien to so much that came out of the East.[8]

At any rate, and to the comfort of the moderate elements in Europe, the United States adopted the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, which set up an Economic Coöperation Administration (ECA) to carry out a European Recovery Program (ERP). President Truman appointed Paul Gray Hoffman, president of the Studebaker Corporation, to head the ECA. Shortly thereafter, sixteen European states (all outside the Soviet orbit) formed an Organization for European Economic Coöperation (OEEC) to rebuild Europe's economy and make the most effective use of United States aid.

There could, then, be little doubt that the ideals and self-interests of the United States and the Soviet Union were in disharmony. Any resolution of the differences in calm and reasoned fashion was made the more difficult by untruthful communist propaganda, by Soviet stubbornness, and by the fact that a starving, freezing, confused, lassitude-filled Europe had become the pawn in a battle of titans. Ways of doing things which seemed dishonest and tricky to the Americans, British, and French were looked upon as merely shrewd by the Russians. Similarly, where Westerners regarded compromise as wise and courageous, the Russians looked upon concessions as signs of weakness and stupidity. How to bring about a meeting of these

[8] Further to strengthen the defensive system of the United States, and in view of lessons learned during the war, a law of July 1947 created a new national Department of Defense, which embraced the army, the navy, and the air force. The first secretary of defense was the former secretary of the navy, James Vincent Forrestal. The civilian secretaries of the army, the navy, and the air force, were without cabinet rank.

minds was perhaps the chief problem of the day. Meanwhile, in so troubled an atmosphere the United Nations began its work and the peace treaties were written.

FORMATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS

It became increasingly clear, as the Second World War wore on, that some form of effective international organization was necessary if humanity wished to avoid the specter of an even more disastrous third global conflict. Among Western Europeans the conviction grew that new machinery must be created, of a type more likely to be utilized than was the League of Nations. Among United States citizens of both large political parties the feeling grew that United States isolationism in the post-1919 period probably helped prevent the erection of an effective international security system. President Roosevelt emerged as leader of those who believed that the United States would "have to take the responsibility for world collaboration" or else "bear the responsibility for another world conflict." In this stand he was seconded by Wendell Lewis Willkie (1892–1944), unsuccessful Republican presidential candidate in 1940. The Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Declaration of January 1942 foreshadowed the development of a successor to the League.

Seeking to apply the lesson of experience, the Allied leaders decided to keep the matter of a new world organization distinct from the drafting and early enforcement of any peace treaties. Hence strenuous effort was made to bring a United Nations organization into existence while the wartime coöperation was still strong "and before the great coalition was weakened by disagreements which were bound to make their appearance at the peace table."

From the time of American entry into the war, much preliminary studying and planning, official and private, was done in both the United States and Great Britain. This bore first fruit in congressional resolutions of 1943 endorsing the principle of United States participation in appropriate international peace machinery.[9] Then came a Moscow Declaration of Four Nations on General Security issued in November 1943 by the United States, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., and China. The declaration, among other things, stated that the powers concerned "recognize the

[9] The Fulbright Resolution in the House and the Connally Resolution in the Senate. Both major-party platforms in 1944 supported the substance of the resolutions, as did presidential candidates Roosevelt (Democrat) and Thomas Edmund Dewey (Republican).

necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security."

The next step was taken in the Washington Conversations at Dumbarton Oaks on International Peace and Security Organization (August–October, 1944). Here the representatives of the same four powers drew up general principles for a new world organization. The outline provided for an assembly, a security council, a secretariat, and an international court, all resembling in composition and functions the similar bodies in the old League. In addition, there were projected an Economic and Social Council and a Military Staff Committee to command the international armed forces which it was proposed to make available to the new organization.

Already at Dumbarton Oaks it became evident that the views of the U.S.S.R. and the other great powers would clash on some points. Moscow apparently accepted the idea of a world organization only for the convenience of using the new society as a medium for getting general acceptance by all nations of the big powers' decisions and as a sounding board for Soviet propaganda. The Soviet Union had no intention of countenancing a setup wherein the larger number of Western-oriented countries could regularly overrule Bolshevik Russia and her satellites. Hence there was raised the question of the precise right of each great power to veto, in certain cases, the adoption of any decision of which it might not approve. Moscow wanted an absolute veto, on the theory that only unanimity among the big states could actually preserve peace. Washington agreed to the principle of a veto, but wished to restrict its use in cases where the state involved was party to a dispute under review. Britain and China wished to limit still further the veto power of any one state. Hence at Dumbarton Oaks the differences were shelved for later settlement.

Further progress was made at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. Here the Messrs. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin agreed that an organizational conference of the United Nations should be held at San Francisco, with the Dumbarton Oaks proposals as the basis of discussion. It was also agreed that, in the council, decisions on matters of procedure should be made by a majority vote of seven of the eleven members; decisions on substantive matters, however, would require seven affirmative votes including those of the five great powers who would be permanent members of the council.[10] A party to a dispute, finally, should abstain from voting. Unhappily, Roosevelt and Churchill did not foresee the struggles that later

[10] The United States, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., France, and China.

would develop over the question of whether certain items were procedural or substantive.

The San Francisco Conference sat from April 25 to June 26, 1945. Fifty nations participated, and fifty-one became original signatories of the resulting United Nations Charter. The document entered into force, following appropriate ratifications, on October 24, 1945.[11] A Preparatory Commission met in London during the autumn of 1945 to work out necessary details, and the first meeting of the General Assembly convened in London in January 1946. In December of the same year, the assembly voted to establish permanent headquarters on a site in mid-Manhattan, offered as a gift by John D. Rockefeller, Jr.

THE FIRST FIVE PEACE TREATIES, 1947

Leaving for later description the structure and activities of the United Nations, let us turn now to the negotiation of peace. The attempted organization of peace after the close of hostilities in 1945 offered little parallel to the peace-making procedures of 1918–1919. During the Second World War the Allied leaders had gone much farther along the path of advance preparation for the eventual peace proceedings than had previously been the case. Virtually all the major wartime conferences enunciated principles to govern not merely the immediate military strategy, but the eventual planning of peace. A European Advisory Commission, representing the Big Three, was set up in London in the fall of 1943, with instructions to study major diplomatic questions as soon as they arose or could be foreseen.[12] Important private groups such as the Council on Foreign Relations in the United States and the Royal Institute of International Affairs in Great Britain made expert studies and influential recommendations on future policy in all parts of the world. Unfortunately for later harmony, the principles accepted by the respective heads of states were sometimes stated so loosely as to be open to conflicting interpretations. And for the sake of immediate agreement, serious differences often were glossed over, only to crop out later in a form to stalemate international action.

By the summer of 1945 it was generally agreed that "a full-dress peace conference, like that of Paris in 1919, should be avoided." Realism, it was held, demanded recognition of the fact that a workable settlement would

[11] The United States Senate consented to ratification with only two dissenting votes.
[12] A French representative was added to the commission in November 1944. At the end of hostilities the commission was replaced by separate Allied Control Commissions (or Councils) for Austria, Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Japan.

depend, in the last analysis, on agreement among and support from the great powers—regardless of the wishes of the lesser Allies. Hence at Potsdam in July 1945 there was established the Council of Foreign Ministers, representing the four great victorious powers.[13] This council, meeting periodically, was to draft the peace treaties with Italy and the smaller states of Eastern Europe. The task was completed within two years, for the U.S.S.R. was eager to get the Allied occupation forces out of Italy, and the Western Allies wanted Soviet troops removed from the satellite states.

The first direct steps in peacemaking were taken by the Council of Foreign Ministers in London during September 1945.[14] It soon appeared that the discussions would be largely in terms of future control of Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean area. Thus Molotov astonished his colleagues by requesting a Soviet trusteeship over the former Italian colony of Libya. He also gave vigorous backing to communist-dominated Yugoslavia's demand for expansion along the Adriatic at Italy's expense. Before long "it was apparent that the main task was not to make peace with Italy and the Balkan nations, but to make a settlement between the Western powers and the Soviet Union."

The focus of dispute was the circumstance that the Western powers regarded as temporary and the U.S.S.R. regarded as permanent the dominant position Moscow had gained in Eastern Europe through the armistice agreements with the former axis satellites, now become Soviet satellites. This remained a block to successful negotiation even though the Western delegates, for the sake of accomplishment, made concessions in principle and in detail. No treaties were drafted by the meeting; only a few guiding principles were accepted. Here, as elsewhere later on, the willingness of the Western leaders to make concessions and accept compromise confirmed the Bolsheviks in their views that it paid to be rudely unyielding, and that the best way to win was to combine occupation of satellite areas with vituperative propaganda offensives and hard bargaining at the conference table.

A meeting of the United States, British, and Russian foreign ministers in Moscow during December 1945 was more successful in bringing agreement on certain procedures relative to the five projected peace treaties. It was decided that the final texts would be written by the Council of Foreign Ministers, but that opportunity would be given at a conference for the

[13] China was to be included whenever Far Eastern questions were discussed.
[14] The surrender dates of the countries with which peace was promptly to be made were: Italy, September 3, 1943; Romania, August 23, 1944; Bulgaria, September 9, 1944; Finland, September 19, 1944; and Hungary, January 20, 1945.

presentation of the views of all states that had waged war against the axis in Europe, and of the five satellites themselves. Also that, after the treaties were signed, Allied occupation forces would be withdrawn from the countries affected. Soviet troops, however, might remain in Romania and Hungary to protect the Russian lines of communication as long as the U.S.S.R. continued to occupy Austria.[15]

The Council of Foreign Ministers held its second meeting in two sessions at Paris from April to July 1946. Here sufficient agreement was reached on all five drafts to justify the calling of a conference of all United Nations members who had fought the axis in Europe. The resulting Paris Conference was attended by delegates from 21 states, who sat from July 29 to October 15, 1946.[16] Once again action was held up by time-wasting discussion of procedural and substantive issues. Eventually the performance became so ridiculous that the conference voted limited speaking periods for each delegation on each treaty. After more than eleven weeks of talk, the representatives of twenty nations indicated approval of numerous recommendations concerning the five draft treaties. These would now go back to the Council of Foreign Ministers for final action. Only Yugoslavia did not sign, because the Italian draft did not meet all Belgrade's demands.

The third meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers was held in New York during November and December 1946. There the final peace treaties were written, though not entirely in accord with the wishes of a majority at the Paris Conference. All five treaties required reparation payments, demilitarization, surrender of surplus war materials to the Allies, and a guarantee of equal rights for minorities. All except that with Bulgaria brought territorial losses. Some further weeks were consumed in preparing official English, Russian, and French texts of the documents. At last, on February 10, 1947, they were signed in Paris by twenty-one members of the United Nations and the five defeated states. The necessary ratifications to make the treaties effective were deposited in Paris (for Italy) and Moscow (for the others) on September 15, 1947. From that day formal peace was restored to a large part of Europe. Yet, since not one of the defeated states regarded its treaty as fair, "the campaign for revision began at once."

The treaty with Italy deprived that country of several small territories

[15] Here again the Russians had something in mind that occurred to no one else until after the event. Moscow delayed the negotiation of an Austrian treaty for year after year, thus making legal her continuing occupation of Romania and Hungary.
[16] Meanwhile the international atmosphere had been further poisoned by Moscow's failure to abide by an earlier agreement and withdraw from Iran the Soviet troops who had been stationed there during the war.

in Europe and all its colonies. France received the Little St. Bernard Pass, the Montcenis Plateau, the Mont Thabor and Chaberton area, and a region including the communes of Briga and Tenda (renamed by the French: Brigue-Tende). To Yugoslavia went 3000 square miles in eastern Venezia Giulia plus Zara and some Adriatic islands, including Pelagosa. Yugoslavia also wanted Trieste, but this was made a free territory, to be administered by a governor appointed and paid by the Security Council of the United Nations. The Dodecanese Islands, Rhodes, and Castellorizo went to Greece. Albania recovered the island of Saseno, which she had lost to Italy after the First World War. The South Tirol remained Italian, but the treaty recognized an Austro-Italian agreement of September 1946 that guaranteed equal rights and a limited autonomy to the German-speaking inhabitants.

Italy renounced all rights to Libya, Eritrea, and Italian Somaliland. Their future was to be determined jointly by the governments of the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union within one year of the coming into force of the treaty. If these governments could not agree. then the matter was to be referred to the General Assembly of the United Nations for a recommendation, which recommendation would be accepted by the four powers. In October 1947 the deputies of the four foreign ministers appointed a commission to investigate conditions in the colonies and discover the political sentiments of the inhabitants. (Both Ethiopia and Albania had been freed from Italian control during the war and reëstablished as independent countries. Haile Selassie returned to Ethiopia as emperor in May 1941. In Albania, where Russian influence was strong at the end of the war, a constituent assembly proclaimed the country a republic in 1946. The Leftist Colonel General Enver Hoxha became premier and dictator.)

The reparation burden imposed upon Italy was $360,000,000. This was to be paid in commodities over a seven-year period and distributed as follows: $125,000,000 to Yugoslavia; $105,000,000 to Greece; $100,000,000 to the Soviet Union; $25,000,000 to Ethiopia; and $5,000,000 to Albania. The treaty limited Italy's army to 250,000 men and 200 tanks. Her navy was reduced to 25,000 men, 10 war vessels, and some torpedo boats. The air force was limited to 25,000 effectives with 200 fighter planes and 150 transport planes. Fortifications along the French and Yugoslav borders, along the coasts of Sicily and Sardinia, and on such islands as Lampedusa and Pantelleria, were to be razed. These terms were to remain in force until modified by agreement between Italy and the other signatories, or, after Italian admission to the United Nations, between Italy and the Security Council.

Romania's treaty confirmed that country's earlier cession of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina to the U.S.S.R. and of southern Dobruja to Bulgaria. But Romania regained the Transylvanian territory which, under axis pressure, she had had to give Hungary in 1940. Reparation was awarded only to the Soviet Union, which was to receive $300,000,000 in commodities over eight years. The Romanian army was limited to 120,000 men, the navy to 5000, and the air force to 8000 effectives.

Bulgaria lost no territory; she regained the southern Dobruja previously lost to Romania. Her reparation figure was set at $70,000,000 payable over eight years; $45,000,000 would go to Greece and $25,000,000 to Yugoslavia. The Bulgarian army was cut to 55,000 men, the navy to 3500, and the air force to 5200. There were to be no permanent fortifications on the Bulgarian side of the frontier with Greece.

The treaty with Finland, in its territorial clauses, largely confirmed Russia's gains as recorded in the Treaty of Moscow (1940) and the armistice of September 1944. These included the Karelian Isthmus, the Salla sector, Petsamo Province, and a fifty-year lease on Porkkala-Udd, west of Helsinki, for the establishment of a Soviet naval base. Russia was to be paid reparation of $300,000,000 in commodities over an eight-year period.[17] The Finnish army was not to exceed 34,400 men, the navy 4500, and the air force 3000 with a maximum of 60 planes.

Hungary had to return to Romania the portion of Transylvania that changed hands in 1940 and to Czechoslovakia the land acquired in Slovakia by the Vienna Award of 1938. Czechoslovakia also got the villages of Horvathjarfalu, Oroszvar, and Dunacsun, south of the Danube at Bratislava. The U.S.S.R. was to receive $200,000,000 in reparation, and Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia together $100,000,000, payable in commodities over eight years. Prague and Belgrade agreed to divide their share in a proportion of $30,000,000 and $70,000,000, respectively. The Magyar army was limited to 65,000 men and the air force to 5200 with 70 combat planes.

The peace treaties left heavily-armed Yugoslavia the strongest power in the Balkans. The U.S.S.R., on the other hand, was the chief financial beneficiary. It was awarded almost 70 per cent of the total reparation assessment among the five states, being scheduled to receive $900,000,000 of the $1,330,000,000. The Soviet Union, moreover, also got territorial cessions from Czechoslovakia and Poland. From the former, by a Soviet-

[17] In 1948, with an eye to improving the chances of the Finnish communists in elections scheduled for July, Moscow reduced the Finnish reparation bill by $75,000,000. The communists lost several seats in the new parliament.

EUROPE
JULY 1948
International boundaries, 1948
1 From Finland to U.S.S.R.
2 Leased to U.S.S.R.
3 Under U.S.S.R. administration
(Not recognized by United States)
4 From Germany to U.S.S.R.
5 From Poland to U.S.S.R.
6 From Czechoslovakia to U.S.S.R.
7 From Romania to U.S.S.R.
8 From Germany to Poland
9 From Italy to Yugoslavia
10 From Romania to Bulgaria
11 From Italy to France
12 From Hungary to Romania
13 From Hungary to Czechoslovakia
Scale of Miles
0 100 200 300
70° 0° 10° 20° 30° 40°
60° 50° 40°
NORWAY
SWEDEN
FINLAND
Oslo
Stockholm
Helsinki
Tallinn
ESTONIA
Riga
LATVIA
LITHUANIA
Kaunas
Moscow
U. S. S. R.
NORTH SEA
DENMARK
Copenhagen
BALTIC SEA
ENGLAND
London
NETHERLANDS
Danzig
Berlin
GERMANY
(Under Allied Occupation)
Warsaw
POLAND
BELGIUM
Paris
FRANCE
Prague
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Vienna
AUSTRIA
(OCCUPIED)
SWITZ.
Budapest
HUNGARY
BESSARABIA
ROMANIA
Bucharest
Trieste
CHERSO I.
Belgrade
YUGOSLAVIA
Zara
ADRIATIC SEA
LAGOSA I.
SASENO I.
ALBANIA
BULGARIA
Sofia
Istanbul
Rome
ITALY
GREECE
AEGEAN SEA
TURKEY
Athens
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
BLACK SEA

Czechoslovak Treaty of June 1945, Moscow got Subcarpathian Ruthenia. From Poland, by a Soviet-Polish Treaty of August 1945, she got a large section of eastern Poland, which was added to the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Republics. At the Potsdam Conference, in August 1945, Königsberg and a considerable area around it in East Prussia were placed under Soviet administration; the Messrs. Truman and Attlee agreed to support the eventual transfer of the region to the Soviet Union. The United States did not recognize the wartime Soviet annexations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TREATY NEGOTIATIONS

In the official wartime utterances about peacemaking, there were laid down some principles having general application and others relating to specific areas. Basic principles were set forth in such documents as the Atlantic Charter (1941), the Declaration of United Nations (1942), and President Roosevelt's statement at the Casablanca Conference (1943) that denazification and demilitarization would be required of all defeated powers. From 1943 on, specific statements also were forthcoming, especially with regard to Austria, Germany, and Japan. Thus a conference of foreign ministers at Moscow in November 1943 issued a Declaration on Austria. Herein the great powers declared that they regarded the "annexation imposed upon Austria by Germany . . . as null and void" and that they wished "to see reëstablished a free and independent Austria." It thus appeared that Austria would eventually be classed as a liberated rather than a defeated country.

The Big Three at the Yalta Conference (February 1945) agreed that Poland's eastern boundary should be moved westward from its prewar line to the old Curzon Line of 1919. Poland would be compensated for this loss to Russia at the expense of Germany. The conference also outlined plans for German reparation and for the eventual zonal occupation and control of Germany—in which France would be invited to participate. (Churchill advocated the joint occupation of Germany as a whole, but was outvoted by Stalin and Roosevelt.) Secret territorial arrangements were approved concerning the Far East. These were not made public until a year later, because at the time of the Crimea gathering the U.S.S.R. and Japan were not yet at war with one another. It was agreed that southern Sakhalin should be "returned" and the Kurile Islands "handed over" by Japan to the Soviet Union. Outer Mongolia, under Soviet tutelage but still looked upon as Chinese by China, was to become officially independent.

Finally, "preëminent" Soviet interests were recognized in Manchuria. Obviously some of these arrangements were made at the expense of an ally, but there was little that China could do to change them.

By the time of the Potsdam Conference (July–August 1945), President Roosevelt had died and had been succeeded by Truman. Prime Minister Churchill, moreover, had suffered a party defeat in British parliamentary elections and been succeeded by the Laborite Attlee. Hence it was a group two-thirds new which after V–E Day worked on the outline of Germany's future. The resulting agreement confirmed the lines of four occupation zones and declared that "so far as is practicable, there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout Germany." The administration of affairs was to be directed toward decentralization, and, "for the time being," no central German government was to be established.

During the occupation Germany was to be treated "as a single economic unit." The German economy was to be decentralized, the cartel concentrations were to be eliminated, and emphasis for the future was to be placed on the "development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries." The Reich was to pay as much as possible by way of reparation, and the claims of United Nations members were to be met by the removal of German industrial plants and from German external assets. (The lack of a clear definition of "German external assets" led to many quarrels later.) Sufficient resources were to be left to give the inhabitants a standard of living no higher than the average in Europe, not counting Great Britain or the Soviet Union.[18]

Approval was given at Potsdam to Moscow's wish for the annexation of Königsberg and its hinterland in East Prussia. Poland was to administer Upper and Lower Silesia as well as portions of East Prussia, Pomerania, and Brandenburg—"pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier" to be drawn in the German peace treaty. It was here, also, that the Council of Foreign Ministers was created to draft the treaties with the smaller defeated states and prepare a German settlement.

At the first half of the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers (April–May 1946) (see p. 606), the United States wished to take up the question of a treaty with Austria, also divided into four occupation

[18] Since the collection of reparation was to begin promptly, it was necessary to determine the shares for the various Allied states. Such a determination was made through the Paris Agreement on Reparation of January 1946. The eighteen participating countries were Albania, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Greece, India, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Yugoslavia. These were to receive 75 per cent of the reparation dues; the U.S.S.R. and Poland were to get the remaining 25 per cent. But no total figure was set.

zones by an Allied agreement of July 1945 (by which time the fact of zonal occupation already had taken place). Russia, however, vetoed the proposal. During the second part of the meeting (June–Juiy 1946), the United States and Great Britain offered drafts of Austrian treaties. Both recognized the republic's independence and provided for the prompt withdrawal of the occupation forces. The U.S.S.R. once more objected, claiming that denazification had not progressed sufficiently and that Austria was still the refuge of many displaced persons who were unfriendly to Moscow. Hence there was no progress in this direction.

The United States also raised the question of a German treaty at the beginning of this conference, for the course of events in the Russian Zone prevented the agreed-upon administration of the country as an economic unit. The U.S.S.R. demanded more time to "study" the situation, and so, since unanimity was required for action, there was no action. A United States motion to unify the four zones economically was coolly received, and when the United States then offered to administer its zone in joint economic unity with any other, only Great Britain responded. Late in 1946 Washington and London signed an agreement for the gradual economic unification of their zones.

The Paris Conference of Twenty-One Nations (July–October 1946), which met to study the five draft treaties, did not have Germany on its agenda. Hence, though others tried, Moscow refused to allow any discussion of the subject. Not until the third meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, in New York (November–December 1946), was it decided to appoint special deputies to study the problems of a German peace settlement and an Austrian treaty. Both groups would begin by hearing the views of those two countries' neighbors. The reports of the deputies would form the basic agenda for the fourth meeting of the council, to be held in Moscow in March 1947.

This meeting opened inauspiciously. "'Preparation for it seemed to consist largely in public reiteration of conflicting views as a means of strengthening respective bargaining positions." The deputies, moreover, had spent most of their time disputing over procedural matters. In general, the Western deputies wished to allow direct participation by the smaller Allies in the drawing up of the final peace settlement; the Soviet deputies wanted the Big Four to do the job. Hence the deputies had chiefly disagreements to lay before the foreign ministers at Moscow. The gathering broke up after 50 days of wearying squabbles with virtually nothing accomplished. There emerged no German treaty draft, no increased German

economic or political unity, and no Austrian treaty. There did emerge more bitterness.

A factual summary of the fundamental differences between the Soviet and the Anglo-Franco-American positions regarding Germany and Austria was given in a report made after the close of the Moscow Conference by Dr. John Foster Dulles. A leading international lawyer and diplomat, he was one of the Republican advisers to the United States delegation at the several gatherings of the Council of Foreign Ministers, and later secretary of state under President Eisenhower:

> . . . the Soviet delegation wanted to rebuild Germany in a way which the other three delegations thought dangerous. We all wanted a Germany which . . . would never want to make war. But the United States, the British and the French also wanted a Germany which could not again make war even if it wanted to.
>
> The Soviet leaders were willing to take a chance on rebuilding a powerful Germany which might again be a powder keg in the middle of Europe. That represented a big change in Soviet thinking since the Potsdam Conference of 1945. Then the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States had agreed that peace would best be served if Germany did not have a high-powered central government, and if Germany were economically weakened by the removal of industrial plants, particularly those which could readily be converted to war purposes. Those plants, it was agreed, would be taken from Germany and shipped to the Allies, principally to the Soviet Union, as reparations.
>
> That Potsdam scheme did not work out very well in helping the Soviet Union. After the German plants were taken apart the Russians could not always put them together again. Even if they could, it was expensive business to get them going in Russia. Housing had to be built around the machinery and power lines and railroad tracks had to be connected with it. By now, the Russians have lost most of their original enthusiasm about getting plants from Germany. Many parts of German factories are rusting on the railroad sidings between Berlin and Moscow, and the Soviet authorities have taken from their own zone in Germany only about half of the plants to which they were entitled under the Potsdam Agreement. They have switched to taking as reparations, the goods which the Germans manufactured there.
>
> The Soviet Government now wants to extend that scheme to all of Germany and to get $10,000,000,000 worth of German goods. That, however, involves much more than writing a new reparation formula. It involves making Germany into a high-powered industrial state. Even if Germany does not go into the business of making goods for the Soviet Union, Germany will have to have considerable industry.
>
> Much of the farm lands of eastern Germany have been taken away and given to Poland. Also, about 10,000,000 Germans who used to live there or in Czechoslovakia have been expelled into Germany. The result will be nearly 70,000,000 Germans crowded into a Germany much smaller than before and

with relatively little farm land. . . . The people will starve unless they can get food from abroad. They can only pay for that food by manufacturing goods for export. That . . . will require considerable industrialization.

The new Soviet plan would add the further industrialization needed to enable Germany to go into mass production of goods for Soviet needs. If that happens, Germany will again be a great industrial power. . . .

The Soviet leaders, of course, know that this involves risk. However, Soviet economic needs are so acute and so vast, that they are now willing to take risks in order to get goods. They plan to reduce the risk by tying Germany tightly into their own political system so that, they figure, Germany's industrial might will never be used against them. They want in Germany three things: A strong central government operating from Berlin, which is in the Soviet zone; a single dominant political party, in which Communists will play a leading part; a trade union federation which will put all German trade unions under central control located at Berlin. Such a set-up they believe they can control by penetration, at which they are past masters. Under those conditions they are willing to risk turning Germany into a workshop for the Soviet Union. The plan, of course, also fits into Soviet world strategy.

The British, the French and ourselves could not agree to this new Soviet plan. . . . We wanted political institutions which would train Germans to think and act individually and not be mass followers of some fanatical leader. We wanted to see authority grow from the bottom up, and not be imposed from the top down.

We felt that Germany would be more apt to be peaceful under a federal system like our own—where there are checks and balances through states' rights and an independent judiciary, competing political parties and trade unions with local autonomy. We wanted a Germany where ideas and people and goods could move about freely. . . . Those are some of the things we wanted.

There were other things we did not want. We did not want Germany quickly rebuilt as a great, modern industrial machine. We did not want political and economic centralization so that anyone who controls Berlin would automatically control all Germany.

In other words, we did not want all the German eggs in one basket. That is too great a temptation to dangle before militant and vengeful persons who will surely again be found in Germany. Furthermore, we did not want a Germany which would be a projection into western Europe of a totalitarian system. . . .

We did not get an Austrian treaty though at times we seemed close to it. The Soviet delegation wanted Yugoslavia to get an important slice of Austrian territory and to get $150,000,000 from Austria by way of reparation. But the most debatable clauses were the economic clauses. The Soviet delegation wanted economic provisions which . . . would have made Austria a puppet state. They demanded ownership of the most important part of Austrian economy and the right to operate it free from the controls of Austrian law. The effect would have been to make much of Austria a part of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet claim derived from a prior agreement that the Soviet Union could take over, as reparations, German external assets in eastern Europe,

including German external assets in the eastern part of Austria, which the Soviet Army occupied. There was, however, at Moscow much dispute as to what were really 'German' assets. When, in 1938, Germany had seized Austria, German interests proceeded to take over a great part of its economy. The Austrian owners, many of them Jewish, were coerced into selling their property. Naturally, they got only a nominal price.

The Allies, including the Soviet Union, had at London in January, 1943, and again at Moscow in October, 1943, taken the position that they would regard such German acts as null and void. However, the Soviet Union now insists that, even where the Germans had acquired such Austrian assets by duress, the assets should not be restored, but should be turned over to the Soviet Union as the legitimate heir to all so-called 'German assets.'

The result, we estimated, would have been to leave the Austrian State a shell from which the Soviet would have picked the kernel. There would not be that 'free and independent' Austria which had been pledged by the Moscow Declaration of October, 1943. Under the circumstances, the United States delegation did not accept the only kind of a treaty to which the Soviet would agree. . . .[19]

Thereafter months rolled by with much uncertainty and suffering not only in Germany and Austria, but in neighboring regions that would have benefited economically from a settled state of affairs. There was little optimism when London, late in 1947, received the fifth meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Indeed, the parley might better not have been held, for it served chiefly to widen the gap between East and West. The Russians still made demands on Austria that the other big Allies regarded as inconsistent with the promise of Austrian independence. The three Western Allies wished to establish boundary commissions to recommend a new Polish-German frontier and study the Saar's future, but the Soviet Union rejected the proposal. As a consequence, the ministers were not even in agreement on "what they meant by Germany." The British, French, and Americans, finally, wanted a basis for discussing an equitable reparation distribution of Germany's resources; but this was not available because Moscow insisted on continuing withdrawals of current German production and refused to give any information with respect to wealth already removed. In the circumstances, adjournment was the only feasible step.

Thereafter, the U.S.S.R. continued to take from eastern Germany all that it wished and to strengthen the indigenous communist elements. Great Britain, and especially the United States, on the other hand, continued to pour commodities into western Germany, which could not support itself without the agricultural products of the eastern part of the country. From 1948, there was increasing talk of the conversion of the United States and

[19] Reprinted from *The New York Times,* April 30, 1947, by permission.

British zones into a complete, not merely an economic, "Bizonia," with the possibility that, through eventual addition of the French portion, it would become a "Trizonia." The story of these developments, and of the peace situation with respect to Japan, must be left for later chapters.

CHAPTER 22

Western Europe Since 1945

GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND

The election of July 1945 in Great Britain reflected the usual postwar reaction against a wartime government. Under Churchill's somewhat inept campaign leadership, the Conservative Party stood on its record, stressed the Red peril, and offered no positive domestic program. Eagerly sponsoring an early postwar election in the hope of winning through popular gratitude for the wartime guidance to victory, the Conservatives in the upshot were badly beaten. The Labor Party came out with definite, albeit radical, proposals. It was supported by the trade-unions, which had expanded during the war particularly through the addition of women war workers,[1] and it could point to patriotic coöperation in Parliament during the war years.

The election gave the Labor Party almost 400 of the 640 seats in the House of Commons—its first clear-cut majority in history. The Conservatives had about half of this number, and the Communist Party captured two seats. Clement Richard Attlee (1883–), as leader of the Labor Party, became prime minister, and Ernest Bevin (1881–1951) was made foreign secretary. It was noteworthy that the Laborites included proportionally fewer manual workers and many more professionals than was the case in the Parliament elected after the First World War. On the other hand, the number of company directors among Conservative Parliamen-

[1] Britain's trade-union membership was: 1936—5,295,000; 1939—6,231,000; 1944—8,024,000; 1948—9,301,000.

tarians fell from 179 in 1918 to 35 in 1945. This changed economic character of the House of Commons affected the course of legislation.[2]

The population of Britain (including Northern Ireland with 1,400,000) was estimated in 1952 at 50,650,000. Metropolitan London alone had more than 8,000,000. The public debt of the kingdom had tripled from 1939 to 1946. According to an official estimate, the war had cost Britain one-quarter of her national wealth. Wartime property damage on the island was estimated at $5,800,000,000 at 1946 replacement costs. The total casualties (killed, wounded, imprisoned, and missing) of the armed forces and the civilian population were 950,000.

The country therefore faced many difficult problems. It was necessary to readjust the national life to peacetime status. The bomb damage had to be repaired. Large occupation forces must be maintained in the conquered areas. Foreign trade must be rebuilt. Policies vis-à-vis the United States and the Soviet Union required reformulation. Momentous decisions had to be reached and implemented regarding India, Egypt, Palestine, and other overseas regions. Peace treaties had to be made. In 1947 unprecedentedly severe weather conditions followed by floods cost the lives of about 4,000,000 sheep and caused work stoppages among 2,000,000 laborers.

Solution of the domestic problems was sought in nationalization. High on the list for socialization came such "ripe" industries as coal production, which, it was said, needed new capital outlays in amounts that only the government could provide. Such "strong" industries as cotton textiles, ceramics, footwear, aluminum, shipping, and chemicals were officially regarded as "not yet ripe" for nationalization. In its first session (1945–1946) the postwar Parliament passed more than 80 bills, many of far-reaching economic and social significance. And the next session was little less ambitious. The total effect of the program, among other things, laid a heavy strain on both the man power and the financial resources of the country. By mid-1947 "one worker of every four was employed either by the national government or by a local authority."

First came nationalization of the Bank of England. This venerable institution became government property in February 1946. Stockholders transferred their shares to the government in exchange for national securities earning a guaranteed income equal to the average annual yield during the preceding twenty years. The operating practices and personnel of the

[2] Lest the House of Lords act as a check on its socialist plans, the Labor Government further reduced its authority. The Parliament Act of 1949 cut the suspensive veto power of the upper house from two years to one. A Representation of the People Act in 1948 reduced the size of the House of Commons from 640 to 625 members.

bank remained substantially unchanged. The first public board of directors differed little from the last private board. But the government was now in position, through its central bank, to control credit and investment policy.

The Coal Act of 1938, which had nationalized the deposits of coal, was followed in 1946 by the Coal Industry Nationalization Act, which nationalized the other assets of the industry. The former owners were compensated in government securities. The nationalized industry was to be managed by a National Coal Board responsible to the minister of fuel and power. About $600,000,000 was to be made available in the next five years for modernization and physical improvements. In January 1947 the board took over hundreds of mines and became the "owner" of about 1,000,000 acres of land, including farms and houses; thousands of railway wagons and pit ponies; and numerous wharves. It became the employer of 700,000 miners and of administrative staffs numbering 20,000. One of its first acts was to accede to the miners' demand for a five-day week with six days' pay.

The years 1946–1950 also saw the nationalization of civil aviation, telecommunications, radio, inland transport including long-distance trucking, the electric-supply industry, the gas industry, the iron and steel industry, and an atomic-energy development. In each case the conduct of the nationalized industry was left to a public corporation which enjoyed considerable autonomy and could draw on vast amounts of capital, raised through taxation.

The Town and Country Planning Acts of 1947 changed the whole system of freehold land tenure. They provided for coördinated official planning of all land development and assigned to the state the chief share of increased land values resulting from such improvement. In other words, the state, not the owner, would derive the major profit from the conversion, for example, of farmland into building lots. It became the task of the ministry of town and country planning, established in 1943, to supervise the "ideal" distribution of the land among agricultural, industrial, residential, and recreational uses, coördinate all national and local planning, and provide compensation to landowners for loss of "development value."

The National Insurance Act of 1946, operative in 1948, provided social security "from the cradle to the grave" for every person in the United Kingdom. It embodied compulsory insurance based on weekly contributions from workers, employers, and the state. The benefits included unemployment pay, sickness pay, maternity and widows' benefits, guardians' allowances for orphans, retirement pensions, and death grants. Small additional contributions were required for industrial workers to provide accident and disability payments. The National Health Service Act of 1946, also

effective in 1948, provided free medical, dental, and hospital services for all. The choice of doctor was left to the patient and the choice of activity to the doctor. Each participating physician received a basic fee from every patient treated. This "nationalization of doctors" was popular with the masses. And by 1950 about 26 per cent of the national appropriations were "devoted to social insurance."

Several laws passed before the Labor Government came to power, but requiring implementation by that government, fitted into this general picture of social legislation. An Education Act of 1944 established a ministry of education and the threefold classification of primary, secondary, and further education. The school-leaving age was changed from 14 to 15, effective in 1947, and from 1950 free County Colleges provided for the compulsory part-time education of all children between 15 and 18 who were not receiving full-time education. The local education authorities were obliged to set up free nursery schools wherever there was a "reasonable demand" for them. The Family Allowances Act of 1945 required the national treasury to pay every family a weekly allowance for every child under 16 except the first. The Distribution of Industry Act (1945) gave the government wide power to stimulate the growth of new and varied industries in the depressed areas. Many inducements were offered, and with some success, to private owners to make it worthwhile building new plants in southern Wales, northeastern England, and northern Scotland. Now the regions were optimistically renamed "development areas."

To make more efficient the utilization of the country's man power and to fit it into the national planning picture, a Control of Engagement Order of 1947 gave the government control over the labor of industrial workers. With some exceptions, men from 18 to 50 and women from 18 to 40 could henceforth leave one job and take another only through the employment exchanges set up by the ministry of labor. This development did result in the curtailment of unemployment and of strikes, but it was opposed by the trade-unions, and in 1950 the governmental control over labor was abolished.[3] Meanwhile, also in 1947, Parliament had passed a conscription act requiring twelve months' military training for the male youth of Britain.

Because of the bomb damage and for natural reasons, housing was one

[3] In 1946 the Labor Government fulfilled a promise to unionism by repealing the Trades Unions and Trades Disputes Act of 1927 (see p. 105). The act of 1946 repealed the earlier law and brought conditions back to a position "as if it had not been passed."

of the chief needs in postwar Britain. The working out of over-all building priorities was entrusted to the minister of works; but the specific priorities for housing were left to the decision of the minister of health. The latter formulated general principles and delegated the actual planning program to local authorities. The guiding principles were low-cost building, high subsidies, and low rentals. Fairly rapid progress was made. By mid-1949 almost a million families were rehoused.

Although agriculture was not nationalized, Agriculture Acts of 1947 and 1948 placed all farm activity under the direct control of the government, specifically the ministry of foods. The latter was empowered to establish the acreage to be sown, specify the crops to be raised, and fix the price of farm products and livestock in advance of their marketing. Inefficient or uncoöperative farmers, after a period of "supervision," might be dispossessed and their land worked by "a satisfactory tenant" or the government itself. Virtually all produce was purchased by the ministry and resold to the consuming public below cost—an expensive subsidy at the public's own expense.

The legislation which converted Britain into a socialist state greatly increased the number of state employees, the taxes, and the cost of producing British goods. These increases partly offset the benefits to the workers of their higher income. They also made more difficult the sale of British manufactures abroad—an increase in which was the chief need of an economically healthy Britain. A drought in 1946; the cold and floods of 1947; the continuing demands of labor for shorter hours, higher pay, and more "free" services; and the increasing economic nationalism of other countries, all added to the pool of national troubles.

Simultaneously, in order to build up its dollar balance, the government strove by propaganda and by law to cut down imports not merely of luxuries but of necessities. Most of the wartime rationing (food, tea, sweets, soap, domestic fuel, petrol, clothes) was continued to 1949, and in some cases beyond that, in a new "austerity" program. Indeed, bread, which had not been rationed during the war, was so restricted from 1946 to 1948. The importation of tobacco, books, and motion-picture films was sharply limited, and pleasure travel abroad was virtually eliminated.

By 1948 the volume of industrial production and of exports was well ahead of those in 1938; but the population also was greater, the imports were higher, the returns from the shrunken foreign investments (many of which were sold during the war) were less, there was little chance of collecting any of the $8,000,000,000 loaned to allies and governments-in-

exile during the war, and there were far more expensive international political and humanitarian commitments.[4] Loans from Canada and the United States totaling $5,000,000,000 were exhausted by the end of 1947, almost half the amount going for the purchase of food. The pound was devalued in 1949 to $2.80, and Marshall Plan aid was used until 1950. Britain, finding it difficult to redirect her foreign trade in a manner to purchase more from "soft-currency" countries and sell more to "hard-currency" countries, and continuing to buy more from "dollar areas" than she sold to them, could not attain true economic recovery by living on borrowed money.

In the regular parliamentary elections of February 1950 the people indicated some discontent with the continuing austerity and the international tensions. The Labor Party lost almost 80 seats to the Conservatives and retained a majority of fewer than half a dozen in the new House of Commons. Attlee kept a precarious hold on the premiership into 1951, curtailing further socialization in the interest of greater concentration on rearmament. This decision brought about a split in the party's ranks, the defection being led by the minister of labor, Aneurin Bevan. The latter resigned from the cabinet and stridently demanded more socialism and less coöperation with the United States in international affairs. The situation became so difficult that Attlee asked the king to dissolve Parliament and call a new election in October 1951. This time the Conservative Party won 321 of the 625 seats. Its leader, the 75-year-old Winston Churchill, became prime minister, and Anthony Eden was appointed foreign secretary. Four months later, in February 1952, King George VI expired. He was succeeded by his popular daughter, who ascended the throne as Queen Elizabeth II.

The new government checked the trend toward socialization but made no great effort to rescind its predecessor's social and economic legislation. The food subsidies were reduced, denationalization proceedings were begun in the iron and steel and trucking industries, an unsuccessful attempt was made to get major tariff concessions from the United States, the people were asked to work harder and produce more, and there was somewhat closer economic coöperation with other members of the Commonwealth. In 1953 both Churchill (now Sir Winston) and Eden were seriously ill, at a time when strong and energetic leadership was needed to pull Great Britain out of the political and economic doldrums into which she had drifted after her magnificent exertions of the Second World

[4] In 1948 the government established a Colonial Development Corporation, with large borrowing powers, to increase the productive capacity of Britain's colonies.

War. Meanwhile, in September 1953, the Trades Union Congress, from whose ranks came the bulk of Labor Party votes, adopted a report of its right-wing leaders stating that "it would not be true today to say that public opinion is strongly prepared for the transfer of further industries to public ownership." A majority of the workers, feeling that public ownership had done little more than change their employers without bringing them any direct profit, apparently lost interest in further nationalization.

Eire's neutrality in the Second World War brought her a somewhat improved economic position and a still more accentuated nationalism. The axis diplomats in Dublin were permitted wide latitude in propaganda and espionage activities, while Irish ports were closed to British and Allied war vessels. Premier de Valera continued to demand union of Northern Ireland and Eire, despite the obvious disinterest of a majority of the Ulsterites, and in 1945 expressed to the German Minister his sorrow over Hitler's death. Numerous southern Irishmen, however, enlisted in British fighting units or worked in British factories. After the war, Eire applied for membership in the United Nations, but her entry was several times vetoed by the Soviet Union. Dublin's request for inclusion in the Marshall Plan benefits was more successful, and she received considerable economic aid from the United States.

In 1945 de Valera's minister of finance, Seán T. O'Kelly, was elected president to succeed Douglas Hyde. He was reëlected without opposition for another seven-year term in 1952. Meanwhile, elections of 1948 had deprived de Valera's Fianna Fáil of its majority in the Dáil and brought to power John A. Costello at the head of a coalition of all other parties. The Costello Government late in 1948 secured passage of an act establishing the independent "Republic of Ireland" as of Easter 1949. This secession was recognized by the British Parliament through the Ireland Act of 1949, which provided that Ireland, though no longer a member of the Commonwealth, should not be regarded as a foreign country but should continue to enjoy such advantages as might accrue from membership. Two years later, in 1951, the Fianna Fáil again won the elections and de Valera once more became premier. The estimated population of Ireland in 1953 was 3,000,000.

FRANCE

French politics were no less confused during and after the war than in the years preceding 1939. In mid-1942 "Free France" became "Fighting France." In mid-1943 the French leaders who opposed the Vichy regime

formed a French Committee of National Liberation under the co-presidency of Generals Giraud and de Gaulle. De Gaulle soon emerged as sole president, and in 1944 his committee took the name of Provisional Government of the French Republic. In August 1944 this government moved its seat from Algiers to Paris and soon received official Allied recognition. A Provisional Consultative Assembly, also created in Algiers, in 1943, similarly moved to Paris; it held its last session in August 1945.

The first general French election since 1936 was held in October 1945. It was also the first in which women were permitted to vote and to run for office. The purpose of the balloting was the choosing of a Constituent Assembly. Altogether, 586 Constituent Assembly members were chosen, 522 for Metropolitan France and 64 for Algeria and France Overseas. The returns showed that France had moved far to the left in political outlook. The Communist Party captured the largest number of seats—151. Next came a new group called the MRP (*Mouvement Républicain Populaire*). Catholic in sympathy but left of center in outlook, it won 150 seats.[5] The Socialist Party came third with 139 seats. The assembly was to adopt any necessary immediate legislation, elect a president, pass on his cabinet appointments, and frame a new constitution within a maximum period of seven months. The draft constitution was then to be submitted to popular referendum for acceptance or rejection.

The Constituent Assembly in November 1945 elected de Gaulle as President of the Provisional Government. When he resigned, after quarreling with the Leftists, it chose the Socialist Félix Gouin in his place (January 1946). A draft constitution was prepared and presented to the people for vote in May 1946. It was decidedly leftist in complexion, provided for a unicameral legislature, and made a figurehead of the executive. The document was rejected by the people, whose action was a defeat for the communists and a victory for de Gaulle, who had vigorously opposed it. Consequently a Second Constituent Assembly was chosen in June 1946. This time the MRP won the most seats, with the communists second and the socialists third. Gouin resigned the presidency, to be succeeded by the MRP leader, Georges Bidault (1899–), a former schoolteacher, newspaperman, and resistance leader.

A second draft constitution was presented to the public in October 1946. De Gaulle and the Right objected to the lack of provision for a strong executive, but all other groups supported the document. The MRP, while not pleased with the draft, backed it because of an anxiety to get

[5] These figures were for a period early in the session and did not include affiliates.

the Fourth French Republic established without further delay. With many voters abstaining, the constitution was adopted.

It provided for a strong National Assembly elected by universal secret suffrage, and for an upper house called Council of the Republic. The latter was to be indirectly chosen and was renewable one-half at a time. The National Assembly alone could "vote the laws." The Council of the Republic, given merely advisory and delaying powers, was definitely subordinated to the lower body. The president was to be chosen for seven years by the houses meeting jointly as Parliament. He was given slightly more power than previously, but his every act would require ministerial countersignature. He had the right to demand reconsideration of a bill of which he did not approve, and his advice had to be sought by the cabinet before it could dissolve the assembly. Resignation of the cabinet must follow a specific vote of lack of confidence or of censure, but the casting of such a vote was made a highly deliberate process. On the other hand, no dissolution of the assembly was possible within a period of 18 months from the beginning of a parliament. Metropolitan France, the overseas departments, and the "Associated Territories and States" were formed into a French Union, headed by the president of the republic. The French Union would also have a High Council and an Assembly of the Union, both with functions largely advisory.

The first National Assembly of the Fourth French Republic was elected in November 1946, and the first Council of the Republic in the next month. In both houses the communists and their affiliates emerged with the largest number of seats. The MRP was second; and the socialists were a poor third. The leaders of the postwar political groupings included familiar as well as new names. The communists followed Maurice Thorez and Jacques Duclos. The MRP was headed by Bidault and Robert Schuman. The Socialist Party's leaders were Léon Blum and Vincent Auriol. The old Radical Socialists, still loyal to Edouard Herriot and Théodore Steeg, in 1946 formed a bloc with some other groups and took the name *Rassemblement des Gauches Républicaines*. Paul Reynaud was associated with a Rightist bloc that came out most strongly against socialization. In 1947 de Gaulle rallied behind him an anti-communist bloc which, under the name of *Rassemblement du Peuple Français* (Rally of the French People), polled almost 40 per cent of the popular vote in the municipal elections of October 1947.

In the last few weeks of its existence, and pending the election of the upper house, the provisional government had Léon Blum as its president.

Then, in January 1947, the first president of the Fourth Republic was chosen.[6] Because of the close rivalry between communists and MRP, the choice fell on a Socialist, Vincent Auriol. The first prime minister, necessarily heading a coalition cabinet, also was a Socialist, Paul Ramadier. Bidault of the MRP was named foreign minister. Thus at last the new French ship of state was launched—on stormy seas.

French war deaths (military and civilian, through fighting, air raids, and before firing squads) were 620,000. The enforced absence for years of millions of her young men as soldiers, prisoners of war, or deported laborers, shockingly cut the already low birth rate. Accordingly the census of 1946 showed a drop of 1,500,000 persons since 1936 to 40,500,000.[7] This population had suffered much. It had suffered in the period of insecurity before the war, during the four years' occupation by the Nazis, and in the difficult months after liberation. Hundreds of thousands of men were returned prisoners of war, who had sustained physical or spiritual hurt or both in Nazi prison camps or at forced labor. Large numbers of others had suffered under the Nazis in France, lacking sufficient food, clothing, fuel, and medical care. Hatred had developed between those who had remained loyal to Fighting France and those who had become Nazi collaborators. There was much denunciation of the latter, and bitterness grew during the trials of suspects, who numbered thousands, from Pétain down to lowly clerks.[8] With Right and Left often literally in violent opposition to each other, internal unity was as little evident in 1954 as it had been in 1939 or before.

After the war, moreover, the people seemed filled with lethargy. They were apathetic, showed little will to work, and appeared indifferent to the urgency for national reconstruction. The situation was made worse by unusually severe winters in 1945–1946 and 1946–1947, and by a drought in 1947. The existing food shortage thus was made more stringent by the smallest wheat crop in more than a century. There was a crying need for fertilizer in France as elsewhere in Europe, and farm tools and agricultural machines were in woeful disrepair.

Industrial machinery and plants were dilapidated, where they had not been destroyed, and there was little steel because there was such a shortage of coal. As late as the spring of 1947, France was getting only 125,000

[6] The Fourth Republic came legally into being on December 24, 1946, on which day the Council of the Republic opened its first session.
[7] The 1953 estimate was 42,700,000.
[8] In 1945 Pétain was sentenced to death for treason, but de Gaulle commuted the sentence to life imprisonment; he died in 1951. Laval was executed for treason in 1945.

tons of coal monthly from the Ruhr and the Saar, and was having to import 1,000,000 tons monthly from the United States. At this rate it did not take long for France to use up even large United States credits. Further temporary relief, but no solution of the problem, came under the Foreign Assistance Act passed in the United States in 1948. This opened the way for a Franco-American agreement whereby Paris received additional credits for food, fuel, medicines, and other supplies. The United States granted the credits under conditions which seemed necessary to ensure the efficient use of the resources sent abroad; but the French regarded some of the terms as humiliating.

During the period of Nazi control, France had had to pay daily occupation costs of several hundred million francs. The result was a brisk inflation, which expressed itself in galloping prices as soon as the Nazis were ousted and their artificial exchange rates abolished. Inflation continued after liberation, and the skyrocketing cost of living led not merely to hardship but to turbulent demands for higher wages and price controls. Temporary government subsidies to keep down food prices were hardly a cure for the national monetary illness. There was much black-market activity, with resulting further hatreds and bitterness. It was supposedly to catch the black marketeers that the government in 1948 ordered the temporary withdrawal from circulation of all 5000-franc notes. Many who had the notes quickly shipped them to safety in the colonies or in nearby Monaco. Others, however, feared lest 1000-franc notes be next withdrawn, and so shopkeepers began to accept only small change from their customers. The chief result of the move was anger against the authorities.

The cost of government also went up tremendously because of the lusty nationalization policies that followed liberation. Banking, coal-mining, and other industries were taken over by the state and at once became claimants for subsidies, higher wage schedules, and large capital outlays. The laborers in the nationalized as in the private industries, moreover, were stubborn in their apparent unwillingness to comprehend the problems facing the new government. They were impatient in their simultaneous demands for less work, more pay, and lower prices. The communists, through their control of the trade-unions, did their best further to weaken the national economy and create chaos.

While de Gaulle was in power, France kept up a military program out of proportion to her immediate needs. De Gaulle tried to build up a defense force of the type that France needed in 1939; but since Germany was at the moment prostrate, the gesture seemed calculated more to impress the Western Allies than to meet foreign danger. After de Gaulle's resignation,

national defense became less of a drain on the budget, although it still was necessary to maintain sizable establishments in Germany, Austria, and the overseas territories.[9]

The age-old fear of Germany continued to play its part in making French life difficult. Once again Frenchmen feared lest an economically-revived Germany become a physically strong and vengeful invader of their land. They found it hard to weigh unemotionally the gains and losses to be had from a viable European economy centered in an economically powerful Germany. Meanwhile France's own comeback was being hampered by another chronic weakness, namely, the existence of a multiplicity of political groups. This circumstance led now as before the war to the basing of cabinets on coalitions or blocs, and hence on unstable and variable support.

All this was grist to the mill of those in France, the communists, who hoped that as the political and economic situation became worse the soil for communism would become more fertile. The activity of Soviet agents in the fomenting of strikes, industrial sabotage, work stoppages, and pro-Russian propaganda was so clear that the Paris Government toward the end of 1947 expelled some of them from the country. But the campaign of subversion was then carried on by native communists, particularly through the instrumentality of the General Confederation of Labor.

The latter had been driven underground during the Nazi occupation but was promptly revived after the liberation. With their superior organization, their definite goal, and their ample funds, the communists among the labor leaders were able quickly to seize control of the federation and use it for their own ends. Cleverly they appealed for popular support through a propaganda which "capitalized at the same time on hurt national pride, on the fear of Germany, on the dislike for American plutocracy and British imperialism, and on hunger for coal and reparations." Eventually Léon Jouhaux, secretary-general of the federation, and other non-communist labor leaders broke away from the parent body and organized a new workers' group. This *Force Ouvrière,* though socialistic, shunned the violence, subversion, and internationalism of the communists.

The destructive activities of the communists were so obvious that they gradually alienated many of the labor-class followers. The government took

[9] Many French subjects in North Africa were affected by the nationalism which emanated from the Arab League in the Near East. In Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia there were growing independence movements, and in Madagascar there was a bloody revolt. In French Asia the Indo-Chinese set up the independent republic of Viet Nam, which soon became a battleground for pro-French elements and communists.

advantage of this favorable trend to weaken the Reds and strengthen the moderate elements. Thus, in May 1947, when the communists in the assembly fought Premier Ramadier's plans to freeze wages, lengthen the work week, and adopt a pro-United States orientation, he was able to oust them from his cabinet. Although Ramadier himself fell later in the same year, his successor, Robert Schuman (1886–), former finance minister and member of the MRP, carried on his firm policies. In December 1947 Schuman was able to push through a law which made illegal both industrial sabotage and incitement to sabotage or strikes.

Schuman charged that the 1947 strike epidemic had political motivation. On the other hand, many of the workers who obeyed the Red leaders' strike calls probably did so because of dissatisfaction with the continuing food shortages, high prices, and general industrial inefficiency. As compared with 1938, the index of production early in 1948 was estimated at 100, the index of prices at 1500, the index of salaries at 700, and the index of money in circulation at 500. This unbalance among prices, production, and money could not but bring misery and a yearning for change.

In the hope of increasing the volume of exports by lowering the cost of French goods in foreign markets, Schuman early in 1948 devalued the franc. The measure inevitably also raised the price in francs of France's raw-material imports. Thus was begun once more a type of international economic policy which in the prewar years had led to no good end. Yet France continued at the same time to hope for prompt aid under the Marshall Plan, or European Recovery Program (ERP), as it came to be called. France also hoped that the increased purchasing power of the dollar in France would lead to a profitable annual influx of American tourists.

Early in 1948 the MRP, Radical Socialists, and certain right-wing socialists combined to form the "Third Force" in French politics. The bond among them was "a common attachment to democracy and a common dislike of the threatened alternatives of Gaullism and Communism." In the elections of 1951, under a new electoral law framed to favor coalitions, the communists lost seats and the Gaullists made gains, but the Third Force held its own. Nonetheless, the parade of ministries continued, for the members of the governing bloc differed widely in their interpretation of the democracy to which they were attached—particularly in its economic implementation. Not one of the eight Third Force premiers in the next five years, to mid-1953, held office for even eighteen months.[10]

[10] The premiers were Messrs. Robert Schuman, André Marie, Henri Queuille, Georges Bidault, Edgar Faure, René Pleven, Antoine Pinay, and René Mayer. In December

Like his predecessors, Premier Joseph Laniel in 1953 and into 1954 faced, among others, the following problems: how to make the parliamentarians place the welfare of the nation above personal and party considerations; how to convince the politicians that action must replace talk and confusion; how to maintain democratic procedures in the face of persistent onslaughts by Leftists and Rightists who hid behind constitutional guarantees of freedom; how to check the chronic inflation despite a general unwillingness to accept the painful remedy of stabilization; how to make French labor realize that ever shorter working hours, ever higher pay, more bonuses, increasing welfare benefits, a reduction in taxes, and a lower cost of living could not possibly go together; how to get along without further foreign borrowing; how to feel "secure" in a Europe which needed an economically-revived Germany; how to act, in the United Nations and elsewhere, vis-à-vis the activities of the Soviet Union; and how to maintain control over the increasingly restive territories in Africa and Asia without continuing the terrible drain on money, and especially on the fine young manhood which was being slaughtered in overseas fields. Truly, French politics after the Second World War continued to appear as "an interregnum of dissent between spells of chaos."

ITALY

Marshal Pietro Badoglio took over the government of Italy upon Mussolini's dismissal in July 1943. The Fascist Party was dissolved, various laws under which fascism had operated were declared unconstitutional, and an armistice was concluded with the Allies. October saw a declaration of war against Germany, and soon thereafter the Italian King dropped his titles as ruler of Ethiopia and Albania.

Upon the liberation of Rome in June 1944, a broader provisional government was formed under the aged Ivanoe Bonomi. The premier had been a socialist in his youth, had favored Italy's entrance into the First World War, had had cabinet experience between 1916 and 1922, and had retired from politics when Mussolini came to power. His appointment was generally applauded in British and United States circles, and he served for a full year. While the Italian Peninsula was slowly being freed of German soldiers, the interim government was under the close supervision of an

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1953, Senator René Coty was elected president to succeed Vincent Auriol. He took office in January 1954. Meanwhile, late in 1953, the secretary general of the communist-dominated General Confederation of Labor, Benoit Franchon, had been arrested for endangering the security of the state.

Allied Control Commission. Early in 1944 the Allied Control Commission and the Allied Military Government were combined and became known as the AMG/ACC in Italy. The AMG functioned chiefly in the forward areas behind the Allied lines, whereas the ACC worked to restore Italian administration in areas farther removed from the fighting front.

The Allied Control Commission had two voting members (Great Britain and the United States) and two nonvoting members (France and the Soviet Union). Since Britain and the United States had done most of the fighting in Italy, it was understandable that they should wish to control the kingdom's destiny. But this attitude set a precedent which Moscow was quick to follow in those parts of Eastern Europe in which Bolshevik troops had done most of the conquering. Hence the Western Allies later had no more to say in the administration of Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary than did the U.S.S.R. in Italy.

London and Washington had both immediate and long-term aims in respect of Italy. At first they wanted to ensure maximum Italian help in finishing the war against Germany. This "required a policy of alternate kicks and kindnesses." Italian political activities had to be closely watched and Italian economic resources devoted to winning the war. On the other hand, some of the most onerous armistice terms were not enforced; and after Italy's declaration of war against Germany she was recognized as a cobelligerent rather than an enemy. The long-term Allied objective was to provide for the future a friendly Italy, capable of satisfactory national existence but not strong enough again to threaten Britain's lifeline in the Mediterranean. For the rest, it was merely a matter of helping the Italians to liquidate fascism and set up a democratic regime.

Until the liberation of Rome, not much was done by way of liquidating Fascists. A thoroughgoing purge would have impaired local administrative efficiency in a way to hamper the war effort. The AMG found helpful the services of many Italians who had been associated in minor capacities with the Mussolini regime. The Allied Control Commission, on the other hand, had little use for either the discredited King Victor Emmanuel III or Badoglio. The creation of the Bonomi Government eased the situation and prompted the Allies to give Italy more voice in running her affairs. Eventually the word "Control" was removed from the name of the commission, and early in 1947 it was abolished.

These concessions were pleasing to Italian pride, but they did little to ease the economic plight of the kingdom. Weakened by the demands of fascism and by the ruinous war, and with the industrial north still in Nazi hands, impoverished Italy was dependent on Allied economic help for her

very life. Food, fuel, fertilizer, medicine, clothing, raw materials, and means of transport were most needed. The Allies did their best to assist Italy while meeting all the vast demands of their own war effort. By the close of 1945 they had provided more than $500,000,000 worth of supplies for civilian use. Gradually Italy was permitted to resume exports so that foreign exchange might be procured, and in 1946 UNRRA rendered large-scale aid, particularly in foodstuffs.

After the surrender of the Germans in northern Italy, it became possible to think once more in terms of a united state. Bonomi now gave way to one of the ablest underground leaders who had operated behind the German lines, Ferrucio Parri. The latter was a veteran anti-Fascist who for years had fought Mussolini clandestinely and who had achieved a reputation for honesty, modesty, and courage in the struggle against the Nazis. His task was immeasurably difficult. With its 45,500,000 inhabitants and a population density of 375 per square mile, Italy was short of everything save people and scenery. Inflation had got far out of control, black markets flourished, production was in many places at a standstill, hunger and cold tortured millions, political denunciations deepened hatreds, and means of communication and transportation were woefully inadequate. Seeking to weld a coalition of conservative and working-class parties, the unsmiling Parri lasted only from June to November 1945.

Obviously these conditions again were favorable for the propaganda of extremists, especially communists. These made the most of a ripe situation under the leadership of Palmiro Togliatti, who had been an Italian member of the Comintern in Moscow. He arrived in Italy early in 1944 to assume headship of the native Communist Party. Under his direction the Reds blamed all Italy's troubles on the harshness of the Allies, on the Western disregard of Italy's "rights," and on the wickedness of non-communists in general. He was a member of the cabinets headed successively by Badoglio, Bonomi, and Parri. He skilfully used his considerable influence to stir up strife, foment unrest, and prevent that prompt return to law and order which all moderate elements desired.

When Parri retired in 1945 he was succeeded by Premier Alcide de Gasperi. The new prime minister had served a prison sentence under Mussolini for anti-Fascist activity, had been prominent in the wartime underground, and now was leader of the Christian Democratic Party—successor of the Catholic People's Party of pre-Fascist days. The Christian Democrats advocated moderate social reform, were strongly Catholic, and came out unequivocally against communism. De Gasperi worked with a Consultative Assembly which had been set up in September 1945, and

which included such well-known pre-Fascist leaders as Orlando, Nitti, Bonomi, the philosopher-historian Benedetto Croce, and Count Carlo Sforza. The last-named was an independent, who had been one of the most indefatigable anti-Fascists, a diplomat of international renown for thirty years, and a member of the Badoglio and Bonomi cabinets. He was elected president of the Consultative Assembly, which was replaced by a Constituent Assembly in mid-1946.

Meanwhile the rapidly growing antipathy to King Victor Emmanuel for the part he had played in events since the March on Rome in 1922 came to a climax. Count Sforza and his many followers felt that the king had forfeited all right to respect and leadership, and that his abdication was necessary if the throne were to be saved for the Savoy dynasty. At last, in May 1946, Victor Emmanuel bowed to popular feeling and abdicated in favor of his eldest son. The latter, who for some time had been lieutenant general of the realm, became king as Humbert II. While Victor Emmanuel went abroad, where he died in 1947, the kingdom made ready for elections to choose a Constituent Assembly and to decide on whether the future Italy should be a monarchy or a republic. The fateful referendum was held in June 1946, with men and women voting democratically. About 12,700,000 cast their ballots for a republic; 10,700,000 voted to retain the monarchy. On June 10, 1946, Italy was proclaimed a republic. Humbert went into exile in Portugal.

In the other part of the election, relating to a Constituent Assembly, the voters had a choice among the candidates of several parties. Most of these had emerged from a political convention held at Bari early in 1944 and representing all existing anti-Fascist groups. Strongest among the parties were the Christian Democrats under de Gasperi; the Socialist Party under Pietro Nenni and the right-wing Giuseppe Saragat; and the Communist Party under Togliatti. It was in this order that they won votes in the election. Of the 556 available seats, the Christian Democrats captured 207, the Socialist Party 115, and the Communist Party 104.

The assembly elected Enrico de Nicola, an elderly Neapolitan parliamentarian, provisional president. When he resigned one year later because of illness and the assembly's slowness in adopting a constitution, he was overwhelmingly reëlected (June 1947). De Gasperi became premier, and Sforza was appointed foreign minister. Under the guidance of these men the Constituent Assembly had to carry on the current business of government, make peace with the Allies, and draft a new constitution. Perhaps simplest of the three tasks was the conclusion of peace, for this matter was largely in external hands. After valiant but not altogether successful efforts

by de Gasperi and Sforza to obtain generous terms, the treaty was signed in February 1947 and became effective in mid-September. On the date of signing a period of mourning was observed throughout Italy, and a campaign for revision was begun at once.

The task of carrying on government was more difficult. The economic handicaps previously mentioned harassed the people throughout the ensuing years. United States loans and the cancellation of some debts by Washington were helpful. But inflation, high prices, food and raw-material shortages, lack of fuel and fertilizer, and inadequate production continued. The communists made political capital out of all this, in both the agricultural south and the industrial north. In 1947 they tried to organize "hunger marches" in various parts of Italy, but the popular response to these histrionics was cool.

Meanwhile there had occurred a split within socialist ranks over the question of coöperating with the communists. The Italian Socialist Party under Nenni advocated close coöperation with the communists; the smaller Socialist Party of Italian Workers under Saragat broke with the communists. There were brawls in the Constituent Assembly, and there were occasional political murders. In 1948 several thousand army discharges were held up and the soldiers kept in readiness lest the communists attempt to overthrow the republic. There appeared also to be a slight revival of fascism. In general, the less the government relied upon Leftist support, the more popular backing it appeared to enjoy.

The final task of the Constituent Assembly was the drafting of a republican constitution. Shortly before Christmas 1947 this was accomplished, and a constitution was adopted. It became effective on January 1, 1948. The document provided for a bicameral National Assembly composed of a Chamber of Deputies and a Chamber of Senators. The lower house was to be chosen by universal direct suffrage, the upper house in part by popular vote and in part by regional councils. The chambers were given equal legislative functions, and provision was made for a popular referendum in the event of their disagreement. The president, elected for seven years by the National Assembly plus some regional representatives, was endowed with fairly strong powers, particularly with respect to dissolution of parliament.

The first election under the new constitution was held in April 1948. And here, de Gasperi in Italy, as did Schuman in France and Attlee in Great Britain, hoped that the European Recovery Program would be approved by the United States Congress in time to give much-needed support to the moderate elements in the election. For that very reason, the com-

munists opposed the European Recovery Program. They wanted Italy as well as other parts of Western Europe to enter the Soviet orbit through sheer exhaustion and misery. De Gasperi was strengthened and the communists weakened in the election by three major occurrences. One was the approval by the United States Government of the ERP.[11] The second was a proposal by Washington, London, and Paris that the Italian peace treaty be revised so as to restore Trieste to Italy; Moscow, lest it alienate the Yugoslavs, opposed this suggestion. And the third was an efficient anti-communist campaign carried on, especially among the peasants, by Catholic leaders.

When the voting was over, it appeared that the Christian Democrats had triumphed. In the Chamber of Deputies they won 307 of the 574 seats. The communists and left-wing socialists together secured only 182 seats. In May 1948, then, the National Assembly chose Luigi Einaudi to be president of Italy for seven years. The new chief executive was a political independent of anti-communist sympathies. He was a banker by profession and had been governor of the Bank of Italy and vice-premier in the de Gasperi Cabinet. Father of a professor of political science in a university in New York State, he was also an admirer of the United States. Soon after taking office he reappointed de Gasperi as premier.

De Gasperi frequently had to reorganize his cabinet in the next five years. Overpopulation,[12] unemployment, the costs of the war (estimated at $94,000,000,000), widespread poverty, lack of natural resources and shortage of raw materials, war-damaged factories, lack of capital, inflation, loss of markets and all the colonies, inefficient state control of the major industries, limited arable land, growing national budgetary deficits, a social system that encouraged reliance on public authority for personal welfare, clamor for revision of the peace treaty particularly in the matter of Trieste, the rise of a neo-fascism, and the rise of a powerful communist–plus–left-wing–socialist movement that attacked every effort at Italian coöperation with the West and that continually troubled the political and economic waters for better fishing, all made life difficult for the nation as a whole and for the centrist leadership in particular. Only in the cultural sphere did postwar Italy achieve real satisfaction. Her fashions in women's clothing became popular abroad, as did Italian moving pictures and books—such as Carlo Levi's *Christ Stopped at Eboli* and Alberto Moravia's *The Woman of Rome,* and the films *Open City, Shoe-Shine,* and *Bicycle Thief.*

[11] In the first year of its operation, the ERP contributed to Italy about 7 per cent of its national income.

[12] The census of 1950 indicated a population of more than 47,000,000.

Such was the situation in June 1953 when 28,400,000 voters went to the polls to choose 590 deputies and 237 senators from among the 8000 candidates of almost a score of parties in the regular parliamentary elections of that year. The center coalition, advocating gradual social change and coöperation with the United States and Western Europe, emerged with a slim majority in each house. But the coalition bonds were weak, and de Gasperi soon gave up the premiership. He was succeeded, in turn, by several of his Christian Democrat colleagues, with Mario Scelba called to the helm in February 1954.

SPAIN

During the Second World War, the Spain of Chief of State Franco retained an interesting and profitable neutrality. Grateful, and ideologically sympathetic, to Germany and Italy, Spain in the first three years of the war did much to help the axis powers. She sheltered their war vessels, serviced their airplanes, and permitted axis espionage to operate from her territory. She dispatched a "volunteer" division to fight against the Soviet Union, sent laborers to Germany, and sold war materials (particularly wolfram ore) to axis factories. In 1940 she occupied the free city of Tangier in North Africa.

As the fortunes of war changed, Franco gradually began to favor the Allies.[13] From 1943, he allowed interned Allied aviators to leave the country, winked at Allied espionage, and shipped the wolfram ore to the Allies (at the same prices Germany had paid). Franco also refused German requests for the passage of Nazi troops across Spain, offered no obstacle to Allied ship movements preceding the landings in North Africa, and permitted United States troop-carrying planes to use Spanish airfields. In 1945 Spain withdrew from Tangier so that its international status might be reëstablished.

Internally, meanwhile, the Caudillo consolidated his control and set up a police state. He suppressed communism, Freemasonry, and all autonomy movements. The favored position of the Catholic Church was restored. The government's own *Falange española* was the only political party permitted to function. Progress was made, especially after the economic situation was improved by war profits, in repairing the physical ravages of the civil war and in providing housing, schools, and social services. In 1942 a Cortes was reëstablished, its membership representing the chief of state (by ap-

13 United States Ambassador Carlton J. H. Hayes was influential in bringing about this change.

pointment), the provincial governments and municipalities, and various economic, professional, and intellectual organizations. It was empowered to take cognizance of the laws submitted to it by the government.

The end of the war, and of the attendant business, brought Spain the familiar problems of shortages, inflation, black marketeering, lack of fertilizer and farm machinery,[14] and lack of investment capital. Her transportation system was notoriously bad, and there appeared to be official corruption. In 1954 only the army, the church, and the favorites of the government seemed to be well off among the estimated 28,300,000 inhabitants under Franco's rule.

Spain's post-1945 foreign relations were as variable as had been her wartime international status. The Madrid Government was not invited to attend the San Francisco conference which set up the United Nations. In 1946 Spain was specifically barred from membership by the General Assembly, which also urged United Nations members to withdraw their ambassadors or ministers from Madrid. And Spain was not made eligible for the benefits of the Marshall Plan. This foreign pressure encouraged Spanish republican exiles in their hope for a restoration of the republic. But Franco responded by having the Cortes enact a Law of Succession (1947), endorsed by popular referendum, which provided that in the event of a vacancy in the headship of the state a Council of Regency should propose to the Cortes a person of royal descent as king.

Gradually, as the differences between the Western world and the Soviet Union became more apparent and more bitter, Spain came to be regarded in a changed light by the West. Her geographic location, her potentially useful resources, her strong anticommunism, and her large army all now tended to make her dictatorial political system seem less obnoxious to Western eyes. In 1950 the General Assembly of the United Nations voted that each member should have full freedom to regulate its Spanish diplomatic relations as it saw fit. Two years later Spain was able to draw on credits made available by the United States Congress, and in 1953 a United States and Spanish agreement provided for further credits and military supplies in return for Madrid's consent to the establishment of United States air bases on Spanish soil. It was Soviet aggressiveness more than any other factor that helped bring Franco Spain back into the family of Western nations.

[14] About 98 per cent of all farm draft work in Spain in 1952 was done by animals.

CHAPTER 23

Germany and Austria Since 1945

GERMANY

The occupation and administration of Italy, and the return of its sovereignty, were relatively simple compared to the situation in Germany. In Italy the Allies soon handed the administration over to the native central government. Germany, however, had no central authority. Since the Allies gave short shrift to the cabinet which Doenitz tried to set up at Flensburg after Hitler's announced death, the German surrender articles were accepted by the High Command rather than by any civil authority. There actually was no German government when the Allied occupation began. Instead, the Big Four assumed supreme authority over the Reich by a Berlin Declaration dated June 5, 1945.

Furthermore, British and United States coöperation in Italy worked fairly smoothly. But in Germany there were four occupying powers, with sharply conflicting views and interests. And, unhappily for practical accomplishment, it had been agreed at Potsdam that any decisions affecting the country as a whole must be arrived at unanimously. In other words, there was a veto power in the administration of occupied Germany. That power was used often by the Soviet representatives.

Germany in 1937 had an area of 182,000 square miles and a population of 67,000,000. Within these boundaries she was divided, in 1945, into four occupation zones, not including 45,000 square miles comprising the northern half of East Prussia annexed outright by the U.S.S.R. and certain regions (including southern East Prussia, eastern Brandenburg, Pomerania,

and Silesia) provisionally handed over to Polish administration at Potsdam and later claimed by Warsaw and Moscow as definitely Polish territory.

The Soviet Occupation Zone, in the east, comprised 41,500 square miles and 17,000,000 people. The British Zone, in the northwest, was made up of 37,500 square miles with 22,000,000 inhabitants. The French Zone, in the southwest, had an area (including the Saar) of 16,500 square miles and 5,000,000 residents. The United States Zone, in the south and center, embraced 41,500 square miles and 17,000,000 persons. To facilitate its supply services, the United States got a Bremen-Bremerhaven enclave within the British Zone. The French separated the Saar from the rest of their zone by a customs barrier, hoping for its eventual economic absorption into France.[1]



[1] By 1953 the population of the Soviet Zone, now called German Democratic Republic, was estimated at 18,500,000; that of the three western zones, now called Federal Republic of Germany, had risen from a total of 44,000,000 to 51,500,000 (including the Saar). The western total was swelled by the arrival of several million impoverished refugees and expellees from the Soviet Zone, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Thus, in 1953, a Germany only 75 per cent as large as that of 1937 had a population about 105 per cent as large; and taking only the western republic into consideration, an area 52 per cent as large had a population about 78 per cent as large.

The basic instrument of government for occupied Germany was the Potsdam Declaration of August 2, 1945. Besides laying down the general principles for the governance of the region, it provided for an Allied Control Council made up of the commanders-in-chief of the Big Four in Germany. (France was invited to share in the occupation although she did not sign the declaration.) Each general in the ACC was to be military governor of his country's specific zone and to participate in decisions concerning Germany as a whole. (At no time was there an official determination of what constituted "matters affecting Germany as a whole.") The ACC, whose chairmanship was to rotate monthly, opened its headquarters on July 30, 1945, in Berlin. In that city, in the midst of the Russian Zone, each occupying power also had a special sector. This compartmentalization gave rise to many nuisances.[2]

The ACC based its actions on the Potsdam statement, instructions from the respective home governments, and experience gained from the day-by-day handling of problems. The tasks which confronted it were herculean. Their accomplishment was made the harder by Russia's frequent disregard of the Potsdam promises to treat Germany as a single economic unit and to strive for the uniform treatment of the entire German population, regardless of zone. Furthermore, each occupying power approached its assignment from a different point of view. The French were concerned mainly with security; they lived off the conquered land, tried to integrate the Saar with French economy, and hoped the new Germany would be politically decentralized and economically weak. The Russians took from Germany all that they could by way of movable goods and worked for the establishment of a satellite regime subservient to Moscow. The British seemed interested chiefly in efficient administration, even if this meant using former totalitarian officials, and in dismantling potential war industries. The Americans, with no material goal, were interested largely in "reëducating" Germany along "democratic" lines. Whereas both France and Russia took things out of Germany, the United States and Great Britain poured in vast quantities of relief materials and extended sizable credits. Yet, despite these differences in policy, the ACC, in the first 16 months of its existence, placed on the statute books about 50 laws of major importance and 50 directives on lesser matters.

On the military side, the Allied officers strove to disarm Germany;

2 The United States military governors were Eisenhower (1945), General Joseph McNarney (1945–1947), and General Lucius DuB. Clay (1947–1949); thereafter the high commissioners were John Jay McCloy (1949–1952), Walter J. Donnelly (1952–1953), and, from 1953, Dr. James Bryant Conant.

find and try the war criminals; demobilize and gradually release millions of prisoners of war; forestall the growth of new semimilitary formations; and destroy or otherwise dispose of the remaining stores of ammunition and materiel. The political and administrative assignments were legion. They included denazification; the ousting of "tainted" individuals from office and their replacement by "reliable" civil servants; the removal of repugnant laws from the statute books and codes; the supervision of newly appointed administrative and judicial officers to make certain that they exercised authority in accordance with Allied wishes and democratic principles; the nurturing of democratically inclined political parties; the early introduction of self-government on the community level and eventually on a regional level; the creation of a reliable police force; and the general elimination of political and social inequalities from German life. All these activities, moreover, were supposed to be coördinated in the four zones.

From the social and educational points of view it was necessary to tackle the housing problem; clean up the rubble that marked the sites of many formerly flourishing cities; take care of the millions of displaced persons and refugees; overcome the effects of Nazi indoctrination on the youth of the land; provide new schools, teachers, and textbooks; assist in the restoration of religious life; supervise the growth of a free press; stimulate the Germans to overcome their lethargy and realize that the conquerors would help only those who tried to help themselves; and last, but far from least, show the Germans how to make democracy work.

Finally, numerous economic responsibilities had to be shouldered. The ACC was charged with providing and distributing vast quantities of food, fuel, fertilizer, and raw materials; stimulating employment and production so that Germany might again become viable and assume a useful but not menacing position in Europe's economy; rebuilding transport facilities; breaking up the cartel concentrations; eliminating such industry as might become war potential; spurring the prompt payment of reparation; fostering the development of democratic trade-unions; and keeping the costs of occupation to the Allies down to a minimum. And all these in a beaten country which had suffered 4,000,000 soldiers and civilians killed, destruction of almost 3,000,000 buildings and damage to more than 4,000,000 others, and a war cost estimated at $270,000,000,000.

Progress was slow because many of the Allied occupation officials had little experience or knowledge of German ways and conditions, because the Germans themselves were apathetic, and because there was little administrative coöperation between western, industrialized Germany and eastern, agricultural Germany. The food situation was made worse by the

expulsion of millions of Germans from the agricultural east and their forced immigration into an already overpopulated western and central Germany. The Russians drained eastern Germany of its resources and tried to liquidate the native non-communist leadership; the Western Allies, in particular the United States, poured foodstuffs and other supplies into the rest of Germany and supervised the dismantling of western industrial plants for shipment to Russia as per Potsdam agreement. Meanwhile the making of peace dragged on wearily through years of talk and more talk.

In accordance with Allied warnings uttered from 1942 onward, a four-power Interallied Military Tribunal was convened at Nuremberg to try the leading Nazi war criminals. The main trial lasted from November 1945 until October 1946, with 22 Nazi chieftains as defendants.[3] They were charged with participation in a conspiracy against world peace, aggressive warfare in violation of international commitments, and violation of the laws of war through the exercise of total war and the consequent illegal treatment of prisoners of war and civilians.

Three of the accused were acquitted, namely, Papen, Schacht, and radio commentator Hans Fritsche.[4] Twelve were sentenced to death. Of these, Bormann was still missing and Göring committed suicide by poisoning a few minutes before he was to be led to the gallows. Ten were executed: Ribbentrop, Rosenberg, Keitel, Seyss-Inquart, Streicher, Frank, Ernst Kaltenbrunner (high Gestapo and Intelligence officer), Wilhelm Frick (former minister of the interior), Fritz Sauckel (in charge of foreign forced labor), and Colonel General Alfred Jodl. The remaining seven were sentenced to jail terms: Hess, Raeder, and Funk for life; Schirach and production chief Albert Speer for twenty years; Neurath, for his activities in Bohemia-Moravia, for fifteen years; and Doenitz for ten years. The trials of lesser Nazis continued over a long period. Eventually German courts also were permitted to try former Nazis, in particular those who had distinguished themselves for brutality in the concentration camps.

While wrestling with problems of economics, denazification, demilitarization, reparation collection, reëducation, and so on, the occupying powers also permitted the gradual reappearance of German political parties and elections. Despite local differences in the various zones, and despite a prohibition against the formation of national parties, four main political groups emerged by 1946. In a general way these groups, and several lesser

[3] Hitler, Himmler, Goebbels, and Ley killed themselves before they could be brought to trial. Martin Bormann, who had become Hess' successor after the latter's flight to England during the war, could not be found.
[4] Schacht was later sentenced to prison by a German denazification court.

ones, were ideological heirs of the parties abolished by the Nazis in 1933. The most conservative among the major groupings used the name Democratic Party or some variant thereof. Strongly endorsing the right of private property, free enterprise, and separation of church and state, these elements showed some strength in the western part of the American Zone and, for a short time, in the Soviet Zone. A little more to the left were the Christian Democrats, again with slightly varying names in the several zones. The members of this group favored the establishment of a firm Christian base for the new Germany, endorsed the rights of person and property, and advocated moderate social change. They were especially strong in such Catholic parts of the country as Bavaria and the Rhineland, but also had a sizable Protestant following.

The Christian Democrats shared the distinction of being one of the two most powerful groupings in the land with the Social Democrats. Especially strong in the urbanized areas and in the highly industrial British Zone, the latter, in varying degree, followed the traditional socialist labor line. They advocated wide nationalization policies, political leadership of the workers, and a European socialist federation. Outside the Soviet Zone, where they were forced to merge with the communists in April 1946, the Social Democrats firmly rejected close coöperation with the communists. Finally, there was the German Communist Party with the usual Red program. This proposed the abolition of private property and free enterprise, endorsed the concept of the class struggle, and advocated a social and economic revolution. The communists wanted a highly centralized national government, whereas the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats stood for decentralization and some sort of federalism. Except in the Soviet Zone, the communists generally ran a poor fourth to the other groups.

With the passing of time, the German situation became more difficult as the views and policies of the U.S.S.R. on the one hand and the Western Allies on the other grew more divergent. The result was an alternation of closer coöperative steps among the western zones and widening rifts with the eastern zone. At the start of 1947 the United States and British zones were merged into an economic Bizonia. In March 1948 the Russians virtually broke up the Allied Control Council by walking out of a meeting and refusing to return. June 1948 saw the introduction of new and separate currencies in western Germany (now an economic Trizonia) and eastern Germany. In June, also, the Russians tried to force the Western officials out of Berlin by means of a complete ground blockade of that city. The Allies replied with an "airlift" which for fifteen months (until September 1949) kept western Berlin supplied with the necessities of life. Meanwhile,

in April 1949, the Western occupying powers had signed an agreement providing for full trizonal fusion as soon as a provisional German government could be set up.[5]

In anticipation of this development, a Parliamentary Council of 65 leaders elected by the eleven provincial diets in Trizonia met in Bonn and drafted a constitution for a Federal Republic of Germany. The president of the council was Dr. Konrad Adenauer, head of the Christian Democratic Union in the province of North Rhine Westphalia. The document was approved by the provincial diets and proclaimed on May 23, 1949. Allied-German relations henceforth were regulated by an Occupation Statute, which reserved certain controls to the three occupying powers. An Allied High Commission composed of one high commissioner from each country retained power over foreign affairs, foreign trade, demilitarization, refugees, constitutional amendments, and administration of the Ruhr.[6]

The Bonn Constitution resembled its Weimar predecessor. It set up a federal republic of eleven provinces, with a bicameral legislature, a responsible chancellor, and an indirectly elected president.[7] The upper house or *Bundesrat,* representing the provinces, was inferior in legislative power to the popularly-chosen *Bundestag.* The chancellor was made responsible to the lower house, but had to demit only if the latter elected a successor by majority vote and then requested the president to dismiss him. The basic human freedoms were guaranteed, and groups whose activities were "directed against the constitutional order" were prohibited. The president, eligible for immediate reëlection only once, was to be chosen for five years by the lower house plus representatives of the provincial legislatures.

The first election under the Bonn Constitution was held in August 1949. The Christian Democratic Union captured the largest number of Bundestag seats and, in coalition with other center groups, dominated the

[5] In 1947 a popularly-elected Saar Assembly approved a constitution, drawn up under French auspices, whereby the Saar was detached from Germany and attached to France in economic union but with political autonomy. Paris also was entrusted with the Saar's defense and foreign relations. The arrangement became effective in January 1948. With British and United States consent, moreover, the Saar boundaries in 1950 were enlarged from the 1919 area of about 720 square miles to about 990 square miles. In 1950, also, a Franco-Saar agreement gave the Paris Government a fifty-year lease of the Saar coal mines and regulated in detail the precise relations between France and her industrial satellite. The German government which had meanwhile been established at Bonn protested this alienation of territory, and the Saar continued to trouble Franco-German relations.

[6] The industrial Ruhr was placed under a Ruhr Authority representing the United States, Great Britain, France, and the "Benelux" countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg).

[7] Following a referendum in December 1951, the Länder or provinces of Baden, Württemberg-Baden, and Württemberg-Hohenzollern were united as the Southwest State, thus reducing the federation membership to nine.

government.[8] The Social Democrats formed the second-largest parliamentary contingent. Doctor Theodor Heuss, a Lutheran journalist, editor, and biographer, some of whose books were burned by the Nazis, was chosen president. Adenauer became chancellor.

Dr. Adenauer was born in Cologne in 1876. He became an attorney and civil servant, and from 1917 to 1933 was lord mayor of his native city. As a vigorous leader of the Catholic Center Party he was removed by the Nazis in 1933, was twice arrested by the Gestapo, and lived in retirement until the end of the war. After V–E Day in 1945 he helped found the Christian Democratic Union and rapidly rose to political prominence. Imposing in appearance, energetic, stubborn, shrewd, devoutly Catholic, a firm believer in the westward orientation of Germany, Adenauer took the helm of government in 1949 at the age of seventy-three and successfully steered the German ship of state through some of the most perilous years in its stream of history.

The birth of the Bonn Republic was followed on October 7, 1949, by the Soviet establishment of a German Democratic Republic in eastern Germany. The seat of government was placed in the Soviet sector of Berlin, and a constitution was adopted which ensured communist control. Wilhelm Pieck, former cabinet member, union leader, pacifist, deserter, founder-member of the German Communist Party in 1918, Comintern official since 1931, and reputedly a naturalized Soviet citizen, was chosen president. (In 1953 he was reëlected for four years by the East German parliament.) Otto Grotewohl, ex-printer, state insurance official, ex-salesman, imprisoned for a short time by the Nazis, promoter of communist absorption of the east-German socialists, became minister president. Real power from 1954, however, rested with the secretary of the party's central committee, Walter Ulbricht. The latter was a Saxon woodworker who had become a communist leader in 1919, member of the Comintern, Reichstag deputy from 1928 to 1933, and political commissar in the Spanish Civil War. During the Second World War he selected Soviet-held German prisoners of war for political "reorientation" and in 1945 he returned to Germany with the Soviet Army, reputedly as a Russian citizen.

a. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

The Bonn Republic, aided by generous United States grants, made a remarkable economic recovery. By 1953 the number of unemployed, including aged and disabled unemployables and despite a sizable population

[8] The Catholic element was preponderant in the Federal Republic of Germany, while the eastern zone was overwhelmingly Protestant.

increase, was only 1,000,000—a drop of 3,000,000 in three years. This meant that most of the "homeless" immigrants, many of whom had only agrarian background and skill, had been resettled or absorbed into industry.



Courtesy, Foreign Policy Association, *Headline Series.*

The over-all index of production, based on a figure of 100 for 1936, was only about 50 in 1947 but rose to 153 in November 1951. Early in 1953 the republic's industrial capacity was estimated as 40 per cent greater than the highest prewar figure. As previously, Germany began to excel in the production of iron, steel, chemicals, and electrical, optical, and precision instruments. Stimulated in part by the demands of the conflict in Korea, Germany's exports rose more rapidly than her imports. Throughout this period, price levels, compared to those in most European countries, remained relatively stable. In the fall of 1953 Bonn started to repay the debts incurred by Germany over the past quarter century to nineteen countries; by international agreement the total combined debt was set at $3,270,000,000, to be paid within the next three decades.

An effective social-insurance system was built up, resembling that of the pre-Hitler days. The revived trade-unions, federated in 1949, were given a voice in the management of certain large industries. Efforts were made to compensate the victims of war damage and expulsion, and the republic agreed to make a stipulated monetary reimbursement to the state

of Israel for the Nazi plundering of the Jews. Housing remained a serious problem, with an average of five residents per dwelling in 1949 as against three in 1939; but from 1950 each year saw the completion of about 300,000 new dwellings.

The orderly progress within the republic, and the continued unwillingness of the Soviet Union to permit a reunification of Germany along lines acceptable to Bonn and the Western Allies, led the latter, in September 1950, to declare their intention of ending the state of war with Germany. The occupation forces would remain, and indeed be strengthened so as to defend the free world, including the Federal Republic and western Berlin. While there would be no German army, the question of German contributions to a mixed Western force would be studied; meanwhile mobile police units at the disposal of Bonn would be authorized. The Occupation Statute would be amended to reduce Allied controls and permit Bonn to reëstablish a foreign office and renew the traditional diplomatic contacts.

Moscow strenuously objected to this program. But in July 1951 Great Britain and France, and in October the United States (by joint resolution of Congress) ended the state of war with "the government of Germany." The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs was reactivated, and Adenauer became foreign minister as well as chancellor. The Occupation Statute of 1949 was gradually revised to give Bonn greater sovereignty. And Germany in quick succession became a party to several international organizations calculated to strengthen the democratic areas in their stand against communist expansionism. The story of these steps towards a Western European integration is told in Chapter 26.

b. THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Regarding developments in eastern or Russian-occupied Germany during the postwar years, not much could be said with certainty. Under Moscow's supervision, control of the area was placed (1946) in the hands of the communist-oriented German Socialist Unity Party, known as the SED (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*). The party, using the disguise of a National Front, tried to hide its true program of sovietization under slogans calling for a united democratic German state. Most Germans, and indeed the Western Allies, found the slogans acceptable, but not the proposed method of their implementation. The Russians wanted withdrawal of the occupation forces, reunification of Germany, and elections for control of the new government—in that order. The Western Allies and Bonn, fearing that such a procedure would open the way for Russo-German

communist interference at the polls, insisted upon truly free elections in all zones, with reunification following the balloting. While stalemate persisted, year after year, the Russians built up a German communist army under the guise of a militarized police force to supplement the regular civilian police, and the Western Allies planned to include West German units in the international army of the European Defense Community (see p. 725). Meanwhile (1950) the German Democratic Republic, apparently at the direction of Moscow, formally recognized the Oder-Neisse boundary with Poland as "inviolable" and renounced all claims to the Germans still living in Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland.

A constitution was adopted in 1949 which provided for a bicameral parliament made up of a People's Chamber, elected by men and women over 18, and a Chamber of the States, chosen by the five Länder governments and endowed only with the right to submit suggestions. The minister president was to be named by the largest party; the president, by the two chambers sitting together. Actual control was exercised by the Politburo of the SED, itself instructed by the Russian occupation chief. In the elections of 1950, the "unity list" of parliamentary candidates was overwhelmingly endorsed by those who went to the polls. By the end of that year the communists also dominated the trade-unions, the women's organizations, and all social and cultural groups in the region. "Every citizen," it was made plain in a statement of Minister President Grotewohl, had "not only the right but the duty of . . . identification with the government."

Meanwhile the process of sovietization went on, though against stubborn resistance and not nearly so rapidly as the Russians wished. Large businesses were nationalized or placed under Russian control. Labor was conscripted, and pressure was used to make women participate in heavy manual labor. Farms were collectivized. Working "norms" or quotas were set up. The churches were handicapped at every turn, their legal rights were eaten away, and the number of pretheological students was limited.[9] The area was drained of natural and manufactured wealth through reparation requisitions and was economically exploited through a Two-Year Plan from 1948 to 1950 and a Five-Year Plan for the years 1951 through 1955. The degree of exploitation may be judged in part from the circumstance that the Five-Year Plan called for a 60 per cent increase in labor productivity and an increase of less than 20 per cent in wages.

Opposition to the foreign- and Quisling-controlled dictatorship in the "zone of silence" was not wanting. Passive resistance, slowdown activities,

[9] The religious fight was especially fierce and was ably encouraged by Otto Dibelius, Lutheran Bishop of Berlin and Presiding Protestant Bishop of Germany.

and sabotage caused constant embarrassment and irritation to the communist authorities. By 1953 the general living standard had fallen so low, despite the region's rich farmlands, timber forests, brown-coal fields, potash reserves, and industrial plants, that many people were seriously undernourished. There was a steady flow of "escapees" to the western zones; in April 1953, for example, an average of more than 1200 people were entering western Berlin daily, many of them young men of military age. In June 1953, following an order that production be increased 10 per cent without accompanying wage increase, there broke out violent revolt in East Berlin and other eastern cities. The uprising was suppressed by military might and firing squads—the chief persuaders in all the satellite "workers' paradises."

AUSTRIA

The Austrian political situation bore important contrasts to that of Germany. In April 1945, before Germany's surrender but after the Russians had crossed the Austrian frontier, there came out of retirement in the little town of Gloggnitz a 75-year-old socialist who had been chancellor under the Constituent Assembly of 1919 and a parliamentary leader of the Austrian Republic until 1934. This man was Dr. Karl Renner (1870–1950). The invading Russians agreed to let him go to Vienna on the understanding that he would try to reconvene the non-Fascist rump of the last democratic Austrian Parliament (1933).

When he got to Vienna, Renner found that various underground leaders already had formed nuclei of three revived political parties: the Austrian (Catholic) People's Party, the Social Democratic Party, and the Austrian Communist Party. Negotiations developed among all groups, under Russian observation but without Russian interference. On April 29, 1945, with German surrender still several days off, an Austrian Provisional Government was announced. It comprised a cabinet representing all three parties and was headed by Renner as chancellor.

Moscow at once recognized this government. The three major Western Allies, however, were suspicious of Renner's coöperation with the Soviets and angry at the way in which their Eastern partner seemingly had tried to outsmart them. Before they had even had time to occupy their respective zones, the Western Allies were confronted with a Soviet-sponsored provisional government which besought their recognition as the spokesman for liberated Austria. Such recognition therefore was withheld until October 1945. By that time the Western members of the Allied Council for

Austria had required the Renner Government to include more leaders from the rural provinces of Austria, had satisfied themselves that the cabinet really enjoyed widespread popular support, and had deprived the communist minister of the interior of his control over elections and the police. The Renner Government now was empowered to operate "under the guidance and control of the Allied Council." Its chief immediate functions were the encouragement of a free press and preparation for early national elections.

Meanwhile the Renner Government actually had accomplished much. In May 1945 it had restored the democratic constitution of 1920 as amended in 1929. Then it had abrogated the whole body of Nazi law as well as the dictatorial measures of the Dollfuss and Schuschnigg regimes; had proceeded with denazification and the punishment of war criminals; had provided necessary emergency legislation; and had established a well-functioning central administration.

Elections for a National Council (*Nationalrat*) were held in November 1945. No former member of the Nazi Party—of whom there were estimated to be 540,000—was permitted to vote. The balloting resulted in the choice of 85 People's Party deputies, 76 Social Democrats, and 4 communists, for a total of 165. Since it had been agreed in advance that a full coalition government would be formed after the election, the new cabinet (December 1945) contained eight members of the People's Party, six socialists, and one communist. (Several of the original choices had to be dropped because of Soviet veto in the Allied Council.) Leopold Figl of the People's Party became chancellor. An upper house called *Bundesrat* or Federal Council was chosen to represent the Austrian provinces. The parliament unanimously elected Renner first president of the Second Austrian Republic, for a term of six years.[10]

Several clearcut political issues faced the new Vienna Government. First, there was an almost equal division between Right and Left. Rural and western Austria voted conservatively; industrial and eastern Austria voted radically. A similar division had brought misery to the Austria of 1919–1938; now it gave promise of further difficulty. The chief benefactors of the near-balance appeared to be the rank-and-file ex-Nazis who had joined the party for reasons of expediency after 1938. Both the People's Party and the Social Democrats favored lenient treatment for this group in order to attract its support.

A second issue was the firm desire of the People's and Social Demo-

[10] Upon Renner's death late in 1950, Figl became acting president. In May 1951 the socialist mayor of Vienna, Theodor Körner, was elected president by popular vote.

cratic parties to keep Austria out of the Russian orbit, whereas the communists labored earnestly for this very consummation. The communist view was strongly backed by the Soviet occupiers, who, among other things, wanted to ensure continued Russian control of Danubian shipping and of the rich Zistersdorf oil fields. Finally, since a majority of the Austrians wanted their country free of Soviet influence, and since the Western Allies would not countenance close coöperation with any part of Germany, it was necessary to plan promptly for a viable Austria, one which could exist without the perennial foreign financial injections that had kept alive the old Austrian Republic.

The exact occupation zones in Austria were defined by the European Advisory Commission in July 1945. By that time each of the four occupying powers already had taken over a section of the country and tried to bring order out of the administrative and economic chaos resulting from the war and the collapse of Nazism. The Soviet Zone included Lower Austria and Burgenland. The British Zone embraced Styria, Carinthia, and some of eastern Tirol. France took over the rest of the Tirol and Vorarlberg. To the United States was assigned Salzburg and Upper Austria. Vienna, like Berlin, was divided into sectors; each occupying power held one sector, while a fifth was internationalized and ruled in monthly rotation by the occupiers. The Russian Zone contained the oil fields, the chief industrial areas, and some of the best agricultural land. The other zones were rich mainly in Alpine scenery. The area of Austria was 32,370 square miles. Its estimated population rose from 6,900,000 in 1947 to 7,100,000 in 1953.

The Allied authority in the country was the Allied Council, composed of the commanding generals of the Big Four in Austria. (In 1950 the three Western powers substituted civilian high commissioners for the military governors.) As in the case of the German counterpart, decisions had to be unanimous. Early in 1946 the AC approved the free exchange of surplus goods among the four zones, but the Russians limited the exercise of this right in their zone. From March 1946, Austria was allowed to exchange diplomatic representatives with all foreign countries save Germany and Japan. (Thus the Allies came to deal with Austria through both the AC and diplomatic representatives.) An agreement of June 1946 permitted the central government to make and administer certain national laws. Any bill not involving constitutional change or international affairs would automatically become law after 31 days unless it had incurred the unanimous disapproval of the AC. Austria now also could negotiate bilateral agreements with any of the occupying powers without AC approval.

Enjoying this much autonomy, the Austrian Government did a competent administrative job except where it was hampered by Soviet interference.

The postwar food shortage in Austria was even more serious than that in Germany. In 1945 her people were kept alive largely through supplies provided by the Allied armies; in 1946 UNRRA distributed the necessary minimum for subsistence. Foreign aid was made available from 1947. Meanwhile Austria's contribution to the occupation costs was gradually reduced, at Western insistence, from more than 50 per cent of her budget in 1945 to 15 per cent in 1946. In 1947 the United States waived payment of further occupation costs, an example which by the end of 1953 had been followed by the other occupying states. By that time the total of costs incurred and losses suffered by Austria during eight years of occupation approached an estimate of $2,000,000,000.

And yet, despite this drain and despite continuing Soviet exploitation of the country, Austria, through generous United States aid and through wise legislation and administration, made striking economic progress. In mid-1953 the United States Ambassador to Austria reported that the republic's industrial production was well ahead of the prewar peak, that agricultural output was back at the prewar level, that inflation had been checked, and that the Austrian schilling was among the most stable of European monetary units.

Only after a peace treaty were signed would Austria be free as well as liberated. The three Western Allies were sympathetic to such a goal and, as has been indicated, strove diligently to convert Moscow to the same view. But the Soviet Union had no desire to quit Austria. Angered to find the Austrian people unsympathetic to communism, the Soviets at least wanted to keep the control they had assumed over Austrian shipping, oil, and industrial assets. Furthermore, it was to their general advantage to leave forces in Austria because then they might legally maintain "communication lines" in Hungary and Romania. Finally, if there were a sufficient accumulation of misery and want in Austria, her people out of sheer desperation might enter the association of Danubian states already within the Soviet orbit.

By way of justifying her refusal to negotiate a treaty, the U.S.S.R. charged Austria with slothfulness in the denazification program and readiness to remain a haven for anti-Soviet displaced persons. In order to prevent the early negotiation of a treaty, the U.S.S.R. continued to demand the cession of Austrian territory to Yugoslavia, presented a preposterous reparation claim, and refused to accept the interpretation which all three

other Allied partners placed on the Potsdam phrase "German external assets."

The Potsdam Declaration had assigned such assets to the account of reparations. In the opinion of the United States, Great Britain, and France, the phrase referred to properties which Germans had owned abroad before 1938 or which they had acquired by purchase or other legal means thereafter. But the Russians chose to interpret the phrase as meaning anything in German hands regardless of time or method of acquisition. They thus included properties which had been taken by fraud or force from Jews or from any anti-Nazis, or which had simply been appropriated by such large-scale despoilers as Göring and Ribbentrop. Under this interpretation there obviously was little of value in Austria that could not be called "German."

In order to block Russia's efforts at wrecking Austrian economy, the Figl Government in 1946 nationalized the country's big industries. Moscow, however, replied that this action could have no effect on properties already taken over by the Soviets. It therefore disregarded the law and continued to ship eastward all that it wished from Austrian plants, wells, and farms. By way of compromise the Russians at one time proposed to turn the economic assets in question over to a corporation which would be owned half-and-half by each government; but the Austrian authorities understandably rejected this proffered economic partnership. Then Moscow offered to settle the dispute by accepting $200,000,000 reparation money in lieu of the "German" assets. But it was clear that impoverished Austria could not pay this sum—and that the Soviets knew this when they made the proposal.

The results of the regular parliamentary election of 1949 were gratifying to the West but further increased Russian intransigeance. This time the coöperating People's and Social Democratic parties won 77 and 67 seats, respectively, for a total of 144 out of a possible 165. The communists got 5 seats, and 16 were captured by a new League of Independents, composed largely of former Austrian Nazis who had been reënfranchised since the previous election. Figl remained as chancellor but during the ensuing years found it increasingly difficult to hold his coalition together. Late in 1952 there came an open break during debates on the next year's budget.

The People's Party insisted on a balanced budget; the socialists demanded heavy government spending for social services regardless of possible inflationary consequences. New elections therefore were held

early in 1953, but the result was indecisive. The People's Party got 74 seats, to 73 for the socialists, 14 for the League of Independents, and 4 for the communists. After prolonged political jockeying, Figl resigned and was succeeded by his colleague, Dr. Julius Raab, chairman of the People's Party and a foreign-trade expert. Raab's cabinet included members of both major parties, and he made some concessions to the socialists in the matter of government expenditures to relieve unemployment and the housing shortage.

Regularly during all these years the Western Allies tried to negotiate a peace treaty, and just as regularly Moscow prevented its completion. In the middle of 1953, by which time the Big Four foreign ministers or their deputies had held a total of almost 300 fruitless meetings on an Austrian settlement, the Soviet Union refused even to send a representative to another conference—on the ground that it could not possibly be successful. Thus Austria, which for centuries had been regarded as a bridge between East and West, now was dominated in its own eastern section by Russia and supported in its western area by the United States.

CHAPTER 24

Eastern Europe Since 1945

THE SOVIET UNION

While Soviet war losses remained in the realm of conjecture, it was generally estimated that the soldier and civilian deaths numbered at least 15,000,000, and that perhaps 25,000,000 other persons were made homeless and destitute. Tens of thousands of square miles of land were systematically laid waste by the Nazi armies. General Eisenhower wrote: "When we flew into Russia, in 1945, I did not see a house standing between the western borders of the country and the area around Moscow." Thus there had really happened to Russia what the Bolshevik leaders had most feared from abroad in the 1920's and 1930's.

Beaten by German soldiers in the First World War, partially occupied for several years by Allied troops after that war, ringed in the west by a cordon of small and hostile states created by the Paris Peace Conference, treated as an outcast from the family of nations for much of the period between 1919 and 1939, and now devastated by Hitler's forces, Russia emerged from the Second World War seemingly determined never again to be so vulnerable. To this end her leaders apparently decided to rebuild the Russian army and war potential as rapidly as possible; to establish a *cordon sanitaire* in reverse by setting up puppet regimes in and making satellites of the smaller neighboring states; to make Germany ever weaker economically and keep her disunited unless or until a communist government could there be helped to power; to fulfill at last the task bequeathed to his successors by Tsar Peter the Great in the matter of securing direct

access to the sea through warm-water outlets; to resist the revival of a powerful Japan; and, while extending Moscow's hegemony southward into Arabia, Iran, China, and Korea, to continue pursuit of the goal of world revolution both for its own sake and to protect the "socialist fatherland" from possible "capitalist-imperialist aggression." [1]

The Soviet rulers, in seeking to implement these aims, were helped by several factors. The final triumph in 1945 over a Western great power was unique in modern Russian history and vindicated the Stalinist leadership in the eyes of the Russian people. During the war and as a concomitance of victory, Russian nationalism was aroused to a new pitch.[2] After the war the Russian leaders, flushed with unaccustomed victory and apparently succumbing to their own propaganda lire that the Western contributions to the defeat of the axis had been minimal, came to display an exuberant confidence in international dealings that bordered on the defiant and challenging. The peace-endangering combination of almost hysterical fear of new (albeit imaginary) Western designs and of boastful defiance was made more dangerous still by a portion of the Western press which gave exaggerated space to minor Soviet pronouncements and actions and thus further fed Russian fear, vanity, and bellicosity.

The Kremlin executives also were aided, in the short run, by their bewilderingly unorthodox approach to diplomacy, their readiness to use untruth as an instrument of national policy, their materialistic justification of any means to achieve the communist end, their assumption that Western willingness to compromise was a sign of weakness, and their utilization of United Nations sessions as a sounding board for propaganda and a means of sowing discord among the nations. The ruthless control of thought and expression in the U.S.S.R., which had kept Russia relatively free of Nazi fifth-column activity during the war,[3] now also apparently kept the

[1] The establishment of the Cominform in 1947 (see p. 598) was a sign of the renewed interest in world revolution.

[2] The trend from proletarian internationalism to Soviet nationalism was marked by such things as the adoption of an anthem called "Hymn of the Soviet Union" and the relegation of the "Internationale" to the status of a song of the Communist Party; by the official substitution of the designations Soviet Army and Soviet Navy for the former Red Army and Red Navy; by the restoration of military medals and traditional military titles; and by the almost feverish claiming of Russian priority in a wide variety of Western inventions and discoveries in order to demonstrate a supposed Russian superiority in science, art, and music as well as politics and economics.

[3] In 1941 Moscow dissolved the community of Volga Germans (whose ancestors had settled there in the eighteenth century) and deported perhaps 400,000 persons to Siberian wastes. In 1946 it was announced that a similar fate had befallen (apparently in 1944) the Crimean Tatars and the Chechens and Ingush in the Caucasus—supposedly for harboring members who wished to aid the Nazi invaders. Many inhabitants of the three Baltic states, absorbed in 1939, also were deported—and replaced by Russian colonists. Several thousand Russian prisoners of war, led by General Andrei A. Vlasov, did fight for the Nazis but were not used on the Russian front.

country content to follow its leadership at a time when there was much confusion and conflict over policies within the Western democracies. As partial counterbalance to her war losses, Russia since 1939 had annexed about 260,000 square miles of territory inhabited by more than 22,000,000 people. Finally, through a policy of satellitism—the Soviet version of tsarist imperialism—Moscow extended its political influence and economic control over Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and, for a time, Yugoslavia.

Meanwhile pressing domestic problems had to be tackled. The government proceeded energetically with limited demobilization and announced emergency measures to provide food, housing, and jobs for the returned soldiers. Food rationing, reintroduced during the war, ended with the close of 1947. Work hours were lengthened, and efforts, involving both rewards and punishments, were made to step up labor productivity. Much efficient man power was needed for rebuilding and reconstruction, and for the implementation of the Fourth Five-Year Plan launched in 1946 and the Fifth Five-Year Plan inaugurated in 1951. The goals of these plans were complete rehabilitation, a production level far above that of the best prewar year, and a start toward all-time highs in virtually every phase of manufacture. Special emphasis was placed on the heavy industries that were basic to success in modern war. Thus the Fourth Five-Year Plan called for an increase of 62 per cent in the production of capital goods but only 26 per cent for consumer goods.

Parallel with all this, the military was kept strong. With Stalin as first incumbent of the newly created office of Generalissimo of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Army was given a heavy training schedule for all the youth. The air force and navy were enlarged, the latter particularly in submarines. Research was pushed on atomic weapons—with the aid of captured German scientists and foreign spies. Moreover, to make up for wartime losses and to provide for many future soldiers and workers, the government pursued a vigorous campaign for larger families. In an area of 8,500,000 square miles, the estimated population passed the 200,000,000 mark in 1947 and in 1954 reached perhaps 215,000,000. Bonuses were granted for extra children. Heavy taxes were placed on bachelors, childless couples, and married couples with no more than two children. "Medals of Motherhood" were awarded for fertility. From 1944 on, the marriage and divorce laws were revised so as to strengthen family ties.

In the war years, when the need was for a maximum agricultural output with a minimum of energy-consuming supervision, the government eased some of its restrictions on the peasants and temporarily halted its campaign for total collectivization. But with the end of war, the agrarian

legislation was strictly enforced, and efforts were made to regiment the peasants as thoroughly as the urban workers. In the process, the number of farm officials, managers, and accountants was greatly multiplied, and since many of these were townsmen, there was resultant misunderstanding and ill feeling.

While the official party line still extolled the virtues of a classless society, the Soviet Union developed many "class strata," based largely on income and education. In each of the categories of soldiers, industrial workers, peasants, and "toiling intelligentsia" (including political officials, bureaucrats, managers, professionals, teachers, writers, artists, and clerks) there were numerous rank, income, and privilege levels.[4] A great majority of the factory workers were paid varying wages under the piecework system, and soon after the war, output norms ("labor days") were established for the peasantry. Thus, in 1949, the "norm" monthly wage of a skilled furnace-worker was more than three times that of an unskilled stoker; extra output on the part of the skilled man would make the disparity even greater. The manager of a sizable factory received thirty times the pay of a sawmill apprentice. Officials and managers who exceeded their assigned quotas in any field were well rewarded; those who fell short of the arbitrary goals were disgraced and sometimes "liquidated." Writers who pleased the rulers were especially pampered and, literally, showered with luxuries. A far cry, this, from the original communist slogan: "From each according to his ability; to each according to his needs."

The more highly paid strata generally came to form a new aristocracy. They inhabited preferred living quarters and, indeed, from 1948 on were permitted to own private houses on land leased from the state. Such houses did not need to be shared with other families as was the case with most ordinary workers' apartments, and they were heritable by the relatives of a deceased owner. The upper strata also were able to buy table delicacies and other luxuries in special stores, ride in automobiles, enjoy vacations in private summer cottages, and sit far removed from the ordinary proletarians in even the trade-union cinemas. Above all, their children enjoyed educational advantages that were closed to all but the most brilliant children of the poorer strata. From 1940 on, tuition was charged for attendance in the three top classes of secondary schools and for all higher education. Simultaneously the state scholarships were reduced in number and made available only to really outstanding students. The full import

[4] Many of the officers in the civil administration were required to wear uniforms, and civil ranks were assimilated to military ranks. Thus a Junior Jurist was given rank equal to that of a second lieutenant in the army.

of this became apparent in 1952 when the policy was enunciated of placing only "cultured people . . . at the helm in industries and agriculture." Thenceforth, for example, the post of manager of a collective farm was virtually closed to the peasantry. Thus, as one observer put it, "in Russia all people were equal, only some were more equal than others."

But with all their privileges, even the new aristocrats were subject to the universal subordination of the individual to the interests of the state—and to sudden liquidation in the event of failure or of a precipitate change in official policy or personnel. Verily, "the obsession of the rulers with output targets . . . caused them—free as they were from any moral or religious inhibitions—to regard human beings as instruments of production." Under Stalinism, there was nothing that the self-perpetuating ruling group might not "do to the men or women or their children, or the population of whole provinces or countries, to bend them to their will." In the fourth decade of Soviet control, the dominant motive in Russia was not the welfare of the worker and peasant but the unbounded increase of the economic power of the state, and through it of the political power of the new pharaohs.

Certain wartime and postwar changes were made in the governmental structure of the U.S.S.R. As has been mentioned, the Union Republics in 1944 were given the right to carry on foreign relations and to create their own military establishments. Thenceforth the Ukraine and White Russia participated in international conferences and were active in the United Nations. The commissariats in 1946 were changed to ministries and greatly increased in number. By 1948 the Council of Ministers, of which Stalin was head or premier, contained about 70 members; after his death, in 1953, the number was reduced. Corresponding to the president in other republics was the president of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. Upon the retirement in 1946 of the aged Michael I. Kalinin, who had first been elected in 1938, the post went to former trade-union leader Nikolai Mikhailovich Shvernik. The latter was reëlected in 1950, but after Stalin's death in 1953 he was reappointed to the leadership of the trade-unions and replaced as president by Marshal Klimenti Efremovich Voroshilov. The marshal was reëlected by a newly chosen Supreme Soviet in 1954.

During the war, the bars to membership in the Communist Party were lowered. The period of candidacy was shortened, fewer recommendations were required, and soldiers were given preferred treatment. As a result, the reported total of members and candidates increased from 2,500,000 in 1939 to 6,300,000 in 1947 and, despite a postwar purge of the "unfit,"

to 6,800,000 in October 1952. At the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1952—the first such gathering in 13 years—the use of the word "Bolshevik" was dropped, and the official party name became "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union." On the same occasion, the Politburo and Orgburo (see p. 327) were abolished and replaced by a Presidium.

Since organized religion, such as it was, had loyally supported the war effort, the government decided to reward this conduct. A somewhat more conciliatory religious policy might also remove a continuing source of internal discontent and possibly win new support abroad. Hence some concessions were made in the spheres of religious study, worship, and organization. There was a big ceremony at the official installation, after a long lapse, of a Patriarch of all the Russias—who however was made responsible to an agency of the police. A number of theological seminaries and monasteries were reopened and shrines restored. The number of churches in the postwar U.S.S.R. was estimated at about one-third of the number in the Russia of 1914. Simultaneously with the religious revival came a revivification of "culture" as a vehicle for propagandizing the Soviet ideology. This involved a long series of dismissals and new appointments of officials—and disgrace or rewards for contributors—in the fields of art, literature, and music. Even the hitherto celebrated and bemedalled composer Shostakovich fell into official disfavor for a time. Thus it was once more emphasized that every word, every deed, every waking thought of a faithful subject of the Soviet Union must coincide with the latest official "line." Regardless of the frequency of change of this line, the party was always right; only the individual who hewed to any one form of the line too long was at fault.

The first union-wide elections since 1937 were held in 1946, a year after the minimum age of candidates for office had been raised from 18 to 23. All the electoral lists presented by the party—which still included the names of some nonparty members—were approved. The same result was achieved in the next regular elections in 1950 and 1954. With each successive election the number of workers and peasants in the two houses of the Supreme Soviet declined, while the number of professionals and nonmanual laborers increased.

Beginning late in 1951 there were frequent rumors that Stalin was seriously ill. Whatever the truth of these, the world was informed early in March 1953 that Stalin had died of heart disease. The reins of government passed into the hands of a five-man "inner cabinet" headed by Georgi Maximilianovich Malenkov as premier.

Malenkov was born in Orenburg (Chkalov) in 1901. According to the

official version, his parents were "poor proletarians"; but there was reason to believe that his father was a well-to-do landowner. In any case, he received a good secondary education, fought in the Red Army at 18, and became a member of the party in 1920. Ambitious, energetic, tireless, ruthless, an early supporter of Stalin in the latter's battle with Trotsky, a good organizer, Malenkov rose rapidly to a position of influence on Stalin's personal secretarial staff and eventually in the central committee of the party. For many years (1925–1939) he worked with party personnel files, gaining valuable information about his colleagues—and his rivals. Apparently he also accumulated much of the evidence that was used against the accused in the political purges of the 1930's.

During the war Malenkov supervised the war industries as a member of the all-powerful Committee for State Defense. Then he became chairman of the committee charged with rehabilitating the liberated areas, an official of the Cominform, a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, and, in 1953, a member of the new party presidium. Stout, smooth-shaven, crudely jovial, narrow-minded but practical, he regularly affected semi-military dress with trousers tucked into high boots.

The premier, or chairman of the Council of Ministers, had four deputies, each of whom had also been a deputy chairman in Stalin's last cabinet. Molotov, who had presided over foreign affairs from 1939 to 1949, again became foreign minister. Marshal Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin, who had distinguished himself in the war against the Nazis, became defense minister. Lazar Moiseyevich Kaganovich, a close friend of Stalin, who had been active in the trade-union sphere, was a former commissar for railways and for oil, and had served on the Committee for State Defense, now continued to advise on economic matters. Finally, Lavrenti Pavlovich Beria, native of Georgia in the Caucasus, party member since 1917, police official since 1921, head of the N.K.V.D. from 1938 to 1946, member of the defense and rehabilitation committees, became minister for internal affairs or head of the dread M.V.D. Second in power to Malenkov, Beria and the premier apparently hated and feared each other. And within four months Beria was ousted and placed in confinement on the customary charges of traitorous activity. It may be, as some observers claimed, that anti-Semitism played a part in this overturn; at any rate, the general pattern of action resembled the earlier Stalin-Trotsky duel for power after Lenin's death. Gradually, throughout 1953, one after another of Beria's friends in high position was removed, all to be replaced by staunch "Malenkovists."

Meanwhile Moscow implied in several official statements that all outstanding Soviet-Western differences could be settled peaceably. Yet not a

single concrete step was taken which might be interpreted as an earnest of new Soviet intentions to conclude an Austrian treaty, permit the Germans to reunite their country on a basis of self-determination, ease the yoke on the satellite nations, check international communist propaganda, stop encouraging subversion in Africa and Asia, or cease trying to embroil the Western peoples in disputes amongst themselves. And in August 1953 Russia proved by experimental explosion her successful development, perhaps parallel to that in the United States, of the so-called H-bomb, or hydrogen bomb, based on thermonuclear reaction and far more effective than the A-bomb whose action depended simply on nuclear fission. Under Malenkov, as under Lenin and Stalin, the Soviet Union continued to keep the non-communist world in a state of tense uneasiness.

THE SOVIET SATELLITES AND YUGOSLAVIA

There is not space here for a detailed discussion of the postwar changes in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece. Except in the last-named country, Soviet influence was everywhere paramount by 1948. Poland and Czechoslovakia remained as republics; Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania had all become republics. In each case, communist minorities, backed by Moscow's armed might, came to exercise political control and gradually put into effect the economic and social practices prevalent in the Soviet Union. When, on occasion, one of these states tried to act independently in foreign affairs, Moscow quickly called the offender to account. Thus, when Czechoslovakia in 1947 agreed to attend an international conference on the Marshall Plan, the U.S.S.R. made its displeasure known, and Prague reluctantly withdrew its acceptance.

On the basis of official and unofficial reports by United States and other foreign observers, and of eyewitness accounts of exiles who managed to reach foreign safety, there could be little doubt that oppression and terror were employed as instruments of policy in every one of these countries. There was a difference in degree, but not in kind. Opposition leaders and intellectual opponents were jailed or executed, the press was severely censored, elections were "fixed," false statements were issued under official seal, political trickery was glorified at the expense of integrity, secret police agencies became pillars of government, and the people were deliberately misinformed with respect to the aims and ideals of the Soviet Union on the one hand and the Western democracies on the other.

In none of these countries were economic conditions satisfactory. Sev-

eral, indeed, obviously would have liked to benefit from the establishment or reëstablishment of trade connections with the West. But even when the native communist leadership was sufficiently nationalistic to wish for national economic improvement, Moscow prevented the growth of external ties that might weaken its hold on a satellite. It was to keep Greece and Turkey, strategically situated between Russia in the north and the Mediterranean Sea and Arabian Peninsula in the south, out of the Soviet orbit, that President Truman secured for them United States economic and military assistance in May 1947 (see p. 600).

The general pattern of life in the several "people's democracies" was thus well described in 1953: [5]

> The hierarchical organization of the communist parties [in the satellites] is . . . essentially the same as that of the Soviet Communist Party. The communists control the organs of central and local government as in the Soviet Union. The constitutions . . . are closely modelled on the Soviet Constitution of 1936. Parliaments are elected by direct, equal, secret, universal suffrage, but there is only one list of candidates, and the parliaments only meet for a few days every year. Between sessions, legislative business is carried on by the Presidiums, whose members are still more rigorously selected by the communists than are the members of the parliaments. Local authorities are elected in a similar way, and are similarly controlled by the party. As in Soviet Russia, they are strictly subordinate to the central authorities. The judicial hierarchy is equally controlled by the party. . . . As in the Soviet Union, great powers are held by the separate hierarchy of procurators controlled . . . by the senior procurator, himself a member of the party and appointed by the parliament. Communist control over the police is complete. In the armed forces control is exercised partly through . . . political commissars . . . and partly through the secret police departments of the armed forces. . . . Political control in this narrow sense is supplemented by control over the so-called 'mass organisations' —especially youth and women's movements. Special attention is paid to the hierarchy of education, from primary school to university, and to sports—or 'physiculture.'
>
> The communists have done their best since 1948 to remodel the economic hierarchy on Soviet Russian principles. Here progress was quicker in the industrial than in the agricultural field. Both the managerial and the trade union pyramids were firmly held by the party. Managerial policy was based on the practice of the later Stalinist era rather than of the early period of Bolshevism. There was much less persecution of pre-revolutionary experts than in Russia. Efficient managers who were willing to submit to the communists retained their jobs, and were even admitted into the party, as well as enjoying the social privileges established in Russia since the late 1930's. The agricultural hierarchy

[5] Seton-Watson, H. *From Lenin to Malenkov. The History of World Communism*, pages 261–263. Reprinted by permission of the publisher, Frederick A. Praeger, New York. Copyright 1953 by H. Seton-Watson.

was also closely copied from the Soviet Russian model. Collective farm managements . . . were subject to the control of the party. . . . The purpose of collectivisation in Eastern Europe was the same as in Russia—to increase food supplies for the increasing non-agricultural population and to organise the recruiting of labour from the villages to the new industries, mines and public works. With the exception of Bulgaria, however, the pace was slower in Eastern Europe than in Russia, and—with the same exception—there were few cases of destruction of livestock or clashes between peasants and the police. Of the trend there could be no doubt. At least by the late 1950's it was intended that East European agriculture should be collectivised. The trend of industrial planning was also the same as in Soviet Russia. First priority was given to capital goods industries, and especially to metallurgy and engineering. . . .

The position of the social classes in Eastern Europe has been approaching that in Soviet Russia. . . . Trade unions represented the interests of the State against the workers, not of the workers against the boss. Differential piece rates . . . and 'socialist competition' were encouraged. Welfare services were admirable on paper: in practice when economic conditions dictated economies the welfare services were the first to be cut. Severe penalties were imposed for lateness at work or minor breaches of discipline, and more was heard from official spokesmen of the doctor's duty to prevent malingering in the factory than of the worker's right to medical attention.

The position of those intellectuals who were not technicians or managers, was precarious. Their special knowledge was in demand, and even received high material rewards, but their pre-revolutionary educational background caused them to be treated with suspicion. Meanwhile the communists busily prepared a new intelligentsia, recruited from children of workers, peasants and party bureaucrats, closely watched for ideological orthodoxy and trained in the new schools whose organisation and curriculum were dictated by the party. Such elements of a liberal education as had existed under the pre-revolutionary regimes of Eastern Europe were swept away: they were replaced by a combination of technical instruction with Marxist indoctrination. Press, radio and book publication were controlled by communist censorship, and the latest [Russian] teachings . . . on literature, art, philosophy, genetics and linguistics were introduced. Communist control of education inevitably brought conflict with the Christian churches. Religion was excluded from all but the narrowest field of worship. . . . To outward appearance at least, Eastern Europe was being rapidly organised under a totalitarian hierarchy, whose dominant groups . . . were, as in Soviet Russia, a combination of party bureaucrats and technical managers.

The first apparent defection behind the "iron curtain" of Soviet dominance came in Yugoslavia in the spring of 1948. There the government was controlled by Josip Broz who, as Marshal Tito, had assumed power after the withdrawal of German troops from Yugoslavia. Tito (1892–) was a Croatian peasant who deserted to Russia from the Austro-Hungarian Army in 1915 and served in the Red Army from 1917 to 1921. Thereafter

he was active in illegal communist activities in Yugoslavia, served a prison term for conspiracy, and spent most of the decade of the 1930's in Paris. He recruited Yugoslavs for the International Brigade during the Spanish Civil War and returned to Yugoslavia shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War.

During this war he came to the leadership of the Yugoslav Partisans of communist sympathies. When the latter, late in 1943, set up a provisional government in opposition to the royal government-in-exile in London, Tito was made head of its liberation committee and marshal of Yugoslavia. Towards the close of 1944 he arranged with the government-in-exile for an eventual free plebiscite on the return of King Peter II. The plebiscite and elections for a constituent assembly were held in November 1945 in circumstances which led to a complete victory for the candidates of Tito's National Front. They won all seats in the new assembly. Shortly after the election, the assembly ended the monarchy and set up a Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, with some autonomy for the constituent elements. The Allies recognized this government, with Tito as premier and minister of defense, before the end of 1945. Peter thereupon joined the company of homeless ex-monarchs.

Tito efficiently consolidated his power and had his chief rival, General Mikhailovich (see p. 549), executed for treasonable Fascist activities. For a time thereafter he seemed to be the darling among Moscow's puppet leaders, and the U.S.S.R. gave him strong backing in his aggressive territorial and financial demands on Italy and Austria. His capital, Belgrade, moreover, became the headquarters of the Cominform. And then, in June 1948, unexpectedly so far as the outside world was concerned, this same Cominform blasted Tito and some of his aides as "deviationists from the party line" and traitors to the cause of Soviet solidarity. Tito and his nationalistic Yugoslav followers, rebelling against the complete subservience that was demanded of all satellites by the Soviet hierarchy in Moscow, responded with counterblasts and attacks even on the internal policies of the U.S.S.R.

Moscow broke with Belgrade, rather than the reverse, because Russia had not been able to penetrate the Yugoslav civil and military administrations as she had those of the other satellite states. The military staff and civil bureaucracy had been built up by Tito during the war without reliance on Soviet representatives or advisers. Indeed, while Tito claimed to be a better Leninist than Stalin, he also had his secret police watch Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia, and he sympathized with his officers who objected to Moscow's insistence that its military advisers receive higher pay than

equal-ranking natives. The Kremlin evidently expected the populace to embrace its viewpoint and rise up against Tito; instead, the nationalistic Southslavs resented Moscow's foreign arrogance and continued to accept their own dictator.

In the years following the break, Yugoslavia gradually lost its previous artificially stimulated fear of Western designs and, unlike the continuing satellites, sought and accepted Western economic support. The communist one-party system, however, remained in effect, with most of the adult population enrolled in the People's Front. Similarly, the country continued to be a police state and to fight the influence of the Roman Catholic clergy. There appeared to be a limited amount of economic decentralization, and in 1952–1953 some of the farm collectives or "labor coöperatives" were permitted to dissolve. The Serb hegemony over the other nationalities seemed to have been lessened, and some autonomy was extended to each of six federated republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro.

A new constitution in 1953 set up a bicameral parliament composed of a Federal Council (elected by popular secret vote) and a Council of Producers representing economic groups. There was some separation of executive and legislative functions, but the president, chosen by parliament, was endowed with virtually dictatorial powers. Tito was elected first president. The republic in 1953 had a population of 17,000,000 in an area of 95,500 square miles. Its foreign relations continued to be ruffled with the Cominform (which regarded it as heretical), with the papacy (over the treatment of the clergy), and with Italy (over the final disposition of Trieste). But at least, as one observer put it, "the removal of the obligation to adulate all things Russian and to spit at Western culture lifted a great weight from Yugoslav schools and universities."

TURKEY

Through the exercise of wisdom and caution, Turkey was able to remain neutral throughout most of the war. A treaty of 1939 bound her to aid the French and British, but the collapse of France in 1940 created a new situation. The realism of continuing neutrality was made evident by mid-1941, when German forces almost surrounded Turkey in dominated areas every place except on the republic's Russian frontier. Thereafter Turkey began to sell more raw materials to Germany, though most of her output, especially chrome ore, continued to go to the Allies. The United States and Great Britain supplied Ankara with large amounts of military

equipment, so that an army of 2,000,000 men could be built up. In February 1945 Turkey at last declared war on Germany, chiefly in order to qualify for admission to the San Francisco conference on the organization of the United Nations.

Meanwhile Turco-Russian relations had become strained. Moscow used Turkish neutrality as an excuse to become angry, to denounce the non-aggression pact of 1925, and to make aggressive demands. These demands of 1945 included cession of some Black Sea and Caucasian territories to the U.S.S.R., the right to establish military bases in the area of the Straits, and a revision of the Montreux Straits Convention (see p. 389). Throughout 1946 and into 1947 Russian propaganda against Turkey and Russian demands for Russo-Turkish "defense" of the Straits became more intense. But United States economic and military aid from 1947 onward, following enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, stiffened Turkish resistance. In 1950 Ankara "finally and conclusively" rejected Moscow's demands. And soon after the outbreak of war in Korea, Turkey sent 4500 men to fight under United Nations auspices against communist aggression.

After the Second World War, and perhaps partly because of the growing friendship with the United States, Turkish domestic politics became increasingly liberal. The political monopoly of the People's Party was broken in 1946 when a Democratic Party was permitted to come into existence. A Conservative Party appeared in 1947 and a Peasant Party in 1952. Meanwhile various government controls were relaxed, stimulus was given to private enterprise, and religious instruction was reintroduced into the schools.

Really free national elections were held in 1950. They resulted in overwhelming victory for the Democratic Party. This party advocated support of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (see p. 723), the upbuilding of military strength, friendship with the United States, vigorous private enterprise, and further industrialization. After the balloting, President Inönü resigned and was succeeded by the founder of the Democratic Party, the economic expert, Celâl Bayar. The premiership went to the latter's colleague, Adnan Menderes. It was a definite sign of new times in the Balkans when, in 1953, owing largely to Ankara's initiative, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey signed a five-year pact to "unite their efforts to strengthen the organization of defense against aggression." A few months later, when the British, at Egyptian insistence, were considering the possibility of weakening their hold on Suez, Turkey offered facilities in the southeastern part of the republic (especially at Iskenderun, the former Alexandretta) for a NATO military base. To the

Western powers, defense of their eastern interests had come, by the end of 1953, to mean defense of Turkey.[6]

[6] The second free national election in Turkey was held in May 1954. Again the Democratic Party swept the polls, and the Messrs. Bayar and Menderes were returned to office. The republic's population in 1954 was estimated at more than 21,000,000.

CHAPTER 25

Asian and African Developments Since 1945

ASIA UNDER THE ASIATICS

Most of Asia was involved in the Second World War. Throughout the vast continent the postwar years witnessed a restless and surging nationalism that aimed at bringing to an end the Asiatic colonialism of the weakened Western powers. Ready or not, the leaders of Asia's peoples demanded self-rule without further delay. And by self-rule many of the leaders apparently meant concentration of power in their own inexperienced hands and not-altogether-democratic persons.

As so frequently had happened in the newly independent areas in Europe after the First World War, the new governments in Asia generally were aggressive in their foreign policy and oppressive against their political opponents at home. With the waning of European (and Japanese) "imperialism," Asiatic (and Soviet) imperialisms created new repressions and new sore spots—in the Arabian Peninsula, in India, in China, and in southeastern Asia. And everywhere Moscow-directed agents, foreign and native, carried on communist propaganda. They created and confused issues, fanned jealousies and hatreds, interfered with attempts at orderly administration, and organized power-seeking dissidents into subversive nuclei.

Western financial and technical aid were widely accepted, even when Western motives were questioned and Western philosophies derided. And

gradually progress was recorded in many areas in improving the daily lot of humble persons, in education, in the art of representative government, in the production of capital and consumers' goods, and in respected participation in world affairs. Let us now consider these and other events in more detail for certain specific parts of the new and self-confident Asia.

ISRAEL AND THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

After the close of hostilities in the Second World War, the Palestine situation became acute. The critical factors included the increased national spirit of the Arabs both within and without the mandate, the desperate plight of hundreds of thousands of Jews left stranded in postwar Central Europe, the announcement by the British Government that all Palestine entry visas permitted by the White Paper of 1939 had been used up, the congregation of large groups of Jewish refugees in Mediterranean ports and their efforts to enter Palestine clandestinely, the activities of newly organized Jewish terrorist groups, the importance of Palestine in the Near Eastern oil picture, the growing Soviet interests in Arabia, and the exigencies of United States politics particularly with the approach of the presidential-election year of 1948.

The outlook became darker rather than brighter through the efforts of an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, which issued a controversial report in April 1946. Among other things, the committee recommended the immediate admission into Palestine of 100,000 Jewish victims of Nazi persecution, the removal of restrictions on land transfers, educational reform, the fostering of both Jewish and Arabic economic development, and the suppression of the terrorism and violence that for months had been taking a toll of British, Arabic, and Jewish lives. On the political side, the report advised against any attempt to set up an independent Palestinian state or states, advocated dominance neither of Jew by Arab nor of Arab by Jew, and urged continuance of the mandate until a UN trusteeship agreement could be negotiated.

President Truman promptly expressed his satisfaction with the report, especially that part relating to the admission of another 100,000 Jews. This item also pleased the Jewish Agency for Palestine, which however was disappointed because there was no proposal to create a Jewish state. The Arab Higher Committee denounced the report and threatened a "national struggle" if an effort were made to implement the recommendations. The British Government pointed out that to permit the indicated large-scale Jewish immigration would require the sending of additional large troop

units to the Near East, and this it was not prepared to do. Foreign Secretary Bevin in a caustic speech wondered whether Washington would help provide the necessary armed might to carry out the terms which it endorsed, and made some remarks about the unwillingness of the United States to open its own doors to the many hapless Jewish refugees.

As violence and Jewish-immigrant smuggling increased, the Palestinian Arabs received more and more backing from the League of the Arab States. This league was formed at Cairo in 1945 among Syria, Trans-Jordan (from 1949 the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan), Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt, and Yemen. The members, having agreed to coöperate in safeguarding one another's independence and sovereignty, now joined in demanding a cessation of Jewish immigration into Palestine. Thereupon Great Britain in the spring of 1947, anxious to "end it all" in so far as its Palestinian obligations were concerned, requested a special session of the UN General Assembly. Its main task should be the appointment of a committee to study the Palestine situation and report to the second regular assembly in September. Enough states agreed to the request so that the special session was promptly convened.

In May 1947 the assembly appointed a Special Committee on Palestine with "widest powers to ascertain and record facts, and to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine." The committee represented eleven nations. Under the chairmanship of Chief Justice Alfred Emil Sandstrom of Sweden it quickly got to work, and on the last day of August 1947 signed its report in Geneva. There was unanimity on such general principles as the need for early termination of the mandate, a short transition period under UN supervision preceding independence, the safeguarding of the religious rights of the several communities represented, the preservation of the land's economic unity in any territorial solution, and the inclusion of democratic guarantees in any new constitutional setup. A majority of the committee then proposed a partition of Palestine into an Arabic state, a Jewish state, and the city of Jerusalem, the three to be linked in an economic union. A minority proposed one independent federal state, with its capital at Jerusalem, containing autonomous Arabic and Jewish states.

Consideration of this report by the General Assembly from mid-September onwards gave opportunity for heated debate. The situation was made more difficult by the continuance of strife and terror in Palestine; by the emotional aspects of the whole problem; by the overwhelming amount of propaganda, much of it irresponsible, that was hurled into the atmosphere; and by the intrusion of partisan politics and political pressure,

especially in the United States. Great Britain expressed approval of the principles of early mandate termination and independence for Palestine. The Jewish Agency was pleased at the prospect of the creation of a Jewish state. The Arabs were bitterly opposed to any partition plan. They made it clear that they had no quarrel with the Jews as such, only with "the political Zionists who wanted to dominate Palestine." The United States and the U.S.S.R. backed the general principles of the report and the partition plan advanced by the committee majority.

In November 1947 the assembly accepted a modified version of the majority report.[1] It recommended the partition of Palestine into an Arabic state, a Jewish state, and the City of Jerusalem as an enclave within the Arabic state. Linked in a customs union, the two states were to have a unified currency system and jointly operated transportation and communication facilities. A commission of the assembly was to supervise the area during the transition period between relinquishment of the mandate by Great Britain and establishment of the two independent states, this latter to be consummated not later than October 1, 1948. The assembly promptly appointed a Palestine Commission, but this, through force of circumstances, ceased to exist in May 1948. It had held 75 meetings, but had never left its base at Lake Success in New York.

In the early months of 1948, following a British announcement that London would lay down the mandate in May 1948, the strife in Palestine increased to alarming proportions. The Security Council therefore turned its attention to the problem—and found itself facing a whole series of problems. The debates kept veering around to the use of international force in Palestine, but this possibility gave rise to new questions. Could an international army properly be used to enforce partition, or must its assignment be limited to putting down violence? If an international army were called upon, who would be asked to furnish the soldiers? The United Nations, after all, despite much paper work by the Military Staff Committee, did not yet have available a force of its own.

The United States, though she had used her influence to get the partition plan adopted, now strongly maintained that force should be used only to keep peace, not to effect the partition. Others felt either that such a policy simply could not be carried out or that it would be futile. Great Britain, moreover, refused to commit any more of her blood to the settlement of the issue. Neither Washington nor Moscow wished to see the other's troops sent to the Near East for what might prove to be an

[1] The General Assembly could only *recommend* a solution of the Palestine problem. It requested the Security Council to supervise the carrying out of the proposals.

indefinite period. Yet if United States troops were sent, Moscow would want Russian soldiers to participate, and vice versa. A combined United States and Soviet expedition, on the other hand, might lead more to trouble than to peace. But all further discussion was made superfluous by the declaration in Tel Aviv of a new independent State of Israel as of midnight, May 14–15, 1948, immediately following the scheduled laying down of the Palestine mandate by Great Britain and the departure of High Commissioner Lieutenant General Sir Alan Gordon Cunningham. This surprise act also led to dissolution of another General Assembly session on Palestine, convened at United States request a month earlier.

For weeks after the opening date, this special session had been bewildered not merely by the events in Palestine and the conflicting statements of Jews and Arabs, but by the confused and impulsive actions of the Washington Government. These actions had included, for example, the presentation of seven different "plans" for settling the issue. They had included also the immediate *de facto* recognition of Israel by President Truman. Owing to the difference in time between Palestine and Washington, the United States recognition actually came during the evening of May 14. Russian recognition followed soon thereafter. There now remained nothing for the General Assembly to do but authorize the Big Five to find and send to the Holy Land a mediator to put a stop to the war that immediately broke out between newly-established Israel and the Arab League. Within a few days the Big Five unanimously selected Count Folke Bernadotte of Wisborg, nephew of the King of Sweden and head of the Swedish Red Cross and Boy Scouts.

The Israeli declaration of independence made no specific mention of boundaries, but promised coöperation in the implementation of the United Nations resolution of 1947, which endorsed the partition of Palestine along specified lines. A constituent assembly was to be elected before the year was out. Meanwhile the veteran British Zionist, Dr. Chaim Weizmann (1874–1952), was made provisional president; David Ben-Gurion, native Palestinian trade-unionist and Zionist, became premier; and Moshé Sharett (until 1949 named Shertok), who had pleaded the Zionist cause before the UN, was appointed foreign minister. These men on the one side, and King Abdullah Ibn Hussein of Trans-Jordan (chief military leader of the Arab League) and the Grand Mufti (head of the Moslem community in Jerusalem) on the other, were the ones whom Count Bernadotte tried to persuade to reach a peaceful settlement of one of the most troublesome problems bequeathed to the world by the First and Second World Wars.

Bernadotte did manage to arrange an uneasy truce, but soon was

assassinated by a Jewish terrorist. The fighting between Israel (with its area of 8000 square miles and Jewish population of about 650,000) and the Arab League (with a combined area of about 2,000,000 square miles and a total population of perhaps 40,000,000) was thereupon renewed. And the Israeli were successful, so that another armistice, arranged in 1949 by a United Nations Commission headed by the distinguished United States Negro, Dr. Ralph Bunche, reflected Israel's favorable military position.



The Arab states, recently emancipated and jealously nationalistic, with widely varying standards of living and of development, needing Western aid and bombarded with Soviet propaganda, had failed to coöperate effectively, and now blamed one another for the League's defeats. They seemed agreed, basically, on only one item: common hatred of Israel.[2] The latter, for its part, could not count on peace until its frontiers were

[2] "The pooling of their diplomatic resources at the United Nations also enabled the Arab states to trade votes with the Latin American countries . . . ." Israel was admitted to the United Nations in 1949.

recognized by the League, a satisfactory international agreement was reached regarding the status of the Holy Places, and homes were found for the approximately 900,000 Arab refugees who had been rendered homeless in Israel and lived miserably in tent camps in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, sustained only by United Nations charity.

The truce therefore dragged on through year after year, enlivened by frequent border incidents. In October 1953 the Eisenhower Administration in Washington expressed itself as "shocked" over some Israeli reprisals in a little Jordan village. The United States also protested against Israel's interference with United Nations observers in a zone supposedly demilitarized under the truce terms, and her attempted diversion of water from general to exclusively Israeli use. A planned United States grant of many million dollars was held up pending correction of these conditions.

Meanwhile, elections based on universal suffrage early in 1949 resulted in the establishment of a unicameral parliament or *Knesset* of 120 members. This body chose Dr. Weizmann as regular president, and upon his death in 1952 replaced him with Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, a journalist and labor leader. The Knesset also voted, in 1949, to acquire a constitution "by evolution over an unspecified period of years." The political parties in general were heirs of the groups that had functioned under the mandate. The largest party, after elections both in 1949 and 1951, was Ben-Gurion's socialistic *Mapai*. Late in 1953 Ben-Gurion retired as premier and was succeeded by Sharett.

The new state, with its vigorous foreign policy, Four-Year Plan for industrial and agricultural development, and extensive program of social welfare, avoided bankruptcy chiefly because of aid from the United States Government and successful fund drives among United States Jewry. The surrounding Arab states boycotted Israel economically, and Iraq banned the piping of oil from Kirkuk to the refinery at Haifa; but trade agreements with European countries and the influx of hundreds of millions of dollars per year from the United States more than made up for these losses.

The population growth of the republic was amazing. It was estimated that in 1948, when war with the Arab League began, Israel was inhabited by 1,350,000 Arabs and 650,000 Jews, for a total of perhaps 2,000,000. As a result of Israeli policy, 900,000 Arabs had left the country by mid-1953, but 600,000 new Jewish immigrants had arrived from Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East, leaving a net population estimated at 1,700,000. Understandably, many Israeli felt that their country was not merely a "melting pot" but a "pressure cooker."

INDIA AND PAKISTAN

India, after an initial period of passive resistance, loyally helped in the fight against the axis with men and materials. By way of gratitude and in line with proposals originally made in 1942, the postwar British Labor Government declared its intention promptly to grant self-government to India. Early in 1946 a cabinet mission went to India to discuss with the native leaders the relative advantages of dominion status and outright independence. The big stumbling block, it soon appeared, was not so much the future relation between India and Great Britain as the structure of the new state itself. As on numerous previous occasions, it seemed impossible to get agreement among the Indians themselves regarding measures to ensure that Hindus and Moslems would live in harmony after the removal of British restraint. The Nationalists or Congress Party, under Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–), insisted on a united Indian state. The Moslem League, under Mohammed Ali Jinnah (1876–1948), demanded with equal vigor the creation of a separate Moslem country to be called Pakistan.

Months of indecisive discussion led only to frequent and bloody riots between Hindus and Moslems in many parts of the unhappy land. Fed up with the situation and anxious to get out of India, London created an interim Executive Council to represent the two major elements and all important minorities. The viceroy presided over the council, but Nehru was made vice-president. At first the Moslem League refused to participate, but eventually several of its leaders took seats in the council. Again there were only quarrel and stalemate. Even Gandhi pleaded in vain for Hindu-Moslem political amity. At last, in mid-1947, Prime Minister Attlee informed all concerned that Great Britain, before the year was out, would transfer power "to one or two successor authorities" on a dominion basis. This would in no way prejudice the right of a dominion later to leave the British Commonwealth and assume a wholly separate status.

Both the Congress Party and the Moslem League now prepared for the implementation of this decision. Plans were quickly developed for the formation of a Hindu dominion and a Moslem dominion. The states still ruled by princes would be free to join either dominion or remain autonomous. Thereupon, in July 1947, George VI gave his assent to an Indian Independence Act. This ended British control of India effective August 15, 1947. On that day there were born two new dominions: India, with a majority of Hindu inhabitants, and Pakistan, with a majority of Moslem citizens. The word "emperor" was removed from the sovereign's title and

he became, for these dominions as for the others, King George VI. The office of viceroy was replaced by that of governor-general, and all British soldiers left the peninsula. Both India and Pakistan adopted English as the official language.[3]

Despite the solemnity and joy that marked Indian Independence Day, peace was not yet come to that subcontinent. In India there remained a minority of perhaps 35,000,000 Moslems; in Pakistan there continued to live more than 20,000,000 Hindus. In the partitioned provinces of Punjab and Bengal, and in other places, there were new riots, and more blood was shed. Charges of discrimination and of oppression were hurled by both sides, and refugee-filled trains began to shuttle back and forth between the neighboring dominions. Some of the smaller Indian States that had preferred to remain autonomous found Indian or Pakistani imperialism a greater threat to their self-government than had been British imperialism; gradually they became affiliated with one or another of their big neighbors.

Early in 1948 the two dominions came close to war over a boundary dispute covering the large state of Kashmir. The problem was taken to the Security Council of the United Nations, and neither side seemed particularly pleased at that body's desire to collect all facts before coming to a decision. So bad did the situation become that Gandhi undertook another fast as a means of forcing arbitration. When he already was close to death, both sides promised to apply reason to the issues at hand. Just then (January 1948) Gandhi was shot and killed by a member of a nationalistic and violently anti-Moslem association of Hindus. For a time the population was grief-stricken, and the politicians became somewhat less belligerent. But when the Security Council voted to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir, both India and Pakistan protested. Six years later, in mid-1954, Kashmir was still in dispute, its own people and leaders were divided, and India and Pakistan were anything but neighborly in their attitudes towards one another.

India, which included most of the several hundred Native States, had an area in 1954 of almost 1,300,000 square miles and a population of perhaps 360,000,000. The capital was at New Delhi. Earl Mountbatten of Burma, former Supreme Allied Commander for Southeastern Asia, was appointed governor-general in 1947, while Nehru, a Leftist in politics, became prime minister. The dominion took over India's charter membership in the United Nations. The caste system, having been legally abolished in

[3] Burma, previously separated from India, became an independent republic outside the British Commonwealth in January 1948. In the same year Ceylon became a dominion.

the spring of 1947, was on its way out. In January 1950 India adopted a constitution which converted the dominion into a republic, but the new state retained membership in the British Commonwealth. Dr. Rajendra Prasad, a prominent attorney and nationalist leader, was promptly chosen president by the constituent assembly and in 1952 was elected to a regular five-year term by the popular vote of men and women over 21. Nehru continued as prime minister, being responsible, under the constitution, to a bicameral parliament. The latter was to be chosen for five years: the lower House of the People by universal suffrage and the upper Council of States by the legislative assemblies of the several states comprising the Republic of India.[4]

Pakistan was made up of two widely separated areas—almost 1000 miles apart—in the northwest and the northeast of the peninsula, plus some scattered smaller regions. Its total area in 1954 was about 365,000 square miles, and the inhabitants numbered approximately 76,000,000. Karachi was made the capital. Jinnah became both governor-general and head of the constituent assembly. The prime-ministership went to Liaquat Ali Khan. Upon Jinnah's death in 1948, the governor-generalship went to Al-Haj Kwaja Nazimuddin, a Cambridge graduate who had been minister of education in Bengal, Indian delegate to the League of Nations, and Jinnah's deputy as head of the Moslem League. In 1951, following the murder of Liaquat Ali Khan, Nazimuddin became prime minister of Pakistan, and the governor-generalship went to Ghulam Mohammed, a monetary expert who had been the country's minister of finance. The latter in 1953 dismissed Nazimuddin for his apparent inability to relieve a food shortage and settle Moslem factional strife. Then, as was his power, he appointed Premier Mohammed Ali, a financial expert who recently had been Pakistani Ambassador to the United States,[5] and who soon also was elected president of the Pakistani Moslem League. During all the intervening years, government officials had been at work on a constitution. By 1954 it appeared that Pakistan, too, might eventually become a republic affiliated with the British Commonwealth and governed by a bicameral parliament representing both people and states.

Partition brought new economic problems to both India and Pakistan. The latter was comprised of areas, relatively backward industrially, which produced much raw cotton and jute and, in normal times, a surplus of wheat. India had most of the subcontinent's processing facilities but was

[4] In early 1954 the states numbered 29.
[5] The United States contributed hundreds of thousands of tons of wheat to help Pakistan, and much was procured from Australia and Canada.

short of raw materials—and when the government used artificial means to stimulate cotton and jute growing, the Indians cut down on their production of food with its lower price ceilings. Even India's industrialization, however, was only relatively heavy, for actually less than 2 per cent of her working population in 1952 was employed in factories. In both countries, the authorities stressed the need for planned economy, with Pakistan more inclined to support the development of private enterprise and industry. India adopted a Five-Year Plan (1951–1956) that called for an expenditure of about $4,500,000,000, much of this capital to be supplied by foreign loans and, it was hoped, United States grants. The plan gave priority to increased production of food and raw materials and to widespread state welfare services.

CHINA

The story of China during and after the war was largely one of continuing internal strife and misery, dependence upon foreign support, and, for a time at least, somewhat heightened prestige in international affairs. This last was reflected in a number of diplomatic advances. Thus in 1943 Great Britain and the United States gave up all their extraterritorial and other special rights and privileges in the republic. China, moreover, was regularly counted as one of the Big Four or Big Five (depending on the position of France) in the war against the axis. Finally, in 1945 she became one of the five states endowed with the veto power in the United Nations organization.

Much of this new prestige accrued to China because of backing from the United States. She was looked upon in Washington not merely as a traditional friend but as a wartime base for action against Japan, and then as a bulwark against Soviet expansion in Eastern Asia. Beginning in 1942, the United States showered financial and economic aid upon China. It was estimated that between V–J Day and the end of 1947 alone, the major categories of United States help to China amounted to almost two billion dollars. This included military lend-lease goods, bank credits, the major share of UNRRA and United Nations relief, and some private philanthropic grants. In addition, the United States sent military and diplomatic missions to China in the hope that their mediation might bring about coöperation among the several Chinese political groups. None of these missions was successful. There were implied warnings that help would stop if the dissidents failed to get together; but since the aid shipments continued anyway, the rival Chinese groups continued on their disparate ways.

There were three major political groups in wartime and postwar China. First there was the central government, which returned after hostilities from Chungking to Nanking. It was headed by President Chiang Kai-shek and dominated by the nationalist party called Kuomintang. Rightist in tendency, it advocated postponement of direct popular participation in government until after a longer period of political tutelage. Most prominent among the middle groups was the Democratic League. Though its membership was limited, its influence was considerable. It appealed to those who were dissatisfied with the conservatism of the Kuomintang but had no desire to become Leftists. The members included intellectuals, professionals, teachers, students, small businessmen, and some industrialists who put patriotism above profits. The Democratic League opposed all dictatorship, urged the prompt end of civil war, and favored an extension of democracy on the Western pattern.

At the extreme left were the communists, headed by Mao Tse-tung as political leader and Chu Teh as commander-in-chief. In 1937 the communists controlled a small part of northwestern China inhabited by about 1,500,000 people. By 1946 they claimed authority over 130,000,000 people living in northern and central China and in Manchuria. Although these figures were open to question, there could be no doubt that in the intervening period the communists had made extensive gains and built up a large military force. Part of this extension was owing to military conquest and especially to the overrunning of territories evacuated by the defeated Japanese. But the communists also appealed to many peasants by their promises of low interest rates, taxes, and rents; their program of reducing the landlords' power and increasing that of the tenants; and their emphasis on clean government in place of political corruption. In other words, they did not stress Marxism but confined their propaganda to rapid political and social change of a type that would appeal to down-trodden, famine-stricken peasants who had had their fill of war lords and corrupt tax officers.

The people of China were not in an enviable position at the close of the war. The prolonged fighting against Japan, the activities of the Japanese invaders, the costly and disruptive civil strife, the lack of civil liberty, the general feeling of insecurity, repeated famines, and continued political oppression, all had left their mark. Inflation raised prices to astronomical figures. It was estimated early in 1947 that the value of the Chinese dollar had fallen to one ten-thousandth of its worth in 1936. City dwellers found it difficult and often impossible to buy what they needed for simple living. Peasants starved because of famine and because of official mismanagement

and greed in relief projects. Private business was placed at a disadvantage when the government began to acquire various profitable monopolies. Conscription was administered in unfair and inefficient fashion. The soldiers were poorly treated. Speculators lived high. And civil war between the Nanking Government and the communists continued with much bitterness.

In order to win more liberal support at home and in the United States, and in line with earlier promises, the Nanking authorities convened an assembly in 1946 to draw up a new constitution. The assembly was not chosen in democratic fashion and was dominated by the Kuomintang. It worked rapidly, utilizing earlier drafts as a basis for discussion. Chiang Kai-shek eventually proclaimed the finished instrument and made it effective as of Christmas Day, 1947.

The document contained a bill of rights, but otherwise it was not especially liberal. China's 460,000,000 people were to be represented in a National Assembly of 3000 deputies elected on geographic and occupational bases for six-year terms. The body was to meet infrequently, because of its unwieldy size. Its chief powers would be to elect and recall a president and vice-president and to amend the constitution. Real authority was centered in a State Council and five yüan (branches). The yüan included an executive council, a legislative yüan, a judicial branch, a civil service council, and an auditing and impeachment council. Private ownership rights were guaranteed, but public utilities and "monopolistic" industries were to be nationalized. In 1948 the first National Assembly under the new constitution overwhelmingly chose Chiang Kai-shek president of China for six years; in 1954 he was reëlected for a similar term.

The civil war continued into 1950, with the communists showing more determination and better organization than the nationalists. By mid-1950 the Reds, with Russian aid, had acquired control of the whole Chinese mainland save some scattered rural pockets of resistance in the center and south. In 1951 they invaded Tibet and there set up a puppet regime. Meanwhile, Chiang Kai-shek had resigned the presidency in 1949 and resumed it in 1950—though by then his authority stretched only over the recently reacquired (from Japan) island of Taiwan (Formosa), with Taipei as the temporary capital of "Free China."

Taiwan, with an area of 14,000 square miles and a native population (1953) of 8,200,000, now had to harbor refugees from the mainland and a nationalist army of perhaps 600,000. But United States and United Nations financial and technical aid, and a wider distribution of land among the farmers, helped the island produce and sell enough rice, sugar, tea, and bananas to become a "going concern." The national government con-

tinued to function in the restricted area, approximately under the provisions of the constitution of 1947, alongside an increasingly democratic provincial administration. By 1953 the native Taiwanese were better off in every way than they had been under Japanese domination.



Courtesy, Foreign Policy Association, *Headline Series.*

While the followers of Chiang apparently hoped that Taiwan might some day become the jumping-off place for an invasion and reconquest of the Chinese mainland, the Chinese communists hesitated to try reducing the island, situated 100 miles away on the other side of Formosa Strait. Meanwhile Free China continued to be ably represented in the United Nations, where constantly recurring attempts by the communist bloc to seat Red Chinese representatives were regularly defeated.

With the conquest of China proceeding apace, Mao Tse-tung in September 1949 announced the establishment of a People's Republic of China. The chief policy-making body was to be a 56-man Central People's Government Council, headed by Mao and sitting in Peking. Eventually there was to be an indirectly elected All-China People's Congress, with universal direct suffrage, as provided in a law of 1953, for only the lowest level of soviets or councils. Meanwhile "the landlords, the old bureaucracy, groups

and individuals imbued with Western democratic concepts, the entrepreneur class, Christians, Buddhists, Confucians and 'counter-revolutionaries' in general, all elements actually or potentially inimical to the Communist system were purged."

Mass propaganda, ousting of Christian missionaries, incitement of hatred against former landlords and businessmen, forcible redistribution of land with collectivization as the ultimate goal, nationalization of finance and industry, forced road- and railroad-building, heavy taxation and punitive levies, closening economic ties with Russia and promised Soviet aid for China's First Five-Year Plan (1953–1957), education of a communist-minded youth and "after-work schools" for indoctrinating adults—all these were used in the threefold domestic program of consolidating control, destroying the old society, and establishing a new (communist) pattern of thought and life for 460,000,000 people. In the words of a sympathetic Indian observer, "there was no sphere of life, private or public, into which Mao's government did not intrude." Since, according to Mao, everyone was a propagandist, including "any person talking to another," the individual in China came to be denied "even his right of silence."

Foreign Minister Chou En-lai meanwhile made it clear through Red China's actions that Peking was in full accord with Moscow on the final objective of a Soviet world. No sooner had they conquered the Chinese mainland, when the communists "began to spill over the borders." Coördinating their policies with Russia's, they participated (from 1950) against the United Nations in the Korean War; gave considerable aid to the communists in Indo-China; supported subversion in Malaya, Burma, Siam, Indonesia, and India; and in general spear-headed the drive for a sovietized Asia. When Malenkov assumed the leadership in Russia after Stalin's death, Mao telegraphed that China would coöperate with the U.S.S.R. "definitely, forever, and with maximum resoluteness." The anti-democratic Rome-Berlin axis was destroyed during the Second World War; but from its restless aftermath there emerged a new anti-democratic Moscow-Peking axis.

JAPAN

Japan was one of the subjects of deliberation at three of the major Allied conferences held during the war. At Cairo, in 1943, it was announced that Japan would be stripped of all territories that in the course of time she had taken "by violence and greed," and that Korea would "in due course . . . become free and independent." At Yalta, in 1945, the

southern part of Sakhalin "as well as all the islands adjacent to it" were to be "returned to the Soviet Union," and the latter was promised certain rights in China. The Potsdam Proclamation of later 1945 required the elimination "for all time" of the Japanese militarists; the limitation of Japanese sovereignty to "the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine"; destruction of Japanese war-making potential; punishment of war criminals; reparation; removal of all obstacles to "the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people"; establishment of freedom of speech, religion, and thought; and occupation of Japan until these objectives were reached and there had been set up a "peacefully inclined and responsible government."

Within the pattern thus drawn, the problem of postwar Japan was less complicated than that of Germany. The fundamental reason for the difference was that executive occupation authority was placed in the hands of one man. That individual was the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur.[6] From the time of Japan's unconditional surrender, the rule of the emperor and any cabinet was made directly subject to the supreme commander.[7] With the advice of an Allied Council for Japan (ACJ), sitting in Tokyo under the chairmanship of his deputy, he was responsible for implementing the surrender terms and any new policy directives issued by a Far Eastern Commission.

The Allied Council for Japan was made up of a United States chairman, a Soviet delegate, a Chinese representative, and one member representing the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and India jointly. It held meetings every two weeks, beginning in April 1946. Its powers were purely advisory. The Far Eastern Commission, with headquarters in Washington, functioned under authority of a communiqué issued in December 1945 by the Allied foreign ministers meeting in Moscow. The FEC was given power to formulate policy and to review all directives and decisions of the supreme commander; it was not permitted to deal with military matters or territorial readjustments. The commission was made up of a United States chairman and one representative each from Australia, Canada, China, France, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. FEC decisions were reached by majority vote but required the concurrence of China, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., and the United States. Washington, however, could issue interim

[6] MacArthur was succeeded as SCAP in April 1951 by General Matthew B. Ridgway.
[7] On the eve of Japan's surrender, several hundred "diehards," who had wanted to continue resistance, committed suicide. Thus control was made easier for the Allies.

directives on any subjects except changes in the Japanese constitutional structure, changes in the control system, or changes in the "Japanese Government as a whole."

Concentration of executive authority in the hands of one person was not the only differentiating factor in the Japanese and German situations. Whereas there simply was no native government in Germany, the Japanese were allowed to keep their emperor and have a native cabinet. Thus the orders and directives of the occupying powers were carried out by a Japanese central authority. MacArthur made it plain that he would use troops to enforce his orders if necessary. Japan, moreover, was not divided into occupation zones but treated as a political and economic unit. The restoration of normal, everyday life therefore proceeded far more smoothly and rapidly in Japan than in Central Europe.

MacArthur directed the efforts of his administration along two main lines: demilitarization, and the implementation of long-range democratic political, economic, and social objectives. Both were outlined in a basic memorandum prepared jointly by the United States Departments of State, War, and Navy in 1945. The first assignment was virtually concluded by the end of the first occupation year; the second involved a slower process. Under Allied supervision, the Japanese war and navy ministries were converted into a department of demobilization. Within a few months the several million soldiers in Japan proper had been sent home, and by the end of 1946 most of the millions who had been stationed abroad had been repatriated. (There was continuing uncertainty regarding the fate of many of the soldiers who had surrendered to the Soviets in Manchuria and Korea.) Conscription was abolished. Weapons, naval vessels, and air equipment were scrapped or turned over to the Allies. Supplies suitable for civilian use were utilized to that end by the home ministry.

A directive of December 1945 ended state support of the Shinto cult. The teaching of its nationalistic doctrine in schools was forbidden. Future propagation of the concepts of Japanese divine origin and racial superiority was prohibited—a decision that was personally endorsed by Emperor Hirohito. The schools were purged of ultranationalistic teachers, textbooks, and pictures. The military police, intelligence agencies, and "thought police" were declared abolished. An end was decreed to all secret nationalistic societies.

As in the case of Germany, war-criminal trials were instituted. Some offenders were tried on the scenes of their crimes in foreign areas. Thus General Tomoyuki Yamashita and Lieutenant General Masaharu Homma were tried and executed in the Philippines. Others came before an eleven-

man inter-Allied tribunal that convened in Tokyo during the spring of 1946. The first group of defendants included 28 high-ranking military, civil, and industrial officers; later hundreds of others were tried, including ordinary soldiers charged with brutal treatment of prisoners. The main group included former Premier Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma, former Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka (who died in a prison hospital), and Generals Hideki Tojo and Sadao Araki. Prince Fumimaro Konoye committed suicide rather than surrender for trial. Where executions were ordered, they were usually carried out by hanging.

Finally, in the matter of demilitarization, came a purge directive of 1946, called by the natives the "MacArthur typhoon." It excluded from participation in high government or civil service posts all war criminals, professional army and navy men including enlisted personnel, intelligence agents and special policemen of all types, influential members of the nationalistic secret societies, officers of financial and development corporations prominent in overseas expansionist activities, officials who had functioned in areas occupied by Japan, persons who had betrayed anti-Fascists before or during the war, and those who had written or spoken prominently in favor of expansion and aggression. Thus the task of demilitarizing Japan was legally completed except for a future tie-in of reparation with any remaining war potential.

The long-range objectives presented more difficulties. Actually the Allies set a goal in Japan that had been reached in only a few countries throughout the world, namely, to create a "peacefully inclined and responsible government." And this had to be done in an area which had just been defeated and partially destroyed; most of whose experienced leaders were dead, under arrest, or politically suspect; which was short of food and raw materials; whose industries, commerce, and foreign trade were shut down or in process of radical reorganization; which suffered from inflation and unemployment; whose educational trend for years had been the antithesis of Allied desires; and which had to support a large army of occupation. MacArthur, however, faced the herculean task with determination and forthrightness.

Some native assistance was provided through the release of thousands of political prisoners of the old Japanese Government. From this group came a number of courageous liberals to help redirect the thinking of the masses. The establishment of an enlightened and informative press was encouraged. The radio, stage, and cinema were used to instruct the populace in the reasons for Japan's downfall and in democratic principles and ideals. The political and social status of women was raised by the extension

of female suffrage, the appointment of women to office, and the abolition of licensed prostitution. Japanese women voted for the first time in April 1946. Educational reform was outlined by a mission of prominent United States educators. But the carrying out of the proposals was delayed, largely because of the slowness with which the ministry of education prepared the new textbooks and screened the teachers.

Before the war, both political and economic power in Japan was concentrated in the hands of relatively few families. The ruling oligarchy embraced outstanding military men, industrialists, and large-estate owners. In order to overcome the resulting subordination of the masses, the basic United States directive of 1945 ordered four specific policies: (1) "development of organizations in labor, industry, and agriculture, organized on a democratic basis"; (2) "a wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade"; (3) rejection for important economic posts of politically tainted individuals; and (4) dissolution "of the large industrial and banking combinations." These last were known to the Japanese as *Zaibatsu,* or "money cliques," and included such powerful families as the Mitsui and the Mitsubishi.

But it was one thing to point at objectives and another to reach them. Economic recovery in Japan required rehabilitation, food and raw-material imports, revived manufactures, and an extensive world trade. These were hard to achieve in the postwar period, especially since the Japanese Government was less than energetic in carrying out the economic directives of the supreme commander. But the laxity was not wholly a matter of unwillingness to coöperate. The industrial damage caused by bombings and the demilitarization process, the undernourishment of workers, inflation, and raw-material shortages all helped keep the production level for 1947 down to 40 per cent of the 1930–1934 average.

Japan was hungry. With a population estimated in 1954 at 87,000,000, she had a cultivated land area about equal to the farmland of the state of Washington. Since the average farm comprised only two and a half acres, farming was intensive but inadequate. Moreover, with only few exports, chiefly in silk, Japan could not buy what she needed to eat. As a result, the incidence of disease also was above the prewar normal. Millions were fed through large food imports from the United States. Indeed, in 1946 and 1947, about 95 per cent of *all* Japanese imports came from and were paid for by the United States.

In 1946 the Japanese Government, following a directive, passed a Land Reform Law. This provided for the purchase by the government of most of the farmland under tenant cultivation and its subsequent cheap resale

to the peasants.[8] (About 70 per cent of the 5,700,000 farm families were tenants or part tenants in 1946.) The size of holdings of owner-cultivators was limited, ranging from a maximum of 30 acres in Hokkaido to 7.5 acres in Honshu, Kyushu, and Shikoku. The administration of the law was placed in the hands of local commissions, elected by the farmers of 11,000 villages. Peasants might pay for their land in a maximum of 30 annual instalments, with low interest. The aim was to convert 80 per cent of the tenants into independent proprietors. For the remainder, the rents and other terms of tenantry were eased.

There was opposition to this land reform not only from big landlords but from many who had modest holdings. They felt that the act penalized their thrift and energy. The purchase price set by the government, moreover, was below the prevailing market rates. But by the end of 1950 the government had purchased and resold to the peasants most of the available land. Unhappily, the law did not tell the newly independent owners how to keep out of debt, how to make inadequate holdings self-sustaining, and how to keep from losing the new acquisitions as a result of economic stress. And the need to import food for her expanding population remained one of Japan's big economic problems. In 1951 she had to import 24 per cent of her total food-grain consumption, as against 15 per cent in 1936.

The breakup of the Zaibatsu was hampered by the complexities involved in overthrowing one and creating another financial-industrial ownership, by lack of zeal on the part of Japanese officials, and by delays within the office of the supreme commander. Months were occupied in the collection of detailed information about the vast holdings, far-flung connections, and intricate interrelations. Some of the chief holders promised voluntary surrender of their interests, but the bank accounts of all were frozen to prevent unauthorized transactions. In October 1946 the large stockholders generally voted dissolution, and the securities were transferred to an official commission. There was no expropriation, since the stockholders were to be compensated with government bonds after their respective shares had been determined. Eventually the commission was to dispose of the accumulated assets through sales to the Japanese public. This created new problems, since most of the "public" had no money to invest, and since some of the properties were to be assigned to the reparation account.

Gradually the United States, in light of the world situation and in order to ease the enormous drain on her resources of virtually sustaining Japanese life, modified her attitude on the empire's industrial decentralization. Instead of trying to complete this process, Washington from 1948 sought

[8] A law of 1947 dealt similarly with pasture land.

to facilitate Japan's development into a new "workshop of the Far East." Feeling that it would be fatal "to sterilize the business ability of Japan," the United States decided to allow decentralization to "stop short of the point where it (might) unduly interfere with the efficiency of Japanese industry." Accordingly some of the former industrial leaders, who had remained in the background in the early days of the occupation, reëmerged and began to rebuild Nipponese big business. In 1946 the index of industrial production, based on 100 for the period 1935–1937, was down to 26; by 1951 it was up to 109. In this revival of industrial production followed by much-needed foreign trade lay Japan's hope of being able to purchase enough food for her growing population.

The reparation problem was muddled, owing largely to policy disagreement between Washington and Moscow. An official United States estimate of a total "just" claim of $100,000,000,000 obviously was impossible of payment by Japan. Russia, moreover, took untold wealth and industrial equipment out of Manchuria but held that this was "war booty" and not reparation. For a time the United States removed Japanese machine tools to various claimant countries, chiefly China; but when it was decided to check the process of industrial weakening, these shipments gradually ceased. In the end, the peace treaty ratified in 1952 merely obligated Japan partially to compensate her war victims "by making available the services of the Japanese people in production, salvaging and other work for the Allied Powers in question." Specific details were to be arranged by bilateral agreements.

The workers eagerly took advantage of the directive which afforded them opportunity to organize once more after years of suppression. Thousands of unions quickly were formed—and as quickly inaugurated a series of strikes for higher pay and better working conditions. Recalcitrant employers often were locked out of their plants by the strikers. The situation became so disturbing that the supreme commander eventually forbade strikes inimical to the objectives of the occupation. In the period of a year during 1946–1947 the trade-union membership rose from 160,000 to 5,600,000.

Reference has several times been made to a "Japanese Government" functioning under the supervision of the supreme commander. This government, aside from the emperor whose office carried prestige rather than authority, was composed of a cabinet and a bicameral parliament based, in appearance at least, on a multiparty system. When the occupying authorities cast about for suitable material for a native central administration, they found that it was necessary to rely largely on conservative bureaucrats

and some of the less aggressive intellectuals and business interests. They therefore permitted (October 1945) the appointment as premier of Baron Shidehara. A former foreign minister and ambassador to the United States, he had, despite his marriage relationship to the Mitsubishi, been leader of a moderate group which had opposed the militarists in their aggressive designs on China.

The purge directive of 1946 affected a number of Shidehara's assistants and weakened his position. He also encountered troublesome opposition from the laborers, from emerging socialist and communist groups, and from those who blamed his government for the worsening economic situation. Following elections of April 1946 for a lower house, in which no political group received a majority, he made way for Shigeru Yoshida (1878–). The latter had also been a foreign minister and was son-in-law of one of the emperor's closest advisers. Labor demonstrations made life difficult for the Yoshida Government, and on one occasion it was saved from downfall by a last-minute order from MacArthur forbidding an impending strike of government employees. (Similar action was taken by SCAP in 1948, after which the cabinet issued an ordinance denying public servants the right to bargain collectively or strike.)

Although a number of political parties appeared soon after the occupation began, none of these was able in the first eighteen months to attract a broad membership or develop an effective party machinery. Personal influence and loyalty to individuals were the chief cohesive forces, and the respective platforms were vague. Hence, in the election for a House of Representatives in April 1946, there were almost 2800 candidates for fewer than 500 seats, and no single group could attract a working majority. Almost one-fourth of the successful candidates were officially listed as "Independents."

Perhaps the most important duty of the new parliament was the replacement of the constitution of 1889. A draft instrument had been prepared, under Allied guidance, by the Shidehara Cabinet. During the summer of 1946 it was passed with minor revisions by both the newly-elected lower house and by the dying House of Peers. Promulgated by the emperor, it went into effect in May 1947. Under this document the emperor, at least on paper, lost his exalted position and retained chiefly ceremonial functions. His every act required the "advice and approval" of the cabinet, and he "derived his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power." Japan, moreover, "forever renounced war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes."

The constitution contained a bill of rights guaranteeing universal secret suffrage and freedom of thought and assembly. It provided also for a responsible cabinet of civilians and established a bicameral parliament in which the will of the lower house could overrule the opposition of the upper body. An independent judiciary on the United States model was created, and there was liberal provision for local autonomy. Government support of Shintoism or of any religious activity was forbidden. The peerage was abolished. Equal rights were bestowed on husband and wife. The House of Representatives was to be popularly elected for four years. The House of Peers was replaced by a House of Councillors. The councillors were to be elected for six-year terms. All cabinet members must be civilians.

Shortly before the going into force of the new constitution, elections were held in April 1947. Once again the balloting was characterized by a widespread disregard of party lines and by a tendency to vote on personalities and loyalties. Several parties, however, did emerge with sizable backing. First came the Social Democratic Party with 30 per cent of the representatives. It advocated recovery through favorable labor policies, nationalization of key industries, and heavy taxation. The Liberal Party came second with 28 per cent of the seats. Representing conservative business and financial interests, it was strongly anti-communist and urged recovery through stimulation of free enterprise. The Democratic Party was a close third, with 27 per cent of the seats. This group opposed nationalization but favored fairly strict economic controls. It urged an early peace settlement, a strong foreign-trade drive, and return of some of the lost territories. Half a dozen minor parties captured the remaining seats, with only four for the communists. The Social Democratic leader Tetsu Katayama became head of a coalition cabinet. Because of mounting inflation and increasing opposition from the leftist members of his own party, he made way early in 1948 for Hitoshi Ashida of the Democratic Party.

Faced by charges of corruption and worsening labor troubles, the Ashida Cabinet was replaced later in 1948 by a conservative government under the Liberal Party leader Yoshida. The Yoshida Government, with several reorganizations, was still in office in 1954. During this period it checked inflation, freed the economy from a number of controls, and increased foreign trade. It made peace with the Allies and brought an end to occupation, helped supply the United Nations forces in the Korean War, and pursued a pro-Western policy in international affairs. And it scored victories in parliamentary elections in 1949, 1952, and 1953.

Whereas the communists had won more than thirty seats in the 1949 election, they got no seat in 1952 and only one in 1953. The Reds' defeat

was owing in part to the restrictive measures of the authorities and in larger part to popular objection to communist-inspired violence, to the refusal of the U.S.S.R. to repatriate the more than 350,000 Japanese prisoners of war still believed to be in Soviet hands, and Moscow's veto of Japan's admission to the United Nations. Yoshida's own Liberal Party, however, was itself in some danger of a split. The premier's personal rival, Ichiro Hatoyama, built up a following which criticized Yoshida's unwillingness to strive for rearmament, objected to his readiness to follow the lead of the United States, favored more government subsidization of industry, and wished to carry on some trade with China regardless of its domination by communists.

Perhaps the best proof of the over-all good work of MacArthur in Japan was the generous form of the peace treaty that was ratified in 1952—almost seven years after V–J Day. The delay was owing chiefly to disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on both procedure and policy with respect to a peace conference. Washington favored a gathering including all eleven members of the Far Eastern Commission and reaching decisions by a two-thirds majority, without any veto rights. Moscow, supported by China, held that the drafting of a treaty was the exclusive province of the Big Four (United States, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., and China), functioning through their Council of Foreign Ministers, with veto right for each participant.

The resulting stalemate continued until September 1950, when President Truman authorized the Department of State to discuss with the other members of the FEC concrete proposals for a peace settlement. On the recommendation of John Foster Dulles, Republican consultant to the department, it was agreed to seek a nonpunitive settlement—with or without Russian coöperation—that would promptly restore a viable Japan to the family of nations, but with safeguards to protect the relatively disarmed empire from possible foreign aggression.

During the first half of 1951 a Dulles Mission worked hard, visiting Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, France, and Great Britain; representatives of the other interested governments participated in the discussions in Washington. The U.S.S.R. refused to join the talks and took part only through an exchange of notes. Eventually a draft, and then an amended draft were circulated among the powers, with a time limit for suggestions for change. Then about fifty nations were invited to send representatives to San Francisco to sign, not negotiate, a Japanese peace treaty.

The document was signed on September 8, 1951, by 48 countries plus

Japan. Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the U.S.S.R. refused to sign. India, Burma, and Yugoslavia had turned down the invitation to attend the conference. Italy and China had not been invited—the former because Japan had been her onetime axis partner; the latter because about half of the other participants recognized only Nationalist China, and the other half Communist China. After proper ratifications, the treaty was proclaimed effective by President Truman on April 28, 1952. Meanwhile, on the same day as the signing of the treaty, the United States and Japan had signed a security pact under which the former was permitted to maintain armed forces in the latter "so as to deter armed attack" upon the empire while "irresponsible militarism" still troubled the world. This treaty, which became effective with the peace settlement, was to expire whenever Washington and Tokyo agreed that United Nations or other safeguards could assure "international peace and security in the Japan area." Nationalist China and Japan signed what in effect was a provisional peace a few hours before the main settlement went into force.[9]

The 27-article treaty of peace terminated the state of war between Japan and her former enemies and recognized the empire's "full sovereignty." The new boundaries coincided with those of the surrender terms and included only the four large home islands and some minor adjacent islands, with a total area of about 150,000 square miles. The occupation forces were to be promptly withdrawn, subject to any special bilateral arrangements such as that which was made with the United States. Japan renounced all special rights in China and agreed to accept the judgments of the Allied war-crimes courts. Commercial arrangements with other countries were to be negotiated bilaterally as occasion warranted. Reparation, as previously indicated, was to be arranged separately with the former enemies on the basis of economic services by Japanese subjects. Prewar external debts were to be honored. Disputes involving interpretation of treaty terms were to be referred to the International Court of Justice.

Thus did Japan emerge from the war which it had helped to precipitate. Aside from its continuingly pressing economic and political problems, made the more severe by the large and growing population in a restricted area, Japan faced a peculiarly difficult security situation. Demilitarized by the occupation powers, the empire in its constitution also had forever renounced war and the threat or use of force as sovereign rights. But because of the proximity of imperialist-minded Russia and Red China, the Nippon-

[9] On April 29, 1952, there became effective an "Anzus Pact" among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, providing for coöperation to maintain their mutual security in the Pacific area.

ese needed armed protection, and for this they were temporarily relying on United States forces based on the home islands. Obviously there were present in this pattern the seeds of fear, of wounded national pride, and of subversive machinations. It remained to be seen how Japanese statesmanship would resolve the dilemma.

RESTLESS AFRICA

As the Western powers began to lose their hold on and influence in Asia, they began anew to "discover" Africa. Businessmen, diplomats, military experts, seekers after raw materials, moving-picture producers, scientists, hunters, and educators—these and many more came to display a deep interest in the second-largest continent—one whose area was almost four times that of the United States, whose population was estimated at 200,000,000 with perhaps 5,000,000 "Europeans," and whose "complexities were without number." Paralleling this rise in world interest, there mushroomed within Africa itself strong native reactions to Western rule and procedures.

The fundamental native reaction was manifested in a wide variety of national spirits, similar only in their intensity. Continental generalizations, especially as these might relate to the African continent, were unwise; yet it appeared to many that lack of education and experience marked most of Africa as unready for and presently incapable of effective self-government. But this factor really was irrelevant. The Africans in general had come to *want* self-government, for better or for worse. Feeding this national spirit were a number of circumstances, chief among them European racism and the land situation.

European racism, expressed in segregation and discrimination, was known to the Africans as the "color bar." It was effective, to a greater or lesser degree—politically or economically or socially or all three—in most of Africa. And it was becoming more and more resented in the same vast area, if not by all the people then at least by a growing number of vocal leaders, many of them educated in Europe. The specific distribution of good land in Africa, favorable to the relatively small number of Europeans, presented a very tangible additional grievance to the natives. This was especially evident in such areas as, for example, Kenya. Here the increasing difficulty of the Kikuyus in supporting a growing population (made possible by European health services) in the limited lands allotted to them was a factor in the perpetration of atrocities from 1952 onward against white settlers by a secret society called Mau Mau. Their rallying cry was: "Take back the land which the white man has stolen from us!"

Confusion was worse confounded by the development of power blocs on the African question in the United Nations and at international conferences. The old colonial powers, notably Great Britain, France, and Belgium, were ready to make broad concessions but were not yet ready to "move out." They were motivated not merely by economic and strategic considerations but by a feeling of responsibility to finish the self-assumed task of preparing the Africans to stand alone in the troubled world of the mid-twentieth century. On the other side was the "anticolonial bloc" of such newly independent countries as India, Pakistan, Egypt, and the Arab League. These regularly, and sometimes more emotionally than judiciously, attacked the Western states for their "imperialism" and supported almost any demand that came out of Africa. All which made easier the Soviet undertaking of spreading communism in Africa, often through natives trained in Moscow—natives such as Jomo Kenyatta, who headed a Kikuyu school in which were taught the Mau Mau secrets and ritual blood oath.

The economic importance of Africa was clear from the circumstance that, in the postwar years, it produced about one-fifth of the world's copper and tin, a fourth of the manganese, half the gold, three-quarters of the palm oil and sisal, nearly all the industrial diamonds, and much uranium. Foreign money in large amounts went into the development of this export production, but relatively little went into the service of African needs. Thus the already wide gap between "European" and native standards of income and living was further widened—and thus the whole situation was made ever more disturbing. Meanwhile, because of Western fear of Russian expansionism and Arab nationalism, Africa became dotted with air bases, roads, railways, airports, and harbor installations controlled or built by the United States. Let us now, since space will permit no more, consider in greater detail the story of postwar Egypt as an example of Africa in ferment.[10]

EGYPT

Although Egypt did not declare war on Germany and Japan until early in 1945, and then mainly in order to qualify for representation at the San Francisco Conference on the United Nations, she was of tremendous help

[10] In the Union of South Africa, elections of 1948 placed in power the Afrikaner Nationalists who, under the leadership of Dr. Daniel F. Malan, sought to effect a policy of *apartheid* or complete segregation of the whites and blacks, and the permanent subordination of the latter to the former. The descendants of the Boer settlers were generally more in favor of apartheid than were the people of British origin. Partly to prevent a spread of this policy and partly for better administration, Great Britain in 1953 united Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland into a Central African Federation under a prime minister appointed from London.

to the Allies as a base from the very beginning of armed hostilities. Throughout the war, voice was frequently given by Egyptians of all classes and parties to demands for a postwar revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. The British Labor Party's election victory in 1945 filled the Egyptians with optimism in this respect. When nothing much happened to justify the optimism, mobs attacked British troops in Cairo and Alexandria in 1946.

Eventually negotiations for treaty revision were instituted, but little came of them save irritation and frustration, since the Egyptians wanted full British withdrawal and the British felt the need for continuing occupation, particularly in the area of the Suez Canal. An Egyptian appeal to the United Nations in 1947 accomplished nothing, and the situation was made worse by the creation of Israel in 1948 and resultant war between the new state and the Arab League, of which Egypt was a member. At last, in October 1951, the Wafd-controlled government of Nahas Pasha unilaterally denounced the treaty of 1936 and proclaimed Farouk as "King of Egypt and the Sudan."

But, as one observer wrote, "it is one thing to banish a piece of paper and quite another to unseat a military occupation." For the next few months the Egyptians practiced noncoöperation with the British forces, conducted anti-British guerrilla warfare, and indulged in riots and destruction. In January 1952 Cairo was sacked and foreign property ruined. Government followed government in rapid succession. When the king tried to restore some order by measures against the turbulent native army officers, Major General Mohammed Naguib (1901–) effected a *coup d'état* in July 1952. Farouk was forced to abdicate in favor of his infant son, Ahmed Fuad II. Naguib, a devout Moslem, became commander-in-chief of the army, then minister of war, and, after a few weeks, prime minister.

The new premier arrested most of the previous high officials, later executed some of them, drove "Mr. Farouk" into exile, attacked corruption, abolished noble titles, "purified" and later abolished the political parties, confiscated large estates for resale to the peasantry, proclaimed self-government in the Sudan, and told the British to get out of Egypt and away from Suez. In June 1953 the country was declared a republic, and Naguib became president as well as premier. A committee was appointed to draft a new constitution in place of that of 1923, which was abrogated. The populace seemed wildly enthusiastic over these developments. But it remained to be seen what the new government could and would do to alleviate the economic situation in a country where 95 per cent of the



EGYPT AND THE SUDAN, 1953.

Courtesy, Foreign Policy Association, *Headline Series.*

people lived in 3.5 per cent of the area. More than 20,000,000 persons lived in a narrow, fertile region along the Nile, only slightly larger than Connecticut and New Hampshire. The other million inhabited a desert half again as large as Texas. Nationalism alone could not give them livelihood and security. That all would not be smooth for Naguib was evident early in 1954 when, amid turbulence and confusion, he was first ousted and then restored as president.

Meanwhile the Sudan remained under joint Anglo-Egyptian rule, and the dispute over the presence of British troops in the Canal Zone continued. To the evident astonishment of the Egyptians, many of the 8,000,000 Sudanese had caught the full contagion of nationalism and saw no reason for accepting the dominance of Cairo. Late in 1953, indeed, the Sudanese (many of them illiterate and using symbols) went to the polls to vote for a parliament which would decide on the future political status of their desert land—almost one-third the size of the United States. Pending final settlement of this status, the British governor-general remained as chief executive, aided by a native legislative assembly.

In Egypt itself the chief international puzzle was how far Naguib would go in trying to force the departure of the British soldiers. Their presence might offend Egyptian national sensibilities, but simultaneously it offered defense against fear of Israeli expansion and possible Russian designs on the canal. To London, troops at the canal represented an important link in the whole pattern of defense of the Middle East. The events of 1952–1954 and the Anglo-Egyptian impasse made many think of the old Egyptian proverb which, commenting on the "ups and downs" of life, ran: "One day it's onions; the next day it's honey." Doubtless some of these many wondered what the morrow would bring: onions or honey?

CHAPTER 26

The United Nations and European Integration

ORGANIZATION OF THE UN

Embraced in the 111 articles of the United Nations Charter were four fundamental purposes: to maintain international peace and security; to develop friendly relations among nations on the bases of equal rights and self-determination of peoples; to achieve international coöperation in the handling of world-wide economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems; and to promote respect for human rights, dignity, and freedom. In furtherance of these ends, the members accepted the principle of the sovereign equality of large and small states, the obligation to settle international disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the use or threat of force in their international dealings, and the duty to assist in any United Nations action against a violating state. The organization was not to intervene in matters which were essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any country.

There were 51 charter members of the United Nations. New members were to be admitted by a two-thirds vote of the assembly following recommendation by a majority of the council members, including the five permanent members. The requirements for membership appeared simple. Applicants must satisfy the society that they were "peace-loving," would accept the obligations of the Charter, and were capable of carrying out these responsibilities. But the fact that any one of the Big Five could veto

an application in the council made each membership appeal a potential opportunity for dispute, or at least for diplomatic bargaining. In May 1954 the membership was sixty.

Early in 1946 Trygve Halfdan Lie (pronounced Lee), a Norwegian Labor Party leader and former foreign minister, was appointed secretary-general by the assembly upon recommendation of the council. After seven years of hard and effective work he resigned, largely because of Russian opposition to his policies. He was succeeded (1953) by Dag H. A. C. Hammarskjöld, a Swedish financial and foreign expert. The financing of the organization was supervised by the assembly, which determined the financial contributions of members. The budget for 1948 was, in round figures, $35,000,000; for 1954 it was set at $48,000,000. The share of the United States declined from almost 40 per cent in 1946 to 33⅓ per cent in 1954; in the latter year the share of the U.S.S.R. was increased from 9.85 per cent to 12.28 per cent. Until permanent buildings were constructed on Manhattan, temporary headquarters were maintained at Lake Success on Long Island.

The Charter provided for six main organs: the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the Secretariat, and the International Court of Justice. This last functioned under its own statute of seventy articles. A group of subsidiary and specialized agencies was to operate under the general coördination of the Economic and Social Council, itself supervised by the assembly.

The General Assembly was the only instrument of the United Nations consisting of all members. Each member state might have five delegates but only one vote. The assembly was to meet every year beginning in September, but special sessions might be called by the secretary-general at the request of a majority of the members or of the Security Council. Decisions on "important questions" required a two-thirds vote; others only a simple majority. The "important" matters were recommendations as to peace and security, the admission or suspension of members, trusteeship items, and elections of members of other organs.

The assembly could discuss any matter "within the scope of the present Charter," any question relating to peace and security brought to its attention by a member or a nonmember, and any item relating to the powers and functions of other UN organs. It had to formulate plans for eventual disarmament and could make recommendations to the member states and, with one exception, to the Security Council. If the latter already were handling a dispute or situation, the General Assembly might make a recommendation only upon the special request of the other body. The

assembly adopted the UN budget and was expected to receive, study, and discuss reports from all other organs. It elected its own president and vice-president for each session.

The assembly was empowered to elect the nonpermanent members of the Security Council, and all members of the Trusteeship Council and the Economic and Social Council. The last two bodies definitely were made to function under authority of the assembly. The General Assembly was well characterized as a "town-meeting of the world," as essentially a "deliberative organ, an overseeing, reviewing, and criticizing organ." With the Charter coming into force on October 24, 1945, the assembly opened its first meeting in London on January 10, 1946.

The Security Council, operating more or less as the executive body, was required to function continuously. It was made up of five permanent and six nonpermanent members, each with one vote. The nonpermanent members were chosen by the General Assembly, three each year for two-year terms. They were ineligible for immediate reëlection. The permanent members were China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Decisions of the council required seven of the eleven votes. The concurring votes of the five permanent members had to be included in the majority of seven except on matters of procedure. (If, however, one of the Big Five were party to a dispute under consideration, then it was to abstain from voting.) Thus was established the principle of the veto of council decisions by any one of the five permanent members. The principle was most frequently applied by the U.S.S.R.

To the Security Council was entrusted "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." It was empowered to "investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute." Legal quarrels were, "as a general rule," to be referred to the International Court of Justice. The members of the UN agreed "to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter." The council might decide, and then call on the members to apply such "measures not involving the use of armed force" as were "to be employed to give effect to its decisions." In the event that these measures proved inadequate, the council might "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." The members undertook, in accordance with special agreements, to make available to the council for this purpose all necessary armed forces, facilities, and rights of passage.

Plans for the "application of armed force" were to be made by the council with the advice and assistance of a Military Staff Committee. The

latter was made up of the chiefs of staff of the permanent members or their representatives. The committee was made responsible under the council for the "strategic direction" of any armed forces placed at the council's disposal. Questions relating to command were to be worked out "subsequently." The committee was also to advise the council on "the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament." Meanwhile the member states were to "hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action" of a strength and "degree of readiness" to be determined by the council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

If "an armed attack occurred against a Member of the United Nations," nothing in the Charter was to "impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense" until such time as the council could take necessary action. The Charter also permitted regional arrangements or agencies for the maintenance of peace, but these were to become active for enforcement action only under the authority of the council. The Security Council would call on such agencies for help wherever necessary and possible. The council, finally, must submit annual, and might render special, reports to the General Assembly for its consideration. The council met for the first time on January 17, 1946, in London.

In order to bring about the "conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations," and in order to promote higher standards of living, full employment, cultural and educational coöperation, and a universal respect for and observance of "human rights," the Charter created an Economic and Social Council. This council was to be composed of eighteen members elected, six each year for three-year terms, by the General Assembly. Retiring members were eligible for immediate reëlection. Each member had one representative and one vote. Decisions were by majority vote.

The Economic and Social Council was empowered to prepare studies and reports on appropriate matters, make recommendations on subjects within its competence to the General Assembly and the UN members, establish commissions in economic and social fields, prepare draft conventions, summon international conferences, furnish information to the Security Council, and bring into proper relation with the UN any specialized intergovernmental agencies created by the members of the UN. The commissions came to include such bodies as those on population, human rights, the status of women, narcotic drugs, transport and communications, and economic commissions for Europe, for Asia and the Far East, and for Latin America. The intergovernmental agencies with which agreements had been

made by the Economic and Social Council and approved by the General Assembly up to the middle of 1954 included: the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Universal Postal Union, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the International Labor Organization, and the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).[1]

The constitution of UNESCO came into force in 1946. In 1954 it had 68 members, with headquarters in Paris. In 1946 the General Assembly approved the transfer to UNESCO of the property rights of the League of Nations' International Institute of Intellectual Coöperation. The purposes of UNESCO were to advance mutual knowledge and understanding of peoples through all means of mass communication, give fresh impulse to popular education, and increase and diffuse knowledge throughout the world.

The Charter established a trusteeship system "for the administration and supervision of such territories as might be placed thereunder by subsequent individual agreements." These regions were to be called "trust territories." Categories open to trusteeship were existing mandates, areas which might be detached from enemy states as a result of the war, and any regions voluntarily included by the governments responsible for their administration. The terms of trusteeship were subject to negotiation between the UN and the controlling state, except that the basis of all administration was to be the paramountcy of the interests of the native inhabitants. Any part of a trust territory might be designated as a "strategic area." The functions of the UN with respect to strategic areas were to be exercised by the Security Council; those for other trust territories by the General Assembly operating through a Trusteeship Council.

The Trusteeship Council was composed of all members administering trust territories, any of the five permanent members of the Security Council

[1] An amendment of 1946 to the constitution of the International Labor Organization made it possible for any member of the UN to join the ILO through a communication to the latter's director-general. A direct relation between the ILO and the UN was established in the same year. With its headquarters in Geneva, the ILO by early 1953 had adopted 102 conventions, of which 79 were in force. See also page 47.

An International Refugee Organization (IRO) was in operation from July 1947 to October 1951. It took over many of the functions of UNRRA, gave legal and political protection to millions of refugees in Europe, and resettled about 1,000,000 refugees while repatriating 75,000 others. Its work was carried on from 1951 by an Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Both organizations were hampered by inadequate funds and the general unwillingness of countries to negotiate immigration agreements.



Courtesy, Foreign Policy Association, *Headline Series.*

not already included by virtue of such responsibility, and as many other members as might be needed to give the Trusteeship Council an equal number of administering and nonadministering countries. The latter were to be elected for three-year terms. Each member of the council had one vote, and decisions were reached by simple majority. In 1954 there were twelve members, namely, the Big Five, Australia, New Zealand, and Belgium as administering states, and four elected members.

The council was empowered to consider reports submitted by the administering authorities, accept petitions and examine them in consultation with the administering state, provide for periodic visits to the trust territories at times agreed upon with the administrators, and take any other actions permitted under the individual trusteeship agreements. A thorough questionnaire was to be compiled by the council and made the basis for annual reports by each administering authority to the General Assembly. The Trusteeship Council might at any time call on the Economic and Social Council for aid.

The first session of the Trusteeship Council was held at Lake Success on March 26, 1947. By the end of 1953, the General Assembly had approved eleven draft trusteeship agreements. These concerned New Guinea (Australia); Ruanda-Urundi (Belgium); the Cameroons (France, Great Britain); Tanganyika (Great Britain); Togoland (France, Great Britain); Western Samoa (New Zealand); Nauru (Australia on behalf of herself, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom); Somaliland (Italy);[2] and the "strategic area" composed of the former Japanese mandates in the Marshall, Marianas, and Caroline islands (United States).

The chief administrative officer of the United Nations was the secretary-general, appointed by the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council. He acted as secretary-general at all meetings of the General Assembly and of the Security, Economic and Social, and Trusteeship councils. He was required to make an annual report to the assembly and was empowered to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion might threaten international peace and security. He and his staff were international officials ineligible to seek or receive instructions from any authority outside the organization of the UN. Efficiency and a due regard for geographical distribution were to be the basis of staff appointments.

The International Court of Justice functioned under a statute based upon that of the earlier World Court and included as an annex to the Charter. Every member of the UN was *ipso facto* a member of the court.

[2] This former Italian colony was to become an independent state in 1960.

Nonmembers of the UN might join the court, on conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council. Each member of the UN undertook to comply with the decisions of the court in cases to which it was a party. In the event of noncompliance, the aggrieved party might appeal to the Security Council for help. The court might render advisory opinions on legal questions submitted to it by the General Assembly or Security Council, and by other UN organs with the approval of the assembly. Only states might be parties in cases before the tribunal. The court was composed of fifteen judges, no two of whom were nationals of the same state. They were elected for nine years by the General Assembly and the Security Council.

Amendments to the Charter of the United Nations were to come into force when they had been adopted by a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly and properly ratified by two-thirds of the members of the United Nations, including all states that were permanent members of the Security Council. Not later than the tenth annual session of the General Assembly (the eighth was held in 1953), there must be placed on its agenda a proposal to call a General Conference of the Members of the United Nations to review the entire Charter. The conference must then be held if so decided by a majority in the General Assembly and any seven members of the Security Council.

UN EFFORTS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

The early record of the United Nations in dealing with international disputes was somewhat disappointing to its protagonists. Yet much was accomplished in difficult circumstances, and experience was a good teacher in methods of procedure. Again, however, as with the old League of Nations, it became clear that no international system would work well unless its individual members, particularly the big members, were ready to act coöperatively and not in a spirit of obstruction.

The free use of the veto power by the Soviet Union regularly hampered the Security Council's efforts. Thus, by the end of January 1954, the U.S.S.R. had exercised its veto right 57 times. Some of the vetoes came during the preliminary stages of discussions and were applied in procedural as well as substantive matters. By contrast, France, in the same period, had used the veto power only twice. On occasion, when not actually bent upon vetoing an item, the U.S.S.R. showed its displeasure by abstaining from voting. Another obstacle to the efficient functioning of the Security Council was the failure of the Military Staff Committee to agree on the fundamental

principles underlying enforcement action. As a consequence of these and other weaknesses in council procedure, more and more problems came to be thrown in the lap of the General Assembly, where recommendations even of a coercive nature required only a two-thirds majority vote.

Among the first serious issues to reach the UN was that between Iran and the Soviet Union in January 1946. The Tehran Government claimed Soviet interference in its domestic affairs through Moscow's failure to recall the troops stationed in Iran by agreement during the war. Moscow denied the charge of interference, and for a time the Soviet representative to the council withdrew in protest against that body's continued consideration of the dispute. The council decided nonetheless to keep the matter open but deferred action until May. By that time the Russian troops had been removed from Iran, and the immediate quarrel was resolved.

In January 1946, too, the Security Council received a Greek question for settlement. The U.S.S.R. complained that the continued presence of British troops in Greece represented interference in the domestic affairs of another country and hence constituted a threat to peace. The council listened patiently to the views of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, Greece, and several other states. Then, in February, due note was taken of the fact that the British soldiers were there at the request of the Athens Government, and the matter was considered "closed."

Next, still in January 1946, the Ukraine alleged that British and Japanese troops were being used against native nationalists in Indonesia, thus creating another threat to peace. The delegate from the Ukraine therefore proposed the sending of a commission to inquire into the facts and establish peace in the islands. This motion was lost, as was also an Egyptian resolution urging that British troops not be used against Indonesians and be withdrawn from the area as soon as all remaining Japanese had been rounded up. The Netherlands delegate, speaking for the ruling country, made it clear that his country had no complaint to make about the presence of British troops; hence any council action would mean interference in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands. He emphasized that the British were merely carrying out a joint Allied order to capture remaining Japanese and to liberate any still-imprisoned Allied nationals. In the process they were finding it necessary to protect themselves against attack by Indonesian nationalists who were engaged in wholesale anti-European activities. The president of the council therefore declared (February) the matter closed.

The Syrian and Lebanese delegations in February 1946 called the attention of the Security Council to the continued presence of British and French

troops in their countries. Having become independent republics during the war, these two former mandates now wished to be entirely free of foreign control. In particular, there was objection to an Anglo-French Agreement of December 1945, which made the withdrawal of troops subject to conditions regarded by Syria and Lebanon as inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter. A majority in the council voted for a United States resolution that the body take note of the stated intention of the British and French governments to withdraw their troops from Syria and Lebanon as soon as practicable. But since the U.S.S.R. voted against this resolution, it was lost. Britain and France thereupon agreed to give effect to the majority view. In May 1946 the Syrian Premier informed the council that all British and French troops had been withdrawn from his country. Lebanon soon made a similar declaration.

A particularly knotty problem was introduced to the Security Council in April 1946 by Poland. The Polish delegate proposed to the council that it declare the continuance of the Franco regime in Spain a threat to peace and call on all UN members to sever diplomatic relations with Madrid. A subcommittee, appointed to study the situation, reported that, though the Franco regime was fascist in nature, no act of aggression on its part nor actual threat to peace had been established. Since the government's continuance, however, might be considered a "potential menace" to peace, the subcommittee recommended referral of the matter to the General Assembly. Russia vetoed the recommendation, whereupon the council voted "to keep the situation in Spain under continuous observation." Then, in November 1946, at the suggestion of the Polish delegate, the Spanish question was taken off the list of council matters, and the records were placed without comment at the disposal of the General Assembly.

Toward the end of 1946 the assembly adopted a resolution that barred the Franco Government from any international agencies or conferences held under UN auspices, urged all UN members to recall their chief diplomatic representatives from Madrid, and recommended that the Security Council consider "adequate measures . . . to remedy the situation" if "within a reasonable time" Spain did not come under a democratically elected government. Gradually most of the UN members which still had ambassadors or ministers in Madrid withdrew them. As if in answer to all this, a Spanish law of 1947 granted Franco life tenure as chief of state and set up a regency council to enthrone a king of his choosing following his death or disability; the act was heavily endorsed in a referendum. Late in 1950 the assembly revoked its resolution.

In June 1946 India lodged a complaint with the assembly that the

Union of South Africa was discriminating against and mistreating the Indian minority there resident. The assembly debated the matter but refused to interfere in what it interpreted as a domestic issue. The same stand was taken when India and Pakistan several times renewed the charge in later years.

Meanwhile, in August 1946, Greece had once more come on the council's agenda. Shortly before the holding of a plebiscite on the return of the Greek King, the Ukraine informed the Security Council that Greece's policies were threatening the peace of the Balkans. Athens was charged with violation of the Albanian border and persecution of minorities—all supposedly because of the continued presence of British troops in Greece. When the plebiscite proved favorable to George II, the Soviet charges became more vehement but no less vague.[3] Several council members held that the council's agenda should not become a sounding board for unsubstantiated grievances; but a majority believed that it should listen to all complaints. Hence weeks of listening followed.

Greece replied to the Ukrainian charges, and in turn accused her northern neighbors of seeking to disrupt her internal life. She expressed pain at Russia's apparent encouragement of a war of nerves against a former ally. After much palavering on proper procedure, Albania was permitted in September to air her views before the council. Even the World Federation of Trade Unions entered the controversy, by sending a letter to the council president accusing Greece of being undemocratic in her treatment of workers. At last, after the taking of many inconclusive and divided votes, it was understood through an interpretation of the secretary-general that the council was no longer "seized" of the Greek case. Hence it automatically fell off the agenda. But fate soon brought Greece back on the agenda. In December 1946 Athens requested council consideration of the border situation between Greece on the one hand and Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia on the other. After much debate, the council unanimously appointed a Commission of Investigation to make an on-the-spot study of the facts. Only Greece gave this group full support.

In June 1947 the Security Council began consideration of the commission's report.[4] It was a majority conclusion that Yugoslavia, and to a lesser extent Albania and Bulgaria, had supported guerrilla warfare in Greece. The guerrillas were generally of communist sympathy. The Soviet and Polish commission members issued a minority report placing full blame for

[3] King George II died in 1947 and was succeeded by his brother, Paul.
[4] Meanwhile the first steps had been taken in the program of United States aid to Greece and Turkey.

all trouble on the Greek Government. In the council debates on the report, the Soviet Union several times vetoed solutions that all other members of the Security Council regarded as necessary to end the troubled situation along the northern Greek frontiers. In despair, the council passed the matter on to the General Assembly.

The assembly debated the Balkan issue for a month, and then established a Special Balkan Committee to observe and assist in the compliance by the governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia with certain assembly recommendations. In January 1948 the committee informed the assembly that the noncoöperative attitude of Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, particularly their refusal to allow the stationing of UN observation groups on their soil, made the fulfilment of its task "very difficult." Eventually, after the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in 1948 and the defeat of the communists in Greece in 1949, the matter dwindled in importance.

Meanwhile other disputes had arisen in the Balkan area. In January 1947 Great Britain referred to the council certain differences that had arisen between her and Albania. Two British destroyers had been damaged by mines in the Corfu Channel off Albania, and London's demand for an Albanian apology and compensation was rejected by Tirana. The council eventually voted on a resolution placing on Albania blame for having sown an unnotified minefield in violation of international law. The Soviet Union exercised its veto power, and the resolution failed of adoption. The council then recommended submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice. Great Britain promptly appealed to the court, and Albania eventually decided to accept the jurisdiction of the court. Thus the Corfu Channel Case became the first case before the new world tribunal. In 1949 the tribunal decided in favor of Great Britain, but Albania failed to pay the awarded damages.

In its draft of the Italian peace treaty, the Council of Foreign Ministers placed upon the Security Council responsibility for maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Free Territory of Trieste and for appointing its governor. Hence, before the treaty was signed, it was necessary to get the approval of the Security Council for these provisions. Such approval was received in January 1947. The treaty also required the council to consult the governments of Italy and Yugoslavia before naming a governor. The candidate, whose term would be five years, must not be a citizen of Italy, Yugoslavia, or Trieste. Throughout 1947 numerous closed sessions were held by the council in an effort to get a generally acceptable

nominee. The "spectre of the veto," however, regularly inhibited even a sizable majority from announcing any choice. As a consequence, no governor was named, and Trieste continued as an international enclave with joint British and United States rule in Zone A (which included the port city) and Yugoslav control over Zone B. Early in 1954, with Washington and London impatient to leave the area, it appeared that Italy and Yugoslavia might have to come to some direct agreement over the future of the 300-square-mile area.

Southeastern Asia appeared once more on a UN agenda in July 1947. At that time India and Australia requested the Security Council to consider a bad situation in Indonesia (Java, Madura, and Sumatra), rebellious colony of the Netherlands.[5] Here the Netherlands Government claimed to be taking only "police measures" in order to stop the hostage-taking practice of the native nationalists and bring order into large areas over which the rebels claimed authority but in which they exercised little control; hence the dispute was domestic. Most of the council members, however, felt that the Netherlands herself had recognized the Indonesian Republic in a Linggadjati Agreement of 1946. The council issued a cease-fire order to both sides, and when this was ineffective it set up a Committee of Three to go to Indonesia and try to help in the reaching of an amicable settlement. The committee persuaded the disputants to stop both the shooting and the local propaganda phases of their quarrel, and to discuss matters aboard a United States Navy transport vessel. In January 1948 the two sides accepted an immediate truce and agreed that, upon eventual free vote of the people, Java, Madura, and Sumatra might severally or collectively join some neighboring regions to form the United States of Indonesia. This autonomous Asiatic federation would exist in equal partnership with the Netherlands as the Netherlands-Indonesian Union.

The truce continued uneasily until the end of the year. Then Netherlands forces, in a surprise attack, captured all republican leaders, including President Sukarno. The Security Council intervened once more and eventually induced The Hague to recognize (November 1949) a sovereign Republic of the United States of Indonesia. In 1950 the name of the new state was changed to Republic of Indonesia, and it became the sixtieth member of the United Nations. President Sukarno's capital was established in Jakarta (formerly Batavia), on Java. The republic in 1954 had 78,-

[5] In August 1945, with the Japanese forces still in the land, Dr. Achmed Sukarno (Soekarno), a longtime nationalist leader in Java, had declared an independent Indonesian republic with himself as president.


INDONESIA
100°
110°
120°
130°
140°
10°
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BURMA
SIAM
FRENCH INDO-CHINA
SOUTH CHINA SEA
Manila
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
PACIFIC OCEAN
Malacca Strait
George-town
BRITISH MALAYA
Singapore
SUMATRA
BRUNEI (Br.)
BR. NOR. BORNEO
SARAWAK (Br.)
BORNEO
W. BORNEO
SOUTH & EAST BORNEO
HALMAHERA
Equator
BANGKA
Palembang
BILLITON
CELEBES
INDONESIAN REPUBLIC
Jakarta
MADURA
JAVA
Semarang
Jogjakarta
Soerabaya
BALI
LOMBOK
SOEMBAWA
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Port
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NEW GUINEA
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Scale of Miles
0 100 200 300 400
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AUSTRALIA

000,000 inhabitants in an area of 735,000 square miles. Rich in the raw materials of industry, Indonesia was ruled by a coalition of nationalists and socialists who planned an eventual strongly-centralized government.

The long-drawn-out efforts of the United Nations to settle peaceably the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir, and the Palestine question, were discussed earlier. In 1948 Chile asked the council to investigate the violation of Czechoslovak independence by the Soviet threat of force which converted that state into a satellite; but Moscow's veto prevented a proposed investigation. The same year found the ruler of Hyderabad complaining to the council against aggression by newly independent India; a change in Hyderabad's government led to a withdrawal of the complaint. The blockade of Berlin by the Soviets in 1948–1949 was brought before the council by the Western Allies. Moscow's veto blocked any recommendations, but the matter was settled directly.

The year 1949 saw first Bolivia and then other countries asking the General Assembly to stop the violation of human rights, guaranteed by the peace treaties, in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. The Soviet bloc prevented action, and the assembly had to content itself with condemning the three satellites for their "willful refusal" to coöperate with an investigation. Nationalist China, also in 1949, charged the U.S.S.R. with violation of both the UN Charter and a Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 by giving direct aid to the communists in China. The assembly found Russia guilty as charged, which at least was a moral victory for the Nationalist Government. In 1949 and 1950 the UN settled the fate of Italy's former colonies: Libya became a constitutional monarchy under King Idris I (December 1950), Eritrea was united with Ethiopia, and Somaliland was to achieve independence aften ten years of Italian trusteeship.

Leaving for later consideration the Korean War, it may be noted here that both the council and the assembly in 1950 rejected Soviet demands for a condemnation of the United States because its fleet was protecting Taiwan (Formosa) from communist attack originating on the Chinese mainland. Tibet appealed to the UN Secretariat in 1950 for help against Chinese communist aggression, but the matter was not placed on any agenda, and in 1951 it was "settled" by the establishment of a Chinese protectorate over the area.

In 1951 the assembly called for a commission to study the possibility of holding free elections in Germany, but the project collapsed when the Soviet Zone refused admittance to its members. Yugoslav complaints of hostile Soviet activities within the republic were debated, and a Soviet charge that the United States was using economic aid to organize spy

networks in Europe was rejected. No action was taken on accusations of French "terror tactics" in Morocco and Tunisia because of Paris' insistence that the matter was one of domestic concern alone. And the council discussed, though it apparently could do nothing about, the dispute between Great Britain and Iran over the latter's nationalization of foreign-owned oil properties.

In 1952 the assembly debated the signing of an Austrian peace treaty and agreed that the rapid restoration of full Austrian sovereignty was urgent. Russia, however, evinced no hurry to get out of Vienna and continued to prevent conclusive negotiations. Burma, in 1953, asked the assembly to help her solve the problem of what to do with bands of "marauding" Chinese Nationalist troops who had there sought refuge when driven out of China by the communists. The assembly called for the withdrawal of these soldiers—an assignment which was made possible for Chiang Kai-shek through the aid of United States transportation facilities.

With so many disputes plaguing the postwar world, it was natural that the UN should turn to the implementation of its obligations with regard to disarmament. A General Assembly resolution of January 1946 established an Atomic Energy Commission. This was made up of one representative from each member of the Security Council, plus Canada when that state was not on the council.[6] It was instructed to make proposals for the international exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends; for the control of atomic energy to ensure its use for peaceful purposes only; for the elimination of atomic and other mass-destruction weapons; and for effective inspection and other safeguards against violation and evasion. The commission had to report to the Security Council and was responsible to the latter in all security matters. The first meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission was held in June 1946.

At the base of all commission and council discussions on atomic energy during the ensuing years were two divergent proposals of the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States presented a plan for a powerful International Atomic Development Authority. This body would conduct continuous surveys of world supplies of uranium and thorium, bring the raw materials under its control, possess the exclusive right of atomic-explosives research, issue national licenses for other atomic research, and enjoy full rights of inspection in all countries. Its own dangerous activities and stockpiles would be decentralized and strategically distributed. Imme-

[6] Because of coöperative wartime effort, Canada shared with the United States and Great Britain advanced information on nuclear fission.

diate punishment would follow infringement of the rights of the body. Above all, "there must be no veto to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes."

The Soviet Union, for its part, proposed as a first measure the adoption of an international agreement to prohibit the production and use of atomic energy weapons. Within three months of the entry into force of the agreement, all atomic weapons should be destroyed, under penalty of severe punishment. The convention should be of indefinite duration and come into force after approval by the Security Council and ratification by its five permanent members.

The deliberations of the commission and the council bared three basic differences in viewpoint between Washington and Moscow. These differences related to the amount of power to be given the international authority, the voting procedure in the council when atomic matters were under discussion, and the time and extent of release by the United States of its special atomic information. In plain terms, the United States was unwilling to relinquish its currently advantageous position until it had firm guarantees of protection against the results of trickery by another state; the Soviet Union objected to any plan which would permit free access to its territory by an international authority and which would limit its much-used veto power in the Security Council. Meanwhile stalemate persisted, and Moscow had time, with the help of captured German scientists and foreign spies, to accomplish nuclear fission and make atom and hydrogen bombs.

The great amount of talk and small actual accomplishment led the assembly to urge the council and the Atomic Energy Commission to hasten the formulation of effective measures to combine limitation of armaments and security. It also pressed for the prompt withdrawal of Allied troops from ex-enemy territories and a general progressive reduction in armed forces throughout the world. Once again it was evident, as in the days after the First World War, that the well-armed countries were reluctant to accept limitation without water-tight guarantees against foreign bad faith and without unquestioned collective security; the poorly equipped states, on the other hand, eagerly favored the immediate general reduction of armaments as the first step towards their own security. Anxious to comply with the assembly's request, the Security Council established a Commission for Conventional Armaments. Consisting of representatives of the members of the council, the commission was to make proposals for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and for the resulting necessary

practical safeguards. It was not to touch the subject of atomic weapons. But, despite a vast accumulation of words and paper, the work of the UN was still not discernible in a limitation of armaments, even by 1954.

The overburdening of the assembly in its regular sessions, and the frequent overruling of the majority will in the council by the Soviet Union, led in 1947 to the establishment of an Interim Committee of the assembly, containing one representative from each UN member. The committee's function was to assist the assembly in discharging its responsibilities in the maintenance of international peace and security during the months between its regular sessions. Specifically, the "Little Assembly," as it came to be called, was to study important matters left unsettled by the past assembly session and to report on matters that might well find a place on the agenda of the next assembly session. Simultaneously, since decisions would be by two-thirds majority, the Little Assembly could clearly establish the will of the majority of the world's countries. For in the Security Council, as the Argentine delegate pointed out, some states appeared to believe that unanimity simply meant imposing the will of the minority on the majority. The Little Assembly normally met in January of each year, beginning in 1948.

The gradual shift in emphasis from the Security Council ("the private preserve of the big powers") to the vetoless and more representative General Assembly received special impetus in 1950. In that year the UN members realized with consternation that, if the U.S.S.R. had not at the time been boycotting council sessions—over the issue of Chinese representation in the UN—Moscow might well have vetoed any and all UN action after the unprovoked attack of North Korean forces on South Korea. To prevent a recurrence of such a possibility, the assembly in November 1950 adopted (52 to 5) a resolution, sponsored by the United States, called "United Action for Peace."

The resolution contained several parts. It provided that the assembly might be called into special session in an emergency upon the summons of any seven members of the council or a simple majority of the UN members. A Peace Observation Commission of fourteen members, including the five big powers, was set up to be at the call of either council or assembly for the sending of observers to any trouble spot. Each UN member was asked to maintain certain special military units for emergency duty on behalf of the organization. (Little such "earmarking" of units had been done by 1954.) Finally, a fourteen-member Collective Measures Committee was created to study further methods for maintaining peace and strengthening security.

On the nonpolitical side, more than 90 countries and territories, by 1954, had received technical and economic assistance under UN auspices. Thousands of experts representing scores of nationalities were sent to aid the less-highly-developed areas, and thousands of fellowships were granted to residents of these areas for study in the industrialized countries. The United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) provided equipment, supplies, and information that by 1953 had benefited 60,000,000 children in 70 countries. More than $1,500,000,000 had been loaned to 28 countries and territories by 1953 through the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The International Monetary Fund helped many countries maintain relatively stable currencies and improve their banking policies.

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) helped increase farm, fishery, and forest productivity throughout the world, while the World Health Organization (WHO) fought disease on all fronts, distributed vast quantities of penicillin and other drugs (particularly to tropical areas), and fostered effective international quarantine regulations. The United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) undertook to reduce illiteracy, provide vocational education where needed, and stimulate the world-wide exchange of new knowledge. In the words of a Siamese prince, "while the hare of disarmament has got into a snarl, the tortoise of technical assistance and of coöperation through the specialized agencies has been crawling forward."

Thus, despite some failures and disappointments, the United Nations achieved much in the early years of its existence. Its greatest weakness appeared in the field of the hardest international problems, namely, political dispute. But satisfaction could be derived from what *had* been done in this sphere, and even more from the constructive work accomplished under UN auspices by the many specialized agencies concerned with economic, social, cultural, technical, and humanitarian matters of world scope. Settlements in these spheres of human activity were perhaps less spectacular than achievements or failures in the political sphere; but they were nonetheless important as milestones on the road to world happiness. It remained for the people of the world to make the prestige of the United Nations so great that it could practice and defend all the principles upon which it was founded.

THE KOREAN WAR

At the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor (1941), Korea had for some decades been under Japanese domination. Hence, at the wartime Cairo

Conference (1943), the United States, Great Britain, and China agreed that Korea should "in due course" become independent. The Soviet Union accepted this arrangement in 1945 when it entered the struggle against Japan. Then, chiefly as a military convenience, it was agreed that the Japanese forces in Korea north of the thirty-eighth parallel should surrender to Russia, and those south of it to the United States. And thus were created two Koreas, under Soviet and United States occupation respectively.

When negotiations between the two military commands for Korean unification broke down, Washington laid the matter before the General Assembly in 1947. The latter proposed that a United Nations Commission for Korea supervise the holding of free elections in all Korea, the establishment of a native government, and the withdrawal of all occupation forces. Moscow rejected the plan and forbade the UN commission to enter North Korea. Thereupon, with some misgivings lest the division be "solidified," the commission supervised elections in the south alone—where lived two-thirds of the Koreans. As a consequence, the Republic of Korea was established late in 1948 and soon won the recognition of most of the UN membership. Its capital was Seoul, and its president Dr. Syngman Rhee.[7]

Meanwhile Moscow set up in the north a Democratic People's Republic of Korea along the usual communist-satellite lines. Throughout 1949 and into 1950, as United States and Soviet relations in general worsened, the situation in Korea became more dangerous. As was perhaps to be expected, both Korean governments uttered belligerent statements and threatened to bring about unification by force if necessary. The UN Commission in 1949 reported "military posturing" on both sides of the dividing parallel. According to the commission, the numerous border incidents were largely the fault of North Korea, which also tried to incite civil disturbances in the south; the Rhee Government, whatever its feelings, was restrained in its actual conduct by the United States. It was, therefore, not altogether surprising when the UN Commission informed the world that on June 25, 1950, Korean time, North Korean forces had invaded the Republic of Korea.

By request of the United States, the Security Council met on the day of the attack. With the U.S.S.R. absent and Yugoslavia abstaining, the nine other members charged North Korea with having broken the peace, called for the withdrawal northward of the invading forces, and asked all UN

[7] Rhee was born in 1875, educated at a Methodist mission and in several United States universities, and served as a Methodist missionary among his people and in Hawaii. From early youth a Korean nationalist, he suffered both imprisonment and exile and acted for more than a score of years as "president" of a revolutionary Korean Provisional Government. The total area of Korea was about 85,000 square miles, and its population 30,000,000.

members to support the council resolution while refusing assistance to North Korea. The rapid headway of the aggressors induced President Truman to order United States forces to the assistance of the Seoul Government *before* the council on June 27 urged the entire UN membership to help Rhee repel the attack and "restore" peace to the area.

Within the next few weeks a willingness to give active support to the principle of collective security was indicated by a total of 53 members. Sixteen (plus the Republic of Korea itself) sent military units of one sort or another, while the remainder offered medical supplies, food, clothing, bases, transport facilities, and material. The bulk of contributions in all spheres came from the United States, which, on July 7, 1950, was asked by the council to assume responsibility for a United Nations Unified Command, flying the UN colors. Washington appointed General of the Army MacArthur, who was succeeded in 1951 by General Matthew B. Ridgway, in 1952 by General Mark Clark, and in 1953 by General John E. Hull.[8]

In August 1950 the Soviet Union returned to the council meetings, with her delegate as chairman under the regular rotation system. The Russian chairman used parliamentary devices to prevent any and all council action on Korea during that month. As long as the UN forces were able to drive back the invaders, this Soviet stand and the threat of future vetoes were not regarded as especially serious by the other members. But when large Chinese communist forces entered the war late in October, the picture changed. Hence, during a successful Chinese counterattack, the whole Korean dispute was transferred to the General Assembly. There it remained even after the UN forces once again acquired the initiative and pushed the battle line a short distance north of the thirty-eighth parallel. In February 1951 the assembly condemned Red China as an aggressor and soon thereafter called for an embargo on shipments of strategic materials to the Mao Government. Russia, however, freely gave aid to the communists.

After a year of fighting, Russia suggested negotiations for an armistice. Then, over a period of two years (July 10, 1951 to July 27, 1953)—during which men and boys killed and died, misery flourished, and Stalin

[8] At the end of 1951, about half of the ground forces were from the United States, 40 per cent from the Republic of Korea (ROK's), and 10 per cent from other UN members. The air forces were almost entirely from the United States, and the naval units from the United States and British Commonwealth. This inequality was in some ways more apparent than real. France, for example, had 80,000 soldiers fighting communism in Indo-China; Great Britain had 25,000 similarly occupied in Malaya. The smaller and poorer European and Latin American countries hesitated to weaken themselves at home or else felt remote from the issue. The actual military contributors were Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Great Britain, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Siam, Turkey, the Union of South Africa, and the United States.



Courtesy, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *International Conciliation.*

passed from the scene—negotiations started, were broken off, were resumed, were again broken off, and were renewed once more. Decision was made more difficult by the prolonged unwillingness of the Seoul Government—which was allowed to play only a minor role in the talks—to accept any agreement that did not presage a united, non-communist Korea.[9] Rhee eventually ceased his opposition when the United States promised to rehabilitate his country, sign a mutual-security pact, and intervene once more if communist aggression were renewed after the armistice.

The truce terms between the North Korean and Chinese communists and the UN were signed at Panmunjom after 575 meetings. A military demarcation line was established along the final battle line, somewhat north of the thirty-eighth parallel. Each party was to withdraw its troops and equipment 2 kilometers (1.25 miles) from this line, leaving a demilitarized zone 2.5 miles wide. Only civil administrators and relief personnel might, under certain safeguards, enter this zone. All prisoners of war who desired repatriation (which later proved to include nearly all men held by the Reds but only a few of those held by the UN) were to be sent home within 60 days.

A Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, composed of citizens from India (chairman), Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, was to take charge of those who refused repatriation. Communist agents were given permission to visit prison camps in South Korea during a 90-day period to try to persuade unwilling men to return. Prisoners who thereafter still refused repatriation were then to be referred to a political peace conference that would be called for this purpose and "to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, et cetera." Any prisoners whose disposition had not been decided by the political conference after 30 days would be reclassified as civilians and assisted to settle in neutral countries.

The military strength of both sides in Korea was to be frozen, but each was given the right to substitute equipment and rotate up to 35,000 men per month. A Military Armistice Commission (MAC) of five officers from each side was to supervise the implementation of the truce, and consider and correct any violations. Movements to and from Korea and equipment replacements were made subject to inspection by a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission of officers from Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. This NNSC was to report violations to the MAC. The whole arrangement was to remain in force until amended or until there was

[9] At one point Seoul released 25,000 prisoners of war who objected to repatriation.

"appropriate agreement for peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides." Thus ended, at least temporarily, armed hostilities that had cost an estimated 2,500,000 casualties.[10]

Quarreling, however, did not cease with the signing of the truce. Recitals by returning UN prisoners of horrible communist mistreatment inflamed spirits in many countries. The crude, unethical, and brutal behavior of the North Korean and Chinese communist agents, who failed miserably in trying to induce recalcitrants to return to their communist-dominated homes, eventually alienated even the placid Indians, who had been more rather than less sympathetic at the start. And when the time came for calling the political peace conference the Reds again resorted to stalling tactics. Hence, six months after Panmunjom, there still was no political gathering to settle the future of Korea. Thus also the process of freeing nonrepatriated prisoners was delayed, since there was no political conference to consider their cases.

Eventually, in January 1954, the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission returned to the control of the UN Command the 22,000 prisoners of war who objected to repatriation to their communist-held homelands. Thereupon, despite loud Soviet protests, the UN set them free, permitting the 15,000 Chinese to go to Formosa and the 7000 North Koreans to enter South Korean "disindoctrination centers." Three months later, in April 1954, there met at Geneva the political conference which long ago was supposed to have restored peace to Korea.

The conference was attended on the one side by South Korea and most of the UN belligerents in the war; and on the other by North Korea, Red China, and Russia. The gathering found itself confronted not with one but with two main tasks: to settle the Korean problem—and to deal with a crisis in Indo-China. For, a few weeks before the conference met, the communists in Viet Nam, supported by Russia and Red China, launched an offensive to drive the French out of Southeastern Asia. Seven years of uninterrupted warfare in that area had proved a severe drain on French finances and man power, especially on the flower of French youth which was patriotically willing to fight for France overseas.

And now the Russian Foreign Minister, Molotov, cleverly drove a wedge between France and the United States. He tried to win French support for concessions in Korea in return for the hope of truce in Indo-China. The United States, on the other hand, wanted no concessions any-

[10] The UN casualties (dead, missing, and wounded) were close to 500,000, of whom more than half were South Koreans and perhaps a third were from the United States. The figure of 2,000,000 for the communists has been called an "educated guess."

place that might lead to eventual communist domination of Asia. Thus it remained to be seen what would be the final outcome of Soviet aggression in Korea and of the resultant first attempt in history by a world-wide organization to say "No!" to a powerful aggressor.

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The developing postwar ill will between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, and the growing feeling among European leaders that the western part of their continent must not remain divided into small and antagonistic sections while the Moscow and Washington colossi flexed their muscles, stimulated a movement towards some form of European integration aside from general membership in the UN. The trend was foreshadowed in the late summer of 1944 when Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed a so-called Benelux Customs Convention, which became effective at the start of 1948. Meanwhile, early in 1947, Great Britain and France signed the Dunkirk Treaty of Alliance. A year later (1948) the members of this alliance and the Benelux countries concluded a Brussels Treaty providing for economic and social as well as military collaboration among the signatories.

The year 1948 also saw the establishment of an Organization for European Economic Cooperation (O.E.E.C.) with headquarters in Paris.[11] Its aims were to help the members "achieve and maintain a satisfactory level of economic activity without extraordinary outside assistance, . . . increase their production, develop and modernize their industrial and agricultural equipment, expand their commerce, reduce progressively trade barriers among them, promote full employment and restore or maintain the stability of their economies and general confidence in their national currencies." The O.E.E.C. deserved at least partial credit for the general rise in Western Europe's living standard during the ensuing years. And through its European Payments Union (E.P.U.) it did much to assist reconstruction, stimulate international trade, and bring effective system into the settlement of certain international payments.

Then, in April 1949, there was signed in Washington a North Atlantic Treaty. It set up a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) among Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the

11 The members in 1953 were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany (West), Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Trieste, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Canada and the United States were associate members.

Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Later adherents were Greece and Turkey. The signatories undertook to further one another's "capacity to resist armed attack," agreed that an armed attack against any one of them would be considered an attack "against them all," and established a council to implement the treaty and plan for the integrated defense of the whole North Atlantic area. The implementation was made difficult, among other reasons, because of disagreement on the desirability of standardizing weapons, the advisability of freely exchanging information on atomic research, contributions to a standing military force, and the relative value of short-term or detailed long-range planning for defense.

Shortly after the organization of NATO there was adopted in London (May 1949) a Statute of the Council of Europe. This council came to include the same constituency as NATO, except that Canada, Portugal, and the United States remained outside, while Ireland, Sweden, and West Germany were included and the Saar became an associate member. The council was set up in order to achieve greater unity among the members in safeguarding their common heritage and fostering their social and economic progress. Questions of defense were excluded from the council's competence. To carry out the objectives there were created a Committee of Ministers and a Consultative Assembly.

The Committee of Ministers (foreign ministers or their representatives) was to meet privately at least once a year, determine the agenda of the assembly, examine the latter's recommendations, and decide whether these should be transmitted to the member governments. In general, voting, to be effective, required unanimity. The Consultative Assembly was to be made up of representatives appointed as the individual states members desired. Its resolutions in general required a two-thirds majority to be eligible for consideration by the Committee of Ministers. A secretariat was installed in Strasbourg. By the end of 1953 the Council of Europe seemed to have exerted little direct influence on policy, but it did offer a useful sounding board for proposals aiming at closer European integration.

More immediately effective was the European Coal and Steel Community, outlined by a fifty-year treaty in 1951 and established in 1952. It grew out of a so-called Schuman Plan advanced in 1950 by the then French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, and embraced by the Benelux countries, France, Italy, and West Germany. The E.C.S.C. was charged with creating a single market for the indicated products through suppression of import and export duties, quota restrictions, discriminatory buying and selling practices, state subsidies, and market divisions. Administration

of the project was entrusted to a High Authority of nine members, not more than two of whom might be from any one of the member countries. To this authority, operating by majority rule, the states members relinquished certain sovereign rights in the spheres of investment, production, prices and wages, and labor resettlement. The decisions of the High Authority were made binding, and it was empowered to impose fines for violations.

A Common Assembly of 78 representatives appointed by the community members was given power to censure the High Authority by a two-thirds vote if it disapproved of the administration. In such case, the members of the authority must resign. Liaison between the High Authority and the governments was provided by a Council of Ministers, whose approval also was needed before the authority could take action in certain fields—particularly where the action might affect both the common market and the individual national economies. A special international Court of Justice was founded to rule on disputed interpretations or applications. Finally, a Consultative Committee, appointed by the Council of Ministers and representing producers, workers, and consumers, was set up to give advice to the High Authority.

The headquarters of the E.C.S.C. were placed in Luxembourg, and a five-year transition period was provided to prepare the way for complete unification. Early in 1953 the single markets in coal and steel came into effect. The United States, Great Britain, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland attached missions to the community. And so the first really supranational European agency faced its delicate, intricate, and vital assignment.

At one of the NATO meetings in 1950 the United States suggested the inclusion of some German military divisions in the Western defense system. Soon thereafter France, once more afraid of a resurgent and rearmed Germany, proposed the creation of a European army under unified command and incorporating "small" German units. These ideas were discussed at great length in NATO sessions during the next eighteen months. Then, in May 1952, representatives of the E.C.S.C. countries initialled in Paris a fifty-year treaty setting up a European Defense Community (E.D.C.), with a joint army supported by a common budget and forming a part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. There was much basic similarity between the E.C.S.C. and E.D.C. treaties.

The members, in general, were not to maintain armed forces aside from the common army, save for special use as in overseas territories, at international missions such as occupied Berlin, and for internal security.

There were to be common uniforms, equipment, and training. The executive of the E.D.C. was to be a Commissariat of nine members appointed by common consent of the members. Its administrative decisions were to be binding, but it was given no policy-making power. The political authority, which would instruct the Commissariat in major policy, was to be the Council of Ministers representing the signatories. Policy decisions by this council would have to be unanimous. The E.C.S.C. Court of Justice was also to function in the case of justiciable E.D.C. disputes. Temporarily, the E.C.S.C. Assembly, slightly augmented, was to discuss the reports of the Commissariat; formulate suggestions; propose acceptance, modification, or rejection of the common budget; and, by a two-thirds vote, if it wished, censure the administration.

There was one obvious big weakness about the E.D.C. setup. It was to be expected that a common army would be an instrument, if necessary, for implementing a common foreign policy. But thus far, at least, there was no way of ensuring such a foreign policy. Hence, while ratification of the E.D.C. treaty proceeded slowly, the E.C.S.C. Council of Ministers (Benelux, France, Italy, and West Germany) invited the E.C.S.C. Assembly to draft a preliminary constitution for a European Political Community (E.P.C.). This the E.C.S.C. Assembly—reconstituted as an "Ad Hoc Committee" under the chairmanship of the German Dr. Heinrich von Brentano—accomplished by March 1953. The document was then received for study by the six foreign ministers directly concerned. If and when they accepted the draft, it was to be submitted to their respective parliaments for ratification.

The constitution leaned heavily on the pattern of the E.C.S.C. and E.D.C. arrangements, in effect expanding them into a political organ. The proposal was for a parliament composed of a popularly elected People's Chamber and a Senate chosen by the national parliaments. The Senate was to elect a President of the Executive Council, who himself would appoint the remaining members of this cabinet. Again a Council of National Ministers would exercise general supervision—under the unanimity rule for all important items. Whether or not such a federation would eventually become a reality, it certainly appeared, at the start of 1954, that the sad experiences of the Second World War and its aftermath had made Western Europe think more seriously than at any time in modern history of genuine integration.

CHAPTER 27

Events in the Americas Since 1941

THE UNITED STATES

Far more than its predecessor, the Second World War brought heartaches to civilians in the United States. The size of the armed forces was increased from 2,000,000 in 1941 to about 12,000,000 (men and women) in 1945, so that there probably was hardly a family in the country without a relative in uniform.[1] Direct United States participation lasted 44 months, as against only 19 months in the First World War. Hence the casualties were far more numerous, including more than five times as many battle deaths—for a total of about 260,000. Again, however, there was no direct damage or killing on the soil of continental United States; except for the armed personnel overseas, most citizens knew the horrors of bomb destruction only from written, pictorial, or oral reports.

The fundamental dislike of the people of the United States for war was again clearly demonstrated when, even before V–J Day, there was great pressure to return the veterans to their homeland and to civilian status at a precipitate rate. Indeed, the armed forces soon found it necessary to spread themselves dangerously thin in order to implement the diplomatic commitments of the government throughout the world. And while the Soviet army was being rebuilt to carry out Moscow's expansionism, the newly formed (1947) United States Department of Defense (Army, Navy, and

[1] The Selective Service System worked fairly efficiently, though not uniformly, since the 6500 local draft boards operated with considerable autonomy. As a group, young agricultural workers probably were most frequently deferred.

Air Force) was finding it difficult, at least until the Korean War began, even to maintain armed forces as large as those before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Eventually a combination of this proportionate weakening in relation to the U.S.S.R.—except perhaps in the stock-piling of atomic bombs—plus the activities of highly-placed communist spies, led to a widespread fear which in the early 1950's gave rise to numerous congressional investigations of government agencies, industrial plants, and teaching groups.

Meanwhile, also, during and after the war the people of the United States achieved new heights of economic prosperity. There was unprecedented production to equip their own forces and those of the Allies, then to restore and rehabilitate war-torn areas and the human victims of war in virtually every part of the globe, and finally to provide new and more consumer goods to meet the demand for an ever higher standard of living. By the middle of 1943 Washington was spending $8,000,000,000 per month, and during the war years the national debt increased fivefold to a quarter trillion. New and heavy corporate and individual taxes were levied, so that 40 per cent of the war cost was handled on a "pay-as-you-go" basis. In accord with New Deal philosophy, moreover, the new taxes not only provided revenue but sought to bring about a redistribution of wealth through application of a "soak-the-rich" principle. From mid-1943, moreover, a law required employers to deduct income taxes from employees in the hope that this collection at the source would make tax evasion more difficult. The employers who thus were made tax collectors received no compensation for their extra work and expense; but in the hey-day of war profits the employers seemed not to be much concerned over this further step toward statism.

A special War Production Board (WPB) effectively supervised the quantity and direction of industrial output. Using the period 1935–1939 as a base of 100, the index of production rose to 125 in 1940 and 235 in 1944. Unemployment virtually disappeared as the factories reached out to hire women, boys, and girls—and all at competitively high wages. Since the war contracts generally were on a "cost-plus" basis, there seemed no point in haggling over costs. Consequently the average weekly wage in the manufacturing industries almost doubled between 1940 and 1945, and this despite the fact that they were supposed to be "frozen" by a law of 1942. Prices and rents also shot up, but the government agencies involved were much stricter in controlling these than was the National War Labor Board in checking the wage jumps.

Both the A.F. of L. and the C.I.O. gave no-strike pledges for the duration of the war, but the frequent violations thereof led to the passage of

the Smith-Connally Act in 1943. This empowered the President to seize and operate strikebound plants and to punish the instigators and leaders of strikes against companies fulfilling government contracts. The number of idle man-days then dropped from 23,000,000 in 1941 to 9,000,000 in 1944. And where the strikes did occur during the war and postwar years, these were not strikes against oppression or starvation wages; they were strikes in order to gain for certain groups their highest living standards in modern times. As in the case of the First World War, moreover, the farmers fared well financially as suppliers of much-needed food for all the Allies.

There was less hysteria over and hounding of possible enemy sympathizers in the Second World War than there had been in the first. Except for the precautionary wartime forcible removal to inland camps of about 110,000 Japanese-American residents of west coast areas, there was little mass action against enemy aliens. In part this was owing to popular confidence in the ability of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to watch and control such persons and in part to the greater clarity of both the war responsibility and the war issues. On the other hand, there appeared to be an increase in racial tensions. These were traceable to Nazi propaganda, to the widespread joint service of troops of all colors, and to the activities of a government-appointed Fair Employment Practices Committee which tried to enforce for all minority groups equality of economic opportunity with the majority. There was, moreover, a tendency among some minority-group leaders in effect to redefine "democracy" as the will of the minority rather than that of the majority. Such persons showed a readiness to label as "discrimination" almost anything that the majority might favor but which some minority-group leaders did not like.

As had happened so often before, the mid-term congressional elections of 1942 showed a swing to the party out of power, in this case the Republicans. The latter therefore were optimistic about the chances of their Presidential candidate in 1944—Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York. The Democrats readily renominated Roosevelt and eventually agreed upon a compromise vice-presidential nominee in the person of Senator Harry S. Truman of Missouri, who had achieved some prominence for investigating war production and war contracts. Since both parties favored victory in the war and some form of postwar international organization, the chief campaign issue was a Republican charge of New Deal inefficiency and confusion. Roosevelt captured 432 electoral votes to 99 for Dewey, but his popular majority was a little more than 3,000,000. Six months after the voting, Roosevelt died of a cerebral hemorrhage (April 12, 1945).

The new President Truman, with relatively little preparation for the enormous task, faced not only the assignment of governing 150,000,000 war-weary fellow-countrymen but the responsibilities of military victory in a war-torn world and the handling of the Russian problem.

The surrender of the last great axis enemy, Japan, in August 1945, brought a widespread clamor in the United States for a prompt return to peacetime living. With thought chiefly for their material comforts and wishes, and with a naïve disregard for the realities of an unsettled and turbulent postwar world, the mass of people in the United States stampeded the government into acting as though the collapse of the axis meant the immediate winning of Utopia. Political expediency rather than strong, intelligent leadership prevailed—with unhappy long-range effects for the whole world, including the United States.

Specifically, most of the servicemen wanted to be discharged at once, regardless of the fact that there was as yet no peace—and their families, understandably but unwisely, abetted their demands. Less than a year after the axis surrendered, Eisenhower announced that the army did not have one single properly trained and equipped division. After another year, the armed forces numbered only 1,000,000, half of them stationed abroad. At this time the Russians, it was estimated, could put 10,000,000 men in the field within a month. Then gradually, as a result of the worsening world situation, there was a moderate change in trend. In 1948 a new selective service act replaced the one which had expired in 1946. Thus the draft was restored, but with many restrictions and numerous exemptions.

The decision to help rehabilitate war-torn Europe and Asia, the war-induced shortage of consumer goods for the United States, and then the economic demands of the Korean War combined to create enough manpower needs to absorb the returning veterans into industry. Else there might well have come the usual unemployment problems and business recessions attendant upon war's end and large-scale demobilization. Many returning veterans, moreover, were encouraged by favorable legislation to spend some time in college or other educational institutions before swelling the labor market. This was accomplished through the Servicemen's Readjustment Act or "G.I. Bill of Rights" of 1944. It made federal financial assistance for education available to veterans, extended liberal credit facilities to veterans who wished to purchase houses or establish small businesses, provided free medical services to ex-servicemen and their families, and permitted unemployed veterans to receive from the government $20 per week for up to 52 weeks.[2]

[2] This last provision led to the use of a new popular phrase: "The 52–20 Club."

A sizable proportion of United States labor had become accustomed during the war to "take-home pay" swollen by compensation for overtime work paid at one and a half times the regular rate. After the war, when overtime work dwindled, many workers followed their leaders in demanding 48 hours' pay for a 40-hour work week. Washington strengthened labor's hands by insisting that this demand could be met without an increase in prices. Labor disputes resulted and 1946 set a record for strikes in United States history. The situation was made worse by the courts' interpretation that the Wagner Act of 1935 (see p. 490) forbade an employer even to talk to his workmen on the topic of labor relations and left him without redress against a union which broke its contract. In this period, the most aggressive labor leader was John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers. He called a strike in 1946 for various direct and hidden financial benefits. When the owners rejected a new contract negotiated largely on Lewis' terms by federal representatives, Washington seized the mines and granted Lewis' demands. Later in the same year Lewis called another strike, this time in violation of a legal injunction. But for this he was held in contempt of court and fined $10,000; the union was fined $3,500,000. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision in 1947 but reduced the union's fine to $700,000.

When the mid-term elections of 1946 resulted in a Republican majority in the Eightieth Congress, the way was cleared for a revision of the labor legislation. In 1947 Congress passed over Truman's veto the Taft-Hartley Act, which restored to employers some of the rights taken from them by the Wagner Act. The law allowed employers to sue contract-breaking unions, permitted them to talk to their employees on labor matters, outlawed the closed shop, forbade campaign contributions by unions, required union leaders to take an oath that they were not communists, and established a sixty-day prestrike "cooling-off" period. The Federal Government's example was followed by about thirty state legislatures that passed new labor laws holding the unions to greater responsibility.

The A.F. of L., the C.I.O., and the Truman Administration bitterly attacked the Taft-Hartley Act during the ensuing years.[3] In 1952, when the steel companies refused to grant a wage increase and other benefits demanded by the United Steel Workers, C.I.O., without a compensating increase in the price of steel, Truman ordered the Department of the Interior to seize the plants. Government attorneys justified the action on the ground that the Constitution placed no limit on the power of the President

[3] United States trade-union membership in 1947 was reported as 14,000,000 or 22.4 per cent of the labor force, as against 6.6 per cent in 1930.

to meet emergencies. But a federal district court and the Supreme Court declared the action unconstitutional. Thereafter a compromise was reached, with the unions getting most of their demands and the companies getting a price increase. The consumer paid for both.[4]

In the midst of foreign and domestic unrest and dissatisfaction there occurred the Presidential campaign of 1948. The Republicans again nominated Governor Dewey. The Democrats, apparently with considerable misgiving, renominated Truman. A group of Southern Democrats who were strongly opposed to many of Truman's "Fair Deal" proposals, and in particular to his insistence on civil-rights legislation in favor of minority groups, formed the States' Rights or Dixiecrat Party, which nominated Governor J. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina. Henry Wallace, favoring "coöperation" with the U.S.S.R. and vaguely promising a millennium to the "common man," headed a Progressive Party ticket. To the astonishment of newspapermen and other public-opinion "experts," Truman captured 303 electoral votes to 189 for Dewey, 39 for Thurmond, and none for Wallace. In popular votes Truman led Dewey by a little more than 2,000,000. The reasons for Truman's success were not clear, but the Republicans, taking victory for granted, did not really exert themselves during the campaign.[5]

The second Truman Administration was plagued by all the problems of the first plus increasing communist activity within the United States, mounting evidence of corruption in high places, and the Korean War. Aside from direct agents of Moscow, the communists in the United States appeared to be: restless youthful idealists who were rebellious against authority, and who uncritically accepted the high-sounding slogans and formulas which disguised the authoritarianism of the Reds; certain members of minority groups who resented real or fancied discrimination and hoped to reverse the situation in a general overturn; frustrated or maladjusted individuals who thought they had nothing to lose and much to gain from a social upheaval; social reformers who often seemed to have little

[4] The consumer also was the payer of inflated farm prices as the result of a policy of federal price support for agricultural products. From 1942, the government acted to keep farm prices at 90 per cent of parity, meaning at a price level to guarantee farmers a buying power approximately equal to that which they had enjoyed in the "normal" period 1909–1914. The government implemented the policy by becoming a purchaser of farm products whenever the guaranteed price was not reached in the market. By the end of 1951 the farm-support program had cost the tax-paying public more than $2,500,000,000.

[5] The Twenty-second Amendment to the Constitution, effective in 1951 but not applicable to Truman, made two terms the maximum for the Presidency. A person who served more than two years of an unexpired term might be reëlected for only one full term.

knowledge of actual conditions in the Soviet Union; material-minded individuals who wanted to achieve power by any means; and some who, because of moral or other weaknesses, could be blackmailed into coöperation with, and spying for, the Reds.

Whatever their reason for following the "party line," the communists served Moscow by subversive planning aimed at overthrowing the United States Government by force and, when they managed to get placed in positions of trust, by giving secret diplomatic, military, and atomic information to Soviet officials. To check this dangerous activity, Congress passed, over Truman's veto, the McCarran or Internal Security Act of 1950, amended in 1951. This law required communist organizations to register and submit membership lists, prohibited the employment of communists in defense work, and barred from entry into the United States any former member of a totalitarian organization—except those who were under sixteen at the time of joining or who joined solely to maintain their livelihood. The courts, while safeguarding every right of the accused, dealt firmly with proved communist conspirators, spies, and traitors. In 1949 eleven national communist leaders were convicted of conspiring against the government and sentenced to jail—a conviction which was upheld by the Supreme Court. Two citizens, man and wife, were sentenced to death in 1951, and executed in 1953, for espionage in giving secret information about the atom bomb to a Russian agent.

The growing concern of the people over the spread of communist influence was paralleled by indignation over official corruption. During 1950–1951 an investigating committee under Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee established a widespread interrelation among crime, politics, and government. It appeared that crime was organized along business lines on a nationwide scale, with immunity from prosecution assured by the "fixing" of public officials. In 1951 a committee under Senator James William Fulbright of Arkansas proved that a small group of persons in Washington, most of them close to the President, had sold their personal influence as "expediters" to gain political and financial favors for various clients. Other investigations, in 1951 and 1952, uncovered numerous instances of maladministration in the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Often these involved the acceptance of bribes to drop fraud prosecutions; sometimes they involved extortion under threat of prosecution. President Truman appeared unimpressed by many of the revelations and sometimes seemed to put personal loyalty to his appointees and associates above all other considerations.

Although the Congresses elected in 1948 and 1950 had a Democratic majority, they passed little of the legislation desired by the President. They

did raise the level of minimum wages, widen social-security benefits, and raise the President's salary. But they disregarded the Administration's request for such further Fair Deal legislation as socialized medicine, new federal power projects, a civil-rights program aimed chiefly at conditions in the South, broad federal aid to education, and repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act. And in the course of this period deficit financing and inflation continued, the "cold war" with Russia became warmer, and the Korean War became costlier in lives and goods. Thus was the stage set for the Presidential campaign of 1952.

The Republicans nominated General of the Army Dwight David Eisenhower, with Senator Richard Milhous Nixon of California as running mate. The Democrats, informed that Truman would not be a candidate for reëlection, eventually chose Governor Adlai Ewing Stevenson of Illinois and Senator John Sparkman of Alabama. The Republican platform endorsed collective security in world affairs while attacking the specific Truman conduct of the Korean War, advocated a balanced budget and gradual tax reduction, upheld support for farm prices, endorsed the Taft-Hartley Law, and emphasized states' rights in the matter of civil-rights legislation with federal intervention only in case of real need. Eisenhower himself promised, if elected, to visit the Korean battlefront. The Democratic platform endorsed all aspects of the New Deal and Fair Deal, called for repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act, and urged federal legislation to end racial discrimination. Truman campaigned strenuously on Stevenson's behalf, evidently to the latter's embarrassment and perhaps to his disadvantage.

Eisenhower won 442 electoral votes to 89 for Stevenson. The victor's plurality reached nearly 6,500,000 votes. The new Congress also went Republican, but by narrow margin. In December 1952 the President-Elect kept his promise to visit Korea. In January 1953 he was inaugurated, prefacing his address with prayer. John Foster Dulles, long active as expert on foreign affairs and advocate of the application of Christian principles to international relations, became Secretary of State. Thus ended twenty consecutive years of Democratic control in Washington.

LATIN AMERICA

The twenty nations of Latin America in 1953 had a total area of 7,700,000 square miles and a combined population of 162,000,000. They emerged from the Second World War virtually unscathed from the point of view of death and damage, and with a new diplomatic and economic importance in world affairs. In the United Nations they formed a sizable bloc and

generally were represented by able men. From 1948, they were bound, with the United States, in an Organization of American States (OAS) committed to the pacific settlement of disputes, mutual support in the event of armed attack, noninterference in one another's domestic affairs, and condemnation of totalitarianism.

On the economic side, postwar Latin America was an outstanding source of raw materials, customer for manufactured goods, and market for investments. At the end of 1952 United States investments in Latin America came close to the $6,000,000,000 mark. This same year saw the figure for trade between Latin America and the United States rise to nearly $7,000,000,000, the respective exports and imports being almost equal. The total foreign trade of Latin America was about double that with the United States. Brazil possessed one-fourth of the world's known iron ore and the largest single manganese reserve. Chile stood first in the world in copper and natural nitrate resources. Peru produced more vanadium and bismuth than any other country, and Venezuela came second only to the United States in oil output. Bolivia contributed almost 30 per cent of the world's tin. In return these lands and their neighbors purchased from abroad machinery, textiles, chemicals, automobiles, and electrical equipment. Despite these circumstances, the over-all standard of living in Latin America was not high. Inflation was general. The social pattern usually was one of a few very wealthy persons and many very poor people. The raw materials fluctuated widely in price from year to year. Several countries depended on the vagaries of a one-crop economy, such as sugar in the case of Cuba. And nationalism often allowed emotion to triumph over sound economic policy.

Political instability remained a characteristic of post-1945 life, as it had been in the prewar period. There were uneasy stirrings of democracy as a result of the gradually declining illiteracy, the increasing industrialization, and the emergence of a real middle class. But there also were fierce manifestations of nationalism, communism, and fascism—in a variety of combinations. Because the spirit of nationality was easily aroused and readily turned into antiforeign, especially anti-Yankee, channels, the communists frequently used nationalism as a cover for their subversive activities. The leader of communism in South America in 1954 appeared to be the Brazilian Luis Carlos Prestes. His Central American counterpart was the Mexican Vicente Lombardo Toledano. Greatest influence was enjoyed by the Reds in Guatemala, where the power and property of the United Fruit Company served as both target and bait in the leftist propaganda. Elsewhere a mixed nationalist-militarist sentiment expressed itself

in a vigorous fascism. This was especially true in Argentina. There General Juan Domingo Perón, after coming to prominence in a revolt in 1943, rose to the presidency in 1946—being reëlected in 1952 with the combined support of the army and the laborers. His particular form of totalitarian, but vaguely defined, national socialism came to be known as Peronism. With force and censorship as its chief weapons, its main stocks in trade were anti-Yankeeism, economic nationalism, and welfare services.[6]

Largest of the Latin American states was Brazil, a federal republic about one-tenth larger than continental United States. Its population was estimated in 1953 at 54,600,000, about half of whom could read and write. The constitution of 1946 empowered all literate men and women over 18 to vote for a president and a bicameral legislature. The Communist Party was outlawed in 1947. In 1951 President Getulio Dornelles Vargas assumed the presidency for five years after a free election; previously he had been dictator-president from 1930 to 1945. Argentina was second in size, being about one-third as large as the United States. Its inhabitants in 1953 numbered about 18,100,000, of whom 80 per cent were literate. The constitution of 1949 enfranchised women and provided for a popularly elected president with a six-year term. The country was striving for industrialization but in 1954 still existed under a basically agrarian economy. Perón nationalized the transportation facilities and adopted a five-year plan of economic development.

The United States of Mexico came second in population among the Latin American lands and third in area (764,000 square miles). About half of the 27,000,000 inhabitants were literate, and two-thirds of them were engaged in agriculture. President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines was elected for six years in 1952 by male suffrage under the constitution of 1917. His most noteworthy early achievement was the lessening of graft and corruption. Chile, with an area of 296,000 square miles and a population of almost 6,000,000, had a centralized government under a strong president elected for six years by all literate citizens over 21. Agriculture and the exportation of copper and nitrates were the chief sources of national income. Uruguay in 1951 amended its constitution to abolish the presidency and set up an executive National Council on the Swiss pattern. Six councillors were to represent the majority party and three the minority. The council chose its own presiding member, who had no more executive authority than his colleagues. With an area of 72,000 square miles and an estimated

[6] The welfare and health services were the special sphere of interest of Perón's wife, Evita. Throughout Latin America there was much improvement in health services, to a large extent with United Nations help.

population of 2,500,000, Uruguay had a literacy rate of 80 per cent, universal suffrage, an agrarian economy, advanced social legislation, and one of the highest living standards in the Western Hemisphere.

In 1954, as during many years before that date, Latin America remained a region of contrasts and conflicts, tensions and confusion, strong feelings and powerful traditions. All phases of public life, especially politics, were serious; and the battle for democracy had to be fought against a background of authoritarianism in family relationships, religion, and education. Organized military force and organized labor alternately coöperated with and were opposed to one another, and personalities rather than ideologies continued to play a dominant part in the national life. The two great challenges that still faced the twenty Latin American states after many decades of political independence were orderly domestic progress and hemispheric solidarity—in short, good neighborliness at home and abroad.

Bibliography

In view of the existence of numerous bibliographies, general and specific, on national and international events since the First World War, there seems little need to present here another extensive list. Hence this section will merely indicate some of the bibliographies, a few general reference works, and selected books relating to the individual chapters.

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